Книго

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     © Copyright Виктор Суворов
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     Copyright (C) 1982 by Viktor Suvorov
     Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
     Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
     Suvorov, Viktor. Inside the Soviet Army. Includes index.
     1. Soviet Union. Armiia. I. Title.
     UA770.S888 1983 355'.00947 82-22930
     10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
     Printed in the United States of America
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                               To Andrei Andreevich Vlasov


     Foreword by General Sir John Hackett
     Part I: The higher military leadership
     Why did the Soviet Tanks not threaten Romania?
     Why was the Warsaw Treaty Organisation set up later than NATO?
     The Bermuda Triangle
     Why does the system of higher military control appear complicated?
     Why is the make-up of the Defence Council kept secret?
     The Organisation of the Soviet Armed Forces
     High Commands in the Strategic Directions
     Part II: Types of armed services
     How the Red Army is divided in relation to its targets
     The Strategic Rocket Forces
     The National Air Defence Forces
     The Land Forces
     The Air Forces
     Why does the West consider Admiral Gorshkov a strong man?
     The Airborne Forces
     Military Intelligence and its Resources
     The Distorting Mirror
     Part III: Combat organisation
     The Division
     The Army
     The Front
     Why  are   there  20  Soviet  Divisions   in  Germany  but  only  5  in
Czechoslovakia?
     The Organisation of the South-Western Strategic Direction
     Part IV: Mobilisation
     Types of Division
     The Invisible Divisions
     Why is a Military District commanded by a Colonel-General in peacetime,
but only by a Major-General in wartime?
     The System for Evacuating the Politburo from the Kremlin
     Part V: Strategy and tactics
     The Axe Theory
     The Strategic Offensive
     "Operation Detente"
     Tactics
     Rear Supplies
     Part VI: Equipment
     What sort of weapons?
     Learning from Mistakes
     When will we be able to dispense with the tank?
     The Flying Tank
     The Most Important Weapon
     Why are Anti-tank Guns not self-propelled?
     The Favourite Weapon
     Why do Calibres vary?
     Secrets, Secrets, Secrets
     How much does all this cost?
     Copying Weapons
     Part VII: The soldier's lot
     Building Up
     How to avoid being called up
     If you can't, we'll teach you; if you don't want to, we'll make you
     1,441 Minutes
     Day after day
     Why does a soldier need to read a map?
     The Training of Sergeants
     The Corrective System
     Part VIII: The officer's path
     How to control them?
     How much do you drink in your spare time?
     Drop in, and we'll have a chat
     Who becomes a Soviet officer and why?
     Higher Military Training Colleges
     Duties and Military Ranks
     Military Academies
     Generals
     Conclusion
     Index
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     The book,  

Inside the Soviet Army

, is written under the name of "Viktor
Suvorov." As a defector, under sentence  of death in  the  USSR,  the author
does not  use his own name and has chosen instead that of  one  of  the most
famous  of Russian  generals.  This is  a  book  that  should  command  wide
attention, not only in the armed  forces  of the  free world,  but among the
general public  as well. It  is an account  of the  structure,  composition,
operational  method,  and  general  outlook  of the Soviet  military  in the
context of the Communist regime in the USSR and  the party's total dominion,
not  only  over the  Soviet Union,  but over the client states of the Warsaw
Pact as well.
     The book  starts with a survey of the higher military leadership and an
analysis of the types  of  armed services, and of the organization of Soviet
Army  formation.  An examination of  the Red Army's mobilization system that
follows is of particular interest. The chapters that follow on strategy  and
tactics  and  on  equipment  are  also  of  high  interest.  The  first,  on
operational method, emphasizes  the supreme importance  attached  in  Soviet
military  thinking to  the offensive and the swift  exploitation of success.
Defensive action is hardly studied at all except as an aspect of attack. The
second, on equipment, examines Soviet insistence on simplicity in design and
shows  how  equipment  of  high  technical  complexity  (the T-72 tank,  for
instance) is  also developed in another form,  radically simplified in  what
the author calls "the monkey model,"  for swift wartime production. The last
two chapters on  "The Soldiers' Lot" and "The Officer's Role" will be  found
by many to be the most valuable  and  revealing of the whole  book.  We have
here not so much a description of  what the  Red  Army  

looks

  like from the
outside, but what it 

feels

 like inside.
     This book is based on the author's fifteen  years of regular service in
the Soviet Army, in troop command and on  the staff,  which included command
of a motor  rifle company in  the invasion of  Czechoslovakia in 1968. About
this  he  has  written  another book, 

The Liberators

,  which  is a  spirited
account of  life  in the Red Army,  highly informative in a painless sort of
way and often very funny. There is rather less to laugh at in this book than
in that one: Viktor Suvorov writes here in deadly earnest.
     There  is no doubt  at  all of the author's right to claim unquestioned
authority on matters which he, as  a junior  officer,  could be expected  to
know about  at firsthand and  in  great detail.  Nevertheless,  not everyone
would  agree  with everything  he has to  say. Though I know  him personally
rather well,  Viktor Suvorov is  aware that I  cannot  myself go all the way
with him in some of his arguments and I am sometimes bound to wonder whether
he is always interpreting the evidence correctly.
     Having said  this, however, I hasten to add something that  seems to be
of overriding  importance. The value of this book, which in my view is high,
derives as much from its apparent weaknesses  as  from  its  clearly evident
strengths--and  perhaps even more. The  author  is a young,  highly  trained
professional officer with very considerable troop service behind him as well
as staff  training. He went through  the  Frunze Military Academy  (to which
almost all  the  Red Army's elite officers  are  sent)  and  was  thereafter
employed as  a staff  officer. He  tells  the reader how he,  being what  he
is--that is  to  say,  a  product of  the  Soviet  Army  and  the society it
serves--judges  the military  machine  created in  the  Soviet  Union  under
Marxism-Leninism, and how he responded to it. He found that he could take no
more of the  inefficiency,  corruption,  and blatant dishonesty of  a regime
which claimed to represent its people, but had slaughtered millions of  them
to sustain its own absolute supremacy.
     It would be  unwise  to  suppose that what  is  found in  this  book is
peculiar only to the visions and opinions of one young officer who might not
necessarily be typical of  the group as  a  whole. It  might be sensible  to
suppose  that if this is the  way the scene has been observed, analyzed, and
reported  on  by  one  Red Army officer of  his generation, there is a  high
probability that others, and probably very many  others, would see things in
much the  same way. Where he  may seem to some readers to get it wrong, both
in his conclusion about his own army and his opinions on military matters in
the  Western world, he  is almost  certainly  representing views very widely
held in  his own  service.  Thus,  it is  just as  important to take note of
points upon  which  the reader may think  the author is mistaken as it is to
profit from his observation on those parts  of the scene which he is  almost
uniquely fitted to judge.
     This  book should  not,  therefore,  be  regarded as no  more  than  an
argument deployed  in a debate,  to  be  judged on  whether  the argument is
thought to  be  wrong  or  right. Its high  importance  lies far more in the
disclosure  of  what Soviet  officers  are taught  and how  they think. This
window opened  into  the armed forces  of  the  Soviet Union  is,  up to the
present  time,  unique  of its kind,  as far  as I am  aware. Every  serving
officer in the Western world should  read it, whether he agrees with what he
reads or not,  and particularly if he does  not. All politicians should read
it, and so should any member of the public who takes seriously the threat of
a third  world  war and wonders about  the  makeup  and outlook of the armed
forces in the free world's main adversary.
     --General Sir John Hackett
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     It looked as  though  the  soldiers had laid a very  large,  very heavy
carpet at the bottom of the wooded  ravine. A group of us, infantry and tank
officers,  looked  at  their  work  from  a  slope  high  above   them  with
astonishment,  exchanging  wild  ideas  about  the function  of the dappled,
greyish-green carpet, which gleamed dully in the sun.
     `It's  a   container  for  diesel  fuel,'  said  the  commander  of   a
reconnaissance party confidently, putting an end to the argument.
     He was  right.  When  the heavy sheeting, as large  as  the hull of  an
airship, was finally unfolded,  a number of grubby-looking soldiers  laid  a
network of field pipelines through our battalion position.
     All night  long they poured liquid  fuel into the container. Lazily and
unwillingly it became fatter, crushing bushes and young fir trees  under its
tremendous weight. Towards morning the container began  to  look like a very
long, flat, broad hot water bottle, made for some giant child. The resilient
surface was carefully draped  with camouflage nets. Sappers hung spirals  of
barbed wire  around the  ravine  and  a headquarters company  set  up  field
picquets to cover the approaches.
     In  a neighbouring  ravine the filling of another  equally  large  fuel
container  was  in  progress.  Beyond  a stream,  in a depression,  worn-out
reservists  were slowly  spreading out  a  second  huge  canopy.  Struggling
through bogs and clearings, covered from head to foot  in  mud, the soldiers
pulled  and  heaved at an endless web of  field  pipelines. Their faces were
black,  like  photographs  negatives,  and  this  made   their  teeth   seem
unnaturally white  when they showed them, in their enjoyment  of obscenities
so monstrous that they made their young reserve officer blush.
     This whole affair was described, briefly, as "Rear Units Exercise". But
we could see what was going on  with our own eyes and we realised that  this
was more than an exercise. It was all too serious. On too large a scale. Too
unusual. Too risky. Was it likely that they would amass such enormous stocks
of tank fuel and ammunition, or build thousands of underground command posts
communications centres, depots and stores on the very borders of the country
just for an exercise?
     The stifling summer of  1968 had begun. Everyone realised quite clearly
that the sultriness and tension in the air could suddenly turn into a summer
storm. We could  only guess when  and where this would happen.  It was quite
clear  that our forces would invade Romania but  whether they would also  go
into Czechoslovakia was a matter for speculation.
     The liberation of Romania  would be a joy-ride. Her maize fields suited
our tanks admirably. Czechoslovakia was another matter. Forests and mountain
passes are not good terrain for tanks.
     The Romanian army had always been the weakest in Eastern Europe and had
the  oldest  equipment.  But   in  Czechoslovakia   things  would  be   more
complicated. In  1968 her army was the strongest in Eastern  Europe. Romania
had not even a theoretical hope of help from the West, for  it had no common
frontier with the countries of NATO. But in  Czechoslovakia,  in addition to
Czech tank divisions,  we  risked  meeting American, West  German,  British,
Belgian, Dutch and possibly French divisions. A world war might break out in
Czechoslovakia but there was no such risk in Romania.
     So,  although  preparations  were  being  made  for  the liberation  of
Romania, we  clearly would  not  go into  Czechoslovakia.  The risk was  too
great....

     For some reason, though, despite  all our  calculations and in the face
of all common sense, they did  send  us  into Czechoslovakia. Never mind, we
reassured  ourselves--we'll  deal  with Dubcek and then  we'll get around to
Ceaucescu. First of all we'll make the Czech people happy and then it'll  be
the turn of the Romanians.
     But for some reason it never was....
     Elementary  logic  suggested that it was essential to  liberate Romania
and to do so immediately.  The reasons for acting with  lightning speed were
entirely convincing. Ceaucescu  had  denounced  our  valiant  performance in
Czechoslovakia  as  aggression.  Then  Romania announced  that henceforth no
exercises by Warsaw Pact  countries might be held on her territory. Next she
declared that she was a  neutral country  and that in the event  of a war in
Europe she  would decide for herself whether to enter the  war or not and if
so on which side. After this she vetoed a proposal for the construction of a
railway line which was to have  crossed her territory  in order to  link the
Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Each year, too, Romania would  reject suggestions
by  the  Soviet  Union  that  she  should increase  her  involvement  in the
activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
     Then  there  was  a  truly   scandalous  occurrence.  Soviet   military
intelligence  reported  that Israel  was in great need  of  spare  parts for
Soviet-built tanks, which  had been captured in  Sinai, and that Romania was
secretly supplying these spare parts. Hearing of this, the commander of  our
regiment, without  waiting for  instructions, ordered that a start should be
made  with  bringing equipment out of mothballing. He  assumed that the last
hour  had struck for  the stubborn  Romanians. It turned  out to be his last
hour that  had  come. He was  rapidly relieved of his command, the equipment
was put back in storage and the regiment fell back into a deep sleep.
     Things  became   even  worse.   The  Romanians  bought   some  military
helicopters  from France. These were of great  interest  to  Soviet military
intelligence, but our Romanian allies would not allow our experts to examine
them,  even from  a  distance. Some of the more hawkish generals  and  their
juniors still  believed that  the Soviet  leadership would change their mind
and that Romania would be liberated or at least given a good fright by troop
movements  of  a  scale befitting a super-power along  her  borders. But the
majority of officers had already  given Romania up as a bad job.  We had got
used to the  idea that Romania  was allowed to do anything that  she  liked,
that she could take any liberties she pleased. The  Romanians could exchange
embraces with  our  arch-enemies  the  Chinese,  they could  hold their  own
opinions and they could make open criticisms of our own beloved leadership.
     We began to  wonder why the slightest piece of disobedience or evidence
of free thinking was  crushed with tanks in East Germany, in Czechoslovakia,
in Hungary or  inside  the Soviet Union itself,  but not in Romania. Why was
the Soviet Union ready to  risk annihilation in a nuclear holocaust in order
to save far-off  Cuba but not prepared to try to keep Romania under control?
Why, although  they  had  given  assurances  of their  loyalty to the Warsaw
Treaty, were the Czech  leaders  immediately dismissed, while the  rulers of
Romania were allowed to shed their yoke  without complications of any  sort?
What made Romania an exception? Why was she forgiven for everything?

     Many  explanations  are  put  forward   for  the  behaviour  of  Soviet
Communists in the  international arena. The most popular is  that the Soviet
Union is, essentially, the old  Russian Empire--and an empire  must  grow. A
good theory. Simple and easy to understand. But it has one defect--it cannot
explain  the case of  Romania.  In fact,  none  of the popular theories  can
explain  why the Soviet rulers took  such  radically differing approaches to
the problems of  independence in Czechoslovakia  and  in Romania.  No single
theory can explain both  the intolerance which the Soviet leadership  showed
towards  the  gentle criticism  which  came from  Czechoslovakia  and  their
astonishing imperviousness to the furious abuse with  which Romania showered
them.
     If the Soviet Union is to be regarded as an empire, it is impossible to
understand  why it  does  not  try  to expand  south-eastwards,  towards the
fertile fields and vineyards of Romania. For a thousand years, possession of
the  Black  Sea straits  has been  the dream  of  Russian princes, tsars and
emperors.  The road to the straits lies through Romania. Why does the Soviet
Union leap into  wars for Vietnam  and Cambodia, risking collision with  the
greatest powers in the world and yet forget about Romania,  which lies right
under its nose?
     In fact the explanation  is very simple. The USSR  is not Russia or the
Russian Empire; it is not an empire at all. To believe that the Soviet Union
conforms  to  established   historical   standards  is   a  very   dangerous
simplification. Every empire has  expanded in its quest for new territories,
subjects  and  wealth.  The motivating force  of  the Soviet  Union is quite
different. The Soviet Union does not need new territory.  Soviet  Communists
have  slaughtered  scores  of  millions  of  their  own  peasants  and  have
nationalised their  land,  which  they  are unable to develop, even if  they
wished to. The Soviet Union  has no need  of  new slaves.  Soviet Communists
have  shot sixty  million of their  own subjects, thus  demonstrating  their
complete  inability  to rule  them.  They  cannot  rule or  even effectively
control  those who remain alive. Soviet Communists have no  need of  greater
wealth. They squander their own  limitless resources easily and freely. They
are ready to build huge  dams  in the deserts of Africa for next to nothing,
to give away their oil at the  expense of Soviet Industry, to pay  lavishly,
in  gold,  for  any   adventurous  scheme,  and  to  support  all  sorts  of
free-booters and  anarchists, no  matter what the cost,  even if this brings
ruination to their own people and to the national exchequer.
     Different stimuli and other driving forces are at work upon the  Soviet
Union in the international  arena. Herein lies  the  fundamental  difference
which  distinguishes it from all empires, including the old Russian version,
and here too lies the main danger.
     The Soviet  Communist  dictatorship, like any other  system,  seeks  to
preserve its own existence. To  do this it is forced to stamp out  any spark
of dissidence which appears,  either  on  its  own  territory  or beyond its
borders. A communist regime  cannot  feel  secure  so long as an example  of
another kind of life exists anywhere near  it, with  which its subjects  can
draw comparisons. It is for this reason that any form of Communism, not only
the Soviet  variety, is always at pains to  shut itself off from the rest of
the world,  with  a curtain, whether  this is made  of iron,  bamboo or some
other material.
     The frontiers of a state which has nationalised its  heavy industry and
collectivised  its  agriculture--which has,  in other  words, carried  out a
"socialist transformation"--are always  reminiscent of a concentration camp,
with  their  barbed wire,  watch-towers with searchlights and guard-dogs. No
Communist state can allow its slaves free movement across its frontiers.
     In  the world today there are millions of refugees. All of  them are in
flight from Communism. If  the Communists were to open their  frontiers, all
their slaves would flee. It is for this reason that  the Democratic Republic
of  Kampuchea has set up  millions  of traps  along  its borders--solely  to
prevent anyone from attempting  to  leave this Communist paradise. The  East
German Communists are  enemies of the Kampuchean  regime but they, too, have
installed the same sort of traps along their own  borders. But neither Asian
cunning  nor  German  orderliness  can  prevent  people  from  fleeing  from
Communism and  the Communist  leaders  are therefore faced  with the immense
problem of destroying the societies which might  capture the imagination  of
their people and beckon to them.
     Marx  was  right: the two systems cannot  co-exist.  And no  matter how
peace-loving Communists may be, they come unfailingly to the conclusion that
world revolution is inescapable.  They  must either annihilate capitalism or
be put to death by their own people.
     There    are   some   Communist   countries   which   are    considered
peace-loving--Albania,  Democratic  Kampuchea, Yugoslavia. But the  love  of
peace which these  countries affect is simply the product of their weakness.
They  are  not yet strong enough  to speak of  world  revolution, because of
their  internal or  external problems.  But regimes which can hardly be much
more self-confident  than  these, such as  Cuba, Vietnam  and  North  Korea,
quickly  plunge into  the  heroic  struggle to liberate other  countries, of
which they know nothing, from the yoke of capitalism.
     Communist China has  her own very clear belief  in the inevitability of
world  revolution. She has  shown her hand in Korea, in Vietnam, in Cambodia
and in  Africa. She  is still weak and therefore peace-loving, as the Soviet
Union was during its period of  industrialisation. But China, too, faces the
fundamental  problem of how to  keep her billion-strong  population from the
temptation to flee from the country. Traps along the borders, the jamming of
radio broadcasts,  almost  complete isolation--none of  these  produces  the
desired result and when China becomes an industrial and military super-power
she, too, will be forced to use  more radical measures. She has never ceased
to speak of world revolution.
     The  fact  that  Communists  of   different  countries  fight   between
themselves for the leading role in the world revolution is unimportant. What
is significant  is that all have the same goal:  if they cease to  pursue it
they are, in effect, committing suicide.
     `Our only  salvation  lies  in world revolution: either  we achieve  it
whatever  the sacrifices, or we  will be crushed by the petty  bourgeoisie,'
said Nikolay  Bukharin, the most liberal  and peace-loving member of Lenin's
Politburo. The  more  radical members  of the Communist  forum advocated  an
immediate  revolutionary  war  against  bourgeois  Europe. One of  them, Lev
Trotsky, founded  the  Red Army--the army of World Revolution. In  1920 this
army  tried to  force its way across Poland to revolutionary  Germany.  This
attempt  collapsed.  The world revolution has not taken place:  it  has been
disastrously delayed but sooner or later the Communists must either bring it
about or perish.

     To the Soviet Union Romania is an  opponent. An enemy. An obstinate and
unruly  neighbour.  To all intents and  purposes an  ally  of China  and  of
Israel. Yet not  a  single Soviet subject  dreams of  escaping to Romania or
aspires  to exchange Soviet life for the Romanian version. Therefore Romania
is not a dangerous enemy. Her existence does not threaten the foundations of
Soviet Communism, and this is why drastic  measures  have  never  been taken
against her.  However, the first  stirrings  of  democracy in Czechoslovakia
represented a potentially dangerous contagion for the  peoples of the Soviet
Union, just as the change of regime in Hungary  represented a very dangerous
example  for  them.  The  Soviet leaders understood quite clearly that  what
happened in East  Germany might also  happen in Esthonia, that what happened
in Czechoslovakia  might happen in the  Ukraine, and it was for this  reason
that Soviet tanks crushed  Hungarian students  so pitilessly  beneath  their
tracks.
     The  existence   of   Romania,  which,  while  it  may  be  unruly,  is
nevertheless a  typical Communist regime, with  its  cult  of a supreme  and
infallible leader, with  psychiatric  prisons, with  watch towers along  its
frontiers,  presents  no  threat  to  the  Soviet Union.  By  contrast,  the
existence  of Turkey,  where peasants  cultivate their  own land, is like  a
dangerous plague,  an  infection which might  spread into  Soviet territory.
This is why the Soviet Union does so much to destabilise the Turkish regime,
while doing nothing to unseat the unruly government in Romania.
     For the Communists any sort of freedom is dangerous, no matter where it
exists--in Sweden or  in El Salvador, in Canada or in Taiwan. For Communists
any  degree  of freedom  is dangerous--whether  it  is complete  or partial,
whether  it is economic, political or religious freedom. `We  will not spare
our forces in fighting for the victory of Communism:' these are the words of
Leonid Brezhnev. `To achieve  victory for Communism throughout the world, we
are prepared for any sacrifice:' these are  the words of Mao Tse-Tung.  They
also sound like the words  of fellow-thinkers.... For that is what they are.
Their philosophies are identical, although they belong to different branches
of the same  Mafia. Their philosophies  must be identical, for  neither  can
sleep soundly so long as there  is,  anywhere in the world, a  gleam of
freedom  which could  serve  as  a guiding  light  for those who  have  been
enslaved by the Communists.

     In the past every empire has been guided by the interests of the State,
of its economy, of its people  or at least of its ruling class. Empires came
to  a halt when  they saw insuperable obstacles or invincible  opposition in
their paths.  Empires came to a halt when further growth became dangerous or
economically undesirable. The Russian Empire, for example, sold Alaska for a
million dollars and its colonies in California  at  a similarly  cheap price
because  there  was no justification for retaining  these territories. Today
the Soviet Communists are squandering millions of dollars each  day in order
to hang on to Cuba. They cannot give it up, no matter what the cost  may be,
no matter what economic catastrophe may threaten them.
     Cuba is the outpost  of the world revolution in the western hemisphere.
To give  up Cuba would be  to give up world revolution and that would be the
equivalent of  suicide for Communism. The fangs  of Communism  turn inwards,
like  those of a python. If the Communists were to  set about swallowing the
world,  they would have  to swallow it whole. The  tragedy  is that, if they
should  want to stop, this would be impossible because  of their physiology.
If  the world should prove to be  too big for it, the python would die, with
gaping jaws, having buried  its sharp fangs in the soft surface, but lacking
the strength  to  withdraw them. It is not only the Soviet python  which  is
attempting to swallow the world but the  other  breeds of Communism, for all
are tied inescapably  to  pure Marxism,  and  thus to  the theory  of  world
revolution. The  pythons  may hiss and  bite one another but they are all of
one species.
     The Soviet Army, or  more accurately the Red  Army,  the Army  of World
Revolution, represents  the teeth of the most  dangerous but also the oldest
of the pythons, which began to swallow the  world by sinking  its fangs into
the surface and then realised just how big  the world  is  and how dangerous
for its stomach. But the python has not the strength to withdraw its fangs.
--------


     The  countries of the West set up  NATO  in 1949 but the  Warsaw Treaty
Organisation was created only  in 1955.  For the  Communists,  comparison of
these two dates makes  excellent propaganda for  consumption by hundreds  of
millions  of  gullible  souls.  Facts are  facts--the  West  put  together a
military  bloc while the  Communists simply took counter-measures--and there
was a long delay  before they even did  that.  Not only that, but the Soviet
Union and  its allies  have  come  forward repeatedly and persistently  with
proposals for breaking  up military  blocs both in Europe and throughout the
world. The countries of the  West have rejected these peace-loving proposals
almost unanimously.
     Let us  take the sincerity  of  the Communists at  face  value. Let  us
assume  that  they  do  not  want  war.  But, if  that is so,  the delay  in
establishing  a  military   alliance  of  Communist  states   contradicts  a
fundamental tenet of  Marxism:  `Workers of  the World Unite!' is  the chief
rallying cry of Marxism. Why did the workers of  the  countries  of  Eastern
Europe not hasten to unite in  an  alliance  against the bourgeoisie? Whence
such  disrespect  for  Marx?  How  did  it  happen  that the  Warsaw  Treaty
Organisation was  set up, not in accordance with the Communist Manifesto but
solely as a reaction to steps taken by the bourgeois countries--and then  so
belatedly?
     Strange though it may seem, there is no contradiction with pure Marxism
in this  case. But, in trying  to understand the aims  and structures of the
Warsaw Treaty  Organisation, the interrelationships within it and the  delay
in its establishment  (which at first sight is  inexplicable), we  shall not
immerse ourselves in theory nor attempt to follow  the intricate workings of
this unwieldy bureaucratic  organisation. If we study the fate of Marshal K.
K. Rokossovskiy we shall come to understand, if not everything, at least the
essentials.

     Konstantin  Konstantinovich  Rokossovskiy was born  in 1896 in the  old
Russian town of Velikiye Luki.  At eighteen he was called up by the  Russian
army. He spent the whole of the war  at the front,  first as a private, then
as  an NCO. In the  very  first days of the  Revolution he went over to  the
Communists and  joined  the  Red  Army.  He distinguished  himself  fighting
against both the Russian and Polish armies. He moved rapidly upwards, ending
the war in command of a regiment. After the war he commanded a brigade, then
a division and then a corps.
     At the time  of the Great Purge the Communists tortured  or shot  those
people  who had  miraculously  survived until then despite past  connections
with the  Russian government,  army,  police, diplomatic service,  church or
culture. Red Army  Corps Commander  Rokossovskiy  found  himself  among  the
millions of victims because of his service with the Russian army.
     During the investigations he underwent appalling  tortures. Nine of his
teeth  were  knocked  out,  three of  his  ribs  were broken, his  toes were
hammered flat. He was sentenced to death and spent more than three months in
the condemned cell.  There is testimony, including his own, that,  twice, at
least,  he  was subjected  to mock shootings,  being  led to  the  place  of
execution  at night, and made to stand at the edge of a grave as generals on
his right and left were shot, while he was `executed' with a blank cartridge
fired at the nape of his neck.
     On the eve of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy
was let out  of gaol  and given the rank of Major-General of Tank Forces and
command  of a  mechanised corps.  However,  the  charge  resulting from  his
service with the Russian army was not dropped and the death sentence was not
annulled.  `Take  command of  this mechanised corps, prisoner, and we'll see
about your death sentence later....'
     On  the second day of  the  war, Rokossovskiy's  9th  Mechanised  Corps
struck  an unexpected  and  powerful blow against  German tanks,  which were
breaking through in  the area of Rovno and Lutsk, at a moment when  the rest
of the Soviet forces were retreating  in panic. In a situation  of confusion
and disorganisation, Rokossovskiy showed calmness and courage in his defence
of the Soviet regime. He  managed to maintain the fighting efficiency of his
corps  and to make  several successful counter-attacks. On the twentieth day
of the  war he  was  promoted, becoming  Commander of  the 16th Army,  which
distinguished itself both in the battle of Smolensk  and, especially, in the
battle for Moscow, when,  for the first time in  the  course of the war, the
German  army  was  heavily  defeated.  During  the   battle  of   Stalingrad
Rokossovskiy commanded  the Don front,  which played  a decisive role in the
encirclement and complete destruction of the strongest German battle  group,
consisting of twenty-two divisions.
     During  the   battle  for  Kursk,  when   weather  conditions  put  the
contestants on equal terms, Rokossovskiy commanded  the Central Front, which
played a major part in smashing Hitler's last attempt to  achieve a decisive
success. Thereafter Rokossovskiy successfully commanded forces in operations
in Byelorussia, East Prussia, Eastern Pomerania and, finally, in Berlin.
     Stars rained upon Rokossovskiy. They fell on to his shoulder boards, on
to  his  chest and  around his neck.  In  1944  he  was  awarded the diamond
Marshal's  Star and a gold star to pin on his  chest. In 1945 he was awarded
both the Victory order, on  which sparkle no less than one hundred diamonds,
and a  second gold star. Stalin conferred the highest honour on Rokossovskiy
by giving him command of the Victory Parade on Red Square.
     But  what has  all this to do  with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation? The
fact  that,  immediately  after  the  war,  Stalin   sent   his   favourite,
Rokossovskiy, to Warsaw and  gave him  the title of Marshal of Poland to add
to his existing rank as  Marshal of the Soviet Union. In Warsaw Rokossovskiy
held  the posts of Minister of Defence, Deputy  President of the  Council of
Ministers and Member  of the Politburo of  the Polish Communist Party. Think
for a moment about the full  significance of this--a Marshal  of  the Soviet
Union as deputy to the head of the Polish government!
     In practice Rokossovskiy acted as military  governor of Poland,  senior
watchdog over the  Polish government and supervisor of the Polish Politburo.
As  all-powerful ruler  of  Poland,  Rokossovskiy  remained  a  favourite of
Stalin's, but a favourite who was under sentence of death,  a sentence which
was lifted only  after the death of Stalin in 1953. A favourite of this sort
could have been shot at any moment. But, even if the death sentence had been
lifted, would it have taken long to impose a new one?
     Now  let  us  see  the  situation  from  the  point   of  view  of  the
Generalissimo of the  Soviet Union,  J. V. Stalin. His subordinate in Warsaw
is Marshal of the  Soviet Union  Rokossovskiy. This subordinate carries  out
all  orders  unquestioningly,  accurately  and speedily.  Why  should Stalin
conclude a military alliance with him? Even to contemplate such a step would
show a flagrant  disregard for the  principles of subordination and would be
an offence in  itself. A  sergeant has no right to make an agreement  of any
kind with the soldiers under him or a general with his officers. In the same
way, a  Generalissimo  is not  entitled  to conclude alliances with  his own
Marshal. It  is the  right  and  duty of a  commander to give orders  and  a
subordinate is  bound to obey these orders.  Any other kind  of relationship
between  commanders  and  their  subordinates  is  entirely  forbidden.  The
relationship between Stalin and Rokossovskiy was  based  upon the  fact that
Stalin  gave  the  orders and  that  Rokossovskiy carried  them out  without
question.

     The  fact that he knew  no Polish did  not disturb Rokossovskiy in  the
slightest. In those glorious days not  a  single general in the Polish  army
spoke  Polish,  relying instead  on  interpreters  who  were  constantly  in
attendance.
     In Russia in 1917 a Polish  nobleman, Felix Dzerzhinskiy, established a
blood-stained organisation; this  was  the Cheka, the forerunner of the GPU,
NKVD,  MGB,  and KGB. Between 1939  and 1940 this organisation destroyed the
flower of  the Polish officer corps. During the war  a  new Polish army  was
formed in the Soviet Union. The  soldiers and junior  officers of this  army
were Poles, the senior officers and generals  were Soviets.  When  they were
transferred to  the  Polish army  the  Soviets received  joint Polish-Soviet
nationality and Polish military  ranks, while  remaining on the  strength of
the Soviet military hierarchy. Here is one case history from many thousands:
     Fyodor  Petrovich Polynin was born in  1906 in the province of Saratov.
He joined the Red  Army in 1928  and became a pilot. In 1938-39 he fought in
China with the forces of  Chiang Kai-Shek.  He used  a Chinese name and  was
given   Chinese  nationality.  Although  thus  a  Chinese  subject,  he  was
nevertheless made a `Hero of  the Soviet Union'.  He  returned to the Soviet
Union and  reverted to Soviet nationality. During the war  he  commanded the
13th  Bomber   Division   and  then  the   6th   Air  Army.   He   became  a
Lieutenant-General in  the Soviet  Air  Force.  In  1944 he became a  Polish
general. He never  learned Polish. He was made Commander of the Air Force of
sovereign, independent Poland.
     In 1946, while still holding this high position  in Poland, he received
the rank of `Colonel-General of the Air Force'. The Air Force concerned was,
of  course, the  Soviet one,  for Polynin  was also  a  Soviet General.  The
announcement that this rank had been awarded to the  officer  commanding the
Polish Air Force was signed by the President of the Council of  Ministers of
the USSR, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, J. V. Stalin.
     After  a  further short period in Poland, as  if  this was  an entirely
normal development,  Fedya Polynin resumed his Soviet rank and was given the
post of  Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet  Air Forces.  During
his  years in command of the Polish Air Force,  he learned not a single word
of Polish. Why should he bother to do so? His orders reached him from Moscow
in Russian and when he reported that they had been carried out he  did so in
Russian, too. None of his subordinates at the headquarters of the Polish Air
Force  spoke  Polish either,  so that there  was no  point in  learning  the
language.
     Once again, why  should Stalin conclude  a military alliance with Fedya
Polynin, if the latter was  no more than a subordinate of  Rokossovskiy, who
was himself subordinated to Stalin? Why set up a military alliance if a more
reliable and simpler line of direct command was already in existence?

     The  Polish Army,  which  was set up in 1943  on Soviet territory,  was
simply a part of the Red Army, headed by Soviet  commanders, and it did not,
of course,  recognise the Polish  government-in-exile in London. In 1944 the
Communists established  a  new `people's' government, a large  part of which
consisted  of   investigators  from  the  NKVD  and  from   Soviet  military
counterintelligence (SMERSH). However,  even after the `people's' government
had  been  established, the  Polish army did  not come  under  its  command,
remaining  a  part  of  the  Soviet Army.  After  the  war,  the  `people's'
government of Poland was quite simply not empowered to appoint the  generals
in the `Polish'  army or to promote or demote them. This was understandable,
since the generals were  also Soviet generals and posting them  would amount
to interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.
     There was  no  reason  why  the Soviet government  should have had  the
slightest intention of  setting up any kind of  Warsaw  Treaty, Consultative
Committee or other similarly non-functional superstructure.  No one needed a
treaty, since  the Polish army was  nothing more  than a part  of the Soviet
army,  and  the  Polish  government,  brought  up  to  strength with  Soviet
cut-throats and  bully boys, was not allowed to intervene in  the affairs of
the Polish army.
     Nevertheless, after the death of Stalin, the Soviet  government, headed
by  Marshal  of the Soviet Union Bulganin, decided  to conclude  an official
military agreement with the countries it was occupying. Communist propaganda
proclaimed, at the top of its voice, as it continues to do, that this was  a
voluntary agreement, made  between free countries. But a single example from
the  time  when the official  document  was  signed  is an indication of the
truth. The signatory for the Soviet Union was Marshal of the Soviet Union G.
K.  Zhukov, and for free, independent, popular, socialist Poland Marshal  of
the   Soviet   Union  Rokossovskiy,   assisted  by  Colonel-General  S.   G.
Poplavskiy--Rokossovskiy's deputy. Marshal of the Soviet Union Bulganin, who
was present at the  ceremony, took the opportunity to award  Colonel-General
Poplavskiy the  rank  of General of the  Army. You have, of  course, guessed
that Poplavskiy, who signed for Poland, was  also  a  Soviet general and the
subordinate of Marshals  Bulganin, Zhukov and Rokossovskiy. Within two years
Poplavskiy had  returned to  the  USSR  and become deputy to  the  Inspector
General of the Soviet Army. These were the sort of miracles which took place
in Warsaw, irrespective of the existence of the Warsaw Treaty. Rokossovskiy,
Poplavskiy, Polynin  and the others were compelled by Soviet  legislation to
carry out the  orders  which  reached them from  Moscow. The  Treaty neither
increased nor lessened Poland's dependence upon the USSR.
     However Poland is a special case. With other East European countries it
was much easier.  In  Czechoslovakia  there were reliable people like Ludwig
Svoboda, who neutralised the Czech army in 1948 and did so again in 1968. He
carried out the orders of  the USSR  promptly and to  the letter  and it was
therefore  not  necessary to  keep  a Soviet  Marshal  in Prague  holding  a
ministerial post  in  the  Czech  government. With the  other  East European
countries,  too, everything went well. During the  war all  of them had been
enemies of the USSR and it was therefore possible  to execute any  political
figure, general,  officer or  private soldier, at any given  moment  and  to
replace him with someone  more cooperative. The system worked perfectly; the
Soviet  ambassadors to the countries of Eastern Europe kept a  close eye  on
its  operation.  What sort  of ambassadors these were you can judge from the
fact  that  when  the  Warsaw  Treaty  was signed the  Soviet Ambassador  to
Hungary, for instance, was  Yuriy Andropov, who subsequently became head  of
the KGB.  It was  therefore understandable that  Hungary should  welcome the
treaty warmly and sign it with deep pleasure.
     Under  Stalin, Poland and  the other  countries of Eastern Europe  were
governed by a system  of open  dictatorship,  uncamouflaged in  any way. The
Warsaw Treaty  did  not exist for one simple reason--it was  not needed. All
decisions were taken  in  the Kremlin  and monitored  by  the  Kremlin.  The
Defence Ministers of the East  European countries were regarded as equal  in
status  to the Commanders of  Soviet Military Districts and  they came under
the direct command  of the Soviet Minister of  Defence. All appointments and
postings were decided  upon by the Kremlin.  The  Defence  Ministers of  the
`sovereign' states of Eastern Europe were either appointed from the ranks of
Soviet generals  or were `assisted' by Soviet military advisers. In  Romania
and Bulgaria, for instance,  one such  `adviser'  was Marshal  of the Soviet
Union Tolbukhin.  In  East  Germany  there was  Marshal  Zhukov  himself, in
Hungary Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. Each  adviser had at his disposal
at least one  tank army, several all-arms armies and special SMERSH punitive
detachments. To disregard his `advice' would be a very risky business.
     After Stalin's death the Soviet  leadership embarked on the process  of
`liberalisation'.  In  Eastern Europe  everything stayed as it was,  for all
that  happened was  that  the  Soviet government had decided  to conceal its
wolf's jaws behind  the  mask  of  a `voluntary' agreement,  after  the NATO
model.
     To  some  people   in   Eastern  Europe  it  really  seemed  as  though
dictatorship had come to an end and that the time for  a voluntary  military
agreement had arrived. But  they were quite wrong. Just  one  year after the
signing of this `voluntary' alliance the actions  of Soviet  tanks in Poland
and Hungary gave clear proof that everything  was still as it had been under
Stalin, except for some , cosmetic alterations.
     Communist  propaganda quite  deliberately blends two  concepts; that of
the military organisation in force in the Communist states of Eastern Europe
and that of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The military organisation of the
East European countries was set up immediately  <after> the Red Army arrived
on their  territories, in 1944 and 1945. In  some cases, for example  Poland
and Czechoslovakia,  military pro-Communist formations had  been established
even before the arrival of the Red Army.
     The armies of  East  European countries which  were set  up  by  Soviet
`military  advisers' were fully supervised  and  controlled from Moscow. The
military system which took shape was neither a multilateral organisation nor
a series of bilateral defensive treaties,  but was imposed,  forcibly, on  a
unilateral basis in the form in which it still exists.
     The Warsaw Treaty  Organisation  is  a  chimera, called into  being  to
camouflage  the tyranny  of  Soviet  Communism  in the  countries  under its
occupation in order to create an illusion of free will and corporate spirit.
Communist propaganda claims that it was  as a result of the establishment of
NATO that  the countries  of  Eastern Europe  came  together  in a  military
alliance. The truth  is that, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet
Union took full control of the armies of the countries which it had overrun,
long before  NATO  came into  existence.  It was many years later  that  the
Communists  decided  to conceal their mailed fist and attempt to present the
creation of NATO as the moment when the military framework of Eastern Europe
was set up.
     But the Communists  lacked  the  imagination  to establish this  purely
ornamental  organisation,  which  exists  solely  to  conceal grim  reality,
tactfully and with taste. During the Organisation's first thirteen years the
Ministers of  Defence of the sovereign  states, whether they were pro-Soviet
puppets or actual Soviet  generals and Marshals, were  subordinated  to  the
Commander-in-Chief,  who was appointed by the  Soviet government and who was
himself Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR. Thus, even in a legal sense,
the  Ministers   of  these  theoretically  sovereign  states  were  directly
subordinated to  a Soviet Minister's deputy.  After  the Czechoslovak affair
the similarly spurious Consultative Committee was set up.  In this committee
Ministers of Defence and Heads of State gather supposedly to talk  as equals
and allies.  But  this  is  pure play-acting. Everything  remains  as it was
several  decades  ago.  Decisions  are   still  made  in  the  Kremlin.  The
Consultative Committee takes no decisions for itself.
     Any  attempt  to  understand  the  complex  and  fanciful  structure of
committees and  staffs which  make up the Warsaw  Treaty  Organisation is  a
complete waste of  time.  It  is rather like  trying to  understand  how the
Supreme Soviet arrives at  its decisions or how the President of  the Soviet
Union governs the country--the nature of his authority and the extent of his
responsibilities.  You  know  before  you  start  that,  despite  its  great
complexity, the organisation  has absolutely no  reality. The Supreme Soviet
neither formulates policy nor takes decisions. It is purely decorative, like
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, there for show and nothing more. In the same
way, the  President  of the Soviet  Union  himself  does  nothing,  takes no
decisions,  and  has neither responsibilities  nor authority.  His  post was
devised solely to camouflage the absolute power  of the General Secretary of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
     The Warsaw Treaty Organisation, then, is a body of the same type as the
Supreme Soviet.  It is a showpiece  whose only  function is  to conceal  the
Kremlin's dictatorship. Its Consultative Committee was set up solely to hide
the fact  that all  decisions are taken  at  the  Headquarters of the Soviet
Army, on Gogol Boulevard in Moscow.  The function  of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Warsaw  Treaty Organisation is purely  decorative. Like the President
of the Soviet Union he is  without  authority. Although  he is still  listed
among the first deputies of the Soviet Minister of Defence, this is a legacy
of  the past,  and  is no more than an honour, for  he is remote  from  real
power.
     During  a  war, or  any  such undertaking  as  `Operation  Danube', the
`allied' divisions of the  Warsaw Treaty Organisation are integrated in  the
Soviet Armies. None of the East  European  countries has the right to set up
its  own Corps,  Armies or  Fronts.  They  have only divisions commanded  by
Soviet generals. In the  event of war, their Ministers  of Defence  would be
concerned  only with  the reinforcement, build-up and technical servicing of
their own divisions, which would operate as part of the United (that is  the
Soviet) Armed Forces.
     Lastly,  a  few  words  on  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  Warsaw Treaty
Organisation:  the  disbandment  of  all  military  blocs,  in   Europe  and
throughout the world. This is the real aspiration of  our Soviet `doves'. It
is based on a  very simple calculation. If NATO is  disbanded, the West will
have   been  neutralised,  once  and  for  all.  The  system  of  collective
self-defence of the  free countries will have ceased to exist. If the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation is disbanded at  the same  time, the USSR  loses nothing
except a cumbersome publicity machine. It will remain in complete control of
the  armies  of  its  `allies'.  The  military  organisation  will  survive,
untouched. All that will be  lost is the title itself and the organisation's
bureaucratic ramifications, which are needed by nobody.
     Let  us suppose,  for  example,  that  France should suddenly return to
NATO. Would  this be a change? Certainly--one of almost global significance.
Next,  let us  suppose  that Cuba  drops  its  `non-alignment' and joins the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation. What would this change? Absolutely nothing. Cuba
would remain as aggressive a pilot fish of the great shark as she is today.

     There are  millions of  people who  regard  NATO and the  Warsaw Treaty
Organisation  as identical  groupings. But to  equate these two  is  absurd,
because  the  Warsaw Treaty  Organisation has no real existence.  What  does
exist Soviet dictatorship and  this has no need to consult its allies. If it
is able to  do  so,  it  seizes  them by  the  throat;  if not it bides  its
time---Communists do  not  acknowledge any other type  of  relationship with
their associates.
     This is a truism,  something which is known to everyone, and yet, every
year, hundreds of books are published in  which the Soviet Army is described
as one of the forces  making up  the  Warsaw  Treaty Organisation.  This  is
nonsense. The  forces of the Warsaw  Treaty Organisation are a  part of  the
Soviet Army. The East  European countries are  equipped with Soviet weapons,
instructed in Soviet methods  at Soviet military academies and controlled by
Soviet `advisers'. It is true that some of the East European divisions would
be  glad to turn round and use their bayonets on the Moscow leadership.  But
there are Soviet divisions who  would be prepared to do this, too. Mutinies,
on Soviet ships and in Soviet divisions are far from rare.
     A situation in which Soviet propaganda stands the truth on its head and
yet  is  believed by the  whole world is by  no  means a new one. Before the
Second World War the Soviet Communists established an international union of
communist parties--the Comintern. In theory, the Soviet Communist  Party was
simply one  of the members  of this  organisation. In practice,  its leader,
Stalin,   was  able   to  cause  the  leader  of  the  Comintern,  Zinoviev,
theoretically  his superior, to be  removed  and shot.... Later,  during the
Great  Purge, he had  the leaders  of  fraternal communist parties  executed
without trial and without consequences to  himself.  Officially  the  Soviet
Communist  Party was a member of the Comintern,  but in  fact the  Comintern
itself was a  subsidiary organisation of the  Soviet Party.  The standing of
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is  exactly  similar.  Officially the  Soviet
Army is a member of  this organisation but in practice  the  organisation is
itself a part of the Soviet Army.  And  the fact that the Commander-in-Chief
of  the Warsaw  Treaty Organisation  is  an official  deputy  of  the Soviet
Minister of Defence is no coincidence.
     In the 1950s it was decided that a building should be erected in Moscow
to house the  staff  of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. But it was never put
up because nobody needed it--any more than they need the whole organisation.
The Soviet General Staff exists and this is  all that is  required to direct
both the Soviet Army and all its `younger brothers'.
--------


     A triangle is the strongest  and most  rigid geometric  figure. If  the
planks of a door which you have knocked together begin to warp, nail another
plank diagonally across them. This will divide your rectangular construction
into two triangles and the door will then have the necessary stability.
     The triangle has been used in engineering for a very long time. Look at
the Eiffel tower, at the metal framework of the  airship Hindenburg, or just
at  any  railway  bridge,  and  you will  see  that  each  of  these  is  an
amalgamation of  thousands of  triangles, which give  the structure rigidity
and stability.
     The  triangle is strong and  stable, not only  in  engineering  but  in
politics, too. Political  systems based  on division  of  power  and on  the
interplay of  three  balancing  forces have been the most  stable throughout
history. These  are the principles upon which the  Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics is built.
     Enormous problems and difficulties are said  to  lie before the  Soviet
Union.  But Soviet  leaders  have  always  been  confronted  by problems  of
considerable magnitude, from the very beginnings of Soviet power. Then, too,
the collapse of the regime was  thought to be  inevitable.  But  it survived
four  years of bloody  struggle against the  Russian  army;  it survived the
mutiny  of  the Baltic  fleet,  which had itself helped  to bring  about the
Revolution;  it  survived  the  mass  flight  of  the  intelligentsia,   the
opposition of the  peasants,  the massive blood-letting of the revolutionary
period,  the  Civil  War,  the  unprecedented  slaughter of  millions during
collectivisation, and endless bloody  purges.  It also withstood  diplomatic
isolation  and political blockade, the starvation  of  scores of millions of
those  it enslaves  and  an  unexpected onslaught  by 190  German divisions,
despite  the unwillingness of  many of its  own soldiers  to  fight for  its
interests.
     So one should not be in a hurry to bury the Soviet regime. It is still,
fairly firmly, on its feet. There are several reasons for its stability--the
scores of millions of corpses within its  foundations, disinterested Western
help, the reluctance of the free world  to defend its own freedom. But there
is  one  other most important  factor  which  gives the  Soviet  regime  its
internal stability--the triangular structure of the state.
     Only three forces are active in the Soviet political arena--the  Party,
the  Army and the  KGB. Each of these possesses enormous power, but  this is
exceeded by the combined strength of the other two. Each has  its own secret
organisation,  which  is  capable  of  reaching into  hostile countries  and
monitoring  developments  there.  The Party  has its  Control  Commission--a
secret organisation which has almost as much influence inside the country as
the KGB. The KGB is a grouping of many different secret departments, some of
which keep  an  eye  on  the Party. The Army has its own secret service--the
GRU--the most effective military intelligence service in the world.
     Each of these three forces is  hostile to  the others and has  certain,
not  unreasonable  pretensions to absolute  power but  its  initiatives will
always fail in the face of the combined opposition of the other two.
     Of the three,  the Party has the est resources for self-defence in
open conflict.  But it has  a strong  lever at its disposal--the appointment
and posting of all officials. Every general in the Army and every colonel in
the KGB takes up his post and is  promoted or demoted only with the approval
of the Administrative Department of the Central  Committee of  the Party. In
addition, the  Party controls all propaganda and ideological work and  it is
always the  Party which  decides  what  constitutes true  Marxism  and  what
represents  a deviation from its general  line.  Marxism can be  used  as an
additional weapon when it becomes necessary  to dismiss an unwanted official
from the KGB, the Army or  even the Party. The Party's right to nominate and
promote individuals is supported  by both the Army and the KGB. If the Party
were to lose this privilege to the KGB, the Army would be  in mortal danger.
If the Army  took  it  over,  the  KGB  would be  in  an  equally  dangerous
situation.  For  this  reason,  neither  of  them  objects  to  the  Party's
privilege--and  it  is  this  privilege  which  makes  the  Party  the  most
influential member of the triumvirate.
     The KGB is the craftiest member of this troika. It is able, whenever it
wishes,  to  recruit  a party  or a  military  leader as  its agent: if  the
official  refuses he can be destroyed by  a  compromise operation devised by
the KGB. The Party  remembers, only  too  clearly, how the KGB's predecessor
was  able to destroy  the entire Central Committee  during the course  of  a
single year. The Army, for its part,  remembers how, within the space of two
months,  the  same organisation was  able to  annihilate  all  its generals.
However, the secret power  of  the KGB and its cunning are  its weakness  as
well as  its strength. Both  the Party and the Army have a deep fear  of the
KGB and for this reason they keep  a very close eye on the behaviour  of its
leaders, changing them quickly and decisively, if this becomes necessary.
     The Army is potentially the most powerful of the three and therefore it
has  the  fewest rights. The Party  and the  KGB  know very  well  that,  if
Communism should collapse, they will  be  shot by their own countrymen,  but
that this will not happen to the Army. The Party and the KGB acknowledge the
might  of the  Army.  Without it their policies  could  not  be carried out,
either at home or abroad. The Party  and  the KGB keep the Army at a careful
distance, rather  as two  hunters  might  control a  captured  leopard  with
chains, from two different sides. The tautness of this chain is felt even at
regimental and battalion level. The Party has a political Commissar in every
detachment and the KGB a Special Department.

     This triangle of power represents a Bermuda Triangle for those who live
within it. The trio have long ago adopted the  rule that none of the legs of
this  tripod  may  extend  too far.  If this should  happen,  the  other two
immediately intervene, and chop off the excess.
     Let us look at an example of the way this  triangle of power functions.
Stalin died in 1953. Observers concluded unanimously that Beriya  would take
command--Beriya the chief inquisitor and head policeman. Who else was there?
Beriya, his  gang of ruffians, and  the whole of  his organisation  realised
that their  chance  to lead  had  arrived.  The  power  in  their hands  was
unbelievable. There was a special file on every senior party functionary and
every general and there  would be no  difficulty in putting any one  of them
before  a firing squad. It was this very power which  destroyed Beriya. Both
the  Army  and the Party  understood their  predicament.  This  brought them
together  and together they cut  off the head of  the chief executioner. The
most powerful  members of the security apparatus came to unpleasant ends and
their  whole  machine of  oppression was  held up  to  public ridicule.  The
propaganda organisation  of  the Party worked  overtime  to  explain  to the
country the crimes of Stalin and of his whole security apparatus.
     However, having  toppled Beriya  from  his pedestal, the Party began to
feel uncomfortable; here it was, face to face  with the captive leopard. The
NKVD had  released the chain it held around the animal's  neck and it sensed
freedom. The  inevitable  outcome was  that  the  Army  would  gobble up its
master. Marshal Zhukov acquired  extraordinary power, at home and abroad. He
demanded a fourth Gold Star of  a Hero of the Soviet  Union  (Stalin had had
only two and Beriya one). Perhaps  such outward  show  was unimportant,  but
Zhukov  also   demanded  the  removal  from  the  Army   of   all  political
commissars--he  was  trying  to  shake  off the  remaining chain.  The Party
realised that this could only end in disaster and that, without help, it was
quite unable to resist the Army's pressure. An urgent request for assistance
went  to  the KGB and, with  the  latter's  help,  Zhukov was dismissed. The
wartime Marshals followed him into the wilderness, and then the ranks of the
generals  and  of  military  intelligence  were  methodically  thinned.  The
military budget was  drastically reduced and purges  and cuts followed thick
and fast. These cost the Soviet Army 1,200,000 men,  many of them front-line
officers during the war.
     The KGB was still unable to  recover the stature it  had lost after the
fall of Beriya, and the Party began a new campaign of purges and of ridicule
against it. 1962 marked the  Party's triumph  over both the KGB, defeated at
the hands  of the Army, and the Army,  humiliated  with the help of the KGB;
with, finally, a second victory over the KGB won by the Party alone. The leg
of  the  tripod represented  by  the  Party  began  to extend to a dangerous
degree.
     But the triumph was short-lived. The theoretically impossible happened.
The two mortal enemies, the Army and the KGB, each deeply  aggrieved, united
against the Party. Their great strength  brought down the head of the Party,
Khrushchev, who fell  almost without a  sound. How could he  have  withstood
such a combination?
     The  era which  followed  his  fall  provided  ample  evidence  of  the
remarkable  inner  stability of  the triangular  structure even in the  most
critical  situations--Czechoslovakia,  internal  crises, economic  collapse,
Vietnam, Africa, Afghanistan. The regime has survived all these.
     The  Army has not  thrown itself upon the KGB,  nor has the KGB savaged
the Army. Both tolerate the presence of the Party, which they acknowledge as
an arbitrator or perhaps rather as a second in a duel, whose  help each side
tries to secure for itself.
     In the  centre of the triangle, or more  accurately, above  the centre,
sits the Politburo.  This organisation  should not be seen as the  summit of
the Party,  for it represents neutral territory, on  which the three  forces
gather to grapple with one another.
     Both the  Army and  the KGB are  equally represented  in the Politburo.
With  their agreement, the Party takes  the leading role; the  Party  bosses
restrain the others and act as peacemakers in the constant squabbles.
     The Politburo plays a decisive part in Soviet society. In effect it has
become a  substitute  for  God.  Portraits of  its members are on display in
every street and  square. It  has  the last  word in  the resolution  of any
problem,   at   home   or   abroad.   It  has  complete   power   in   every
field--legislative,     executive,    judicial,     military,     political,
administrative, even religious.
     Representing, as  it does, a fusion of  three  powers, the Politburo is
fully aware that  it  draws its own stability from each of these sources. It
can be compared to the seat of a  three-legged stool. If one of the  legs is
longer than the others, the stool will  fall over. The  same  will happen if
one of the legs is shorter than the others. For their own safety, therefore,
the members of the Politburo, whether they  come  from the Party, the KGB or
the  Army, do everything they can  to maintain  equilibrium.  The secret  of
Brezhnev's  survival lies in  his skill  in keeping the balance between  the
trio, restraining any two from combining against the third.
--------


     When  Western  specialists   talk  about  the  organisation  of  Soviet
regiments  and divisions, their explanations  are  simple and comprehensive.
The diagrams they draw, too, are simple.  At a single glance one can see who
is subordinated to whom. But,  once the  specialists begin talking about the
organisational system of  control at higher  levels, the picture becomes  so
complicated  that  no one can understand  it.  The  diagrams  explaining the
system of  higher  military  control  published in  the West  resemble those
showing the defences of a sizeable  bank  in Zurich  or Basle: square boxes,
lines,  circles,  intersections.  The uninitiated might  gain the impression
that there is dual control at the top--or, even worse, that there is no firm
hand and therefore complete anarchy.
     In  fact,  the control structure  from top  to bottom is simple  to the
point  of primitiveness.  Why,  then,  does it  seem  complicated to foreign
observers?  Simply  because they  study the Soviet Union  as  they would any
other foreign country; they try to explain everything which happens there in
language their readers can  understand, in generally accepted categories--in
other words, in the language of common sense. However, the Soviet Union is a
unique phenomenon,  which  cannot  be  understood  by  applying  a frame  of
reference  based on  experience  elsewhere. Only  3% of  arable land  in the
Soviet Union is in  the hands of private owners, and not a single tractor or
a kilogram  of fertiliser.  This  3% feeds practically the whole country. If
the private owners were  given another  1/2 % there would be no problem with
food  production. But the Communists prefer to  waste 400 tons of  gold each
year buying wheat abroad. Just  try to explain  this in normal common  sense
language.
     Thus, when examining the system of higher military control,  the reader
must not attempt to draw parallels with human society in other parts  of the
world. Remember  that Communists  have their  own logic, their own  brand of
common sense.

     Let us take a diagram explaining the system of higher military control,
drawn by some Western specialist on Soviet affairs,  and try to simplify it.
Among the maze  of criss-crossing lines we will try to pick out the outlines
of a pyramid of granite.
     Our  specialist  has, of course, shown  the President at the  very top,
with the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet next and then the  two chambers of
the Supreme Soviet. But the Party must  not be forgotten. So there, together
with the President,  are the  General Secretary of the Party, the Politburo,
and  the Central Committee.  Here there  is  disagreement among the  experts
about who should  be  shown higher  up the page  and  who lower--the General
Secretary or the President.
     Let  us  clarify  the picture.  Here  are  the  names of  past  General
Secretaries: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev. Try  to remember the names of the
Presidents of the Soviet  Union during the  periods when those three were in
power. Even the experts cannot remember. I have put other questions to these
experts. Why, when Stalin went  to meet the President of the United  States,
did he  not take the Soviet President with him? When the Cuban rocket crisis
was at its height and  Khrushchev discussed the fate of the world on the hot
line with the American President, why was it he who did this rather than the
Soviet  President?  Surely it was the two Presidents who should  have talked
the  matter  over? And why,  when  Brezhnev  talks  about missiles  with the
American President, does  he not give  the  Soviet  President a seat  at the
conference table?
     In   order  to  decide  which   of   the  two--President   or   General
Secretary--should  be  shown  at  the  top,  it   is  worth   recalling  the
relationship between  Stalin and his President,  Kalinin. Stalin gave orders
that  Kalinin's wife and  his closest  friends  should  be shot but  that it
should appear that the  President  himself had issued the order. One  Soviet
historian tells us  that, as he signed the  death sentence on his  own wife,
the President `wept from grief and powerlessness'.
     In  order to simplify our diagram, take  a red pencil and cross out the
Presidency. It  is  nothing  but  an  unnecessary ornament  which  leads  to
confusion. If  war  breaks  out,  no  future historian  will  remember  that
standing  by the side of the General Secretary  was some President  or other
now totally forgotten who was weeping from grief and powerlessness.
     As  well as the  Presidency,  cross out  the Praesidium  of the Supreme
Soviet and both of  its chambers. They are not  involved  in  any  way  with
either the government of  the country or the control  of its  armed  forces.
Judge for  yourself--this Soviet `parliament' meets twice a year for four or
five days and discusses thirty to forty questions  each day. Bearing in mind
that  the Deputies do not  overwork themselves, one can calculate the number
of minutes they spend on each question. The Soviet parliament has fifteen or
so  permanent committees  dealing  with such  questions  as  the  supply  of
consumer goods  (where to buy  lavatory paper) or  the provision of services
(how  to get taps mended). But none of these committees concerns itself with
the affairs of the armed forces, with the KGB, with military industry (which
provides employment  for twelve separate ministries), or  with prisons.  The
Soviet  parliament has never discussed the reasons why  Soviet forces are in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba or Afghanistan. During the Second World War it
did not meet once. Why should such  an organisation be included among  those
concerned with questions of higher military control?
     * Illustration
     Military and Political Infrastructure of the Soviet Union
     An example of Western misunderstanding. But who runs the country?
     But  this is not the  most important  point.  The Soviet parliament  is
nothing but  a  parasite. All  its decisions  are reached  unanimously.  The
nomination  of  a  new  President--unanimous.  The  removal and  ignominious
dismissal of his predecessor--also  unanimous. In reality, these nominations
and dismissals took  place many months  earlier. Parliament simply  ratifies
them  subsequently--and  unanimously.  When  Parliament  does  not meet  for
several years, nobody knows the reason and nothing  changes as a result.  If
all its members were tried as parasites and sent to prison  under Soviet law
nothing would change: Soviet  Presidents would continue to be appointed with
great ceremony  and chased from office in disgrace. According to Soviet law,
the  rank  of Marshal must  be conferred--and  removed--by  Parliament.  But
several  Marshals have been shot without any reference to  Parliament.  Just
try  and work  out how many Marshals  have  been appointed and how many shot
without the knowledge or consent of Parliament. And this did not only happen
during the Stalinist Terror.  It was  under Khrushchev  that  Marshal of the
Soviet Union  Beriya was  shot, that Marshal  Bulganin  was struck  off  the
pay-roll, that  eleven other Marshals  were dismissed from their posts.  All
this was done without the knowledge or consent of the Soviet Parliament.
     But,  you  will  say,  if  neither the  President nor  Parliament  does
anything  or is  responsible  for  anything  and  is there only  to  approve
any--absolutely any--decision unanimously, why  were their positions in  the
system ever created? The answer is, as camouflage.
     If all power were seen to rest entirely in  the hands of the Politburo,
this might offend both the Soviet people and the rest of the world. To avoid
this,  Soviet  propaganda  compiles   extremely  complicated  diagrams,   as
complicated as those  for a  perpetual  motion machine, which  its  inventor
purposely  makes  more and more intricate,  so that no one will realise that
hidden inside his brainchild there is a dwarf who is turning the wheels.
     It is a great pity that  many Western specialists, who know that during
the war  the Soviet President was not allowed to attend  the meetings of the
military leadership, nevertheless show him at the very top of their diagrams
just where he is said to be by Soviet propaganda.
     There is  one situation in  which the  Soviet  President can  become  a
person of importance,  and this has happened  only once in Soviet history. A
General Secretary decided that he should  be President as  well.  Naturally,
this was  done without an election of any sort.  The name  of this President
was--and is--Brezhnev.  However,  it is only  abroad that he is honoured  as
President. Everyone at home knows that `President' is completely meaningless
and calls him by  his real  title--General Secretary--which  has, of course,
the true ring of power.

     We have removed these useless embellishments from the diagram but  that
is not all we must do. Do not cross  out the Council of  Ministers, but move
them  to one side. Why?  you may ask. Is the Minister of Defence not subject
to the decisions  of the Council of  Ministers? That is  correct. He is not.
The Council  of  Ministers only has control over industry, which in the USSR
is  almost entirely military.  The Soviet  Union  uses  more cloth, of  much
better quality, for the production of parachutes than for the manufacture of
clothes for  260 million people. However, of  these  260 million,  very many
receive  military  uniforms, of  good quality; all that  is  left,  for  the
remainder, is material of appalling quality, and there is not enough even of
that.
     In the Soviet Union the number  of cars in private ownership is  lower,
per thousand  head  of  the population,  than  the total owned by  the black
inhabitants  of  South  Africa,  for  whose  freedom the  United  Nations is
fighting so fervently. But, against this, the number of tanks in the  Soviet
Union is greater than in the rest of the whole world put together.
     Twelve of the Ministries which the Council controls produce nothing but
military equipment. All the remainder (coal, steel production, energy, etc.)
work in the interests of those which produce arms.
     Thus,  the Council  of  Ministers  is,  essentially, a single  gigantic
economic organisation, supporting the Army. It is, therefore,  with  all its
military  and auxiliary industry, a  sort of subsidiary rear organisation of
the  Army.  It  possesses  colossal  power  over those  who produce military
equipment  but, against this, it has  not even the authority  to  send a new
doorman to one of the Soviet embassies abroad. This can  be done only by the
Party or, more accurately, by the Party's Central Committee.
--------


     By now much of our diagram has been simplified. The summit of power has
become  visible--the Politburo, in which  sit  representatives of the Party,
the KGB, and the Army.  Decisions taken  in the Politburo by the most senior
representatives  of  these  organisations are also  implemented by them. For
instance, when Afghanistan was suddenly invaded by the Army on the orders of
the  Politburo, the KGB removed unsuitable senior personnel, while the Party
arranged diversionary operations  and worked up propaganda campaigns at home
and abroad.
     The role of the Council of Ministers is important but not decisive. The
Council is responsible for increasing  military productivity, for the prompt
delivery to the forces of military  equipment, ammunition and fuel, for  the
uninterrupted  functioning of the  military industries  and of  the national
economy,  which  works  only  in support  of  the  military  industries  and
therefore in  the interests of the  Army. The  Chairman of the  Council will
certainly be present when decisions  on these subjects are taken but  as one
of  the members of the  Politburo,  working for the  interests of  the Army,
rather than as the head of the Council.
     What does  the highly secret organisation known  as the Defence Council
do  at  a  time  like  this?  Officially,  all  that  is  known  about  this
organisation is that it is  headed  by Brezhnev. The identities of the other
members of the Council are kept secret. What sort of organisation is it? Why
is its make-up given no publicity? Soviet propaganda  publishes the names of
the head of the KGB and of  his deputies, those of the  heads of ministries,
of the heads of all military research institutions, of  the Defence Minister
and of all his deputies. The  names of those responsible  for the production
of atomic warheads and for  missile programmes are officially known,  so are
those  of the head of the GRU and of the head of the disinformation service.
Why are the names of those who are responsible for overall decisions, at the
highest level of all, kept secret?
     Let us examine the  Defence Council from  two different points of view.
Firstly who sits  on such a council? Some  observers believe that it is made
up of the most prominent members  of the Politburo and the leading Marshals.
They are mistaken. These officials attend the Chief Military Council,  which
is subordinate to the Defence Council. The Defence Council is something more
than a  mixture of Marshals and Politburo members. What could be superior to
such a group? The answer is--members of the Politburo without any outsiders.
Not all the members: only the most influential.
     Secondly, what  is the position of  the Defence  Council  vis-a-vis the
Politburo--higher, the same or lower? If  the Defence Council had more power
than  the Politburo  its first  act  would  be  to  split up this  group  of
geriatrics, so that they would not  interfere. If  the Defence  Council were
equal in  power to the Politburo we should witness a dramatic battle between
these two giants,  for there is only  room for one  such organisation at the
top. A dictatorship cannot exist for  long when power  is shared between two
groups. Two dictators cannot co-exist. Perhaps, then, the Defence Council is
of slightly lower status than the Politburo? But there would be no place for
it in this  case, either. Directly below the Politburo is the Chief Military
Council, which links the Politburo with  the Army, serving  to bond the  two
together. Thus the Defence Council cannot be either inferior  or superior to
the  Politburo; nor can  it hold  an equal  position.  The  Defence  Council
exists, in  fact, within the Politburo itself. Its membership is kept secret
only because  it contains  no  one but  members of the Politburo and  it  is
considered undesirable to give  unnecessary emphasis  to the  absolute power
enjoyed by this organisation.
     Neither the Soviet Union nor its many vassal states contain  any  power
higher than or  independent  of the  Politburo. The  Politburo possesses all
legislative,  executive,  judicial,  administrative,  religious,  political,
economic and every other power. It  is unthinkable that such an organisation
should be prepared  to allow  any other  to take  decisions on the momentous
problems  produced  by Soviet  usurpations and  `adventures' throughout  the
world,  problems of war  and peace, of life  and  death. The  day  when  the
Politburo releases its hold will be its last. That day has not yet come....

     Many Western specialists believe the  Defence  Council to  be something
new,  created  by  Brezhnev.  But  nothing  changes  in  the  Soviet  Union,
especially in the  system  by which  it is  governed.  The system stabilised
itself long  ago and it is almost impossible  to  change it in any way. New,
decorative organisations can be devised  and added but changes to the  basic
structure of the Soviet Union are  out of the question. Khrushchev tried  to
introduce some and the system destroyed him. Brezhnev is wiser and he  makes
no  attempts  at  change.  He rules  with  the help of  a system  which  was
established  in the early  days of  Stalin and which has remained  unchanged
ever since.
     Only the labels change in  the USSR. The security organisation has been
known successively as the  VChK, GPU,  OGPU,  NKVD, NKGB, MGB, and KGB. Some
think that these services differed  from one another  in some way but it was
only their labels  which did so. The Party  has  been called the RKP(B), the
VKP(B), the KPSS. The Army began as the  Red Army,  then  became  the Soviet
Army and  its highest overall council has been successively  labelled  KVMD,
SNKMVD,  NKMVD, NKO,  NKVS,  MVS, and  MO, while remaining  one and the same
organisation.
     Exactly the same has  happened with the Defence Council. It changes its
name as a snake sheds its skin, painlessly. But it  is still the same snake.
In Lenin's day it was called the  Workers' and Peasants'  Defence Council or
simply  the  Defence Council,  then  the  Council  for  Labour  and Defence.
Subsequently, since its members all belonged to the Politburo, it became the
Military Commission of the Politburo.
     Immediately after the outbreak of war with Germany, the State Committee
for  Defence  was  established,  which,  entirely  legally  and  officially,
acquired  the  full  powers  of  the  President,  the  Supreme  Soviet,  the
Government, the Supreme Court, the Central Committee of the Party and of all
other authorities and  organisations.  The decisions of the State  Committee
for Defence  had  the force  of  martial law  and  were  mandatory  for  all
individuals and  organisations  including  the  Supreme  Commander, and  the
President. The State Committee for Defence had five members:
     Stalin--its President
     Molotov--his first deputy
     Malenkov--the head of the Party's bureaucracy
     Beriya--the head of the security organisation
     Voroshilov--the senior officer of the Army
     These five were the most influential  members of the Politburo, so that
the State Committee for Defence consisted not of the whole Politburo, but of
its  most  influential component parts. Take another look at its composition
and you will recognise our triangle. There are the Supreme Being,  his Right
Hand and,  below them, the triangle--Party, KGB,  Army. Note the  absence of
the President of the Soviet Union, Kalinin. He is a member of the Politburo,
but a purely nominal one. He possesses no power  and  there is therefore  no
place for him in an organisation which is omnipotent.
     Before the  war the same powerful  quintet existed inside the Politburo
but at that  time  they called themselves  simply the Military Commission of
the  Politburo. Then, too,  these five  were  all-powerful  but they  worked
discreetly behind the scenes, while the stage was occupied by the President,
the  Supreme  Soviet,  the  Government,  the  Central  Committee  and  other
decorative  but  superfluous  organisations  and individuals. When war began
nothing changed, except that the  quintet  took over the stage and were seen
in their true roles, deciding the fate of tens of millions of people.
     Naturally, this group did not allow power to slip from their grasp when
the  war ended;  they disappeared back  into the shadows, calling themselves
the Military Commission of the Politburo once again and pushing to the front
of the stage  a series  of  pitiable clowns and cowards who `wept from grief
and powerlessness' while this group slaughtered their nearest and dearest.
     The  Second  World  War  threw   up  a  group  of   brilliant  military
leaders--Zhukov, Rokossovskiy, Vasilevskiy, Konev, Yeremenko--but not one of
them  was allowed by  the  `big  five' to enter the sacred precincts of  the
State Committee for Defence. The Committee's members knew quite well that in
order  to retain power they must safeguard their privileges with great care.
For  this  reason,   throughout  the  war,  no  single  individual,  however
distinguished,  who was not  a member of the  Politburo, was admitted to the
Committee. All questions were decided  by the Politburo members who belonged
to the Committee and they were then discussed with Army representatives at a
lower  level, in the  Stavka, to  which both  Politburo members  and leading
Marshals belonged.
     Precisely  the same organisation exists today.  The Defence Council  is
yesterday's State Committee for Defence under another  name. Its  membership
is  drawn exclusively from the Politburo,  and then only from those with the
greatest power. It is they who take all decisions,  which are then discussed
at  the Chief Military Council  (otherwise  known  as  the  Stavka) which is
attended by members of the Politburo and by the leading Marshals.
     Brezhnev is the old wolf of the Politburo. His long period in power has
made  him  the equal  of Stalin.  One  can  see  why  he  is disinclined  to
experiment with the  system by which power over the Army  is  exercised.  He
follows  the  road which Stalin built, carefully adhering to the  rules laid
down by that experienced  old tyrant.  These are simple: essentially, before
you  sit  down at a table  with the Marshals  at the Chief  Military Council
decide everything with the Politburo at the  Defence Council. Brezhnev knows
that  any modification  of  these rules  would mean  that he must share  his
present unlimited powers with the  Marshals--and that this  is equivalent to
suicide. This is why the Defence Council--the highest institution within the
Soviet  dictatorship--consists  of  the  most  influential  members  of  the
Politburo and of no one else.
--------


     The  system  by  which  the  Soviet  Armed  Forces  are  controlled  is
simplified  to the greatest  possible extent. It is deliberately kept simple
in design,  just  like  every  Soviet  tank,  fighter  aircraft,  missile or
military plan. Soviet marshals and generals believe, not unreasonably, that,
in a war,  other  things  being equal,  it  is  the simpler  weapon, plan or
organisation which is more likely to succeed.
     Western specialists make a careful  study of the obscure  and intricate
lay-out  of  Soviet military  organisation, for they see  the Soviet Army as
being  similar to any other  national army. However, to any other army peace
represents  normality  and war an abnormal, temporary situation.  The Soviet
Army  (more  accurately  the Red  Army)  is  the  striking  force  of  world
revolution.  It  was brought into being to serve  the  world revolution and,
although  that revolution  has  not yet come,  the Soviet Army is poised and
waiting  for it, ready  to fan into  life  any  spark or ember which appears
anywhere in  the world, no matter what the consequences might be. Normality,
for the Soviet  Army, is a  revolutionary  war;  peace  is an  abnormal  and
temporary situation.
     In order to understand the structure of the military leadership  of the
Soviet Union, we must examine it as it exists in wartime. The same structure
is preserved in peacetime, although a variety of decorative features,  which
completely distort the true picture, are added as camouflage. Unfortunately,
most researchers do not attempt to distinguish the really important parts of
the  organisation  from  those  which are  completely  unnecessary and there
purely for show.
     We already  know  that  in wartime  the Soviet Union and  the countries
which it  dominates would  be ruled by the Defence Council, an  organisation
first  known as the  Workers' and  Peasants'  Defence  Council, next  as the
Labour and Defence Council and then as the State Committee for Defence.
     On this Council are  one representative each from the Party,  the Army,
and the KGB and two others who preside over these organisations--the General
Secretary and his closest associate. Until  his recent death the latter post
was held by Mikhail Suslov.
     The  Defence  Council possesses  unrestricted powers.  It functioned in
wartime  and has  been  preserved  in  peacetime with the  difference  that,
whereas during wartime it  worked openly  and  in full view, in peacetime it
functions from behind  the cover  offered  by  the President  of the  Soviet
Union,  the Supreme Soviet,  elections,  deputies,  public  prosecutors  and
similar irrelevancies. Their only  function is to  conceal  what is going on
behind the scenes.
     Directly  subordinate  to  the  Defence  Council  is  the  Headquarters
(Stavka) of the Supreme Commander, which is known in peacetime  as the Chief
Military  Council. To  it  belong  the  Supreme Commander  and  his  closest
deputies,  together  with  certain  members  of  the  Politburo. The Supreme
Commander is appointed by the Defence Council. He may be either the Minister
of  Defence, as was  the  case  with  Marshal  Timoshenko,  or  the  General
Secretary of the Party, as with Stalin, who also headed both the Stavka  and
the  civil  administration.  If  the Minister of  Defence is  not  appointed
Supreme  Commander  he becomes  First Deputy to the latter. The organisation
working for the Stavka is the General Staff, which prepares proposals, works
out the details of the Supreme Commander's instructions and supervises their
execution.

     In wartime, the armed forces of the USSR and of the countries under its
rule  are directed  by the Stavka  along two clearly differentiated lines of
control: the operational (fighting) and administrative (rear).
     

The line of operational subordination:

     Directly   subordinate    to   the    Supreme   Commander   are    five
Commanders-in-Chief  and  eight  Commanders.  The   Commanders-in-Chief  are
responsible for:
     The Western Strategic Direction
     The South-Western Strategic Direction
     The Far Eastern Strategic Direction
     The Strategic Rocket Forces
     The National Air Defence Forces
     The Commanders are responsible for:
     The Long-Range Air Force
     The Airborne Forces
     Military Transport Aviation
     The Northern Fleet
     Individual Front--Northern, Baltic, Trans-Caucasian and Turkestan.
     The Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction has under his
command four Fronts, one Group of Tank Armies and the Baltic Fleet,
     The Commander-in-Chief  of  the South-Western Strategic  Direction also
commands four Fronts, one Group of Tank Armies and the Black Sea Fleet.
     The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Far  Eastern  Strategic  Direction is
responsible for four Fronts and the Pacific Fleet.
     The  Fronts subordinated  to  the Strategic  Directions  and individual
Fronts, subordinated directly to the  Stavka, consist  of All-Arms, Tank and
Air Armies. The Armies are made up of Divisions. East European Divisions are
included in  Armies, which  can  be  commanded only by Soviet  generals. The
commanders of  East  European divisions are thus  subordinated  directly  to
Soviet command--to Army Commanders, then to Fronts, Strategic Directions and
ultimately  to the Defence Council--in  other words to the Soviet Politburo.
East European governments  can  therefore exert absolutely no influence over
the progress of military operations.
     

The line of administrative subordination:

     The First  Deputy of  the Minister  of Defence is  subordinated  to the
Supreme Commander.  At  present the post  is held by Marshal S. L.  Sokolov,
under  whom come four Commanders-in-Chief  (Air  Forces, Land  Forces, Naval
Forces,  Warsaw Treaty  Organisation) and  sixteen  Commanders  of  Military
Districts.
     The  Commanders-in-Chief  are  responsible  for  the  establishment  of
reserves, for bringing forces up to strength, re-equipment, supply of forces
engaged in  combat operations, development of new military  equipment, study
of combat  experience, training of personnel, etc. The Commander-in-Chief of
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has precisely these responsibilities but only
on  behalf  of the East European divisions  operating as  part of the United
(i.e.  Soviet)  forces.  He has full control  over  all  the  East  European
Ministries of Defence.  His  task is  to ensure that these  Ministries bring
their divisions up to strength, and to re-equip and supply them according to
schedule. In  wartime  he has  only a modest role.  It is  now clear why the
function of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is seen
in  the USSR as being a purely honorific  legacy  from the past, remote from
real power.
     Each of the sixteen Commanders  of Military  Districts is a territorial
functionary,  a  sort of  military  governor.  In questions  concerning  the
stability of Soviet authority in the territories entrusted to them, they are
responsible directly to the  Politburo (Defence Council), while  on subjects
concerning   the  administration   of  military  industries,  transport  and
mobilisation they are  subordinated to  the First  Deputy of the Minister of
Defence, through him to the Stavka and ultimately to the Defence Council.
     Troops acting  as  reserve  forces,  to  be used to  bring units  up to
strength, for re-equipment, etc.,  may be stationed in  the  territories  of
Military  Districts.  These  troops  are  subordinate,  not  to  operational
commanders but  to the  Military  District  Commanders, through them  to the
Commander-in-Chief,  to  the  First  Deputy  and  then to  the  Stavka.  For
instance, during war, on the territory of the  Urals Military District there
would  be  one  Air  Division (to  replace  losses),  one Tank  Army (Stavka
reserve), one Polish tank  division  (for re-equipment) and three battalions
of marine infantry (a new formation). These units will be subordinate to the
Commander of the Urals Military District and through him, as regards the Air
Division, to the Commander-in-Chief of  the Air  Forces, while the Tank Army
comes under the  Commander-in-Chief of Land  Forces,  the Polish division to
the Commander-in-Chief of the  Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the battalions
of  marine  infantry   to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Naval  Forces.  Each
Commander-in-Chief has  the  right  to  give orders to  the Commander  of  a
Military  District, but only in matters concerning sub-units subordinate  to
him. Because the complement of each Military District always consists mainly
of sub-units of  the Land Forces some Western observers have  the impression
that Military Districts are  subordinated to the Commanders-in-Chief of Land
Forces. But this is not so. The Commander of a  Military District  has  very
wide powers,  which  are  not in  any way  subject to  the  control  of  the
Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces. As soon as the Stavka decides to transfer
one or other  sub-unit to  an operational army,  the  sub-unit  ceases to be
controlled by  the line of administrative subordination and  comes under the
instructions of the operational commander.

     In  wartime the  system for controlling the Soviet Union, the countries
which it has occupied  and the entire united armed forces is stripped of the
whole of its unnecessary decorative superstructure. The division between the
operational and administrative lines of subordination then becomes apparent.
     In peacetime  the operational and administrative structures are blended
with one another;  this  produces a  misleading  appearance  of  complexity,
duplication and muddle. Despite this, the system  which  one can see clearly
in wartime  continues to function in peacetime. One simply needs to  look at
it carefully,  to distinguish  one  structure from  another  and  to  ignore
useless embellishments.
     But  is it possible to spot the summit of the edifice in peacetime--the
Defence  Council  and the  Stavka?  This  is quite simple.  Each year  on  7
November a  military parade takes  place on Red Square  in Moscow. The whole
military and political  leadership gathers in the  stands on top of  Lenin's
mausoleum. The position  of  each person  is clearly discernible. For such a
position,  for each place in  the  stands,  there  is a constant, savage but
silent struggle,  like that which  goes on in a  pack of wolves  for a place
closer to the leader, and then for the  leader's place itself. This jostling
for position has already continued for many decades  and each place has cost
too much blood for it to be surrendered without a battle.
     As is to be expected, the General Secretary and the Minister of Defence
stand shoulder to shoulder  in the centre of the tribune. To the left of the
General Secretary  are the  members  of the  Politburo, to the  right of the
Minister  of Defence  are the Marshals. The stands  on the mausoleum are the
only  place  where  the  members of  the  political  and military leadership
parade, each in the  position where he belongs. This is the only place where
each  individual  shows his retinue, his rivals and his  enemies, the  whole
country and the whole world how close he is to the centre  of power. You can
be sure that if the head of the KGB could  take his place by the side of the
General  Secretary he would  do so  immediately, but  this place  is  always
occupied  by a more influential individual--the Chief Ideologist. You can be
certain that  if the Commander-in-Chief  of the  Warsaw Treaty  Organisation
could move closer to the centre he would immediately do so, but the place he
is after is already occupied by the almighty Chief of the General Staff.
     On the  day after the parade you can  buy  a copy  of  

Pravda

 for three
kopeks and on the front page, immediately beneath  the masthead, you can see
a photograph of the entire political and military leadership.
     Take a red  pencil and  mark the General  Secretary  and the four other
members of the Politburo  standing closest to him.  These are the members of
the Defence Council. They run  the country.  It is to  them that hundreds of
millions are  enslaved, from  Havana  to  Ulan Bator.  It is they  who  will
control the fate of the hundreds of millions in their  power  when  the time
comes to `liberate' new peoples and new countries.
     Now, mark the General Secretary, the member of the Politburo closest to
him and the five Marshals nearest to him. This is the Stavka.
--------

     A platoon commander has three  or four, sometimes  five, sections under
his command.  It is pointless  to give him more than this. He would be quite
unable  to  exercise effective control over so large a  platoon. If you have
another, sixth, section  it would be  better to form two  platoons of  three
sections each.
     A company commander has three, four, or sometimes  five  platoons under
his command. There is no point in giving him more--he just could not control
them.
     This  system,  under which  each successive commander controls  between
three and five detachments, is used universally and at  all levels. A  Front
Commander, for instance,  directs  three or four and  sometimes five Armies.
And  it is at just this level that  the system breaks down. The Soviet  Army
has sixteen Military Districts and four Army Groups. In the event of all-out
war each District and each Army Group is able to form one Front from its own
resources. How, though, can the Stavka control twenty Fronts simultaneously?
Would it not be simpler to interpose a new intermediate link in the chain of
command, which would control  the operations of three or four and  sometimes
five Fronts?  In this way the  Stavka could be in immediate  control not  of
twenty  Fronts but of between three and five of the new  intermediate units.
Such an innovation would complete the whole balanced system of control, in a
logical fashion.
     In fact, intermediate control links  between the Stavka  and the Fronts
do  exist, but they are  given  no  publicity.  They are designated as  High
Commands  in  the  Strategic Directions. The first mention of  these command
links  occurred in the  Soviet military press in  1929. They were set up two
years later,  but their  existence was  kept secret  and was not referred to
officially. Immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War they were
officially brought into existence.
     During the first two weeks of the war, official announcements were made
about the  formation of  North-Western, Western  and South-Western Strategic
Directions.  Each Direction consisted of  between  three and five Fronts. At
the head of each Direction was a Commander-in-Chief, who was subordinated to
the Stavka.
     Just how  important  each of these High Commands were can  be judged by
looking  at   the  composition  of  the  Western  Strategic  Direction.  The
Commander-in-Chief  was Marshal of  the  Soviet Union S.  K. Timoshenko, who
held the  post  of Minister of Defence at the outbreak of war. The Political
Commissar  was  Politburo member N.  A.  Bulganin, one  of those  closest to
Stalin, who later became a Marshal of the  Soviet Union and President of the
Council of Ministers. The Chief of Staff was Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, the
pre-war Chief of the General Staff. The other  Strategic Directions also had
command  personnel of  approximately  the  same  calibre--all the posts were
occupied by Marshals or members of the Politburo.
     In 1942 a further High Command, the North Caucasus Strategic Direction,
was  established, incorporating  two  Fronts  and  the Black  Sea Fleet. Its
Commander-in-Chief was Marshal S. M. Budenniy.
     However it  was subsequently  decided  that no  further  steps in  this
direction should be  taken  for the  time being. The  High Commands  of  the
Strategic Directions  were abolished and the Stavka took over direct control
of the Fronts, which totalled  fifteen. However the idea of an  intermediate
link was not abandoned. Frequently throughout the war representatives of the
Stavka, usually Marshals Zhukov or  Vasilyevskiy, were detached to work with
those who were preparing large-scale operations and coordinating the work of
several  Fronts.  Among  the  most   brilliant  of  many  examples  of  such
coordinated efforts are the battles for Stalingrad and Kursk and the advance
into Byelorussia. What  amounted to a temporary grouping of Fronts, under  a
single command, was set up for each of these  operations.  A  system of this
sort  provided  greater  flexibility  and  justified  itself  completely  in
conditions in  which operations  were  being carried  out  against a  single
opponent. As soon as the decision had been taken to go to war with Japan, in
1945, the Far  Eastern  Strategic Direction was set up,  consisting of three
Fronts, one Fleet and the  armed forces of Mongolia. The  Commander-in-Chief
of the Direction was Marshal A. M. Vasilyevskiy.
     It is  interesting to  note that the  very existence of a  Far  Eastern
Strategic  Direction  with  its  own  High  Command  was  kept   secret.  As
camouflage,   Marshal  Vasilyevskiy's  headquarters  were  referred  to   as
`Colonel-General Vasilyev's Group'. Many officers, including  some generals,
among  them  all   the  division  and  corps  commanders,  had  no  idea  of
Vasilyevskiy's function,  supposing that  all the  Far  Eastern  Fronts were
directed from  Moscow,  by  the  Stavka.  The  fact  that he  had  acted  as
Commander-in-Chief was only  revealed by Vasilyevskiy after the advance into
Manchuria at the end of the war.
     The  High  Command of the  Far  Eastern  Strategic  Direction  was  not
abolished  at  the end  of the war  and no  official  instructions  for  its
disbandment were ever issued. All that happened was  that  from 1953 onwards
all  official mention  of it ceased. Does it exist  today?  Do High Commands
exist for other  Strategic Directions  or  would they be set up only  in the
event of war?
     They  exist--and  they   are  in  operation.  They  are  not  mentioned
officially, but no particular efforts are  made to  conceal their existence.
Let us  identify them. This is quite simple. In  the  Soviet  Army there are
sixteen Military Districts and four Army Groups. The senior  officer in each
District and each Army Group has the  designation  `Commander'. Only in  one
case, that of the  Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, is  he given the title
of `Commander-in-Chief'.  In the event of  war most Districts would be  made
into  Fronts.  But Fronts, too, are headed  only  by `Commanders'. The title
`Commander-in-Chief' is considerably senior to `Commander of a  Front'. In a
war the  number of troops available would increase many  times over. Platoon
commanders  would  take over  companies,  battalion  commanders  would  head
regiments and regimental commanders  would become  divisional commanders. In
this situation every officer might receive a higher rank; he would certainly
retain the one he already holds. A general who  in peacetime commands enough
troops  to  be entitled  to the designation `Commander-in-Chief' can  hardly
have his responsibilities  reduced to  those of a Front  Commander at a time
when  many  more troops are  being  placed  under  his  command.  If  during
peacetime the importance of his post is  so great, how  can it diminish when
war breaks out? Of course it cannot. And  a general whose peacetime title is
`Commander-in-Chief   of  the  GSFG'  will  retain   this  rank,  which   is
considerably higher than that of Front Commander.
     There can be no doubt that the organisation known  as the `Headquarters
of the GSFG' in peacetime  would become, not  a Front Headquarters,  but the
Headquarters of the Western Strategic Direction.
     It is  significant that, already in peacetime, the Headquarters of  the
GSFG controls two Tank Armies and one  Shock Army (essentially another  Tank
Army). For each Front can have only a  single Tank Army and in many cases it
does  not  have one  at  all. The presence  in  GSFG  of three  Tank  Armies
indicates that it has been decided to  deploy at least  three  Fronts in the
area covered  by  this  Direction. Is this sufficient? Yes, for in a war the
Commander-in-Chief of the  Western  Strategic Direction would have under his
command  not only all  the Soviet troops  in  East  Germany but all those in
Czechoslovakia  and  Poland,  together  with the  entire  complement of  the
German,  Czech  and Polish armed forces,  the  Soviet Baltic Fleet  and  the
Byelorussian  Military  District. This will be discussed in greater  detail.
For  the present it is sufficient to note that the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany is  an organisation which is  regarded  by the Soviet  leadership as
entirely different  from  any other  Group  of forces.  No  other  force--in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Cuba, Afghanistan or, earlier,  Austria or
China--has ever been headed by  a Commander-in-Chief. All these Groups  were
headed by a Commander.
     Let  us list  the  Generals  and Marshals who  have held  the  post  of
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany:
     Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the former Chief of the General Staff, who became
First Deputy to the  Supreme Commander  and subsequently Minister of Defence
and a member of the  Politburo, the only man in history to have been awarded
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union four times.
     Marshal  V.  D.  Sokolovskiy,  former  Chief  of Staff  of  the Western
Strategic Direction and later Chief of the General Staff.
     General  of  the  Army  V.  I.  Chuykov,  subsequently  a  Marshal  and
Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces.
     Marshal  A. A.  Grechko, later Minister  of Defence and a member of the
Politburo.
     Marshal M. V. Zakharov, later Chief of the General Staff.
     Marshal P. K. Koshevoy.
     General  of  the  Army  V. G.  Kulikov, later  a Marshal,  Chief of the
General Staff and then Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
     Only  one of this  galaxy rose no higher--Marshal  Koshevoy, who became
seriously ill. But to reach the  rank of Marshal is no mean achievement--and
it was in Germany that he received the rank of Marshal, at a time when other
Groups   of   forces  were  commanded   only   by  Lieutenant-Generals   and
Colonel-Generals. Thus Koshevoy, too, stands out from the crowd.
     One rule applied to all--anyone who held the post of Commander-in-Chief
of  the  GSFG was  either a Marshal already,  was promoted  to  this rank on
appointment  or was given  it shortly  afterwards. Nothing of this sort  has
occurred with other Groups of forces.
     The  GSFG  is  a  kind  of  springboard  to the  very highest  military
appointments.  Commanders  of other  groups have  never  achieved  such high
standing. Moreover even the Commanders-in-Chief of the Land Forces,  of  the
Air Forces,  Fleet,  Rocket  Troops  or  Air  Defence  have never  had  such
glittering  careers  or  such  future  prospects  as  those  who  have  been
Commanders-in-Chief in Germany.
     Surely this is  enough to indicate  that in wartime something  far more
powerful will  be set up on the  foundation represented  by the GSFG than in
the other, ordinary, Military Districts and Groups of forces?
     None  of  the  other Military  Districts  and  Groups  of  forces  have
Commanders-in-Chief--only Commanders. Does this mean that in peacetime there
are  no  Strategic Directions?  Not at  all. The Headquarters of the Western
Strategic  Direction  (HQ,  GSFG) is  hardly  concealed  at  all  while  the
existence of  the other Strategic Directions is only lightly camouflaged, as
was `Colonel-General  Vasilyev's Group'. But it is easy to see through  this
camouflage.
     It is  sufficient  to analyse the careers of those  commanding Military
Districts. One can then see that, for the  overwhelming majority, command of
a District  represents the  highest peak they  will reach. Those who advance
further are rare. In  some cases what  follows is  honourable  retirement to
posts such as Director of one Military  Academy or another or an Inspector's
post in the Ministry of Defence. Both these types of appointment are seen as
`elephants' graveyards'. They represent, in fact, the end of any real power.
     However one of the  sixteen  Military Districts is a  clear  exception.
None of its former Commanders  has ever left for an elephants' graveyard. On
the contrary--the Kiev Military District is a kind of doorway to power. Here
are the careers of all those who have commanded this District since the war:
     Colonel-General  A. A. Grechko became Commander-in-Chief of  GSFG and a
Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation, Minister of Defence and a member of the Politburo.
     General  of  the  Army  V.  I.  Chuykov--C-in-C GSFG,  Commander,  Kiev
Military District,  Marshal, C-in-C of Land  Forces  and Deputy  Minister of
Defence.
     Colonel-General  P.  K.  Koshevoy--First  Deputy  to  the C-in-C  GSFG,
Commander, Kiev Military District and General of  the Army, C-in-C GSFG, and
Marshal.
     General  of the Army I. I.  Yakubovskiy--C-in-C  GSFG, Commander,  Kiev
Military District, C-in-C of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and Marshal.
     Colonel-General V. G. Kulikov--Commander Kiev Military District, C-in-C
GSFG and General of  the  Army, Chief of the  General  Staff, C-in-C of  the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and Marshal.
     Colonel-General  G.  I.  Salmanov--Commander  Kiev  Military  District,
Commander of the Trans-Baykal Military District.
     Surprisingly,  as we have been following  the brilliant  careers of the
Commanders  of the  Kiev Military District,  we  have  come across some  old
friends, whom we met previously as C-in-C GSFG. Strangely, there has been an
interchange of Generals between  Wünsdorf and Kiev.  Those who  have gone to
Kiev have later gone to GSFG. Those who have reached  GSFG without going  to
Kiev  have done so later. However, a Commander of the Kiev Military District
does not see himself as junior to the C-in-C GSFG. The  journey from GSFG to
Kiev is not demotion and for many it has represented promotion. Chuykov, for
instance, was C-in-C GSFG as a General  and was made a Marshal when he moved
to Kiev.
     But perhaps the Kiev Military District is of greater numerical strength
than the others? Not at all--Byelorussia has more troops and the Far Eastern
Military District  has  more than  both  the  Kievan  and  Byelorussian  put
together. In territory  Kiev is one  of  the est of  the Districts. The
Siberian District is  sixty-seven times as large  and Moscow District is far
more  important.  But the  Commander of  the Moscow,  Siberian, Far Eastern,
Byelorussian  and  the  other Military Districts  cannot even dream  of  the
prospects which stretch  before Commanders in Kiev. In the last twenty years
not one of the Commanders of Moscow District has become a Marshal, while all
but one of those from Kiev have done so, the exception being the most recent
who is still young and who will certainly soon be promoted.
     Why  is there such a sharp  contrast between the Kievan and the fifteen
other Districts? Simply  because the  organisation  designated  Headquarters
Kiev Military District  is  in  fact  the Headquarters of  the South-Western
Strategic Direction, which  in the event of  war would take control not only
of  the troops  already on  its territory,  but  of those in  Sub-Carpathia,
Hungary (both Soviet and Hungarian) and  also the  entire  armed  forces  of
Romania and Bulgaria, with their fleets, and, finally, the Black Sea Fleet.
     While relations with China were good there were only two High  Commands
of Strategic Directions--the Western and the South-Western--but  as soon  as
the  relationship  deteriorated  the  Far  Eastern  Strategic  Direction was
reestablished. It encompasses the  Central Asian, Siberian, Trans-Baykal and
Far  Eastern Military Districts, part of the Pacific Fleet and the Mongolian
armed forces.  In peacetime the Headquarters of this Strategic Direction  is
merged with  that  of  the Trans-Baykal Military  District and is located in
Chita. Clearly this is a most convenient location,  occupying, as it does, a
central  position among  the  Military  Districts  bordering  on  China  and
protected by the buffer state of Mongolia.
--------


--------


     Over   the   centuries,  the  armed  forces  of  most  countries   have
traditionally been divided between land armies and fleets. In the  twentieth
century  the  third  category of  air forces  was added.  Each of the  armed
services is divided into different arms of service.  Thousands of years ago,
land forces  were  already  divided into infantry  and cavalry. Much  later,
artillery  detachments were  added, these  were  eventually  joined by  tank
forces, and so the process continued.
     Today's Red Army consists, unlike any other in the world, not of three,
but of five different Armed Services:
     The Strategic Rocket Forces
     The Land Forces
     The Air Defence Forces
     The Air Forces
     The Navy
     Each  of  these Services, with  the exception  of the Strategic  Rocket
Forces,  is made  up of different arms  of service. In the Land Forces there
are seven, in the Air Defence Forces three, in the  Air Forces three, and in
the Navy  six. The  Airborne Forces  constitute a  separate  arm of service,
which is not part of the complement of any of the main Services.
     In addition to these  Services  and their constituent arms of  service,
there are supporting arms of  service--engineers,  communications,  chemical
warfare and transport  troops  and others--which form part  of the different
Services and  their component  arms. In addition  there are  other  services
which support the  operations of the whole Red Army. There are fifteen or so
of  these but we will examine only the most important: military intelligence
and the disinformation service.

     At the head of each of the Armed Services  is a Commander-in-Chief. The
standing  of  these  Commanders-in-Chief varies.  Three  of  them--those  in
command  of  the Land Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy--are  no more than
administrative  heads.   They  are  responsible  for  the   improvement  and
development  of  their  Services,  and  for  ensuring  that  these are up to
strength  and  properly equipped. Two of the others--the Commanders-in-Chief
of the Rocket Forces and of the Air Defence Forces--are responsible not only
for administrative  questions but also for the operational control of  their
forces in action.
     The discrepancy  in the positions  of  Commanders-in-Chief results from
the fact that, in combat, the  Rocket Forces operate independently,  without
needing to work  with any  other  Service. In the same  way, the Air Defence
Forces operate  in  complete independence. The  Commanders-in-Chief of these
two Services are  subordinated directly  to  the Supreme Commander  and  are
fully responsible for their forces both in peacetime and in war.
     With  the  Land  Forces,  Air  Forces  and  Navy the situation is  more
complex. In their operations they need to  cooperate constantly and closely.
If any of these three should  decide to take independent action, the results
would  be  catastrophic.  For this  reason the Commanders-in-Chief of  these
`traditional' Services are deliberately denied the right to direct their own
forces in war. Their task is to supervise all aspects of the development and
equipment of their Services.
     Since the Land  Forces,  Air Forces and  Navy can only operate in close
conjunction, combined  command structures have been devised to  control them
independently of  their  Commanders-in-Chief.  We  have  already encountered
these combined  structures--they are the Fronts, which contain elements from
both Land and  Air  Armies, and the Strategic Directions  which  incorporate
Fronts and Fleets.
     The establishment  of  these combined command structures and of systems
of   combat   control,   which   are   not    subordinated   to   individual
Commanders-in-Chief, has made it possible  to  solve  most of  the  problems
which result from the rivalry  which has existed between  the  Services  for
centuries.
     Let us take the  case  of  a  Soviet general who is slowly climbing the
rungs of  his professional ladder. First he commands a motor-rifle division,
then he  becomes deputy to  the  Commander of  a  Tank  Army  (it is  normal
practice  to move officers from motor-rifle forces to tank forces  and  vice
versa) and next he becomes an Army Commander. Until now he has always been a
fierce champion of  the  interests of the  Land  Forces,  which  he supports
fervently. So far,  though, his position has been too lowly for his views to
be heard by anyone outside the Land Forces. But now he rises a little higher
and becomes Commander of a Front. He now has  both an operational  task, for
the fulfilment of which his  head is at stake, and the  forces with which to
carry  it  out--three  or   four   Land  Armies  and   one  Air  Army.   The
Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces supplies  his  Land  Armies with  all they
require, the Cbmmander-in-Chief of Air Forces  does  the  same  for his  Air
Army. But it is  the  Front Commander who is responsible for deciding how to
use these forces in combat. In this situation every Front Commander forgets,
as soon as he takes  over his  high post, that he is an infantry  or a  tank
general. He  has  to carry out his  operational task  and  for  this all his
Armies--Land and Air--must  be appropriately prepared  and supplied. If  the
Air Army is worse prepared and  supplied than the All-Arms and Tank  Armies,
the Front Commander will either immediately take steps  himself  to  restore
the balance or will call  on his  superiors  to do this. There  are  sixteen
Front Commanders in all. All of them are products  of  the  Land Forces, for
these provide the  basic strength  of each  Front,  but  they are in no  way
subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces in questions concerning
the use of  their resources. It is the Front Commanders who have the task of
directing their forces to victory. For this reason,  if the Land Forces were
to be increased at the expense  of the Air Forces, all  the Front Commanders
would protest immediately and sharply, despite their own  upbringing  in the
Land Forces.
     If our general should climb  still higher and become Commander-in-Chief
of a Strategic Direction, he will have a Fleet under his control, as well as
four Fronts, each of which contains a mixture of Land Forces and Air Forces.
     In wartime he will  be  responsible for combat operations covering huge
areas  and he is already  concerned, in  peacetime,  to  ensure that all the
forces under his command  develop  proportionately and  in balance  with one
another.  In this way yesterday's tank officer becomes an ardent champion of
the development not  only  of the Land Forces but of the  Air Forces and the
Navy.

     The Armed Services consist of arms of service. At the  head of each arm
of service  is a  Commander. However in  most cases  the latter  has  purely
administrative  functions.  For instance,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Land
Forces has as one of his subordinates the Commander of Tank Forces. But tens
of  thousands  of  tanks are  spread  throughout  the  world,  from Cuba  to
Sakhalin.  Every   reconnaissance  battalion  has   a  tank  platoon,  every
motor-rifle regiment has  a tank battalion, every motor-rifle division has a
tank regiment, every Army a tank division, every Front a Tank Army, and each
Strategic Direction has a Group of  Tank Armies. Naturally, decisions on the
use of  all these tanks in combat are taken by the combat commanders as  the
situation develops. The  Commander of Tank Forces is in no  position to play
any part in the control of each tank  unit, and any such  intervention would
be a violation of  the principle of  sole responsibility for the conduct and
results of combat operations. For this reason, the  Commander of Tank Forces
is strictly forbidden to intervene in  combat planning and in  questions  of
the  use  of  tanks in combat. His responsibilities cover the development of
new types  of  tank  and their  testing,  the supervision of the quality  of
production  of  tank  factories,  ensuring  that all  tank  detachments  are
supplied  with the  necessary spare parts and the training of specialists in
the  Tank Force Academies, in the five  Tank  High  Schools  and in training
divisions. He is  also responsible  for the technical  condition of tanks in
all the armed forces and acts as the inspector of all tank personnel.
     The  Commander of  the Rocket Forces and Artillery of the Land  Forces,
the Commander of  the Air Defence  of Land  Forces, the Commander  of  Fleet
Aviation and Commanders of other arms of service have similar administrative
roles.
     However there  are  exceptions to this  rule. It is possible that  some
arms of service may be  totally  (or almost  totally)  deployed  in a single
direction. The Commanders  of these arms of service have both administrative
and  combat roles. These arms of service include  the Air Forces' Long-Range
(strategic missile-carrying)  Aviation and Military  Transport Aviation  and
the  Airborne Forces.  In wartime,  and  on  questions concerning the use of
their  forces,  the Commanders  of these arms  of  service  are subordinated
directly to the Stavka.
--------


     The  Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are the newest  and  the est of
the five  Armed Services  which make up the  Soviet Army. They are  also the
most important component of that Army.
     The  SRF was established as an independent Service in December 1959. At
its head is a Commander-in-Chief  with the title of Marshal  of  the  Soviet
Union. Under his command are  three  Rocket Armies, three independent Rocket
Corps,  ten to twelve  Rocket divisions, three sizeable rocket ranges  and a
large  number of scientific research and teaching establishments. The  total
strength of the SRF is about half a million.
     The SRF  is both  an operational and an administrative organisation. In
peacetime its Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the  Minister of  Defence
on all administrative questions and to the Politburo  on all aspects  of the
operational use  of rockets. In  wartime the  SRF would be controlled by the
Defence Council, through the Supreme Commander. A final decision on the mass
use of  strategic rockets would  be made by  the  Defence  Council--i.e. the
Politburo.
     A Rocket Army consists of ten divisions. A  division is made up  of ten
regiments and a technical base.  A rocket regiment may have from one to  ten
launchers, depending on the type of rocket with  which  it  is  equipped.  A
strategic rocket regiment is the est in size of any in the Soviet Army.
Its fighting  strength is between 250 and 400 men,  depending on the type of
rocket with  which  it is  equipped. Its  basic  tasks are  to maintain  the
rockets, to  safeguard and defend them and to launch them. Organisationally,
a rocket regiment consists  of the  commander,  his  staff, five duty launch
teams, an emergency repair  battery and a  guard  company. This  sub-unit is
dignified with  the title  of  regiment  solely because  of  the  very great
responsibility which its officers bear.
     Each regiment has an underground command post in which there  is always
a duty team of officers with direct communication links with  the divisional
commander, the Army  commander,  the commander-in-chief of the SRF  and  the
Central  command  post.  If this underground post  goes  out  of action, the
commander of the regiment immediately deploys a mobile control point working
from  motor  vehicles. In  a  threatening situation  two  teams are  on duty
simultaneously--one  in  the  underground  command post and the  other at  a
mobile one--so that either could take over  the firing of all the regiment's
rockets.
     According to the situation, the duty teams at command posts are changed
either every week or every month.
     If a  launcher is damaged, it is dismantled by the regiment's emergency
repair battery. The guard company  is responsible for the  protection of the
command  posts and  of  the  launchers. A large proportion of the regiment's
personnel  are  involved in guard duties. Not one of them  will  have seen a
rocket  or know  anything  about one.  Their  job is  to guard  snow-covered
clearings in pine forests, clearings which  are surrounded by dozens of rows
of barbed wire and  defended  by minefields.  The guard company of a  rocket
regiment has fifty or so guard dogs.
     The principal task of a rocket division is the technical supply  of its
regiments. For  this, a  divisional commander has under him a sub-unit known
as a technical base, which has a complement of 3,000-4,000  and is commanded
by a colonel. The  technical base  carries  out the transport,  maintenance,
replacement, repair and servicing of the regiment's rockets.
     The strength of a rocket division is 7,000-8,000.
     The headquarters of each Rocket Army is responsible for coordination of
the operations  of  its divisions, which will be deployed  throughout a very
large area. In a  critical situation, the headquarters of a Rocket Army  may
make use of flying  command posts to  direct the firing  of  the  rockets of
regiments and divisions whose command posts have been put out of action. The
independent  Rocket  Corps are organised by  the Rocket  Armies, except that
they have three or four rather than ten  divisions. They are also armed with
comparatively short-range rockets (3,000-6,000  kilometres),  some  of which
are fired from mobile rather than from fixed underground launchers.
     The existence of  the rocket  corps is due to  the fact that while  the
three  Rocket  Armies  come  under  the exclusive  control  of  the  Supreme
Commander, they are needed to support the forces of the three main Strategic
Directions  and are  at the  disposal of  the Commanders-in-Chief  of  these
Directions. A whole Corps, or some of its divisions, can be  used in support
of advancing forces in any of the Directions.
     Separate    rocket    divisions,    subordinated   directly   to    the
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF,  form  his operational reserve. Some of these
divisions are  equipped with  particularly powerful rockets.  The rest  have
standard rockets and can be moved to any part  of the Soviet Union, in order
to reduce their vulnerability.

     The Strategic Rocket  Forces have a  much revered  father figure. If he
did  not exist  neither would the  SRF.  His name is  Fidel  Castro: you may
smile, but the SRF does not.
     The story behind this  is  as follows. In 1959 Castro and his  comrades
seized  power  in Cuba.  No one  in Washington  was alarmed  by this  and no
reaction  came  from  Moscow;  it  was  seen  as  a  routine  Latin American
coup-d'état. However  it  was not  long before Washington  became uneasy and
Moscow  began to show interest. The  Kremlin  saw  an  unexpected  chance to
loosen the hold of its hated enemy, capitalism,  on the  Western hemisphere.
This  was  obviously  an  excellent opportunity  but  one  which  it  seemed
impossible to exploit because of lack of strength on the spot. Hitherto, the
Soviet Union had been able to support allies of  this  sort with tanks.  But
how could it help Fidel Castro at  the other side of an ocean? At  that time
the  Soviet  Fleet could  not  dream of  trying to  take  on  the  US  Navy,
particularly on the  latter's  own doorstep. Strategic  aircraft existed but
only for parades and demonstrations of strength. How could the United States
be dissuaded from stepping in?
     There was a simple, brilliant solution--bluff.
     It was decided  to  make  use  of a weapon which  had not yet come into
service--what  Goebbels would have called  a `miracle weapon'. For a miracle
weapon  was  what  the  Politburo  employed.  Throughout  1959  there   were
top-priority  firings  of   Soviet  rockets  and   persistent   rumours   of
extraordinary successes. In  December  rumours began to circulate about new,
top-secret forces which were all-powerful,  highly  accurate,  invulnerable,
indestructible and so forth. These rumours were supported by the appointment
of Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin to a highly important position of some
sort,  with  promotion  to  Chief  Marshal  of Artillery.  In  January  1960
Khrushchev announced the  formation of  the  Strategic Rocket  Forces,  with
Nedelin at their head.  He followed this  with claims that nothing  would be
able  to  withstand these  forces,  that they could  reach any point  on the
globe, etc. Talking to journalists, Khrushchev revealed `in confidence' that
he  had  been to a  factory  where  he  had  seen rockets `tumbling  off the
conveyor belts, just like sausages'. (Incidentally, then, as now, the supply
of sausages  was  presenting  the  USSR  with  acute  problems.)  The  West,
unaccustomed to dealing  with so high-level a charlatan, was  duly impressed
and consequently  there was no invasion of Cuba. During the drama which took
place, Khrushchev took to making fierce threats about `pressing the button'.
     At the moment when the establishment of the SRF was announced, a  Force
equal  in standing to the Land  Forces and said to far  exceed the latter in
striking  power, at  the  moment  when Marshal  Nedelin's  headquarters  was
established,  with  great show, the Soviet rocket  forces consisted of  four
regiments  armed  with 8-Zh-38 rockets (copies  of the  German  V.2) and one
range, on which experiments with new Soviet rockets were being carried  out.
The figures for rocket production were negligible. All the rockets that were
made   were  immediately  used  for  demonstrations  in  space   while   the
newly-formed divisions received nothing  but replicas, which were shown  off
at parades and in films. Empty dummies, resembling  rockets, were splendidly
designated  `dimensional  substitutes'.  Meanwhile, a  hectic  race  was  in
progress to produce real, operational rockets. Accidents occurred, one after
another.  On 24 October, 1960,  when  an experimental 8-K-63 rocket blew up,
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Strategic  Rocket  Forces,  Chief  Marshal
Nedelin, and his entire staff were burned alive ...
     However, the SRF had won its first battle, the battle for Cuba.

     As time passed, the  SRF became able to  stand on its own feet. But the
bluff  continues.  The  American  armed  forces  refer  modestly  to   fifty
intercontinental ballistic missiles as a Squadron. The Soviet Army builds at
least five  Regiments around this number  of  missiles.  Alternately if  the
rockets  are obsolescent they may form a Rocket Division  or  even  a Rocket
Corps.  The  Americans do  not  classify a  thousand rockets  as  a separate
Service, or even as an individual arm of service. They are just  part of the
US Air Force's Strategic  Air  Command. In the  USSR fifteen hundred rockets
make up a complete Service, commanded by a Marshal  of the Soviet  Union. At
present,  the Americans are  armed,  essentially,  with  a  single  type  of
intercontinental rocket, the `Minuteman'. In the Soviet Union there are more
than  ten different types, amounting to approximately the same  total as the
Americans possess. Why this lack of coordination? Because not one of them is
of really good quality. Some lack accuracy, and have too  low a payload, and
too  short  a range,  but they are kept in  service  because they  are  more
reliable than other  types. Others are retained  because  their accuracy  is
more or less acceptable. Others are neither accurate nor reliable but have a
good range. But there  is  one other  reason for this  untidy situation, for
this multiplicity of types. The  fact is  that  the rocket forces  have been
developed piecemeal, like a patchwork quilt.  Soviet industry  is unable  to
turn out long production runs of rockets quickly. For this reason, while the
factories are  familiarising themselves with the manufacture of one type and
beginning slowly to produce it, another type is being brought just as slowly
into service. Familiarisation with this new type  starts, in a dilatory way,
and a  production run begins, with equal lack of haste, and  thus, year
by year, the Rocket Forces expand, gradually and in leisurely fashion. Often
a really  good  rocket  can only be produced  in    numbers because the
United States  will only sell a  quantity of the  parts needed for  it.
For example, if the Americans only sell seventy-nine precision fuel filters,
the Soviets will be unable to produce more than this number of rockets. Some
of these will be allocated for experimental use and the number available for
operational deployment therefore becomes er still. It is then necessary
to  design a  new rocket without high-precision filters but with  electronic
equipment to control the  ignition process.  But then,  perhaps,  it is only
possible to purchase two hundred sets of this electronic equipment  from the
US. A first-class rocket, but no more than two hundred can be produced...

     The  SRF  faces  another,  even  more critical problem--its hunger  for
uranium.  The shortage of uranium and plutonium has led the Soviet Union  to
produce extremely high-powered thermonuclear warheads with a  TNT equivalent
of scores of megatons.  One of the reasons for this was the poor accuracy of
the  rockets;  in  order  to  offset this it became  necessary  to  increase
drastically the yield of  the warheads. But  this was not the most important
consideration.  The  fundamental  reason  was  that a thermonuclear  charge,
whatever its  yield,  needs  only  one  nuclear  detonator. The shortage  of
uranium and plutonium made  it  necessary to  produce  a comparatively 
quantity of thermonuclear warheads and to compensate  for this by increasing
their yield.
     The Soviet Union has put a lot  of work into the problem of producing a
thermonuclear warhead in which reaction  is brought about  not  by a nuclear
detonator  but  by  some  other  means--for  instance, by  the  simultaneous
explosion of a  large number of hollow charges.  This is  very difficult  to
achieve, for if just one charge functions a thousandth of a second early, it
will scatter  all  the  others. American  electronic  equipment is needed to
solve the problem high precision timers, which will  deliver impulses to all
the charges simultaneously. There are some grounds for believing that timers
of this sort may  be sold to the Soviet Union  and, if this happens, the SRF
will  acquire  titanic  strength. Meanwhile,  not all  Soviet  rockets  have
warheads. There are not enough for every rocket, so that, at present, use is
being made of radioactive material which is, quite simply, waste produced by
nuclear  power stations--radioactive  dust.  Rather  than  launch  a  rocket
without a warhead, the wretched thing might as  well be used to scatter dust
in the enemy's eyes... Naturally,  scattering  quantities  of dust over
wide areas of enemy territory, even if it is highly radioactive, will not do
much damage  and it will certainly not decide the outcome of a war. But what
can one do if one has nothing better?
     However, naturally, the SRF must not be underestimated. Rapid technical
progress is being made and  Soviet engineers are skilfully steering a course
between the technological  icebergs which confront them, sometimes achieving
astounding successes, brilliant in their simplicity.
     The  technical balance could change very quickly, if the West does  not
press forward with the development of its  own  equipment  as quickly and as
decisively as the Soviet Union is doing.
--------


     The National Air Defence Forces (ADF) are  the third most important  of
the five Services which make up the Soviet Armed Forces, after the Strategic
Rocket Forces and  the Land  Forces.  However, we will examine  them at this
point, directly  after the  SRF,  since like  the latter they represent  not
simply  an  administrative  structure  but  a  unified,   controlled  combat
organisation, subordinated directly to  the  Supreme Commander. Because they
form  a unified combat  organisation, the ADF  are  always  commanded  by  a
Marshal of the  Soviet Union. The Land Forces, which are five times the size
of  the ADF, and  which represent the striking force of the Soviet  Union in
Europe, are headed only by a General of the Army.

     In  the  armed  forces  of any other country,  responsibility  for  air
defence is laid upon its air forces.  In the Soviet  Union,  the air defence
system was so highly developed that it  would be quite impossible to confine
it within the organisational structure of  the Air Forces. Moreover, the ADF
are  the third most  important  Service while  the Air Forces  occupy fourth
place.
     The independence of  the ADF  from the Air  Forces  is due not  only to
their  size  and  to their technical development,  but  also to the  overall
Soviet philosophy concerning the allocation of wartime roles. In any country
in  which  Soviet  specialists  are  given  the  task  of  setting   up   or
restructuring the armed forces,  they establish several parallel  systems of
air defence. One is a static system, designed to defend the territory of the
country  and  the  most  important administrative,  political,  economic and
transport installations  which  it contains. This is a  copy  of the ADF. In
addition,  separate  systems  for  self-defence  and protection against  air
attack are set up in the land forces, the navy and the air force.
     While the  national defence system  is static, those of  the  different
armed  services are mobile, designed to move alongside the forces which they
exist  to protect. If several systems find themselves operating in  the same
area, they  work with one another and in such a case their collaboration  is
always organised by the national system.

     The division of the ADF  into a national  system and another system for
the protection of the  armed services,  took  place long  before  the Second
World War. All anti-aircraft artillery and all searchlight and sound-ranging
units  were divided  between  those  under the  command  of army  and  naval
commanders and those covering  the most important civil installations, which
are not subordinated to army commanders but had their own control apparatus.
The fighter  aircraft available  were divided in the same  way. In 1939, for
instance,  forty air regiments (1,640 combat aircraft) were transferred from
the strength of the Air  Forces to that of the ADF, for both  administrative
and combat  purposes. Mixed  ADF  units were formed from  the  anti-aircraft
artillery,  searchlight and air  sub-units, which  succeeded  in cooperating
very closely with one another.
     During the war the ADF  completed  their development  into a  separate,
independent constituent  of the Armed Forces, on an equal  footing with  the
Land  Forces,  the  Air  Forces  and  the Navy.  During  the  war, too,  the
development  of fighter  aircraft designed specifically  for  either the Air
Forces or the  ADF was  begun.  Flying training schools were set up to train
ADF pilots,  using  different teaching  programmes from  those  of  the  Air
Forces. Subsequently, anti-aircraft gunnery  schools  were established, some
of which trained  officers for anti-aircraft  units of the  Land  Forces and
Navy while others prepared officers for  the anti-aircraft units of the ADF.
After the war,  the teams designing anti-aircraft  guns for the Armed Forces
were directed to develop especially powerful anti-aircraft guns for the ADF.
     At the end of the war the total strength of the  ADF was  more than one
million, divided into four ADF fronts (each with  two  or  three armies) and
three independent ADF Armies.
     After the war the ADF was given official status as an independent Armed
Service.

     Today  the  ADF  has more than 600,000 men. For administrative purposes
they are divided into three arms of service:
     ADF Fighter Aviation
     ADF Surface-to-air Missile Forces
     ADF Radar Forces
     For greater efficiency and closer cooperation, the sub-units  of  these
three  arms  of  service  are  brought  together to  form  mixed  units--ADF
Divisions,  Corps, Armies and Fronts  (in  peacetime Fronts are known as ADF
Districts).
     The  fact  that  3,000 combat  aircraft, among  them  some of the  most
advanced,  have  no  operational,  financial,  administrative  or  any other
connection with the Air Forces, has not been grasped by ordinary individuals
in the  West,  nor even by  Western military  specialists.  It is  therefore
necessary to repeat, that the  ADF rate as a  separate and independent Armed
Service, with  3,000  supersonic  interceptor aircraft, 12,000 anti-aircraft
missile launchers and 6,000 radar installations.
     It is because the ADF are responsible both for the protection of Soviet
territory  and  of the most  important  installations in the USSR  that they
function independently. Since they are concerned mainly with  the defence of
stationary  targets, the fighter  aircraft developed  for  them differ  from
those with which the Air Forces are equipped. The ADF are also equipped with
surface-to-air missiles and radar installations which differ from those used
by the Land Forces and by the Navy.
     The Air Forces  have  their  own fighter  aircraft,  totalling  several
thousand. The Land Forces have thousands of their own anti-aircraft  missile
launchers, anti-aircraft  guns and  radar installations. The Navy, too,  has
its  own  fighters,  anti-aircraft  missiles and guns  and radar, and all of
these belong to the individual Armed Service rather than to the ADF, and are
used to  meet  the  requirements of  the operational commanders of  the Land
Forces, Air Forces and Navy.  We  will discuss these independent air defence
systems later; for  the moment we  will confine ourselves  to  the  national
defence system.

     The fighter aircraft of the ADF are organised as regiments. In all, the
ADF has more than seventy regiments, each with forty aircraft.
     The  ADF  cannot,  of course, use  fighter aircraft built  for the  Air
Forces, any more than  the latter  can use aircraft built  to the designs of
the  ADF. The  Air  Forces  and  the  ADF  operate  under entirely different
conditions and have different  operational tasks and  each Service therefore
has its particular requirements from its own aircraft.
     The ADF  operates from permanent airfields and  can therefore use heavy
fighter aircraft. The fighter aircraft of  the  Air Forces are constantly on
the  move behind the  Land Forces and must  therefore operate from very poor
airfields, sometimes with  grass runways or even from sections of road. They
are therefore much lighter than the aircraft used by the ADF.
     ADF  fighters are assisted  in their  operations by extremely  powerful
radar and guidance systems, which direct the aircraft to  their targets from
the ground.  These aircraft do not therefore need to be highly  manoeuvrable
but every effort  is made to increase their speed, their operational ceiling
and range. The  Air  Forces  require different qualities from their  fighter
aircraft, which  are  lighter,  since  they have to  operate  in  constantly
changing situations,  and  from their pilots,  who  have to work unassisted,
locating and attacking their  targets for themselves. The Air Force fighters
therefore  need  to be both  light  and highly  manoeuvrable  but  they  are
considerably inferior to  those  of  the ADF  in  speed,  range, payload and
ceiling.
     Let  us look at an  example of these two different  approaches  to  the
design of  fighter aircraft. The MIG-23  is extremely light and manoeuvrable
and is  able  to  operate  from  any  airfield,  including  those with grass
runways.  Clearly, it is an aircraft for the  Air  Forces. By contrast,  the
MIG-25,  although designed by the same group, at the same time, is extremely
heavy  and unmanoeuvrable and  can  operate only  from  long and very stable
concrete runways, but it has gained  twelve world records  for range, speed,
rate  of climb and altitude reached.  For two decades  this was the  fastest
operational  aircraft in  the world. It is  easy to see that this is an  ADF
fighter.
     Besides the MIG-25, which is  a high-altitude interceptor, the ADF have
a low-level  interceptor, the SU 15,  and  a long-range interceptor,  the TU
128,  which is  designed to  attack  enemy aircraft attempting to  penetrate
Soviet air space across  the endless wastes  of the Arctic or the deserts of
Central Asia.
     The   

Surface-to-air  Missile  (SAM)   Forces  of   the  ADF

   consist,
organisationally, of rocket brigades (each with 10 to 12 launch battalions),
regiments (3 to 5 launch battalions) and independent launch battalions. Each
battalion has 6  to 8 launchers, according to the  type of rocket with which
it  is  equipped. Each  battalion  has between  80 and 120  men. First,  all
battalions  were  equipped with S 75 rockets.  Then,  to replace  these, two
rockets,  the  S   125  (low-altitude  and   short-range)  and  the   S  200
(high-altitude and long-range), were developed. The S 200 can be fitted with
a nuclear warhead to destroy  enemy rockets or aircraft. Also introduced, to
destroy  the enemy's  inter-continental  ballistic missiles, was the UR 100,
which has a  particularly powerful  warhead, but the deployment of this type
has been limited by the US-Soviet ABM Treaty.
     Each SAM battalion is equipped with several anti-aircraft guns of 
(23mm) and large (57mm) calibre. These are  used  to repel either low-flying
enemy  aircraft  or  attacks  by  enemy  land  forces.  In  peacetime, these
anti-aircraft guns are not classified as  a separate arm  of service  of the
ADF. However, in wartime, when the strength  of the ADF would  be  increased
three  or  four times,  they  would  form  an  arm of  service,  deployed as
anti-aircraft artillery  regiments and divisions, equipped with  23, 57, 85,
100 and 130mm guns, which are mothballed in peacetime.
     

The Radar Forces of the ADF

 consist of brigades and regiments, together
with a  number of  independent  battalions and companies. They are  equipped
with  several thousand  radar installations,  for  the  detection  of  enemy
aircraft and space weapons and for the guidance towards these targets of ADF
robot and interceptor aircraft.
     In addition to these three main arms of  service, the complement of the
ADF includes many supporting sub-units (providing transport, communications,
guard duties  and administration),  two military academies and eleven higher
officers'  schools, together with  a  considerable  number  of  test-ranges,
institutes for scientific research and training centres.

     Operationally  the  ADF consists  of a Central  Command Post,  two  ADF
Districts, which would become ADF  Fronts in wartime, eight independent  ADF
Armies and several independent ADF Corps.
     Up to regimental and  brigade level ADF  formations are  drawn  from  a
single  arm of service--for  example from  SAM brigades, fighter  regiments,
independent radar  battalions, etc. From division level upwards, each arm of
service is represented in each formation and these are therefore  called ADF
Divisions, Corps, etc.
     The  organisation of each division, corps or  other higher formation is
decided  in accordance with the  importance  of the installation which it is
protecting.  However,  there  is one guiding principle:  each  commander  is
responsible  for the  defence  of  one  key  point only.  This  principle is
uniformly applied at all levels.
     The commander of an ADF division is responsible for the protection of a
single, highly important installation, for instance, of a large power-supply
centre. He is also required to prevent incursions by enemy aircraft over his
sector. The  division therefore deploys one  SAM  brigade to cover  the main
installation,  and moves  two  or  three  SAM regiments  into the-areas most
likely  to be threatened, ahead of the brigades, and a number of independent
SAM battalions  into  areas which  are  in  less danger.  In  addition,  the
divisional  commander has one air regiment which may be used to make contact
with the enemy  at a considerable distance, for  operations at boundaries or
junctions not  covered  by  SAM  fire, or  in the area in  which  the  enemy
delivers his main  thrust. The  operations of the SAM sub-units and  of  the
interceptor  aircraft are  supported by radar battalions and companies which
are  subordinated  both  to  the  divisional  commander  himself and  to the
commanding officers of the division's SAM units.
     An  ADF  corps  commander  organises  coverage  of  the  target  he  is
protecting in  precisely  the  same way.  To protect  the  main installation
itself he has one  ADF  division. Both he and  his divisional commander  are
involved in the defence of the same installation. Two or three SAM  brigades
are moved forward to cover  the sectors  which  are  under greatest  threat,
while SAM regiments are deployed in less endangered areas.  One air regiment
is under  the direct command of  the  corps commander, for long-range use or
for operations in the area in which the  enemy  delivers his main attack. If
the SAM sub-units are put out of action, the corps commander can at any time
make use of his fighter regiment to cover an area in which a breakthrough is
threatened. Thus there are two air regiments with each ADF Corps, one at the
disposal of the ADF divisional  commander, the other  for use  by the  corps
commander. A corps contains three or four  SAM  brigades,  one  with the ADF
division,  the others at the disposal of  the corps commander, covering  the
approaches to the divisional position. In a corps there are five or six  SAM
regiments, two or three of which are used in the division's main sector, the
remainder in the  secondary  sectors  of  the corps area. Lastly, the  corps
commander himself has a  radar regiment, in addition  to the radar forces of
his subordinates.
     An  ADF  Army commander, too, is  responsible for the protection  of  a
single  key objective and has an ADF corps to cover it. In addition, an Army
has two or three independent ADF divisions, each of which provides cover for
its  own  key installation and  also defends the main  approaches to the key
objective guarded by the  Army. Independent SAM brigades are deployed in the
secondary  sectors of the Army's area.  An  Army commander also  has two air
regiments  (one with aircraft for high-altitude  operations, the  other with
long-range  interceptors)  and  his  own   radar   installations  (including
over-the-horizon radars).
     An ADF  District is similar  in structure. The key objective is covered
by an Army. Two or three independent ADF corps are deployed in  the  sectors
under  greatest  threat  while the less  endangered areas are covered by ADF
divisions, each  of which, of  course, has a key  objective of its own.  The
District Commander also has two interceptor air regiments under  his command
and radar detection facilities, including very large  aircraft equipped with
powerful radars.
     The nerve centre--Moscow--is,  of course, covered by  an ADF  District;
the main approaches to this District by ADF Armies and the secondary sectors
by ADF corps.  Each District and Army has, of course, the task of covering a
key installation of its own.
     The ADF  contains two ADF Districts. Something must  be said  about the
reasons for the existence of  the second of these--the Baku District. Unlike
the  Moscow  District, the Baku ADF District does not have a  key  target to
protect. The fact that Baku produces oil is irrelevant: twenty-four times as
much oil is produced in the Tatarstan area as in Baku. The Baku ADF District
looks  southwards,  covering  a  huge  area along  the  frontiers, which  is
unlikely to  be attacked.  Several of the  armies of  the ADF (the  9th, for
instance),  have  considerably  greater combat resources than the whole Baku
District.  It is, however, because of the  need to watch such a huge area, a
task for which an ADF Army has  insufficient capacity, that  a District  was
established there.
     All in all, the ADF is the most  powerful  system  of  its  sort in the
world. It has at its disposal not only the largest quantity of equipment but
in some respects  the best  equipment in the  world. At the beginning of the
1980s the MIG-25 interceptor was the fastest in  the world and the S-200 had
the largest yield and the greatest  range of any  surface-to-air missile. In
the period since the war the Soviet  Air  Defence Forces  have  shown  their
strength on many occasions. They did this most strikingly on 1 May, 1960, by
shooting down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, a type regarded until
then  as  invulnerable,  because of the  incredible height at which it could
operate. There is no doubt that the  Soviet Air  Defence Forces are the most
experienced in the  world. What other system  can  boast  of having spent as
many years fighting the most modern air force in the world as the Soviet ADF
system in Vietnam?
     In the  mid-1970s some doubt arose  as to its reliability when  a South
Korean aircraft  lost its way and flew over Soviet Arctic territory for some
considerable  time before being forced down  by  a Soviet SU-15 interceptor.
However, the  reasons for this delay  can  be fully explained; we have noted
that interceptor aircraft do  not represent the  main  strength of  the ADF,
which lies in its surface-to-air missiles. The territory  across  which  the
lost aircraft flew was quite unusually well-equipped with SAMs, but there is
simply  no reason to use them against  a civil aircraft.  At the same  time,
because of the deep snow which lay in the area, hardly any interceptors were
stationed  there. Their absence was compensated  for by an  abnormally large
number  of SAMs, ready to shoot  down any military aircraft. In this unusual
situation, once the invader had been found to be a civil aircraft, it became
necessary to use an interceptor brought from a great distance. This aircraft
took  off from  Lodeynoye  Polye and  flew  more than  1,000  kilometres, in
darkness, to meet  the intruder. In an operational  situation  it  would not
have been necessary to do this. It would be simpler to use a rocket.
     Nevertheless,  despite everything,  the ADF  has its Achilles heel. The
fastest aircraft  are  flown  by  men who detest socialism  with  all  their
hearts. The pilot Byelenko is by no means unique in the ADF.
--------


     The Land Forces are the oldest, the largest and the most diversified of
the Services making up the Armed Forces of the Red Army.  In peacetime their
strength totals approximately 2  million, but mobilisation would  bring them
up to between 21 and 23 million within ten days.
     They contain seven arms of service:
     Motor-rifle Troops
     Tank Troops
     Artillery and Rocket Troops of the Land Forces
     Air Defence Troops of the Land Forces
     Airborne Assault Troops
     Diversionary Troops (Spetsnaz)
     Fortified Area Troops
     The existence of the last three is kept secret.
     In their organisation and  operational strength, the Land Forces can be
seen  as a scaled-down model of the entire Soviet Armed Forces. Just  take a
look at their structure: the Strategic Rocket Forces are subordinated to the
Stavka; the Land Forces have their own rocket troops; the Air Defence Forces
are subordinated to the  Stavka; the Land Forces  have their own air defence
troops. They also have their own aircraft, which  are independent of the Air
Forces. The Air Defence Forces, in their numbers and equipment the strongest
in  the world, are  subordinated to the  Stavka; the  Land Forces  also have
their own  airborne  troops which, using the same yardstick,  are the second
strongest in the world.
     The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Land  Forces  has  no  more  than  an
administrative function.  His headquarters  contains neither  an Operational
nor an Intelligence Directorate. All operational planning is carried out  by
the mixed commands of the Fronts, Strategic Directions or General Staff. The
Commander-in-Chief's   responsibilities  are  limited  to   the   equipment,
provisioning  and training of his  forces. However, despite the fact that he
has no responsibility for the direction of operations the C-in-C Land Forces
is  still  a  highly  influential  administrator.  Clearly,  anyone  who  is
responsible  for  the  development and supply of forty-one Armies, including
eight Tank Armies deserves respect.
     The Commanders  of the various arms of service of the Land Forces, too,
have purely  administrative  functions. The direction of operations,  as  we
already  know, is  the  function of mixed all-arms commands,  which are  not
subordinated  for this function  to  either the C-in-C or  the Commanders of
individual arms of service.

        The Motor-Rifle Troops
     Each motor-rifle section has a  strength  of  eleven. One  man acts  as
assistant to the rocket launcher and is  jokingly referred to as the missile
transporter. He does indeed carry three rockets, in a satchel. Each of these
has a  warhead capable of penetrating the armour of any modern tank, booster
and sustainer engines,  a spin  stabiliser, a turbine, a fin  assembly and a
tracer compound.
     His are  not  the only rockets in the section. It is also equipped with
anti-aircraft  rockets with seeker heads, which  enable  them to distinguish
hostile aircraft from friendly  ones and  to destroy them. In  addition, the
section has four 9-M-14 `Malyutka'  rockets which have an automatic guidance
system. All this in one infantry section.
     The section's BMP-1 combat vehicle has an automatic 73mm gun  and three
machine guns and  has sufficient  fire-power, manoeuvrability and protection
to take  on any modern light  tank. The section  also has three radio  sets,
sensors for the detection of radioactivity and gas and other complex devices
in addition to its ordinary infantry equipment.
     At this, the lowest, level, we find not a true infantry formation but a
hybrid of tank, anti-tank, SAM, chemical, sapper and other sub-units.
     The infantry is the  oldest  of the arms of service.  All the remainder
originated later  and were  developed as additions or  reinforcements to the
infantry.  From  our  examination of  the infantry  section we see that  the
modern infantry is an arm of service which,  even at its lowest  level,  has
absorbed elements of many others.
     The concept of the infantry, not as cannon fodder, but as the framework
of the entire Armed Forces, the skeleton on which the whole of the remainder
develops, has been held for a  long time  by Soviet generals. After the last
war, all Soviet infantry officer training schools were renamed Officer Cadet
Academies, and  began  to turn out,  not run-of-the-mill platoon commanders,
but commanders with a wide range of knowledge, able  to organise cooperation
between all arms  of service  in the  battlefield, in order to  ensure joint
success.
     It is  for this  reason that  today's officers  are  not  called either
infantry or motor-rifle commanders, but all-arms commanders.
     The  organisation of a  normal Soviet regiment which, by  tradition, is
still called a motor-rifle regiment, is as follows:
     Command headquarters
     Reconnaissance company
     Signals company
     Tank battalion (three companies)
     Three motor-rifle battalions (each of three companies and one automatic
mortar battery)
     A battalion  of self-propelled howitzers (three fire batteries  and one
control battery)
     A battery of Grad-P multiple rocket launchers
     A SAM battery
     An engineer company
     A chemical defence company
     A maintenance company
     A motor transport company
     In all, the regiment has 27 companies, only 9 of  which are motor-rifle
companies.  It  is significant that, in a so-called  `motor-rifle' regiment,
there are 10 artillery battery commanders--that is to say, one more than the
number of motor-rifle company commanders.
     If we move a little  higher, to the level of  a division, we find that,
surprisingly,  it is still referred to as a `motor-rifle'  division. We will
look at the organisation of a motor-rifle division later; for the present we
will simply note that it contains a total of 165 companies and batteries. Of
these only 28 are  motor-rifle  companies; it also has 23 tank companies and
67 artillery batteries  (mortar, anti-aircraft and rocket). The remainder is
made  up  of   reconnaissance,  signal  and  engineer,  chemical  and  other
companies.
     The  motor-rifle  troops  make  up  the  bulk  of  the  Soviet  forces.
Organisationally,  they consist  of  123  divisions and  of an additional 47
regiments, which form part of the complement of tank divisions. In addition,
there  are motor-rifle battalions serving in fortified  areas and also  with
the Navy's marine infantry brigades.
     In peacetime motor-rifle  sub-units  are divided into those with normal
equipment (armoured  personnel  carriers)  and those  equipped with infantry
combat vehicles (BMPs).  This  is today's  version  of the age-old  division
between light and heavy infantry, between grenadiers and chasseurs.
     In theory all motor-rifle regiments in tank  divisions and one regiment
in each motor-rifle division should be equipped with BMPs. In practice, this
depends upon the output of the  defence industries and upon their ability to
supply combat  equipment  to the  forces. In  many inland military districts
divisions  have  not  received  the BMPs  allocated  to them.  By  contrast,
divisions stationed in East Germany have two rather than one BMP regiment.
     Sub-units equipped with BMPs have much greater fire- and striking-power
than their normal motor-rifle equivalents. This  is not only  because a  BMP
has  better  protection,  armament  and  manoeuvrability  than  an  armoured
personnel carrier. BMP  sub-units also have far more supporting weapons. For
instance, a motor-rifle battalion stationed on Soviet territory has a mortar
platoon.  An equivalent BMP battalion has  a  battery instead  of a platoon.
Moreover, these  are  not  standard  but automatic  mortars,  and  they  are
self-propelled  rather than  towed. A  standard motor-rifle  regiment  has a
howitzer battery,  or in  some cases a battalion  of towed howitzers.  A BMP
regiment has  a howitzer battalion equipped  with self-propelled  amphibious
howitzers and a further battery of `Grad-P' multiple rocket launchers.
     BMP sub-units are the  first  to receive new anti-tank,  anti-aircraft,
engineering and communications equipment. They are, in fact, the  trump suit
in the pack.

        The Tank Forces
     The Tank  Forces represent the main striking power of the Land  Forces.
Their organisation is simple and  well-defined. Every unit commander has his
own tank assault force, of a size appropriate to his position. The commander
of  a  motor-rifle regiment  has  a  tank  battalion  at  his disposal.  The
commander of a  motor-rifle  division  has his  own tank regiment.  An  Army
commander has one tank division and a Front Commander  a Tank Army. Finally,
the Commander-in-Chief of a Strategic  Direction has a Group of Tank Armies.
Combat operations  at  each  level  are  organised  according to established
principles. An advance by a motor-rifle regiment is, essentially, an advance
by  a tank battalion which  is supported  by all the  other  battalions  and
companies of the regiment. This principle applies  at all levels. You could,
in  fact,  say  that  an  advance  by  a  Strategic  Direction is  really  a
break-through by a Tank Army Group  supported by the operations of the three
or four Fronts which belong to that Direction.
     In addition to this  basic striking force, Front Commanders and C-in-Cs
of  Strategic Directions  may keep  independent tank  divisions  in reserve,
using them for rapid relief  of the divisions which suffer the worst losses.
Besides this, however, each commander, from divisional  level  upwards,  has
what might be called a personal tank  guard. Besides the tank regiment which
is his main striking force, a  division commander  has  an independent  tank
battalion.  Thus, a  motor-rifle division has seven tank  battalions in all;
one in each of its three motor-rifle regiments, three in  its tank  regiment
and the independent battalion. This battalion is entirely different from the
others. Whereas the ordinary  tank battalions have 31  tanks (3 companies of
10  each and one for  the battalion commander), an independent battalion has
52 tanks (5  companies of 10 each,  one for  the battalion commander and the
divisional  commander's own ).  Unlike  the others, an  independent tank
battalion has reconnaissance, anti-aircraft, engineer and chemical platoons.
In  its make-up  it is  more like a , independent tank regiment, than a
large  battalion. In addition, the independent tank battalions are the first
to receive the  latest  equipment. I have seen many divisions equipped  with
T-44 tanks while the independent tank battalions had T-10Ms, which have then
received T-55s, while the  independent battalions  got T-72s. The divisional
commander will carefully and patiently  assemble all  his best crews in this
battalion.  The  commander  of  a  motor-rifle  regiment will throw his tank
battalion into the thick of a battle, and a divisional commander will do the
same with his tank regiment but he will keep his independent tank battalions
in reserve. These protect respectively, the  division's headquarters and the
division's rocket battalion. These are not, of course, their main functions,
but fall to the lot of the independent battalions because they almost always
function as reserves.
     But let us suppose that during a  battle a  situation arises in which a
commander  must throw in everything he has, a situation which can result  in
either victory  or disaster.  This is the moment at which he brings  his own
personal guard  into  the  operation, a  fresh,  fully-rested battalion,  of
unusual size, made up of his best crews and equipped with the best tanks. At
this moment a divisional commander is risking everything and for this reason
he may head this, his own independent, tank battalion.
     An Army Commander,  too, in addition to the  tank  division which forms
his striking force, has an independent tank battalion to act as his personal
guard. He puts it into action only at the last possible moment and it may be
with this battalion that  he meets his own death in battle. In  addition  to
his  Tank  Army,  each  Front Commander  has  an  independent  tank brigade,
consisting of the best crews in the  whole  Front and equipped with the best
tanks.  Normally  a  Front's  independent  tank  brigade  has  four  or five
battalions  and  one  motor-rifle battalion. The commander  of  a  Strategic
Direction, too, has his personal  tank guard,  in  addition to his Tank Army
Group. This guard consists of a single special independent tank division or,
in some cases, of a tank corps made up of two divisions.
     In all,  the Tank Forces have 47 tank divisions, 127 regiments, serving
with motor-rifle divisions and more than 500 battalions, either serving with
motor-rifle regiments or acting as reserves for commanders of varying ranks.
In peacetime their total strength is 54,000 tanks.

        The Artillery and Rocket Troops of the Land Forces
     After the  end of the  Second World War, the Rocket Troops were treated
as  a separate  arm of service, not  forming  part  of any  one of the Armed
Services but subordinated directly to the  Minister of Defence. In 1959 they
were split up. The Strategic Rocket  Forces were  established as  a separate
Armed Service. Those rocket troops who were not absorbed  by the new Service
were taken over by the Land forces and united with the Artillery to form the
Artillery and Rocket Troops, as one  of  the constituent arms of  service of
the Land Forces.
     At  present  this  arm  of  service  is  equipped  with  four  types of
artillery--rocket,   rocket    launcher   (multi-barrelled,   salvo-firing),
anti-tank and  general  purpose (mortars,  howitzers  and  field guns). Each
commander has at  his  disposal  the artillery resources  appropriate to his
rank. Commanders of  divisions and upwards have some  of  each of  all  four
types of  artillery  weapon.  Thus  a motor-rifle division  has  one  rocket
battalion, one battalion of multi-barrelled  rocket launchers, one anti-tank
battalion  and a howitzer regiment  of three battalions for general support.
We will  discuss the  quantity  of  fire  weapons available to commanders of
differing ranks when we come to talk about operational organisation.

        The Air Defence Troops of the Land Forces
     We  have  already spoken of the  existence of  two separate air defence
systems--national  and  military.  The two are  unconnected:  the difference
between them is  that  the  national system protects  the territory  of  the
Soviet Union  and is  therefore  stationary  while the military system is an
integral  part  of  the fighting services  and moves  with  them in order to
protect them from air attack.
     Organisationally, each infantry  section, with the exception  of  those
which  travel in platoon commanders' vehicles,  contains  one soldier  armed
with  a  `Strela  2'  anti-aircraft  rocket  launcher.  There are  two  such
launchers in  each  platoon.  The seeker heads with  which  they are  fitted
enable  rockets  fired from  these launchers to  shoot  down enemy  aircraft
flying at heights of two  kilometres and at distances of four kilometres. In
every tank platoon, in addition to the anti-aircraft machine-guns carried by
each tank,  one of  the leaders  has three  of these  launchers,  which  are
carried on the outside of the tank's turret.
     Each motor-rifle and tank  regiment has an anti-aircraft battery, armed
with 4 ZSU-23-4  `Shilka' self-propelled rocket launchers and with 4 `Strela
1' launchers (known in the West as the SA-9).  These two systems  complement
each  other and  are  highly  effective, the Shilka especially  so.  I  have
watched a  Shilka  working  from  a  stony, ploughed  field, belching out an
uninterrupted  blast  of  fire  against    balloons  released,  without
warning, from a wood  a couple of kilometres away.  The results it  achieved
were quite  overwhelming. The British reference book, 

Jane's

, is quite right
to describe the Shilka as the best in the world.
     The officer in charge of the  anti-aircraft defence of each motor-rifle
and tank  regiment coordinates the operations of  his battery and also those
of all the Strela-2 launchers.
     Each motor-rifle and tank division  has one  SAM  regiment, armed  with
`Kub' (SA-6) or `Romb'  (SA-8) rockets. Each Army has one SAM brigade, armed
with `Krug' (SA-4) rockets.
     In addition to all these, a Front Commander  has under  his command two
SAM  brigades with `Krug' rockets, several regiments  with `Kubs' or `Rombs'
and several AAA regiments, armed with 57mm and 100mm anti-aircraft guns.

        The Airborne Assault Troops
     Although the Airborne Assault  troops wear the same uniform as airborne
troops,  they have no connection  with them. Airborne  troops are under  the
direct control of the Supreme  Commander;  they use  transport  aircraft and
parachutes for their operations. By  contrast, the  Airborne Assault  troops
form part of  the Land Forces  and are  operationally subordinate to a Front
Commander.  They are transported by helicopter  and do  not  use parachutes.
Moreover, their  sub-units use helicopters not only as a means of  transport
but as fighting weapons.
     In Soviet eyes, the helicopter has nothing in  common with conventional
aircraft;  it is  regarded  virtually as  a  tank. At first this may seem  a
strange idea, but it is undeniably well founded. No aircraft can seize enemy
territory; this is done by tanks,  artillery and  infantry working together.
Helicopters are therefore regarded as belonging to the Land Forces, as tanks
which do  not fear  minefields, mountains  or water obstacles, as tanks with
high fire-power and great speed but which have only limited protection.
     The  airborne assault troops were  established in 1969. Their  `father'
and guardian angel was Mao. If he had  never existed nor would  they. Soviet
generals had been pressing for their introduction since the beginning of the
1950s, but there were  never sufficient resources for their creation and the
decision to bring them into service was postponed from one five-year plan to
another. However,  in 1969,  armed clashes took place  on  the frontier with
China, and Soviet generals declared that they could only defend a line 1,000
kilometres in length  with tanks which  could be concentrated  within a  few
hours at any one of the sectors of this enormous frontier. So the MI-24 made
its appearance--a flying tank which no weapon has yet managed  to shoot down
in Afghanistan.
     Military  helicopters,  which thus  originated primarily  as  a  weapon
against China, actually made their  first appearance with the Soviet  forces
in  Eastern Europe. This was  because the situation on the Chinese  frontier
improved; that on the frontiers with the West can never improve.
     Organisationally,  the  airborne assault troops  consist  of  brigades,
subordinated to Front Commanders. Each brigade  is made up of one helicopter
assault  regiment  (64  aircraft),  one squadron of  MI-26  heavy  transport
helicopters and three airborne rifle battalions.
     The airborne assault brigade is used in  the main  axis of advance of a
Front in conjunction with a Tank Army and under air cover provided by an Air
Army.
     In addition to this brigade,  a  Front  also has other airborne assault
subunits,  which  do  not represent part of its establishment. Each Army has
one  helicopter  transport regiment,  which is  used  to  air-lift  ordinary
motor-rifle sub-units  behind the enemy's  front line. In  each  motor-rifle
regiment, one battalion  in three is trained, in peacetime,  for  operations
with  helicopters.  Thus each division has three battalions trained for this
purpose and each Army has thirteen such battalions.
     Airborne assault  forces are  growing  continually.  Very  soon  we can
expect to see airborne assault brigades with every Army and airborne assault
divisions with every Front.

        Diversionary Troops (SPETSNAZ)
     Diversionary troops, too,  wear the  same  uniform  as airborne  troops
without  having any connection with  them. Unlike airborne  assault  troops,
they are parachuted from aircraft into the enemy's rear areas. However, they
differ from normal airborne troops  in not  having  heavy  equipment  and in
operating more covertly.
     These SPETSNAZ forces form the airborne forces of the Land Forces. They
are used in  the enemy's  rear to carry out reconnaissance,  to  assassinate
important political or military figures and to destroy headquarters, command
posts, communications centres and nuclear weapons.
     Each all-arms or tank army has one SPETSNAZ  company, with a complement
of 115, of whom 9 are officers and 11 are ensigns. This  company operates in
areas between 100 and  500 kilometres behind  the  enemy's  front  line.  It
consists of a headquarters, three diversionary platoons and a communications
platoon.  Depending on the tasks  to be carried out, the officers and men of
the  company divide  into as  many as 15  diversionary groups, but during an
operation they  may work first  as a single unit,  then  split into  3  or 4
groups, then into 15 and then back again into one.
     Usually, SPETSNAZ companies are dropped the night before an Army begins
an  advance, at a moment when  the anti-aircraft and other  resources of the
enemy are  under  greatest  pressure. Thereafter,  they operate ahead of the
advancing sub-units of the Army.
     Each Front has a SPETSNAZ brigade, consisting of a headquarters company
and  three diversionary battalions. In  peace-time the SPETSNAZ companies of
the Armies of the Front are combined as a SPETSNAZ battalion, which explains
why  it  is  sometimes  thought  that  there  are  four  battalions  in each
diversionary brigade. In  wartime this battalion  would split into companies
which would join their respective Armies.
     Each of the Front's  three battalions operates in the  enemy's  rear in
exactly the same way as the SPETSNAZ companies of the Armies. Each battalion
can split into as many as 45 diversionary groups and the three  together can
therefore produce a total  of up  to 135   groups. But, if necessary, a
SPETSNAZ brigade can operate at full strength,  using between  900 and 1,200
troops  together against  a  single target. Such a target might be a nuclear
submarine base, a large headquarters, or even a national capital.
     The  headquarters  company  of  a  SPETSNAZ  brigade is  of  particular
interest. Unlike both the SPETSNAZ battalions and normal Army companies,  it
is made up of  specialists--between 70 and 80 of them. This HQ company forms
part of  the SPETSNAZ brigade and even many of the latter's officers may not
be  aware  of its  existence. In peacetime  this  company of specialists  is
concealed  within  the  sports  teams  of  the  Military  District.  Boxing,
wrestling, karate, shooting, running, skiing, parachute  jumping--these  are
the sports they practice. As members  of  sports teams they  travel  abroad,
visiting  places  in which  they would kill people in the event  of a future
`liberation'.
     These  Soviet  sportsmen/parachutists, holders of  most of the  world's
sporting records, have visited every national capital. They  have made their
parachute jumps near Paris, London  and Rome, never concealing the fact that
the sporting association which has trained  them  is the  Soviet  Army. When
Munich, Rome and Helsinki  applaud Soviet  marksmen,  wrestlers and  boxers,
everyone  assumes  that  these  are  amateurs.  But  they are not--they  are
professionals, professional killers.
     In  addition to these  companies within the  diversionary brigades
of the Fronts, there  are also SPETSNAZ Long-Range Reconnaissance Regiments.
The  Commander-in-Chief  of  each  Strategic  Direction  has  one  of  these
regiments. The best of these regiments  is  stationed in the Moscow Military
District. From time to time this regiment goes  abroad in  full strength. On
these occasions it goes under the title of the Combined Olympic  Team of the
USSR.
     The  KGB,  as well as the  Soviet  Army,  is  training its diversionary
specialists. The difference, in peacetime, between  the two  groups  is that
the  Soviet  Army contingent always belongs to the Central Army  Sports Club
while  those  from the  KGB are members of the  `Dynamo' Sports Club. In the
event of  war, the two diversionary  networks would operate independently of
one  another, in the  interests  of reliability  and  effectiveness.  But  a
description of the diversionary network of the KGB lies outside our field.

        The Fortified Area Troops
     For  many  decades, the  problem of defence was  not the Soviet Union's
first priority. All its resources were devoted to strengthening its striking
power  and  its  offensive capabilities. But then China  began to present  a
challenge.  Of  course, both  Soviet and Chinese leaders  knew  that Siberia
could never  provide a  solution to China's  territorial  problems.  Siberia
looks large  on the map but even  the great conqueror  Jenghiz Khan, who had
defeated  Russia,  China and Iran, by-passed Siberia, which is nothing  more
than a  snowy desert.  Both  Soviet and  Chinese politicians  realise--as do
their Western opposite numbers--that the solution of the Chinese territorial
problem lies  in the colonisation  of  Australia. Nevertheless,  the  Soviet
Union  takes steps to strengthen its  frontiers,  even  though it is certain
that the West will be  the first victim of China, as it was the first victim
of Hitler and of the Iranian students.
     The  Soviet Union knows  from its own  experience  how  peace-loving  a
socialist country  becomes when its economy,  and consequently its army,  is
weak. But it  also  knows  what  can be achieved by  a country  whose  whole
economy  has  been  nationalised--a  country  in which  everything  of value
belongs solely to the government and in which all resources can therefore be
concentrated in order to achieve  a single goal.  Knowing this,  the  Soviet
Communists are preparing for every possible contingency in good time.
     In  1969 the  problem of defending the  7,000  kilometre  frontier with
China became particularly acute. The calculation  involved was a simple one:
one division can hold a sector of 10 or, at the outside, of 15 kilometres of
the frontier. How many divisions would be needed to defend 7,000 kilometres?
     Since  there  was no question of  using  the old methods  of conducting
operations, new methods--new solutions--were found. We already know that one
of the most important of these was the establishment of the airborne assault
troops. A  second  was  the  introduction  of  a second arm of  service--the
Fortified Area  Troops. This represented a return to  the  age-old  idea  of
building fortresses.
     Today's Soviet  fortresses--the  Fortified Areas--are either completely
new or are  established in  areas in  which there were  old  defences, built
before  the  Second World War,  which  withstood  repeated  attacks  by  the
Japanese army.
     Modern Fortified Areas are, of  course, so  constructed as to survive a
nuclear  war.  All  fortifications have  been  strengthened  against nuclear
attack  and contain automatic systems for the detection of poisonous gas and
air filtration plants.
     Today, the old reinforced concrete structures are hardly ever used  for
operational  purposes.  Instead, they serve  as  underground command  posts,
stores, barracks, assembly points, communications centres, or hospitals. All
operational structures  are being newly built.  Here the Soviet Union  finds
itself in  a  very  favourable situation, because it has  retained  tens  of
thousands  of old  tanks.  These  are now installed  in reinforced  concrete
shelters  so that only  the  turrets  appear above  the ground.  The turrets
themselves are strengthened with additional armour plating, often taken from
obsolete  warships.  Sometimes  the tops  of turrets  are  covered  with  an
additional shield made of  old railway lines;  the whole  is then  carefully
camouflaged.  Under  the hull of the tank is a reinforced  concrete magazine
for  several  hundred shells and a shelter for personnel. The whole forms an
excellent  firing point, with a powerful (often 122mm) tank gun, two machine
guns, an excellent optical system, reliable defence  against a nuclear blast
and an  underground  cable connecting it  with the command post, With  these
resources, two or three soldiers can defend several kilometres  of frontier.
Since these  tank turrets cover one another and since, in addition to  them,
the fortified  areas contain thousands of gun  turrets  taken from  obsolete
warships, some  of which  contain quick-firing  6-barrelled 30mm guns, which
are  uniquely effective  against infantry and aircraft, it would  clearly be
extremely  difficult to break  through such a line  of  defence.  The Soviet
Union  has bitter memories of  the way  little Finland was able to  halt the
Soviet advance in this way in 1940.
     Each fortified area is spaciously  set out, to  increase its ability to
withstand  the  effects of nuclear weapons. Organisationally, each fortified
area is manned by five or six  battalions of troops, a tank battalion and an
artillery  regiment  and is  able to cover a  frontier  sector of 30  to  50
kilometres  or  more.  Clearly,  it is  not possible  to fortify  the entire
frontier in this way and fortified  areas are therefore  set up in  the most
threatened sectors, the intervening territory being  covered by nuclear  and
chemical mines and by airborne assault sub-units, located in bases protected
by the  fortified  areas. This whole arrangement  has  already  enabled  the
Soviet Union to  establish a defensive system covering enormous stretches of
territory, without  having  to move a single one  of the divisions earmarked
for the liberation of Western Europe from capitalist oppression.
--------


     The  Air Forces are the fourth  most  important of the Armed  Services.
There are two reasons for this low rating.
     In the first place,  the Commander-in-Chief  of the Air Forces does not
control  all aircraft.  Those  of  the  Air Defence  Forces--which  are  the
fastest--are completely  independent of the Air Forces.  Those  of the Navy,
which  include  the most modern  bombers, also  have  no link  with the  Air
Forces. The airborne assault troops, as an integral part of the Land Forces,
have nothing to do with the Air Forces either.
     Secondly, unlike the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces
and the  Air  Defence  Forces,  the  C-in-C  of  the Air  Forces  is  not an
operational commander but an administrator.
     Subordinated to the C-in-C of the Air Forces in peacetime are:
     Sixteen Air Armies
     The Commander of the Long-Range Air Force
     The Commander of Military Transport Aviation
     Two military academies, officers' training schools, scientific research
establishments, and test centres, administrative and supply echelons.
     The  total peacetime strength of the Air Forces is half  a  million men
and 10,000 military aircraft and helicopters. However, the apparent strength
of  the  C-in-C of the  Air  Forces is  illusory. He  is responsible for all
questions concerning the functioning of the Air Forces, from the development
of  new aircraft to  the  allocation of  rations  for guard  dogs,  from the
training of cosmonauts to the propagation of experience acquired in Vietnam,
but he is in no way involved in questions concerning the  operational use of
the aircraft under  his  command.  This means that he is  not an operational
Marshal, but an official and administrator, albeit one of very high rank.
     In wartime all  sixteen  Air Armies become  integral components  of the
Fronts. Each Front has an Air Army, which it uses as it considers necessary.
Only the highest operational commanders--the C-in-C of a Strategic Direction
or the  Supreme  Commander--may interfere in a Front's operational  planning
problems (including those of the  Air Army belonging to it).  The  C-in-C of
the Air Forces  may  only advise the  Supreme  Commander if  his  advice  is
sought; if not, his task is solely to ensure that the Air Armies receive all
the supplies they need to carry out their operations.
     Nor is the Long-Range Air Force operationally controlled by  the C-in-C
of the Air Forces.  It is subordinated exclusively to the Supreme Commander,
who can either  make  use  of its entire strength  or  allocate  part of it,
temporarily, to the Commanders-in-Chief of Strategic Directions.
     The  same  arrangement applies to Military Transport Aviation  which is
entirely under the control of the Supreme Commander.
     When control of  all these forces is  taken  from the C-in-C of the Air
Forces, he is left only with military academies, training  schools, research
centres,  administrative echelons, hospitals and  supply depots. He supplies
operational  units with reinforcements of equipment  and  men, oversees  the
supply  of  ammunition,  fuel,  and  spare  parts,  investigates reasons for
catastrophes and does a thousand  other useful  jobs, but he does not direct
operations.
     Even  in peacetime the  range  of  his  responsibilities  is  similarly
limited. His Air  Armies  are deployed in Military Districts and are used in
accordance with the plans of their staffs. The General Staff decides how the
Long-Range Air Force and Military Transport Aviation are to be used.

     In peacetime there are sixteen Air Armies.  In  wartime  there would be
rather more, since some of them would  be divided in two. An Air Army  has a
strictly regulated organisation. It consists of:
     Three fighter divisions
     Two fighter-bomber divisions
     One bomber division
     One regiment of fighter/reconnaissance aircraft
     One regiment of bomber/reconnaissance aircraft
     One or two regiments of light transport aircraft
     Fighter, fighter/reconnaissance  and fighter-bomber sub-units  have the
same  organisational  form: A flight has  4 aircraft, a squadron  12  (three
flights), a regiment 40 (three squadrons and a  command flight),  a division
124 (three regiments and a command flight). Bomber and bomber/reconnaissance
sub-units, too, are  identically  organised:  A flight  has  3  aircraft,  a
squadron 9  (three flights), a regiment  30 (three  squadrons and  a command
flight), a division 93 (three regiments and a command flight).
     In all, an Air Army has 786 combat aircraft and between 46 and 80 light
transport aircraft. In the fighter, fighter-bomber and bomber  regiments  of
its divisions, the  first squadron contains the best pilots, bomb-aimers and
air crew.  It is a  great  honour to  serve in  such a squadron. The  second
squadron  is  trained  in  reconnaissance  duties as  well as  in  its  main
functions.  If necessary, the commander of an Air Army  can put in  the air,
besides two reconnaissance  regiments  (70  aircraft), 18 squadrons, of what
might be called `amateur' reconnaissance aircrew (207 aircraft). Each  third
squadron is made up of young airmen. After the latter have put in some years
of service in this third squadron, the commander of the regiment decides who
shall join the `aces' in the first squadron, who shall go to the second, for
reconnaissance duties, and who shall  stay in the third,  among the novices.
The  best  crews from  the second  squadron  graduate to  the reconnaissance
regiments, where they become professionals rather than amateurs.

     This is all very well, the informed reader may say, but in the 37th Air
Army, which is stationed in Poland, there are two rather than six divisions,
while the 16th  Air  Army, in East Germany, has eight  divisions.  Moreover,
neither  of these has a regiment of  light transport aircraft; instead  they
have helicopter regiments. What is the significance of this?
     It  is quite simple. In wartime a Front would be deployed in Poland. It
would contain an Air Army. The Army's headquarters and two Soviet division's
are already there. In wartime the complement would be brought up to strength
with  divisions of the  Polish Air Forces. In peacetime the latter should be
allowed to believe themselves independent.
     In  East  Germany two Fronts  would  be deployed and the 16th Air  Army
would therefore be split into  two (this is  always done  during exercises).
Each Army would contain four Soviet divisions, the complement being made  up
with  divisions of the  East German Air Forces. In peacetime the two  Armies
are  combined  because of the need for unified control over all air movement
in East German air  space and also in order to conceal the  existence of two
Fronts.
     In wartime each  Soviet  motor-rifle  and  tank  division will  have  4
helicopters and every  all-arms and tank Army will have  12. In peacetime it
is  best to keep them together, which reduces  supply and training problems.
This  is why there are  helicopter  regiments  in  Air  Armies. But  at  the
outbreak  of  war  the  helicopters  would  fly  off  to  their   respective
motor-rifle  or tank  divisions  and  Armies. The  commanders of  helicopter
regiments  would then be left without jobs. At this point they would be sent
light transport aircraft, which  would  come  from the civil air fleet.  The
pilots of these would be only half-militarised  but highly  experienced; the
commanders  are already  military men.  In wartime these regiments  would be
used  to drop  the  diversionary sub-units  of the Front  and of its  Armies
behind the enemy's  lines.  For  experienced  civil  pilots this  is  not  a
particularly difficult  task and  the aircraft  which they  would  be flying
would be those they fly in peacetime.

     The Long-Range Air Force (LRAF) consists of three  Corps, each of three
divisions. Some Western sources mistakenly refer to these Corps as Armies.
     Each LRAF  division  has approximately 100 combat  aircraft and a corps
consists,   on   average,  of  300   strategic  bombers,  which   can  carry
air-to-ground missiles.
     The commander of  the  LRAF is subordinated  to the C-in-C  of the  Air
Forces only for  administrative purposes.  Operationally  he  is subordinate
solely to the Supreme Commander.
     There are three Strategic Directions.  There are also three LRAF corps,
which  are deployed  in such  a way that  each Strategic Direction  can have
access to  one  corps.  During  combat  operations  an  LRAF  corps  may  be
temporarily subordinated to  the C-in-C  of a Strategic Direction or  it may
carry  out  operations to support him, while remaining under the command  of
the Supreme Commander.
     However,  the  Soviet marshals would  not plan to conduct operations in
every sector simultaneously, but would  concentrate on one. It  is therefore
possible  that in wartime  all  900 strategic bombers  might be concentrated
against one opponent.

        Military Transport Aviation
     The  Military Transport Aviation (MTA)  force consists of six divisions
and several independent regiments. It has approximately 800 heavy  transport
and troop-carrying aircraft. Its main task is to land airborne forces in the
enemy's rear.
     Like  the LRAF, the MTA is subordinated to the C-in-C of the Air Forces
for administrative purposes only. Operationally, the MTA is  subordinated to
the  Supreme  Commander  and it  can  be used  only  on his instructions, in
accordance with the plans of the General Staff.
     The MTA has a huge  reserve organisation--Aeroflot, the largest airline
in the  world.  Even  in peacetime, the head  of  Aeroflot  has the  rank of
Marshal of the Air Force and the function of Deputy to the C-in-C of the Air
Forces. Organisationally,  even  in  peacetime,  Aeroflot  is  divided  into
squadrons,  regiments  and divisions  and all  its  aircrew  have  ranks  as
officers  of  the  reserve.  In  wartime  Aeroflot's  heavy  aircraft  would
automatically become  part  of  MTA,  while  its light aircraft would become
transport regiments for  the Air Armies  of the  Fronts.  Even in  peacetime
Aeroflot  helicopters are painted  light  green, as  they  would  be in  the
divisions of an operational army.
--------


     Of  the five  Armed  Services  the  Navy  ranks  as  fifth  and last in
importance. This certainly does  not mean that the Navy is weak--simply that
the other armed services are stronger.
     In all, the Soviet Navy has four fleets: Northern, Pacific,  Baltic and
Black Sea, in order of strength.
     Each of the four fleets has six arms of service:
     Submarines
     Naval Aviation
     Surface Ships
     Diversionary SPETSNAZ naval sub-units
     Coastal Rocket and Artillery Troops
     Marine infantry
     The first two of these are considered the primary arms of  service; the
remainder, including surface ships, are seen as auxiliary forces.
     The   Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Navy  has  a  purely  administrative
function,   since  the  Northern  Fleet  is  subordinated,  for  operational
purposes, to the Stavka  and  the three other fleets to the  C-in-Cs of  the
respective Strategic Directions. In addition to his administrative function,
however,  the  C-in-C of  the  Navy is  the  Stavka's  main adviser  on  the
operational use of the Navy. In certain situations, too, on the instructions
from the Stavka,  he may direct groups of  ships operating in the open  sea.
But he  has no independent operational planning function;  this  is entirely
the responsibility of the General Staff.

     Soviet  naval strength is based  on  submarines.  These are  divided by
function, into submarines used for:
     command
     ballistic rockets
     cruise missiles
     torpedoes
     They   are   further   classified   according   to   their  method   of
propulsion--nuclear  or diesel-electric.  The  building  of  diesel-electric
submarines  (except  for  some   used  for  diversionary  or  reconnaissance
purposes)  has  been halted.  Henceforth  all  Soviet submarines  will  have
nuclear propulsion.
     Nuclear submarines are  grouped in divisions, each of 8 to 12.  All the
submarines in a division have the same type of armament. A flotilla consists
of  4 to 5 divisions. They have mixed complements and may consist of between
35 and 64 nuclear submarines with varying functions.
     Diesel-electric submarines are  organised in brigades each  of 8 to 16.
Brigades  may  form  divisions  (2  to 3  brigades)  or squadrons  (4  to  6
brigades).

     Each  fleet has  a naval  aviation component designated,  for instance,
`Naval  Aviation of the Northern Fleet'.  Each such component is made  up of
air divisions  and of  independent regiments and is the equivalent of an Air
Army. Each fleet's  naval  aviation normally includes a  division armed with
long-range air-to-surface  missiles,  for  operation  against enemy aircraft
carriers,  one  or two divisions  of long-range anti-submarine  aircraft and
independent  regiments   with  anti-submarine  seaplanes,   torpedo-bombers,
reconnaissance aircraft and supply and transport  aircraft. In  the last few
years regiments of deck-landing aircraft and helicopters have been formed.

     The  Soviet  Navy must  be  the  only  one in  the  world  in  which  a
nuclear-propelled cruiser, armed with missiles, is relegated to an auxiliary
category. In fact, every  Soviet surface ship, whether it is a battleship or
a missile-cruiser, ranks as auxiliary (the exception is the aircraft carrier
which  is considered as  a  part of  the naval  air force). Perhaps  this is
correct; in  a global war  submarines  and aircraft would  play the  primary
roles.  All other forces would work to support them. And, no matter  how the
number  of Soviet  surface ships  may  grow,  Soviet  submarines will always
outnumber them. Moreover  there has recently been a noticeable trend towards
an increase in the  displacement of submarines and it is quite possible that
they will eventually surpass  the surface ships  in  tonnage, too,  and will
maintain their superiority permanently.
     Soviet surface ships  are organised  in groups  (for  ships only),
brigades  (medium-size  ships and groups  of  er ones),  divisions  and
squadrons.
     In  the  next few  years,  the  Soviet  Navy will  be  enlarged  by the
acquisition  of  a  series  of  large  nuclear-propelled  missile  cruisers.
Intensive  work  is  being  put  into  the  design  and  building  of  large
nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers. Ships like the 

Moskva

 and the 

Kiev

 have
only  been  built  in  order to acquire  the experience needed before really
large ships are built. Particular attention will be paid  to the building of
large  landing ships which are capable of a high degree of independence. The
construction  of  surface  ships will  continue. Despite  the  enormous
progress which has been made  in building surface  ships, however, they will
continue to be classified as auxiliary forces.

     The presence of diversionary SPETSNAZ sub-units in the Soviet Navy is a
closely guarded  secret. Yet  they  exist and  have done so for a long time.
Already by the end of the 1950s each Fleet had its own SPETSNAZ diversionary
brigade,  under   the  direct  command  of  the  Third  Department  of   the
Intelligence Directorate at Naval Headquarters.
     A diversionary brigade has one division of miniature submarines, two or
three  battalions of frogmen,  a parachute  battalion  and a  communications
company. It forms an entirely independent combat unit and an independent arm
of service within the fleet. For camouflage  purposes, its members sometimes
wear the  uniform  of the marine infantry. In other  circumstances they  may
wear any other type  of uniform, again as  camouflage. The parachutists wear
Naval Aviation uniform, the  crews  of the miniature submarines, of  course,
that of ordinary submarine crews, the  remainder that of seagoing personnel,
coastal artillery forces, etc.
     Again for  camouflage purposes, the personnel of a diversionary brigade
is  dispersed  between  several naval bases. This does not  prevent it  from
functioning  as a unified  combat organisation.  In  wartime these  brigades
would be used against enemy naval installations, in  the first place against
nuclear  submarine bases.  Groups of  diversionary troops  may  operate from
surface ships or  from large submarines or may  be  landed from aircraft. In
addition, a  unit of large fishing trawlers would be mobilised in wartime to
launch and to support  operations by miniature  submarines. The compartments
of these trawlers,  designed to hold large  catches, are ideal for the rapid
launch or recovery of miniature submarines and  diversionary craft.
     The diversionary SPETSNAZ brigades of the Navy, like those serving with
Fronts, each have  as  part of their  complement  a headquarters  company of
specialists,  whose  primary  task is  the  assassination  of political  and
military leaders. These  companies are  disguised  as naval  athletic teams.
These `sportsmen' are, naturally, keen on rowing, swimming  and scuba-diving
as well as on shooting, boxing, wrestling, running and karate.
     As a  well-known  example  we  can  quote  Senior  Lieutenant  Valentin
Yerikalin, of the SPETSNAZ brigade of the  Black Sea Fleet, who won a silver
medal  for  rowing at the Olympic Games  held  in Mexico  City. There was no
attempt to conceal the fact that Yerikalin was a naval officer and a  member
of the Central Army Sports Club. Some years later this `sportsman' turned up
in Istanbul, having now  become a diplomat. He was  arrested by the  Turkish
police for  trying to recruit  a Turkish subject  to work for the Black  Sea
Fleet, or, more precisely, for the diversionary brigade of this Fleet.

     The Navy's coastal rocket and artillery troops consist of regiments and
independent  battalions. They are  equipped with  both stationary and mobile
rocket  launchers and with  artillery weapons.  Their task  is  to cover the
approaches to principal naval bases and ports.

     Each Fleet has Marine Infantry contingents, consisting of regiments and
brigades.  In  their  organisation,  these  regiments  are  similar  to  the
motor-rifle  regiments  of the  Land Forces.  They differ from the latter in
receiving special  training for operating  in varying conditions and also in
being allocated personnel of a higher calibre. Generals from the Land Forces
who  have watched exercises  carried out by  the  marine infantry often say,
with some envy, that a regiment of marine infantry, with the  same equipment
as that issued  to the  Land Forces,  is  the equivalent in  its operational
potential of one of the latter's motor-rifle divisions.
     The Soviet Navy has only  one brigade  of marine infantry. This belongs
to  the  Pacific  Fleet.  It  consists  of two  tank  and  five  motor-rifle
battalions and is equipped with especially heavy artillery. This brigade  is
sometimes mistakenly taken for two independent regiments of marine infantry.
     The Soviet marine infantry has a very promising future. In the next few
years it  will  receive new  types  of equipment which will enable it to put
large units into action against distant targets. Special combat equipment is
being developed for such operations by the marine infantry.

     In our examination of the Soviet Navy we must bear in mind a myth which
is widely  believed in  the  West--`The Soviet Navy was weak  until a strong
man, Gorshkov,  arrived and  brought  it up to  its  proper  strength'. This
presumption is untrue in several respects.
     Until the Second World War,  Soviet Communist expansion was directed at
states  adjacent to the USSR--Finland,  Estonia,  Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Germany,   Romania,   Turkey,    Iran,    Afghanistan,    Mongolia,   China.
Understandably, in this situation, the senior  officers of the  Navy wielded
little influence,  for no one  would allow them to build up the Navy  at the
expense of the Land or Air Forces. For the USSR,  the Second World War was a
land  war,  and  during  the  first  few  years  after  the  war,  Communist
aggression,  too,  remained  entirely  land-based--Czechoslovakia,  Romania,
Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Korea,  China. If Gorshkov had appeared during this
period, no one would  have  allowed  him  to become all-powerful. During the
first few years after the war  too,  there was another problem of overriding
urgency--that of catching up with the United States in the fields of nuclear
weapons and  of delivery systems for  them.  Until  this problem was solved,
there could be no question of allowing Gorshkov to build a navy.
     The situation changed radically at the end of the 1950s.
     Throughout the world, Communist land-based aggression  was running into
opposition from a wall of states bonded together  in military blocs. At this
point,  the  acquisition  of a navy  became necessary  if  the  campaign  of
aggression  was  to continue. Expansion  was continuing  beyond the seas and
across oceans--in Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Africa, Cuba and South  America.
In this situation, even if the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had not wished
to expand his fleets, he would have been forced to do so. Until the war, the
main  threat to the USSR had  come  from  continental  powers--from Germany,
France and  Japanese-occupied Manchuria.  After  the  war  the United States
became the main enemy. Of course, anyone occupying Gorshkov's position would
have received billions of additional rubles to  use  in the struggle against
the USA. At the beginning of  the 1960s it  was  established that a  nuclear
submarine provided an excellent platform for rockets. A start  was made with
their production. Of course, they would not be at Gorshkov's disposal but he
was given the green light to develop conventional naval forces with which to
protect them.
     One final point. The Politburo had realised quite clearly, early on and
without help  from  Gorshkov, that the great  sea powers, Great Britain, the
United States and Japan, would take  the place of  Germany and France as the
main enemies of the  Soviet Union. It was for this reason that in  July 1938
the Politburo adopted a  resolution `On  the construction of an  ocean-going
fleet'. (At that time Gorshkov was only the  commander of  a  destroyer.) In
accordance with  the  resolution, a start was  made  with  the  building  of
aircraft carriers like the 

Krasnoye Znamya

  and with giant  battleships like
the 

Sovetskiy Soyuz

 and cruisers like the 

Shapayev

.
     Germany entered the  Second World War with 57 submarines, Great Britain
with  58, Japan with 56 and the United States with 99. According to its  own
figures,  the  Soviet  Union had 212  when  it came into  the war,  although
American engineers, who built these submarines,  estimate that it  had  253.
The  Soviet Navy had 2,824  aircraft in 1941, the coastal artillery  had 260
batteries, including some 406mm guns. All this was  before Gorshkov. The war
put a brake on the shipbuilding programme and after its end the  building of
all  the large ships laid down before the war  was discontinued,  since they
had become obsolete.
     However, the Politburo understood the  need for an ocean-going navy and
a  new shipbuilding programme, of which  we can  see the  results today, was
approved in September 1955. This programme pre-dated Gorshkov. He was simply
empowered  to carry  out  a programme which  had been authorised  before his
time.
     There  is  no doubt  that  Gorshkov  is a  strong-willed and purposeful
admiral, but this counts for little in the USSR. No admiral would be allowed
to advocate this or that step if the Politburo thought differently from him.
     Finally,  no matter how powerful  the West may  consider Gorshkov,  the
fact remains that the Soviet Navy ranks as fifth of the five Armed Services.
--------


     The Airborne Forces (ABF) do not rank  as one of the Armed Services but
as an arm of service. However they are an independent arm of service, and do
not belong to any of the Armed  Services. In peacetime they are subordinated
directly to the Minister of Defence and in wartime to the Supreme Commander.
     At present there are only 13 formations in the world which one can call
`Airborne  Divisions'. The  US, West Germany, France, China and  Poland each
have one. The remaining 8 belong to the Soviet Union.
     The  airborne  divisions  are  directed,  for both  administrative  and
operational purposes, by  a  Commander. His  post is  of  unique importance.
Although he commands only 8  divisions,  he has the  rank of  General of the
Army, the same as that held  by  the Commander-in-Chief of the Land  Forces,
who has 170 divisions under his command.
     In  peacetime, all  the ABF  divisions  are  up  to  their full wartime
complement and staffed by  the best  troops. The ABF  have first  choice  of
personnel, before even the Strategic Rocket Forces and the  Navy's submarine
detachments.
     ABF  troops  may operate under the control of the  C-in-C  of Strategic
Directions,   in  groups  of  1  to   3  divisions,  or  they  may  function
independently.
     If 1 to 3 divisions  are to be  used  for an  airdrop  in  a particular
sector their operations are coordinated by an ABF corps command group, which
is established temporarily  for this purpose.  One  of the  ABF  Commander's
deputies commands the corps. If 4 or 5 divisions are to be used, a temporary
ABF Army command group is established.  This may be headed by  the Commander
of the ABF himself, or by one of his deputies.
     The entire strength of Military Transport Aviation of the Air Forces is
controlled by the Commander of  the ABF while  an airborne assault operation
is taking place.
     Each-ABF division consists of:
     Three parachute regiments
     A reconnaissance battalion (18 armoured reconnaissance vehicles)
     A battalion of self-propelled artillery (32 airborne assault guns)
     An anti-tank battalion (18 85mm guns)
     A howitzer battalion (18 122mm guns)
     A battalion of multiple rocket launchers (18 BM 27-Ds)
     An anti-aircraft battalion (32 ZSU-23-4s)
     A communications battalion
     A motor transport battalion
     A battalion responsible for the  storage and packing of supply-dropping
parachutes
     A chemical warfare company
     An engineer company
     A parachute regiment  has three  battalions  and mortar, anti-aircraft,
anti-tank, and self-propelled artillery batteries.
     All  the battalions  in  one regiment of a  division are  equipped with
BMD-1  armoured personnel carriers. Two other regiments  have one  battalion
each of BMD-1s and two of light motor vehicles. Thus, of the  nine parachute
battalions  in  a  division,   five   have   armoured  vehicles   of   great
manoeuvrability and considerable fire-power, the remaining  four have  light
vehicles. In all,  a parachute division has 180 armoured personnel carriers,
62 self-propelled  guns, 18  multiple  rocket launchers, 36  field  guns, 45
mortars, 54 anti-aircraft guns, more than 200 anti-aircraft rocket launchers
and  more  than  300  anti-tank  rocket  launchers.  The division  is  fully
motorised, with more than 1,500 vehicles.  Its  average peacetime complement
is 7,200.

     There has  been discussion  for some considerable  time,  in  both  the
Soviet  General  Staff  and  the  Central  Committee,  of  the  question  of
transforming the ABF into a sixth, independent Armed Service.
     It is envisaged that such a Service would have four  or five  parachute
divisions,   a   large   contingent   of    transport    aircraft,   several
newly-established divisions  of marine infantry, units of landing  ships and
several aircraft carriers with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.
     Experience has shown  that  the USSR has not enough forces equipped and
trained for  armed intervention in a territory which is separated from it by
an  ocean and that it is unprepared for such an undertaking. There are  many
examples--Cuba, Indonesia, South Africa, Chile, Central America. A new Armed
Service of  the sort described would  enable  the Soviet Union  to intervene
effectively in such areas.
     As its  internal crises  become more  acute, the  aggressiveness of the
Soviet Union increases. For  this reason it appears probable that  the sixth
Armed Service will be created in the next few years.
--------


     Soviet Military Intelligence  is neither an Armed Service nor an Arm of
Service.  It has no uniform  or identifying badge  or emblem. Nor are  these
needed.  Intelligence is a  logistical  support  service, like  the services
concerned with nuclear warheads or camouflage or disinformation.
     All these services  are secret and do not need publicity. Each of  them
adopts  the appearance  of the unit  in  which it finds  itself and  becomes
indistinguishable from it.
     Soviet military intelligence is a gigantic organisation, which performs
a  vast  range  of  tasks.   In  numbers   and  technical  equipment  it  is
approximately the size  of the Bundeswehr--the entire armed  services of the
Federal German Republic.
     In action,  decisions are  taken by  commanding officers,  ranging from
those in  charge of sections to the  Supreme Commander. The  plans on  which
these  decisions are based are  prepared  for the commanding officer by  his
staff. He  then  either  approves the  plan or  rejects  it and  orders that
another one should be prepared. All commanding officers from battalion level
upwards have staffs. The chief of  staff  is both his commander's  principal
adviser and  his deputy. Staffs vary in size according to the  importance of
the unit--a battalion has a staff of two, and the General Staff numbers tens
of thousands. In  spite of this, the work of any staff proceeds according to
the same plan.
     The first  officer on the  staff  plans operations, the second  officer
provides  him  with the information he needs about the enemy.  The chief  of
staff coordinates  the work  of these  two, helps them,  checks their  work,
prepares a plan with their help and presents it to the commander, who either
accepts or rejects it.
     On a battalion staff the  chief of staff and the first  officer are one
and the same. The staff of a regiment consists of a  chief of staff, a first
officer and a second officer, who is in charge  of intelligence  work. On  a
divisional  staff the first  and  second officers  have  their  own  working
groups. An Army staff has first and second departments. The staff of a Front
and  of a Strategic Direction has First and Second Directorates. The General
Staff has First and Second Chief Directorates.
     Staffs also  have other departments, directorates or Chief Directorates
but   the    work   of    the   first   component--planning--and    of   the
second--intelligence--form the backbone of any staff.
     All  intelligence  work (which includes  reconnaissance) from battalion
level to the  very top,  is thus  wholly in the  hands of the staff officers
concerned and represents one of the most important components of the work of
the staff.
     Those employed on intelligence and  reconnaissance work can  be divided
into   `professionals'--those    whose    basic    function    it    is--and
`amateurs'--those who are employed  on intelligence  work  from time to time
and for whom it is an additional rather than their main occupation.
     The intelligence and reconnaissance  resources  of  a battalion are not
large. A motor-rifle battalion has a mortar battery, with a command platoon,
which includes  an  artillery reconnaissance section. This section works for
the  mortar battery, reporting all the results which it  obtains both to the
battery commander and to the second officer on the battalion's staff, who is
responsible  for all reconnaissance work in the  battalion. This is all. All
the  personnel involved are `professionals'. In a tank battalion there is no
mortar battery  and  therefore no `professionals'. But there are `amateurs'.
In each motor-rifle or tank  battalion the second company, besides  carrying
out its normal  duties, is trained for reconnaissance  operations behind the
enemy's lines. During  an action any of the  platoons of the  second company
may be  detailed for reconnaissance tasks  for the battalion.  Sometimes the
whole second company may be detached to carry out  reconnaissance tasks  for
the regiment.

     The second officer on the staff of a regiment has the title `Regimental
Intelligence Officer'. He is  a major and the resources  at his disposal are
not inconsiderable.
     Directly under his command is the  regiment's  reconnaissance  company,
which has 4 tanks,  7 armoured  vehicles (BMP  `Korshun'  or BRDM-3)  and  9
motorcycles.
     In addition  the regiment has an artillery battalion, anti-tank, rocket
and anti-aircraft  batteries. All these  have  resources sufficient  to meet
their own requirements for artillery reconnaissance and  observation and the
information which they produce is also sent to regimental headquarters.
     The regiment also has an engineer company with a reconnaissance platoon
and a  chemical  warfare  company  with  a  CW  reconnaissance  platoon. The
specialised  reconnaissance  activities  of  these platoons  are  of primary
benefit  to the engineer and  CW companies  but  since they  are engaged  in
reconnaissance they are controlled  by  the regimental intelligence  officer
(RIO).
     Finally, the latter is in charge of the second officers  on  the staffs
of the  regiment's battalions. These officers work  for their battalions but
are  subordinated  to  and  fully  controlled  by  the  RIO.  During  combat
operations, at the direction of the commander of the regiment, the `amateur'
companies from any of the battalions can be subordinated to the RIO, to work
for  the  regiment  as   a   whole.  Thus,   the  regiment's  `professional'
reconnaissance  company may be joined  at any time  by a second tank company
and by the three second companies from the motor-rifle battalions.
     In a battle, a regiment's reconnaissance companies operate at ranges of
up  to  50  kilometres  away.  Both  the  `professional' and  the  `amateur'
companies  have  BMP  or  BRDM  vehicles  for  CW,  engineer  and  artillery
reconnaissance work.  The  fact that these vehicles are always with what are
purely  reconnaissance  sub-units  has led  to  the  idea  that  they are an
integral part of  these  units. But  this  is not  so. The CW reconnaissance
platoon is taken from the  CW company,  the engineer reconnaissance  platoon
from  the  engineer  company and so forth. Quite simply,  it would  be  both
pointless and dangerous to send special reconnaissance sub-units  behind the
enemy lines unprotected. For this reason they  always  operate  with  normal
tank  and  motor-rifle  reconnaissance  sub-units,  which  protect  and  are
temporarily in command of them.
     During  reconnaissance operations,  all reconnaissance  sub-units  work
covertly, keeping  away  from  concentrations  of  enemy troops  and  always
avoiding contact. They operate to achieve surprise, working from ambushes to
capture prisoners and  documents and they  also carry out observation of the
enemy.  They accept battle only when they clash unexpectedly with the enemy,
and  if it  is impossible to  avoid contact  or to escape.  If  they do find
themselves  in  contact with superior numbers of the  enemy they  will often
disperse,  meeting again  some hours later at  an agreed  spot in  order  to
resume their mission.
     There is one situation  in which reconnaissance sub-units would  accept
battle, whatever the circumstances. If they encountered enemy nuclear forces
(missile  launchers,  nuclear  artillery,  convoys  or   stores  of  nuclear
warheads)  they  would  report  that  they  had  located  the  target, would
discontinue their reconnaissance mission  and would launch a surprise attack
on the  enemy, with  all their  resources,  whatever  this  might  cost  and
whatever the strength of the enemy's defences.

     A divisional  intelligence officer--the second officer on  a divisional
staff--has  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel.  He   has  very  considerable
resources  at his disposal. In the  first  place he is in charge of  all the
regimental  intelligence  officers,   in  the  division,   with  all   their
subordinates,  both  `professional'  and  `amateur'. He supervises artillery
reconnaissance  and observation, which in a division  is already of sizeable
proportions. He is also in charge of the  engineer reconnaissance company of
the division's sapper battalion and  of the CW reconnaissance company in the
division's  CW protection battalion. In addition, he has personal control of
the division's reconnaissance battalion.
     To coordinate the workings of all these resources (more than a thousand
`professionals' and  more  than fifteen  hundred  `amateurs')  a  divisional
intelligence  officer has  a group of  officers,  which  has the designation
`Second Group of the Divisional Staff'.
     The reconnaissance battalion of a division is made up of the division's
best  soldiers and  officers--the fittest, toughest, most  quick-witted  and
resourceful. It has four companies and auxiliary sub-units.
     The first  of  these, a  long-range,  reconnaissance  company,  is  the
est and the most ready for battle of the 166 companies and batteries in
the  division. It  has  a  strength  of  27, 6 of  whom are officers and the
remainder sergeants. It has a  commander,  a company sergeant-major and five
long-range reconnaissance groups  each  consisting  of  an  officer and four
sergeants. These groups can operate far  behind the enemy lines. They may be
landed by helicopter or  may push through into the enemy's rear in jeeps  or
light armoured  vehicles after  following close behind their  own troops and
then  passing them and moving on far ahead. Long-range reconnaissance groups
are used both  to  gather  intelligence  and  to  carry out diversionary and
terrorist operations.
     The battalion's second and third companies have the same organisational
structure as the  reconnaissance  companies of  regiments  and use  the same
equipment and  tactics, but unlike them  they operate at  distances of up to
100 kilometres ahead of the front line.
     The fourth company is the `radio  and  radar reconnaissance' or signals
intelligence  company. Its function is  to  detect  and  locate  enemy radio
transmitters, to intercept and decipher their transmissions and  to  locate,
identify  and study the  enemy's  radar stations.  In  peacetime, the  great
majority of these companies are already on an  operational footing.  In  the
Group  of Soviet Forces  in Germany,  for instance,  there are 19  tank  and
motor-rifle divisions.  These contain 19 reconnaissance battalions,  each of
which has one  signals  intelligence company. All these companies  have been
moved, in peacetime, up  to the border with West Germany  and are working at
full stretch, twenty-four hours  a day,  collecting and analysing any  radio
signal which  is transmitted in their operational area.  The same applies to
all  the other,  similar companies of  the divisions which  are stationed on
Soviet territory and  in all the frontier military districts. In a number of
cases, the signals intelligence companies of divisions in military districts
away from  the  frontier  have been  moved into frontier districts  and  are
working operationally,  supplementing  and  duplicating the  work  of  other
similar companies.
     The second officer of the staff of an Army has the  rank of colonel. To
control the Army's reconnaissance work he has his own department, the Second
Department  of the Army Staff.  Because  an Army  has so many reconnaissance
resources  and  because  these differ  so  widely one from  the  other,  the
department is divided into four groups.
     The first group  is concerned  with the  reconnaissance activity of the
motor-rifle  and  tank  divisions  of  the  Army  and  also  of  the  Army's
independent brigades and regiments.
     Army reconnaissance departments have no second group.
     The   third  group  is   concerned  with  diversionary  and   terrorist
operations. Under  its  control  is  an  independent  SPETSNAZ  company, the
organisation and functions of which have already been discussed.
     The fourth group deals with the processing of all the information which
is received.
     The fifth group directs radio and radar reconnaissance. It controls two
electronic  intelligence  battalions.  It  also  coordinates  the operations
carried out in this field by  the  Army's divisions.  Needless  to say,  all
signals intelligence battalions are  working operationally in  peacetime. In
East Germany, for  instance, there are 5 Soviet  Armies, that  is to say  10
electronic  intelligence  battalions,  which keep  a constant watch  on  the
enemy, in  addition to the 19 companies  which are on  the  strength of  the
divisions of these Armies.

     A Front is made up of two or three all-arms armies and of a tank and an
air army. It possesses a large quantity  of reconnaissance resources--enough
to equal the intelligence services of a large European industrial state.
     The  second officer of a Front's staff is a  major-general. To  control
the  reconnaissance and  intelligence  activities  of  the  Front he  has  a
reconnaissance directorate (the Front's Second  Directorate), which has five
departments.
     The first of these controls the  reconnaissance  work of all the Armies
belonging to the Front, including that carried out by the Air Army, which we
have already discussed.
     The second department carries out agent work, for which it maintains an
Intelligence  Centre,  working on behalf of the Armies  making up the Front,
since these do not run agents,  and three or four intelligence outposts. The
centre  and  the  outposts  are  hard  at  work,  in  peacetime,   obtaining
intelligence in  the territory in  which the Front would operate in wartime.
The Soviet Army has a  total of  16 military districts, 4 groups  of forces,
and  4 fleets.  Each of these has  a  staff with a Second Directorate, which
itself has a second  department.  There are  thus 24 of  these; each of them
constitutes an independent agent running intelligence organisation, which is
active  on the territories of  several foreign countries, working separately
from any other similar  services. Each of them has four  or  five individual
agent-running organisations which seek to recruit  foreigners  who will work
for the Front or for its tank armies, fleet, flotilla or all-arms armies.
     The  third department  of each of  these 24 Reconnaissance Directorates
concerns  itself with diversionary and terrorist activities. The  department
supervises activity of this sort in the armies of the Front but also has its
own men and equipment. It has a SPETSNAZ diversionary brigade and a SPETSNAZ
diversionary agent  network of foreign nationals, who have been recruited to
work for the Front in the  latter's  operational  area in wartime.  Thus, in
both  peace  and wartime the officer  in  charge  of the  reconnaissance and
intelligence  work  of a Front or Fleet  has two completely separate  secret
networks,  one,  which  gathers  intelligence,  controlled  by  the   second
department  of the Directorate and another, concerned  with diversionary and
terrorist operations, which is subordinated to the third department.
     The fourth department  collates all the reconnaissance and intelligence
material which is produced.
     The  fifth  department is concerned  with the  radio and reconnaissance
work of the divisions and armies and also has two regiments and a helicopter
squadron of its own which also carry out signals intelligence operations.

     A Strategic Direction is made up  of four Fronts, one Fleet and a Group
of Tank Armies. Its staff contains a Reconnaissance Directorate, headed by a
lieutenant-general.  We  already  know   that  he  has  at  his  disposal  a
diversionary SPETSNAZ long-range reconnaissance regiment, containing Olympic
medal-winners,  most  of  whom  are  not  only   professional  athletes  but
professional  killers. The Reconnaissance Directorate  also  has  an  entire
range  of reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering  equipment, one of which
deserves special mention.
     This is the `Yastreb' pilotless rocket aircraft, which is launched from
a   mobile   rocket   launcher    and   which   carries   out   photo-   and
radio-reconnaissance at heights of more than 30 kilometres, flying at speeds
in excess of  3,500 kilometres per hour. From Byelorussia the `Yastreb'  has
successfully carried  out  photographic  reconnaissance  over  Spain,  Great
Britain and the French Atlantic seaboard. Its appearance at the beginning of
the 1970s caused alarm at NATO headquarters. It was mistakenly identified as
a MIG-25R.  After  a  MIG 25 had  appeared in Japan and  had been  carefully
examined,  the  experts  came  to  the  conclusion  that  this  aircraft had
insufficient operational  radius to fly over Western Europe. It was realised
that there had  been a false alarm and in order not to cause another one the
Soviet Union discontinued flights by the `Yastreb' in peacetime. However, it
is still being used over China,  Asia and Africa and over the oceans. Having
the  invulnerability  of a  rocket and the precision  of  an  aircraft,  the
`Yastreb' would also make an excellent vehicle for a nuclear warhead. Unlike
a rocket it can be used again and again.

     The  second officer of the General Staff  has the  title of Head of the
Chief  Intelligence Directorate (GRU).  He is a full General  of  the  Army.
Besides   controlling   the   intelligence   and  reconnaissance   resources
subordinated to him, he has his own, incomparably huge intelligence network.
The GRU works for the Supreme Commander. It carries out espionage on a scale
unparalleled in history. It is enough to record that during World War II the
GRU was able, with its own resources, to penetrate the  German General Staff
from Switzerland and to  steal  nuclear secrets from  the United States, and
that after  the war  it  was able to induce  France  to leave NATO,  besides
carrying  out many  less  risky operations.  The  work of  the  GRU's  agent
networks is  controlled  by the first four Directorates,  each of  which  is
headed  by a lieutenant-general. The processing of all  information reaching
the GRU is carried out by an enormous organisation which is grouped into six
Information Directorates.  Today  the  Head of  the  GRU  has  two separate,
world-wide,  intelligence organisations,  a  colossal  number  of electronic
intelligence  centres, centrally controlled diversionary units and so on and
so forth.
     However, the Chief Intelligence  Directorate of the General Staff  is a
subject which calls for a substantial book to itself.

     Staffs are of different types. The est is that of a battalion, the
largest  is  the  General  Staff.  But each has  its  own  intelligence  and
reconnaissance resources, just as each brain has its  own eyes and ears. The
higher  staffs  control  the   lower  ones  and  the   corresponding  higher
intelligence  organisations direct those  below them.  At  all  levels,  the
intelligence  and  reconnaissance  organisations  work for their  respective
staffs,  but if intelligence which is received  is  of interest to either  a
higher or a lower echelon, it is passed on immediately.
     Here is a particularly interesting example of such coordination.
     In  the  summer  of 1943,  the  Red  Army was  preparing  to  halt  the
enormously powerful German advance. In the Kursk salient seven Soviet Fronts
were simultaneously preparing their defences.
     The overall  coordination of operations  in the Strategic Direction was
in the  hands of Marshal G. K. Zhukov.  Never in the  history of warfare had
such  a  defence  system  been  set up, on  a  front  more than  a  thousand
kilometres  in  length.  The overall  depth of  the obstacles erected by the
engineers  was  250-300  kilometres.  On an  average,  7,000  anti-tank  and
anti-personnel  mines were laid along every kilometre of the front. For  the
first  time the AT  artillery density  reached  41 guns  per  kilometre.  In
addition, field guns and  anti-aircraft guns were brought up for use against
tanks.   It  was   already  impossible  to  break   through  such  a  front.
Nevertheless, the German  command decided to try  to do so. But,  they  were
only able to  bring together a  million  men  and officers  to carry out the
operation, and they were unable to achieve surprise. On  the night of 5 June
a  reconnaissance group  from  one  of  the thousands  of  Soviet battalions
captured a German lance-corporal  who had been  clearing a  passage  through
barbed wire obstacles. The Soviet battalion was immediately put on the alert
and  the  second officer  on  its  staff  decided  to inform  the regimental
intelligence  officer  of  what  had  happened. The regiment was brought  to
battle  readiness  straight  away  and  the  news  of  the  capture  of  the
lance-corporal was transmitted to the  intelligence group of the  divisional
staff  and  from there to  the staff of the corps,  to the staff of the 13th
Army, straight from  there to  the Central Front  headquarters and thence to
the Headquarters of the  Strategic  Direction, to Marshal Zhukov and finally
to  the  Chief  Intelligence  Directorate  of  the  General  Staff.  It took
twenty-seven minutes for the message to pass from the battalion staff to the
Chief Intelligence Directorate.  The news was astonishing.  If the enemy was
clearing passages through barbed wire,  he must be preparing to advance. But
only  an immense  offensive could be  contemplated  against  such  a  mighty
defensive system. And immense it was--but it ended in complete disaster.
--------


     At the time of the  siege of  Sevastopol,  Nicholas I attempted to make
the  shameful Crimean war  seem  more  acceptable. But nothing  came of  his
efforts:  the Russian newspapers printed not what the  government wanted but
what their journalists saw  with their own eyes. More than  that--it was not
only journalists who wrote  in the Russian newspapers and journals about the
war but officers of the Russian army--actual participants in the war.
     Lev Tolstoy, then a very  young officer,  wrote 

Sevastopol  Stories

, in
which, in contrast to the government's  propaganda,  he described the war as
he saw  it for  himself. At  that time, of course, there was no freedom, let
alone democracy. Yet,  surprisingly,  the  young  officer was not hanged, or
disembowelled  with  a  ramrod  or  banished to  Siberia--he  was  not  even
dismissed   from  the   army.  He  continued  his   military  career,   most
successfully.
     Tolstoy was not an exception. Look at the newspapers from that time and
you  will  be surprised to see how Russian officers, even generals, wrote in
almost  every  issue  criticising  their  own  government  for lethargy  and
clumsiness and for their inability to rule  the country  or direct the army.
Lev Tolstoy stood out from all the critics of the regime only because he was
more talented than the rest.
     During  the  Russo-Japanese war the Tsarist government tried once again
to  make the war seem attractive. It  was  hopeless. The  Russian newspapers
totally  rejected all attempts to embroider reality. They published not what
the Tsar wanted but what eye-witnesses had seen. One of them,  an uneducated
sailor from the battleship 

Orel

,  Novikov, gathered a mass of material about
the blunders  of the Russian Naval  Staff and of the admirals  who had taken
part in the war and,  without any fear of the consequences, began to publish
it. It  sold like hot  cakes and Novikov made  a  lot of  money  out of  his
criticisms of the Russian government  and of  the Tsar himself. Did they cut
off his head? Not at all; he bought a large house by the sea in Yalta, right
next door to the Tsar, and lived there, writing his books, the best of which
is 

Tsushima

.
     By the time of the First World War, the government was no longer making
any great efforts to  colour reality. A certain Vladimir Ulyanov, a  student
who  had not obtained his degree,  and who concealed his identity behind the
pseudonym `Lenin', began  to publish Communist  newspapers, in  editions  of
millions, exposing every attempt to  mislead the public. His newspapers were
free, although it  cost  millions of gold  roubles  to print them. Where did
such a half-educated man lay his hands on so much money?
     But then  the  anarchy came to  an end. The Tsar  was  overthrown,  the
bourgeoisie were driven off and the people inherited  everything. Publishing
houses, being large undertakings, were  immediately nationalised. From  then
on  the newspapers  began to contain not  whatever might come into someone's
head  but what the  people  really  needed,  and whatever would benefit  the
people. Since, naturally, the people as a whole cannot  run a newspaper,  it
is run by  the best representatives of the people. They take great care that
no one  uses  the  newspapers against  the people.  If a  young  officer, an
uneducated sailor or a student without a degree should approach the editors,
these representatives would immediately ask--do our people need this?  Is it
necessary to frighten or disillusion them? Should they be corrupted? Perhaps
it is  not such immature,  subjective writings, which are detrimental to the
popular interests which should be published, but what the people need.
     That is how things developed--if an article or story did  not serve the
people's  interests  it  was  not  published  in  the  people's  newspapers.
Everything had been  nationalised, everything belonged  to the  people. That
being  so, why  should  their  representatives  waste  public money  on  the
publication of a harmful article or a story?
     It  is  said  that  nationalised   undertakings  belong  to  the  whole
community. But  try  sitting in  the  compartment  of a  nationalised  train
without a ticket--you will be made to  get  out and will be  fined. In other
words, the nationalised  railways are not yours or mine or his or ours. They
belong to the people  who run it--in the final instance, to the  government.
The  same  applies to  a  nationalised newspaper.  It,  too,  belongs to the
government. In the Soviet Union all newspapers are nationalised and thus all
belong to the government.  Is it  necessary for the government to  criticise
its own  actions  in its  own newspaper? That  is  the  reason  why there is
absolutely no criticism of the government in the  Soviet newspapers. That is
why no unqualified  student would be  able, nowadays, to voice criticisms of
any representative  of  the Soviet people. On the other hand, the government
has  acquired  excellent  facilities to publish anything they  wish, without
risking public exposure; the  whole  press now belongs to it. And it is this
freedom from control which allows the government and all its institutions to
make daily, even hourly,  use  of  an exceptionally  powerful and  effective
weapon--bluff.

     Soviet leaders use bluff on a large scale in international politics and
they use it in masterly fashion. They employ it with particular skill in the
military field: everything is secret--just try  to find out what is true and
what is not.
     During  the Cuban crisis Khrushchev threatened to reduce  capitalism to
ashes by pressing a  button; this  was at  a  time when Soviet rockets  were
still blind, having completely unreliable guidance systems, which meant that
they could only be launched  on strictly limited  courses, otherwise  no one
could be sure where they would end up.
     After Khrushchev  all work  directed  at  deception of  the  enemy  was
centralised. I have already mentioned the  Chief Directorate  for  Strategic
Deception, which is commanded by General N. V.  Ogarkov. Here is an  example
of its work.
     The  Soviet  Union had been  alarming the rest of the  world  with  its
rockets for some time before the United States began to deploy a  system for
anti-missile defence. For the Soviet  Union this American system was like  a
knife  at its throat--because  of  it Soviet rockets had  lost much of their
power to  terrorise.  The USSR was  quite simply  unable to  deploy  its own
similar system  and  it  had  no  intention of doing so--it  does  not  hold
defensive systems in any great esteem. But it  was essential somehow to stop
the Americans.
     So  the whole Soviet (nationalised)  press began saying--in unison--`We
have  been working on this question for  a long  time  and we  have had some
success'.  Then, casually, they showed the whole world  some lengths of film
showing one rocket destroying  another. A  very primitive  trick.  A  circus
clown  who knows the precise trajectory characteristics of  a rocket and its
launch-time could hit it  with an airgun. If a  trick like this was shown to
Soviet schoolchildren in a circus, they  would  not be taken in.  They would
know  quite  well that there are  no miracles  and  that the clown must have
fixed it  somehow.  In  Western capitals, too, they knew that there  are  no
miracles, and  that until the  US  gave  the USSR computers no system of the
sort could be built there.
     But  the  tricks continued.  A  gigantic rocket  appeared  in a  Moscow
parade, not in  the contingent from the Strategic Rocket Forces but in  that
of the National  Air  Defence Forces--obviously,  therefore,  it must be  an
anti-ballistic  missile.  Finally,  the  USSR  set  about  erecting  a  most
important building--an ABM guidance station. A station of this sort built by
the Americans would be  fully  automated,  needing  a team  of  more  than a
thousand, with  high  engineering  qualifications,  to run  it. This station
looks like the Pyramid of Cheops, although it is much larger.
     They began to build it right in  the  outskirts of  Moscow, directly on
the ring-road  round  the capital. Let all the foreign diplomats take a good
look  at  it.  Occasionally incomprehensible  high-powered  signals would be
transmitted by the  station which careful analysis showed to be exactly  the
sort of signals such a station would transmit. But, inside, the building was
empty, without its most essential component--a computer and command complex.
     However,   the   dimensions   of  the  building,  the  incomprehensible
transmissions, the lengths of  film and various dark hints dropped by Soviet
generals produced the required effect. And the Soviet press provided further
evidence--defence against  missiles, it said,  is a  very expensive  and not
very  effective business,  although  we are putting every  effort  into  it.
Soviet  intelligence agents  suddenly  received orders to suspend all  their
efforts to acquire information on American  ABM systems. The display of such
disrespect for and such lack of interest in America's first-class electronic
industry was calculated  to indicate clearly that the  Soviet  Union enjoyed
enormous superiority in this field.  The West's  nerve failed and the SALT I
talks  followed. At the signing  ceremony  the American President sat at the
conference table with Brezhnev--and signed. The world sighed with relief and
applauded the treaty  as a victory for common sense, as a step forward taken
by two giants, together.
     But did the American  President know that  he was sitting at the  table
with the head of an organisation  which calls  itself the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union?  Did  he  know that  this organisation has shot 60 million
people in its own country and that it has set itself  the goal of doing  the
same throughout  the world? Not even the American Mafia could dream of doing
things on this scale. When he made his quick decision to hold talks with the
ringleader  of  the  most  terrible  band  of  gangsters  in the  history of
civilisation, did he  not realise that they  might simply fool him, as  they
would a naive  schoolchild? Did he take appropriate steps against this? Were
his advisers sufficiently alert?
     When,  next  day, the Soviet  newspapers published  photographs of  the
smiling faces of  the participants in the conference, the  Soviet Army could
not believe  its eyes. Imagine: the US President with his closest  advisers,
Brezhnev and--right behind Brezhnev--General Ogarkov!
     Unbelievable! How could such  a thing  happen? What  were  the American
presidential advisers thinking of? Did they learn nothing from Pearl Harbor?
Could anyone be more negligent than these people were at the signing of this
treaty? Why did none of  them  realise that behind  Brezhnev there stood not
the chief  ideologist, not the Politburo  member  responsible for scientific
research,  not  the Politburo member  responsible for  the  world's  largest
military industrial system, not  the Minister  of Defence, not the Chief  of
the  General Staff,  not  even  the Commander-in-Chief  of the  National Air
Defence Forces, who should be in  charge of the anti-missile defence system?
Why  was  nobody  there except Ogarkov,  head  of  the  Chief Directorate of
Strategic  Deception? This  Chief Directorate is  the  most powerful in  the
Soviet General Staff. It is even more  powerful than either the First or the
Second  Chief Directorate. Strategic Deception  is that  part of the General
Staff which is responsible  for all military censorship--for  all censorship
in  the  fields  of  science,  technology,  economics  and  so  forth.  This
directorate makes  a  careful study of everything that is known in the  West
about the  Soviet  Union and fabricates  an enormous  amount  of material in
order   to  distort  the  true  picture.  This  most  powerful  organisation
supervises  all  military  parades  and  any  military  exercises  at  which
foreigners are  to be  present, it is  responsible for  relations  with  the
service attaches of all foreign countries,  including those with `fraternal'
ties with  the  Soviet Union.  This octopus-like organisation runs 

Red Star

,

Soviet Union

,  

Standard Bearer

,  

Equipment and  Armament

 and a hundred other
military  newspapers and journals.  The  Military  Publishing  House  of the
Soviet Ministry of Defence is part of this Chief Directorate. Nothing can be
published in the  USSR without a  permit from its  head, no film  can appear
without one,  not a single troop  movement can take place without permission
from the Chief Directorate, no rocket-base, no barracks--even for the troops
of the KGB--can  be built without  its agreement, nor can a  single factory,
collective  farm, pipe-line or  railway  be constructed  without  its  prior
permission. Everything in  this huge country must be done in such a way that
the enemy always has a false impression of what  is going on. In some fields
achievements  are  deliberately  concealed;  in  others--as  was  done  with
antimissile  defence--they  are  exaggerated  out  of  all  recognition.  In
addition,  of  course, representatives of the  Chief  Directorate, helped by
Soviet military intelligence, have recruited a collection  of mercenary hack
journalists abroad, through which it spreads false information, disguised as
serious  studies. Its  representatives  attend  negotiations concerned  with
detente,  peace,  disarmament,  etc.  For  instance,  the  head of  the  7th
Department of the Chief Directorate, Colonel-General Trusov, is a  permanent
member of the Soviet delegation attending  the SALT O discussions. When  the
stakes  were at their highest, the  head of  the  Chief Directorate, General
Ogarkov himself,  joined the delegation. He made  a brilliant success of the
operation to fool the American delegation. For this he was made Chief of the
General Staff and at the same time he was promoted to Marshal  of the Soviet
Union. It is significant that  his predecessor, Kulikov, reached the rank of
Marshal only when he left the General Staff.
     Ogarkov's presence in the delegation produced no reaction. The American
delegation did  not break  off the negotiations when  he appeared,  did  not
leave the conference  hall  as a sign of protest, did  not slam the door. On
the contrary,  it was his  arrival which got the talks, which had come  to a
standstill,  going  again,  after which they  moved quickly to a  triumphant
conclusion.  Both  sides exchanged applause and  threw  their cards  on  the
table, having agreed on a drawn game.
     But, for heaven's sake, if the agreement  was shortly going to halt the
further growth of anti-missile systems, if the game  was almost over, surely
this  was  the  moment to take a  peep  at  the  enemy's  cards? Just  as  a
precaution, against what  might happen in the future? What was the point  of
simply  signing the  agreement,  after  which nothing could  be  put  right,
without letting a  group from each side catch a brief glimpse of things
as they were in  the enemy  camp? The agreement should not  have been signed
without some arrangement of this sort.
     Or if only, once the agreement  had been  signed, the Soviets had shown
their  American opposite  numbers  something, not a  film in  a  cinema, but
something real--in the most general  terms, by all means, and without giving
any  details  away.  The   Soviet  delegation,  too,  would  have  been  not
uninterested to see something of  the American achievements.  But the Soviet
card-sharpers knew  in advance that the Americans had at least three aces in
their  hand, and that is why the Soviet side threw their cards on the table,
without showing them, and quickly proceeded to shuffle the pack.
     Incidentally,  shortly after this, having  exploited  the credulity  of
America, the Soviet Union  built an excellent  rocket,  with the  industrial
index number 8-K-84 and the military designation UR-100. UR means `universal
rocket'. It can be  used both to deliver a nuclear strike  and to repel one.
It is the  largest of the Soviet strategic rockets.  Its  manufacture  is an
out-and-out violation of the SALT I agreement, but no protest has come  from
the American  side.  This is  because  Ogarkov's organisation  succeeded  in
concealing the rocket's  second function, so that it  is officially regarded
as a purely offensive  weapon. The SALT I agreement was got round in another
way, too. An excellent  Soviet anti-aircraft rocket, the  S-200,  which  was
developed to destroy  enemy aircraft, was modernised and made suitable--with
certain limitations--for use against enemy missiles.  Ogarkov's organisation
never  allowed  this  rocket  to appear at  parades,  even in  its original,
anti-aircraft variant.  The Chief  Directorate  of  Strategic  Deception  is
strict in its  observance of the principle: `The enemy  should see only what
Ogarkov wishes to show them.' This is the  reason why all foreign  diplomats
were enabled to see the huge  construction right  in  the very  outskirts of
Moscow.

     Ever  since I first found myself in the West, I  have  been soaking  up
information of  all kinds. I have visited dozens of libraries, seen hundreds
of  films.   I  have  taken  in  everything,  indiscriminately--James  Bond,
Emmanuelle, Dracula, the Emperor Caligula, the  Godfather, noble heroes  and
crafty villains. To someone who had only seen films about the need to fulfil
production plans and to build a brighter  future, it was impossible even  to
imagine such variety. I kept on and on going to films. One day I went  to an
excellent one  about the burglary of a diamond warehouse. The thieves  broke
into  the  enormous building  with great skill,  put  a dozen alarms out  of
action,  opened enormously  thick  doors  and  finally  reached  the  secret
innermost room in which the  safes  stood. Of course, in addition to all the
transmitters, alarm devices  and so on, there were TV cameras, through which
a  guard  kept constant  watch on  what was happening in the room where  the
safes  were. But the thieves, too,  were  ingenious.  They  had  with them a
photograph of the room, taken earlier. They put this in front of the cameras
and, using  it  as  a  screen,  emptied  the safes.  The guards sensed  that
something was happening. They began  to feel vaguely  uneasy. But looking at
the television screen they were able to  convince themselves that everything
was quiet in the safe room.
     I  am  sometimes told that  the American spy-satellites  are keeping  a
careful watch on what  is happening in the Soviet Union. They take infra-red
photographs  of  the  country  from  above and  from oblique  angles,  their
photographs are compared,  electronic,  heat  and  all  other  emissions are
measured, radio transmissions are intercepted and painstakingly analysed. It
is impossible  to fool  the satellites. When I  hear this, I always think of
the  trio  of  sympathetic  villains  who  hid from  the  cameras  behind  a
photograph, using  it  as a shield behind  which  to  fill  their  bags with
diamonds.  Incidentally,  the  film  ended happily for  the thieves. When  I
remember the cheerful smiles they exchanged  at the end  of their successful
operation,  I also think  of Ogarkov's beaming countenance at the moment the
agreement was signed.
     The Chief  Directorate  of Strategic  Deception does  exactly what  the
sympathetic trio did--they show the watchful eye of the camera a  reassuring
picture, behind the shelter of  which the  gangsters who call themselves the
Communist  Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Army, Military Industry and
so forth go about their business.
     This is the way it is done in practice. A huge American computer, which
has been installed at the  Central  Command Post of the Chief Directorate of
Strategic    Deception,    maintains    a    constant    record    of    all
intelligence-gathering satellites and  orbiting space stations  and of their
trajectories. Extremely precise short- and  long-term forecasts are prepared
of the  times at which  the  satellites will  pass over various areas of the
Soviet Union and  over all  the other territories and sea areas in which the
Armed  Services of the  USSR are active. Each Chief Directorate unit serving
with  a military district,  a  group of armies or a fleet makes use  of data
provided by  this same American computer to carry out similar  work for  its
own force  and area.  Each  army, division and regiment  receives constantly
up-dated schedules showing  the  precise times at which enemy reconnaissance
satellites  will overfly their area, with details  of  the type of satellite
concerned (photo-reconnaissance, signals intelligence,  all-purpose,  etc.),
and  the track it will follow. Neither the soldiers nor most of the officers
know the  precise  reason for daily orders, like  `From 12.20  to 12.55  all
radio transmissions are to cease and all radars are to be switched off', but
they  must  obey them.  At the same time, each division  has  several  radio
transmitters  and radars which  work only  during this period and which  are
there solely to provide signals for the enemy's satellites.
     The  Chief Directorate  has its  own intelligence-gathering satellites,
but,  unlike  those  working for  the Chief  Intelligence  Directorate, they
maintain  a  watch over  Soviet  territory,  looking  constantly  for  radio
transmitters  and radars which fail to observe the timetables laid down  for
communication security. Severe punishments await  divisional  or  regimental
commanders who are found to be ignoring the timetables.
     In addition to these bogus signals, the Chief Directorate is constantly
organising  nights by aircraft, tests of  rockets, troop movements and other
operations to take place  as the satellites' cameras pass overhead, with the
aim of emphasising one aspect of activity while concealing  others. Thus, in
the period running up to  the SALT I negotiations, every sort of attempt was
made to present  a  picture  of Soviet  activity and success in anti-missile
operations. After the negotiations, great pains were  taken to hide activity
and  successes in this field,  since  these represented  a violation of  the
agreements which had  been reached. The  Chief Directorate differs from  our
resourceful  burglars in presenting false pictures not for  a  few hours but
for decades. It has at its disposal not three crooks  but tens of  thousands
of highly-qualified specialists and  almost unlimited powers in its dealings
with generals, marshals and those  who run the military industries  over the
concealment of the true state of affairs.
     There is no doubt that these activities enable the  Politburo,  without
great difficulty,  to empty  the  pockets of those in the West who  will not
understand that they are dealing with organised crime, committed by a  state
which is operating on a world-wide scale.
--------


--------


     We have already seen that the unit known as a `motor-rifle regiment' in
the Soviet Army is in fact an all-arms unit with half the numerical strength
of brigades in Western armies, which is nevertheless equal or  even superior
to  the  latter in  fire-power and striking-power. This position is  reached
through the  merciless  exploitation of Soviet  soldiers,  who  are regarded
solely as  fighting machines, rather than as  human beings who require rest,
good food, recreation and so forth.
     Having a strength of 2,000,  a motor-rifle regiment is equipped with 41
battle tanks, 3 reconnaissance  tanks, 100 armoured  personnel  carriers,  6
130mm heavy assault guns,  18  122mm  self-propelled  howitzers, 6  `Grad-P'
multiple rocket  launchers, 18 self-propelled mortars,  18 automatic grenade
launchers,  4  self-propelled anti-aircraft  guns, 4  surface-to-air missile
complexes,  100  light anti-aircraft  and  several hundred  light  anti-tank
weapons, including the `Mukha', and the  RPG-16 anti-tank  rocket launchers,
both portable and mounted on vehicles, together with the requisite engineer,
chemical warfare, medical, repair and other supporting sub-units.
     A modern  Soviet  tank regiment is organised along almost  exactly  the
same  lines  as  a  motor-rifle,  regiment,  except  that it has  three tank
battalions rather  than one and one motor-rifle  battalion instead of three.
Its other  sub-units  are exactly the  same:  a battalion of  self-propelled
artillery, a battery of multiple rocket launchers, an anti-aircraft battery,
reconnaissance,  communications,  engineering, chemical  warfare and  repair
companies. The strength of  such  a regiment is  1,300. It  has considerably
fewer light anti-tank weapons than a motor-rifle regiment, reasonably enough
in a  regiment with a total of 97 tanks, since tank guns are the best of all
anti-tank weapons.

     A Soviet motor-rifle  division  is  more  of  an all-arms unit  than  a
motor-rifle regiment, containing, as it does, sub-units with the most varied
functions and capabilities. The  organisation of a  division  is simple  and
well-balanced.  The strength of a motor-rifle  division  is  13,000.  It  is
commanded by a Major-General. It is made up of:
     A headquarters staff.
     A  communications  battalion--the  division's  nerve-system,  used  for
communications  with all its  elements,  with the  higher  command and  with
neighbouring divisions.
     A reconnaissance battalion--the eyes and ears of the division.
     A rocket  battalion--the  most  powerful  weapon  in  the  hands of the
divisional commander, with six launchers which can fire chemical and nuclear
weapons for distances of up to 150 kilometres.
     An independent  tank  battalion--the divisional  commander's bodyguard,
which protects divisional  headquarters and the rocket battalion,  and which
can be used in battle when the divisional commander needs all his resources.
     A tank regiment--the division's striking force.
     Three  motor-rifle regiments, two of which are  equipped with  armoured
personnel carriers and light weapons and which attack on a wide front during
an  offensive,  probing  for  weak spots in  the enemy's defences. The third
regiment, equipped with infantry combat  vehicles and with heavy weapons, is
used  with the tank regiment  to attack the  enemy at his weakest point--`in
the liver' as the Soviet Army says.
     An  artillery  regiment--the  main fire-power  of  the  division--which
consists  of  three  battalions  of 152  self-propelled  howitzers  and  one
battalion of BM-27 heavy multiple rocket launchers. In all, the regiment has
54 howitzers  and  18  heavy  rocket launchers.  The  full  strength of  the
regiment is  used in the division's main axis of advance, in which  the tank
and  heavy  motor-rifle regiments are also active--that  is, in  the area in
which the enemy has been proved to be most vulnerable.
     The anti-aircraft (SAM) regiment has as its primary task the protection
of the divisional  headquarters  and of the  rocket battalion.  It must also
provide protection for the division's main battle group, even though this is
already capable of defending itself against enemy aircraft. The regiment has
five batteries, each  with six rocket  launchers.  In peacetime, two of  the
launchers  of each battery  are held in reserve and the fact that they exist
must not in any circumstances be disclosed until  the outbreak of  war. This
has led Western experts to underestimate the defence capabilities of  Soviet
divisions,  believing  that each  regiment has only  20 launchers whereas in
fact it has  30. In  order to maintain this illusion, the armies of all  the
Soviet allies actually do have only 20 launchers in each regiment.
     The anti-tank battalion  acts as the divisional commander's trump  card
when  he finds  himself in a critical  situation.  Until  then it is kept in
reserve.  It is  brought into  action during  a  defensive  action, when the
enemy's tanks have broken  through fairly  deeply and once the  direction of
his main thrust can be  clearly identified. In an offensive it is  used when
the division's main battle  force has  broken through in depth and the enemy
is attacking its flank and rear. The battalion is armed with 18 100 or 125mm
anti-tank guns and six anti-tank missile complexes.
     The engineer  battalion is used, together with the anti-tank battalion,
to lay minefields rapidly in front of enemy tanks which have broken through,
in order  to  stop them or  at  least  to slow them down  in  front  of  the
division's anti-tank  guns. It also  clears  mines ahead  of  the division's
advancing  troops  during  an  offensive  and  helps  them  to  cross  water
obstacles.
     The chemical warfare battalion  carries out the  measures necessary for
defence against nuclear, chemical or biological attacks by the enemy.
     The transport  battalion supplies  the  division  with  fuel  and  with
ammunition.  Its  200 vehicles enable  it  to  move 1,000  tons  of fuel and
ammunition at the same time.
     The repair battalion recovers and replaces combat equipment.
     The medical battalion does the same, but for the division's personnel.
     The helicopter flight, which has 6 helicopters, is used for command and
communications duties and to land the division's diversionary  troops behind
the enemy's lines.
     The division  has a total of 34 battalions. Those  battalions which are
subordinated directly to the divisional  commander are given the designation
`independent'--for  instance `Independent  Communications Battalion  of  the
24th Division'. This system  is  also used  in  all  higher formations.  For
instance, an Army consists  of divisions. But it also contains regiments and
battalions  which  do not  form part  of  its complement,  which are  called
`independent' as, for  instance  in the  `41st  Independent  Pontoon  Bridge
Regiment of the 13th Army'.
     The total complement of a Soviet motor-rifle division is 287 tanks, 150
infantry  combat  vehicles,  221  armoured  personnel  carriers,  6   rocket
launchers,  18   130mm   heavy   assault   guns,  18   anti-tank  guns,  126
self-propelled  and  towed  howitzers,   96  mortars  and   multiple  rocket
launchers,  46  mobile anti-aircraft  missile complexes,  16  self-propelled
automatic  anti-aircraft   guns,  and   hundreds  of  light  anti-tank   and
anti-aircraft weapons.

     A tank division is organised in the same way as a motor-rifle division,
except that it has three tank regiments rather than one and one  motor-rifle
regiment instead of three.  In  addition, a tank division has no independent
tank or  anti-tank battalions, since its anti-tank strength is  much greater
than that of a motor-rifle division.
     A tank division has  10,500 men.  It is  equipped with  341  tanks, 232
infantry  combat vehicles,  6 rocket  launchers, 6 heavy  assault  guns, 126
self-propelled  howitzers, 78  mortars and  multiple  rocket  launchers,  62
self-propelled  anti-aircraft missiles and artillery complexes  and hundreds
of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. While it  has fewer personnel,
a tank division has far greater striking power than a motor-rifle division.
--------


     Until the mid-1950s, divisions were organised in corps, and a number of
corps  made up  an Army. However, because  of  the greatly  increased combat
strength of the divisions, and also  because an  Army Commander had acquired
the means to control all his  divisions simultaneously, the corps came to be
considered  unnecessary  as an  intermediate  formation  and  was  therefore
abolished.
     Today, however,  a  relatively   number  of  corps are left in the
Soviet armed forces. They exist where a division is too  a unit for the
task in hand and an Army too large.
     From time to time in this book  we have used the term  `All-Arms Army'.
This  has been done in order to  distinguish this  type  of  Army from  Tank
Armies, Air Armies, Air Defence Armies and Rocket Armies. However, in normal
usage the expression `all-arms'  is  not used; instead, the  units concerned
are  simply  referred to as the 13th or  the 69th Army.  Some  have honorary
titles,  such as `2nd Shock Army'  or  `9th  Guards  Army'. These titles add
nothing  to  the present-day  strength  of  these  armies--they  are  simply
reflections of past glory. For instance, the 3rd Army, which has no honorary
title, is considerably better equipped than the 11th Guards Army.
     Sometimes  Armies  evolve  along  new  lines  but  keep  their   former
designations, which do not fit their  present functions. Thus,  the 2nd Tank
Army is now an  All-Arms  Army. By contrast, the 3rd Shock Army, despite its
designation, is in fact a Tank Army.
     During the Second World  War the Red Army had a total of 18 Air Armies,
11 Air Defence Armies, 6 Guards Tank Armies, and 70 other armies, of which 5
were known as Shock Armies and 11 as Guards Armies.
     Today there are fewer armies but their strengths vary considerably. The
Soviet  Armed Forces now have 3 Rocket Armies, 10 Air Defence Armies, 16 Air
Armies,  8  Guards Tank Armies and  33  other armies, a  number of which are
still referred to as either Shock or Guards Armies.

     In the  West it is  firmly believed that today's Soviet  Armies lack  a
clear organisational structure. A superficial analysis of  the complement of
each  of  the  Soviet Armies  seems  to confirm  this:  some  Armies  have 7
divisions  while others have only 3. The proportion of  tank and motor-rifle
divisions which they contain also varies constantly.
     In fact, though,  Armies do have quite clear organisational structures.
However, the  Soviet  Union does  not  think  it advisable  to  display this
clarity  in peacetime; this  would throw too much  light on their  plans for
war.  Divisions have a high degree of  administrative  autonomy and  can  be
quickly  regrouped  from  one Army  to  another.  In  peacetime  the  system
certainly does seem illogical, but once a war began each Army would  take on
an entirely clear shape.
     There  is one further  cause for this apparent confusion.  This is that
the  Soviet Union has forbidden its East European allies to establish Armies
in either peacetime or wartime. If a  homogeneous mass becomes  too large it
may explode.  The Soviet High Command avoids  this danger within the  Soviet
Army  itself,  by constantly  moving the  various  nationalities  around, to
produce  a  featureless grey mass  of soldiery,  unable  to  understand  one
another. In peacetime, the armed forces  of the East European countries only
have divisions.  In wartime these  divisions would  immediately join  Soviet
Armies which  were under strength. This is precisely  what  happened in  the
summer of 1968.
     In peacetime, these East European divisions  see themselves as  part of
their own  national  armed  forces. In wartime  they  would  be  distributed
throughout the Soviet  Armies; for administrative  purposes  they would come
under  their  national  Ministries of  Defence and,  ultimately,  under  the
Commander-in-Chief of  the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. For military purposes
they  would  be  subordinated  to  the  Soviet Armies, Fronts and  Strategic
Directions and, ultimately, to  the  Soviet Supreme  Commander  and  to  his
General Staff. It is  because of this  that  the  Staff of the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation  is  a   bureaucratic  institution   rather   than  operational
headquarters.  And  this is why, in peacetime,  many  Soviet  Armies  appear
unstructured. In wartime they  would  be brought  up  to  strength with East
European contingents and they would then assume their proper forms.

     In wartime an Army consists of five  divisions, one  of which is a tank
division, and the remaining four motor-rifle divisions. In various instances
in which the mass use of tanks would be difficult,  an Army may have nothing
but motor-rifle divisions,  which have only  a  limited number of tanks. But
the Armies which are earmarked  to  operate in Western Europe are made up in
this way--one tank and four motor-rifle divisions.
     Besides these five divisions each Army has:
     A headquarters staff--the brain of the Army.
     A communications regiment--its nervous system.
     An   independent  SPETSNAZ  diversionary  company   and   two   signals
intelligence battalions--its eyes and ears.
     A rocket brigade--the most powerful weapon in the  hands of the  Army's
commander, which  enables  him  to deliver  nuclear  and  chemical  attacks.
Earlier each brigade had 9 launchers,  with a range of up to 300 kilometres.
Today a brigade has 18 launchers, with a greatly increased range.
     An  independent tank  battalion--the  Army  Commander's personal guard.
This defends the Army's control post and the rocket  brigade and  is brought
into  action only  in the most critical  situations,  when everything is  at
stake.
     An artillery brigade--the main fire-power of the Army. This consists of
five battalions--three  with  18  130mm  guns  each,  one  with  18  152  mm
gun-howitzers and one with 18 BM-27 multiple rocket launchers.
     An  anti-aircraft brigade, which covers  the Army's  command  Post  and
Rocket Brigades with  its  fire and which also  operates in the Army's  main
axis  of  advance,  supplementing   the  anti-aircraft  coverage  which  the
divisions can  provide for themselves. This  brigade  consists of a  command
battalion, a  supply  battalion and three fire-battalions,  each with  three
batteries.
     The camouflage service has decreed that one of the launchers in each of
these batteries is never to  show itself. It therefore  appears to observers
that these batteries consist of  three launchers, whereas in fact  they have
four, one of which is  always kept in reserve.  An  anti-aircraft brigade is
therefore generally believed  to have 27 launchers, whereas in  fact  it has
36.
     An anti-aircraft regiment, which has 30  57mm  S-60 anti-aircraft guns.
Experience  in Vietnam  and  in  wars in  the  Middle  East  has  shown that
conventional anti-aircraft artillery has by no means outlived its usefulness
and  that  there  are  many  situations  in   which  the  effectiveness   of
anti-aircraft rockets  falls off sharply  and  that  anti-aircraft guns  can
supplement these most usefully.
     An anti-tank regiment, which consists of three battalions.  This has 57
heavy anti-tank guns and 18 anti-tank missile complexes.
     An independent anti-tank battalion, which has 40 IT-1 tracked anti-tank
rocket launchers. The existence of these battalions, and of the IT-1 itself,
is a  carefully  guarded  secret. These batteries  do  not form part  of the
anti-tank regiment, and  there is  a sound reason for this, since they carry
out  operations  using quite  different tactics. The  independent  anti-tank
battalions, with their highly mobile launchers, harass the enemy constantly,
making surprise  attacks  from  vehicles and manoeuvring  from  area to area
under the pressure exerted  by  the enemy's  superior forces.  Meanwhile the
anti-tank regiment, armed with more powerful but less manoeuvrable guns, has
the  task of stopping the enemy  tanks, at absolutely  any cost,  when  they
reach a previously defined  line.  Thus the  more mobile battalion goes into
action against  the enemy's tanks from the 


momient the latter break through,
while the  anti-tank regiment, deep  in the rear, is preparing an impassable
barrier, behind which it will fight to the last man.
     The helicopter squadron is used for communications and for control, and
sometimes to land troops  behind the enemy lines.  It  has  16  medium and 4
heavy helicopters.
     The Army's supporting sub-units include:
     An engineer regiment
     A pontoon bridge regiment
     An independent assault crossing battalion
     A transport regiment
     An independent pipe-laying battalion
     A chemical warfare battalion
     A medical battalion
     A mobile tank-repair workshop, with a tank recovery company
     In wartime the complement of an Army is 83,000. It  has 1,541 tanks, 48
rocket  launchers,  832 infantry  combat vehicles,  1,100  armoured personel
carriers,  1,386  guns,  mortars  and  multiple  rocket launchers, 376 heavy
anti-aircraft   missile  launchers  and  anti-aircraft  guns,  40  transport
helicopters and thousands of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.

     A Tank Army, like an All-Arms Army, has a permanent complement which is
strictly observed. Its organisation is standardised with that of an All-Arms
Army.  It  is  therefore  simpler  not  to  list  the  rocket  brigade,  the
diversionary company and  so forth but simply to pick out the features which
distinguish  a  Tank  Army  from  an  All-Arms  Army.  There are three  such
features:
     (1) An  All-Arms  Army has  five  divisions,  one  of which  is a  tank
division. A Tank Army has only four, all of which are tank divisions.
     (2)  A  Tank Army does not break through the enemy's defences.  This is
done for it by the All-Arms Armies.  Therefore a  Tank Army does not have an
artillery brigade, of which it has no need.  But while it is  operating deep
in the defences of the enemy it may suddenly  encounter strong  enemy forces
against which  massed intense fire must be  brought  down very quickly.  For
this purpose, in place of an artillery brigade, a Tank Army  has a  regiment
of BM-27 multiple rocket launchers.
     (3) A Tank Army does  not  fight to  hold areas  or  lines: its task is
solely to  attack  the enemy. It therefore has no anti-tank  regiment (which
holds territory) or  independent anti-tank  battalion  (which  harasses  the
advancing enemy).  It has no need of these sub-units, which would contribute
nothing to its proper function.
     In the near  future there will be  one further special  feature in  the
organisation of a Tank  Army. It will include an air-borne assault  brigade,
which has the  function of seizing and  holding bridges, crossing points and
road junctions ahead of the avalanche  of  advancing tanks.  At present only
Fronts have these brigades. Temporarily, until they come into service,  Tank
Armies  are  forced to use  motor-rifle regiments,  or  sometimes divisions,
which have battalions with special training in helicopter assault  landings.
Once  the air-borne assault brigades join the Tank Armies, the need for such
motor-rifle regiments and divisions will disappear.
     In all,  in  wartime, a  Tank Army  has 54,000  men,  1,416  tanks, 993
infantry combat vehicles, 894  guns, mortars and  multiple rocket launchers,
42  rocket  launchers,  314   heavy   anti-aircraft  missile  launchers  and
anti-aircraft guns, 64 combat and 34 transport  helicopters and thousands of
light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.

     If we compare the weapons available to an All-Arms Army with those of a
tank Army, we  discover an apparently  paradoxical  situation; the Tank Army
has fewer tanks  than  the All-Arms Army, but more  infantry combat vehicles
than the latter, whose very foundation is its motor-rifle sub-units!
     In fact,  though,  this  is  not  a  paradox.  An All-Arms  Army  is  a
combination of tanks, of  heavy and light motorised  infantry, artillery and
other forces whose job is 

to break through the enemy's lines.

     A Tank Army is far er than  an All-Arms Army.  It is a combination
of  tanks and heavy  infantry,  with  artillery and  operational  helicopter
sub-units, whose job it is 

to operate deep in the enemy's rear.

     An All-Arms Army has more than 1,000  armoured  personnel carriers (for
light infantry) and a Tank Army has practically none.
     A Tank Army,  being er, has far  better cross-country performance,
and greater manoeuvrability and striking  power. It  has fewer tanks than an
All-Arms Army,  but they  are  far more highly  concentrated. This gives the
Tank Army a clearly  defined offensive character, while the All-Arms Army is
essentially a universal weapon.
--------
        The Front

     The Front is a group of Armies, unified under a single command to carry
out combat operations  in wartime. It is set up either during or immediately
before the outbreak of a war. It  is an all-arms formation in every respect,
incorporating elements of the various Armed Services.
     The Commander  of a  Front  has an operational,  not an  administrative
function. He possesses very considerable authority and the forces  under his
command are not subordinate  to the Commanders-in-Chief of their  respective
Services. The different Services from which the forces making up a Front are
drawn are not permitted to interfere in the operational use of these forces.
A Front Commander has  sole and personal responsibility for the preparation,
conduct and outcome of  combat operations. He is subordinated  either to the
Commander-in-Chief of a Strategic Direction who is in control of  operations
or directly  to the Supreme Commander himself. The Armed Services from which
the  forces  making  up  a  Front  are  taken are  concerned  only  with the
reinforcement, reequipment, provisioning and supply of these forces.
     This  clear  differentiation  between  operational  and  administrative
functions makes  it possible to concentrate complete authority in individual
hands, to avoid duplication of control, to ensure proper cooperation between
sub-units of different Armed Services and to avoid friction between them.
     At the beginning of the  war between the Soviet Union and Germany, five
Fronts were created. In the course of the war  their number was increased to
fifteen.  During  its  final  stages  the  Fronts operating  in  the Central
Direction  were made up of  1 or 2  Air Armies,  2 or 3  Tank Armies, 8 or 9
All-Arms Armies and a considerable number of independent tank, artillery and
motor-rifle corps. These  Fronts had strengths  of up to a million soldiers,
three thousand tanks, three  thousand  aircraft, and  up to fifteen thousand
guns and mortars.

     After the war, because of  the introduction of nuclear  weapons  and as
part of the  continuous technical improvement  of the Armed  Forces,  it was
decided that in any  future  war more powerful,  more  compact and therefore
more easily controlled Fronts would be used.
     Contrary to the belief held  in the West, Fronts  have  a quite clearly
defined combat  organisation,  like  battalions,  regiments,  divisions  and
armies.
     A Front comprises:
     A command staff.
     A communications regiment--the nerve system.
     A diversionary `SPETSNAZ' brigade, a signals  intelligence regiment and
a radar battlefield surveillance regiment--the eyes and ears of the Front.
     An Air Army.
     A Tank Army--the Front's striking force.
     Two All-Arms Armies.
     An  independent tank  brigade--the Front  Commander's  personal  guard,
which defends his command post and the Front's rocket brigades. This brigade
is only brought into action in the most critical situations.
     Two  rocket  brigades. One has  12  launchers with a range  of  9-1,200
kilometres and is used in accordance  with the plans of the Front Commander.
The second  brigade  is  similar  in  composition and armament to  an Army's
rocket  brigade  and is  used  to strengthen the  Army which  is  having the
greatest success.
     An artillery  division,  consisting  of six regiments and  an anti-tank
battalion. Three of the regiments have 54 130mm M46 guns each and two of the
remainder  have 54 152mm D20 howitzers each. The other regiment has 54 240mm
mortars. The artillery division, in its entirety, is used, to strengthen the
artillery of the Army which is having the greatest success.
     A  specially   strengthened  artillery  brigade,   consisting  of  five
battalions. The first three each have 12 180mm S-23 guns, the other two each
have  12 203mm B-4M  howitzers.  The brigade is  used to strengthen the Army
which is having the greatest success.
     A tank-destroyer  brigade,  of  five  battalions,  armed with 90  heavy
anti-tank guns and 30 anti-tank rocket complexes.
     Two  anti-aircraft missile  brigades  and  two anti-aircraft  artillery
regiments, equipped and organised like similar sub-units in an Army.
     An airborne assault brigade,  used for the rapid  capture  of important
lines, bridges,  crossings and  mountain  passes in support  of the  Front's
advancing forces. In the next  few years commanders of the Tank Armies of  a
Front will also each have one such brigade.
     Several  penal battalions, which are used  to negotiate minefields  and
for  attacks on  strongly  fortified  enemy positions. The  number of  penal
battalions available depends on the numbers of soldiers and officers who are
unwilling to fight for socialism.
     The supporting sub-units include:
     An engineer brigade.
     A pontoon bridge brigade.
     An assault-crossing battalion.
     A transport brigade.
     A pipe-laying regiment.
     A CW protection regiment.
     Several field and evacuation hospitals.
     A mobile tank repair workshop.
     A tank transport regiment.
     In territories in which it is difficult to use tanks, a Front will have
no  Tank Armies. Instead  of these it may have an independent tank  division
but it may not have this either. This does not, of course,  apply to Western
Europe.
     Fronts earmarked for operations in Western Europe will have up to 5,600
tanks, 772 combat aircraft, 220 helicopters, 3,000 infantry combat vehicles,
3,000  armoured  personnel  carriers,  and up  to 4,100  guns,  mortars  and
salvo-firing rocket-launchers together with a  large  quantity of other arms
and combat equipment.

     It will,  of course, be pointed  out that the forces stationed  on East
German  territory  are precisely twice  as strong  as those  I have  listed,
having:
     Not one Tank Army, but two
     An Air  Army which has a considerably  larger number of aircraft than I
have shown
     Two airborne assault brigades, rather than one
     Not one diversionary brigade, but two
     Four rocket brigades, instead of two
     Two engineer brigades, not one
     Two pontoon bridge brigades, rather than one
     An artillery division which has more  than 700 guns, as against the 324
listed above
     How  can this be  explained? There  is  nothing mysterious  about it. A
Front advancing against a strong enemy may have a zone of advance of 200-250
kilometres.  In  East  Germany  there  is  thus  room  for  two  Fronts.  In
Czechoslovakia there is room for only one.
     Two routes  lead  from East Germany  to the West, separated  from  each
other  by a considerable distance.  Because  of  this,  it is  convenient to
employ two  different Fronts; control  over  a single Front advancing in two
different directions is bound to  produce difficulties. If the Soviet forces
are supplemented with East German  units there will be precisely  two Fronts
in the GDR. No publicity is given to this intention in  peacetime,  in order
to  keep  it  secret. Besides, it is quite simply inconvenient  to keep  two
generals  of  equal  seniority in the  same  country. For the senior  Soviet
officer  in the  GDR  is  not only  a  military  commander, he  is  also the
administrative head of a Communist colony. For this reason the staffs of the
Fronts are unified,  although even for annual exercises they separate, as do
the Air Armies  and the  artillery divisions. A single telephone call is all
that  is  needed  to set up  two  separate fronts--everything else  has been
arranged already.
--------


     The Soviet  Union maintains  10 motor-rifle,  1  artillery  and  9 tank
divisions  in  East  Germany.   In  Poland  it  has  2  tank  divisions,  in
Czechoslovakia  it   has  2  tank  and  3  motor-rifle   divisions.  In  the
Byelorussian Military District, which borders on Poland, it has 9 tank and 4
motor-rifle  divisions;  Poland has  5  tank and  8  motor-rifle  divisions,
Czechoslovakia has 5 tank and 5 motor-rifle divisions.
     At first  sight, these figures seem  to be an arbitrary and nonsensical
jumble.
     However, let us recall the basic fact that the East European divisions,
brigades and regiments are not permitted to form their own Armies or Fronts.
They simply form parts of various Soviet Armies, taking the place of missing
elements. We should therefore not  regard Soviet and East European divisions
as separate  entities. Instead, we  should see them  as forces of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation,  without national distinctions. Once we do this, we see
an entirely harmonious picture.
     Let  us take Czechoslovakia as an example. In Prague there is a  Soviet
Colonel-General, who commands the Central Group of Forces. Under him are the
staffs of  an Air Army and of  two  All-Arms Armies.  The  Air  Army  has  a
complement of  only 150  Soviet combat aircraft, but, if we add to these 500
Czech combat aircraft, we have a complete Air Army, with a Soviet general at
its head.
     Altogether  in Czechoslovakia  there  are  7  tank  and  8  motor-rifle
divisions. This  is exactly the number needed  to  make up a Front. 4 of the
tank divisions constitute a Tank Army. 2 of the remaining tank divisions and
the 8 motor-rifle  divisions form two Armies and the remaining tank division
acts as a  reserve. In peacetime, Czechoslovakia has two artillery brigaides
and two anti-tank regiments. This is exactly what is needed to complete  two
Armies, but the Tank  Army does not need these sub-units. Czechoslovakia has
three  rocket brigades and this is precisely what is needed--one brigade for
each Army, including the Tank Army. All the front-line sub-units are Soviet.
     The Soviet  Colonel-General in Prague is  the Commander  of the Central
Front.  The  commanders of  the Air Army and of the two All-Arms  Armies are
also Soviet, while the divisions, brigades and regiments are both Soviet and
Czech, but  all  are entirely under  Soviet  control. Already  in peacetime,
there is a complete Front  in Czechoslovakia; only one element is lacking--a
headquarters staff for  the Tank  Army.  Everything else is there.  However,
five  hundred kilometres  from  the  Soviet-Czech  frontier,  in  the  
Ukrainian town of Zhitomir, is the staff of the 8th Guards  Tank Army.  This
staff has no one  under its command. So that the  generals should not become
bored,  they  frequently  make trips to Czechoslovakia to  inspect the  tank
divisions. Then they return home. All that  would be needed to  move them to
Czechoslovakia is a two-hour flight by passenger aircraft. Once this is done
the Central Front is ready for battle.
     In Warsaw, too, there  is a Soviet Colonel-General. He also  has at his
disposal  the headquarters staff of an Air Army (the 37th Air Army which has
360 combat aircraft) but he has only two Soviet tank divisions. There are no
staffs for land armies,  for  it would be odd  to have three Army staffs for
two  tank divisions.  So  the  Soviet Colonel-General  has  a huge  staff in
Legnica on which there are sufficient generals to form both the headquarters
staff of  a  Front and those of three Armies. And in Poland, too,  there are
just  the  right  number  of  divisions  to  form  a  Front--7  tank  and  8
motor-rifle.  As in  Czechoslovakia, there  are  4  tank  divisions--a  Tank
Army--2 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions--two Armies--and one tank division,
to act  as  a reserve.  There are exactly the number of  auxiliary sub-units
needed for the Front and for the Armies from which it is made up. The number
of combat aircraft is sufficient to reinforce both the 37th Air Army and the
Air Army in Czechoslovakia.
     In peacetime there  is already a complete Front in  Poland; it needs no
further strengthening. The  transformation  of  the  Soviet staff in Legnica
into a headquarters staff for a Front and staffs  for three  Land Armies can
take place automatically. In 1968 it was completed  in  a matter of minutes.
What appears to be one staff, in fact, functions, even in peacetime, as four
independent staffs; they are all located in one place in order to camouflage
this fact.
     In East Germany  there are two Fronts. The overall total of  Soviet and
East German  aircraft  is precisely  the number needed  to  make up  two Air
Armies. The staff of the 16th Air Army is already stationed in East Germany;
that of the  1st  Air  Army  can be  brought from  Byelorussia  in a  single
transport aircraft within a couple of hours  and once this has been done the
two Fronts have their complete contingent.
     In peacetime,  there  are two Tank Army  staffs  in  East Germany--each
Front has  one--and three staffs  for  All-Arms Armies. In  other words, one
more is  needed.  This, too--the staff  of  the  28th  Army--would come from
Byelorussia, in a single  aircraft and within two hours. There would then be
two Fronts,  each with one Air Army,  one Tank Army and Two All-Arms Armies.
The move of the staffs can  be  accomplished  so quickly because it is  only
necessary  to  move five generals and  twelve colonels  for each  staff--the
remainder are already in East Germany.
     In all, there are 1 tank and 14 motor-rifle divisions in  East Germany.
Each Front needs a minimum of 6  tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions. Thus only
three more divisions  are needed and they, too, would come from Byelorussia.
This  would  take  twenty-four  hours. The  two Fronts  could  begin  combat
operations without them and they, too, would be in action within a day.
     But what about  poor  Byelorussia, robbed of  the staff of an Air Army,
the  staff of  an  All-Arms  Army  and  three  divisions--one  tank  and two
motor-rifle? She has plenty left.
     To be  specific,  she has  a Colonel-General and his staff, two  rocket
brigades,  two  anti-aircraft  SAM  brigades,  a  diversionary  brigade,  an
airborne assault brigade, the staffs of  the 5th  and 7th Guards Tank Armies
and eight tank divisions--four with each Tank Army.

     With  a  very    number  of  moves--three  Army  staffs  and three
divisions--we have produced a structure which  has the precision and harmony
of a mathematical formula.
     We now have the following picture:
     In the first echelon there  are three Fronts, two  in East Germany, one
in Czechoslovakia.
     In the  second echelon--one  Front in  Poland. In  the third echelon--a
Group of Tank Armies.
     The  seaward  flank is  covered  by  the  Soviet  Baltic Fleet which in
wartime would  incorporate  all  the ships  of  the Polish  and  East German
Navies.
     At the head of each of these formations  is  a  Commander. Above him is
the  Commander-in-Chief,  whose headquarters is  at  Zossen-Wünsdorf.  There
could  be no  better place for a headquarters  anywhere in  the world. It is
very close to West Berlin which,  with its immediate surroundings would,  of
course, be immune from Western nuclear attacks. The C-in-C makes use of West
Berlin as a hostage and as  a safeguard; he is  thoroughly protected against
conventional weapons by concrete shelters and by Tank Armies.
     Each Army has one tank and  four motor-rifle divisions.  Each Tank Army
has four tank divisions. Each Front has one Air Army,  one Tank Army and two
All-Arms Armies. The Group of Tank Armies has two Tank  Armies. In all, each
Front has six tank and eight motor-rifle divisions. There are a total of six
Tank Armies and  eight All-Arms  Armies.  The  Strategic  Direction has four
Fronts (All-Arms) and one Group of Tank Armies.
     The  Armies  of  this  Strategic  Directorate have a total  of 32  tank
divisions and 32 motor-rifle divisions.
     In addition,  the C-in-C of the Western Strategic  Direction has at his
disposal two tank divisions, one in Poland, the other in  Czechoslovakia and
two airborne divisions  (the 6th Polish and the 103rd Guards division, which
is in Byelorussia).
     Also  at the  disposal of  the C-in-C  of the Strategic Direction are a
diversionary  long-range  reconnaissance SPETSNAZ regiment,  a  regiment  of
pilotless  `Yastreb'   reconnaissance  aircraft,   a  Guards  communications
brigade, a transport brigade,  a division of  railway troops, a  pipe-laying
brigade, a CW  protection brigade,  an  engineer brigade, a  pontoon  bridge
brigade and other sub-units.
     For the  duration  of  a  particular  operation he  may  have temporary
command of:
     One Corps from the Strategic Rocket Forces
     One--or in some cases all three--Corps from the Long Range Air Force
     One Army from the National Air Defence Forces
     The whole of Military Transport Aviation

     The  Western  Strategic Directorate is the mightiest grouping of forces
on this planet. It has  the task of breaking  through the West's defences to
rescue the West Europeans from the  fetters of capitalism. The  plan for its
operational  use is  simple--a simultaneous attack by  all three Fronts. The
Front  which  is most  successful will  be  immediately strengthened  by the
addition  of the  second echelon Front  from Poland, which has  the  task of
smashing  through the enemy's defences, after which the Group of Tank Armies
will  be used  to  widen  the breach, supported by  parachute  drops  by the
airborne  divisions.  Divisions  which  suffer  heavy  losses  will  not  be
reinforced  but  will  be immediately  withdrawn from battle and replaced by
fresh divisions  from the  Moscow, Volga or Urals Military Districts. In the
event of a breakthrough into France, the Western Strategic  Direction may be
allocated  a  further Group  of  Tank Armies, which  is  located in the Kiev
Military District in peacetime and is made up of the 3rd and 6th Guards Tank
Armies.
     It  must  be emphasised  that  the  task of the C-in-C of  the  Western
Strategic  Direction is to advance swiftly westwards and to concentrate  all
his efforts on  this and this alone. He is  covered  on the south by neutral
Austria and  Switzerland, which, it  is  planned, will be liberated somewhat
later, while on  the north of the Strategic Directorate lie the  West German
`Land' of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. A plan has been devised to prevent
the  forces of the Directorate from moving northwards as well as  westwards.
The Baltic Military District  will become  the Baltic  Front in  wartime. It
will  not come  under the command of the Western  Strategic Directorate  but
will be independent--in other words  it will be subordinated directly to the
Supreme  Commander.  This Front will cross Polish territory into Germany and
will deploy northwards, with  the task of covering the northern flank of the
Western  Strategic  Directorate,  of liberating  Denmark  and of seizing the
Baltic Straits. Because it will have to work on a  very  narrow front and to
carry out operations on islands,  the composition  of  the  Front  has  been
somewhat modified. It will include:
     The 30th Air Army
     The 9th  and 11th  Guards Armies, each consisting of  one tank division
and of three motor-rifle divisions instead of four
     One tank division, rather than a Tank Army
     An  artillery  division  and all  the  remaining units which ordinarily
constitute a Front.
     As  compensation for  the  divisions it  lacks, the Front has  one most
unusual component--a  Polish  marine infantry  division.  In  addition,  the
Soviet 107th Guards Airborne Division will operate in  support of the Front,
although it will not be subordinated to it.
     To the North another Front will operate, independently of any Strategic
Direction, subordinated directly to the  Supreme Commander. This Front  will
be established on  the base provided  by the Leningrad Military District. It
will be made up of one Air Army, two All-Arms Armies and an independent tank
division. An airborne division based in the Leningrad Military District, but
not  subordinated to it, will  provide operational  support. This Front will
operate against Norway and, possibly, Sweden.
--------


     The South-Western  Strategic Direction stands shoulder to shoulder with
the Western  and is organised in exactly the  same way: three Fronts  in the
first echelon, one Front in the  second echelon, a  Group of  Tank Armies in
the third echelon, and  a seaward  flank protected by the  Black Sea  Fleet,
which  would  be  joined  in wartime by all  the ships of the  Bulgarian and
Romanian navies.
     Unlike  its Western equivalent, the  South-Western  Strategic Direction
covers terrain which is unsuitable for the deployment of a large quantity of
tanks.  In addition, of course, the enemy is not as strong here as he is  in
the West. The Fronts of the South-Western Strategic Direction therefore have
no Tank Armies. Each Front consists of an Air Army and two All-Arms Armies.
     The staffs for all the Armies  are brought  from  military districts in
the USSR. In order to examine the structure  of this Strategic Direction, we
will do two things: we will assume five Bulgarian tank brigades to equal two
tank  divisions--an equation which  any  military specialist will confirm is
reasonable. We  will also move one  Soviet motor-rifle division forward just
200 metres from the town of Uzhgorod on to Hungarian territory. We will then
have the following picture:
     In  Hungary there  are  3 tank and 8 motor-rifle  divisions. The  Front
there will consist of two Armies each of 1 tank and 4 motor-rifle divisions,
with 1 tank division in reserve.
     In  Romania there are 2  tank  and 8 motor-rifle divisions--these  will
also form a Front of two standard Armies together with an Air Army.
     In Bulgaria there are 2 tank and 8 motor-rifle divisions.
     In the second echelon  is the Carpathian  Military District, consisting
of the 58th Air Army and the 13th and 38th Armies. We already  know that the
staff of the 8th Guards Tank Army has  no one  under its  command and is  to
move to Czechoslovakia in the event of war. Having made  this assumption and
after  moving one  motor-rifle  division forward 200  metres, the Front will
have  3 tank  and  8 motor-rifle divisions--2  Armies with  one division  in
reserve.
     Finally, in  the third echelon, there is the Kiev Military District, in
which are located the staff of the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction and the
Group of Tank Armies  (the  3rd and  6th  Guards Tank Armies,  with  a total
complement of 8 tank divisions).
     In   reserve  the  C-in-C  has  two  tank  divisions  (in  Hungary  and
Czechoslovakia)  four motor-rifle  divisions and  the  102nd Guards Airborne
division. In addition he has a  diversionary regiment  and  the  variety  of
supporting formations and units which  the  C-in-C  of the Western Strategic
Direction also has.
     Of course,  it is  no accident that the Group of Tank Armies is located
in the Kiev  Military District. From here the Group can move quickly forward
to  the Front by which  it is  most  needed.  But  it could also  be quickly
brought under  the  command  of  the Western  Strategic  Direction  and,  by
violating  the  neutrality  of  Austria  from   Hungary,  could  attack  the
undefended Austro-German frontier.

     The proportions laid  down for the South-Western Direction are observed
as precisely as those of its Western counterpart.
     In each Army there are 4 motor-rifle divisions and 1 tank  division. In
the  Strategic  Direction there are 4 All-Arms Fronts and  1 Group  of  Tank
Armies.
     In each  Front there  are 2 tank and 8  motor-rifle  divisions. In  all
there are 2 Tank  Armies and  8 All-Arms Armies made  up of  16  tank and 32
motor-rifle divisions. You will recall  that in the Western Direction  there
are 32 tank and 32 motor-rifle divisions.
     The South-Western Strategic Direction can be strengthened  with  forces
from the Odessa and North Caucasus Military Districts.
--------


--------


     The Soviet Army is armed with dozens  of  types of  artillery  weapons:
guns,  howitzers,  gun-howitzers, and howitzer-guns,  ordinary and automatic
mortars,  multi-barrelled,  salvo-firing  rocket  launchers,  anti-tank  and
anti-aircraft guns.  In each of these classes  of weapons there  is a  whole
array of  models--from very   to very large--and most of these exist in
many variants--self-propelled, auxiliary-propelled, towed, assault, mountain
and static.
     But despite the wide  variety of  artillery  systems, all of these have
one  feature in  common; no matter how many men there are in the  crew  of a
gun--three or thirty--only two qualified specialists--the commander  and the
gunlayer--are needed.  All the rest  of the  crew can perform  their  duties
without  any kind of specialised  training. Any  No 2 loader, rammer number,
fuse-setter, ammunition  handler or other member  of  a gun's crew, can have
his duties explained  in  three  minutes  and the  crew can be working  like
automata  within  a  few  hours.  The  same  applies  to  the  driver  of  a
self-propelled gun  or  of a  gun  tractor. If he was  previously a  tractor
driver he too will quickly master his new functions.
     Soviet generals know  that  it is possible  to  teach a bear to  ride a
bicycle--and  very  quickly.  Why, they  reason, do  we need to  maintain  a
peacetime army  of  hundreds of thousands  of soldiers whose  wartime  tasks
would  be  so  simple? Surely  it is  easier to replace the thirty men  in a
two-gun   howitzer   platoon   with   five--the   platoon   commander,   two
gun-commanders  and  two  loaders  and  to  moth-ball  both guns  and  their
tractors?  If war comes, the others--the bears--can be trained very quickly.
For the present let them occupy themselves with peaceful work--casting steel
(armoured,  of  course)  or  building  electrical  power-stations  (for  the
production  of aluminium, which  is used  only for military purposes  in the
USSR).

     In peacetime the great majority of Soviet artillery regiments, brigades
and  divisions therefore  have only  5% of the soldiers they  would need  in
wartime.  Only  those  units (an  insignificant  minority)  stationed in the
countries of  Eastern  Europe  or on the Chinese  frontier  are  up to  full
strength.
     This principle applies not only  to the artillery  but  to most  of the
land forces and indeed to  the bulk  of the whole Soviet Armed Forces. It is
almost impossible to apply it  to certain categories--to tank forces  or  to
submarines  say.  But  it does  apply in  many  cases,  particularly to  the
infantry,  to  the  marine  infantry,  to  repair,  transport  and  engineer
sub-units and to units manning Fortified Areas.
     Because of this, the enormous Soviet land  forces, with their peacetime
strength of  183  divisions  as well as a very large  number  of independent
brigades,  regiments  and  battalions,  have  a  laughably    numerical
strength--little more than one and a half million men.
     This astonishingly    figure  is  deceptive.  Simply bringing  the
existing divisions and the independent brigades, regiments and battalions up
to strength on the first day  of mobilisation will raise the strength of the
land forces to 4,100,000. But this is just the first stage of mobilisation.

     Soviet  divisions are divided  into three categories,  depending on the
number of `bears' absent in peacetime:
     Category A--divisions which have 80% or more of their full strength
     Category B--those with between 30% and 50%
     Category C--those with between 5% and 10%
     Some Western observers use categories 1, 2 and 3 in referring to Soviet
divisions. This  does not affect the crux  of the  matter, but is  not quite
accurate. Categories  1 to  3 are used in  the USSR  only when  referring to
military districts.  Divisions  are always  referred  to by  letters  of the
alphabet.  This  is  because   it  is  simpler  to  use  letters  in  secret
abbreviations.  For instance,  `213  C  MRD' refers to the 213th motor-rifle
division, which falls in category C. The use of a numerical category in such
a message could lead to confusion. In referring to military districts, which
have titles but no numbers, it is more convenient to use figures to indicate
categories.
     Some  Western  observers  overestimate  the  number of  soldiers on the
strength of category B and C divisions. In fact there are considerably fewer
soldiers than it  would appear  to  an outside observer. These overestimates
presumably  result from the fact that in many military camps, in addition to
the  personnel  of  divisions  which are  below  strength,  there  are other
sub-units and units, also below strength but  not included in the complement
of the division. The Soviet land forces  have some 300 independent brigades,
more  than  500  independent  regiments and some  thousands  of  independent
battalions and companies,  which  do not belong to  divisions. In most cases
their personnel are quartered  in the barracks of divisions which  are below
strength,  which  gives a  misleading impression  of  the  strength  of  the
division  itself.  In  many  cases,  too,  for  camouflage  purposes,  these
sub-units wear the insignia of the divisions with which  they are quartered.
This     applies      primarily     to     rocket,     diversionary      and
reconnaissance/intelligence  personnel but  is  also  the  case  with  units
concerned with the  delivery, storage and transport of nuclear  and chemical
weapons.
     About a third of the divisions in the Soviet Army fall into category A.
They include all divisions stationed abroad and a number of divisions on the
Chinese frontier.
     Categories B and C,  too, account  for approximately  a  third  of  all
Soviet divisions.  In recent  years  there has  been  a  constant  shift  of
divisions from category B to category C, because of the introduction of such
new arms of forces as airborne assault troops and fortified area troops. The
new sub-units  and units need entirely  new troops,  which are always  taken
from category B  divisions. They cannot  be taken from category A divisions,
because these represent the  minimum  number  of  troops who must be kept at
readiness, or from category C divisions because these have no one to spare.
     It  must also  be  noted that in category B  divisions  the three  most
important battalions--rocket,  reconnaissance and communications are kept at
category A strength. In category C divisions these battalions are maintained
at category B strength.
     The same  applies  to similar sub-units serving with Armies and Fronts.
All rocket,  reconnaissance,  diversionary and  communications  sub-units of
Armies and Fronts are maintained at a strength one category higher than that
of all the other elements of the particular Army or Front.

     It must be emphasised that  the category allocated to a division has no
effect  whatsoever upon the extent to which it is supplied with new weapons.
Divisions stationed abroad, which are all, without exception, in category A,
take second place when new combat equipment is being issued.
     The  newest  equipment is issued first of all to the frontier  Military
Districts--Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Far Eastern and Trans-Baykal.
     Only five or seven,  sometimes even ten  years after a particular piece
of  equipment has  first been issued, is it supplied to divisions  stationed
abroad.  Third  to be supplied, after  them, are the  Soviet Union's allies.
Once the requirements of all these three elements have been fully satisfied,
the production of the particular model is discontinued. Once production of a
new version has begun, the  re-equipment  of the frontier military districts
begins  once again,  and the material withdrawn  from them is used to  bring
units located  in  the rear areas up to  the required scale. Once the Soviet
frontier military districts have been re-equipped,  the process of supplying
their used equipment to Category C divisions follows. Then the whole process
begins again--to the second echelon, then to the first, then from the second
via the first to the third.
     Such a system of supplying combat equipment has undeniable advantages.
     Firstly, secrecy is  greatly increased. Both friends and enemies assume
that the equipment issued  to the  Group  of  Forces in  Germany is the very
latest  available.  Enemies  therefore  greatly underestimate  the  fighting
potential and capabilities of the Soviet Army. Friends, too, are  misled and
it therefore becomes possible to sell them a piece  of  equipment  which  is
being issued in East Germany as if it were the most up-to-date model.
     Secondly, it becomes far more difficult for a  Soviet soldier to defect
to the  enemy with  details of the newest equipment--or  even,  perhaps,  to
drive  across  the border  in  the  latest  tank or fighting vehicle.  It is
practically impossible  to do this from the Baltic or  Byelorussian Military
Districts. The Soviet command  does not worry at  all about the Trans-Baykal
or Far Eastern  Military  Districts. It  knows very well that  every  Soviet
soldier hates socialism and  that he  would therefore defect  only to one of
the capitalist countries. No one would ever think of defecting  to socialist
China.
     Thirdly,  in the  event  of war, it is  the first echelon  forces which
would suffer the greatest losses in the first few hours--good equipment must
be  lost, of  course, but it should  not be the very latest. But then, after
this, the  Carpathian, Byelorussian  and  Baltic divisions  go  into  battle
equipped with the new weapons, whose existence is unsuspected by the enemy.
     This system of re-equipment has been  in existence for several decades.
It  is  significant  that the T-34  tank, which went into mass production as
early as  1940,  was  issued only  to military  districts in the rear areas.
Although  the USSR  was unprepared  for  Germany's  surprise  attack,  these
security measures were taken automatically, simple as they were  to enforce.
The surprise onslaught  made by  the Germans  destroyed  thousands of Soviet
tanks, but there was not a single  T-34  among them.  Nor, despite  the fact
that  the Soviet Army had  some 2,000  of  these  tanks, did they appear  in
battle during  the  first  weeks of  the  war. It was only  after the  first
echelon of the  Soviet forces had been completely destroyed, that the German
forces  first  met  the  excellent T-34. It  is also significant that German
Intelligence  did not suspect even the existence of that tank, let alone the
fact that it was in mass production.
--------


     On 31  December, 1940, the German General  Staff  finished  work  on  a
directive  on the  strategic  deployment  of  the Wehrmacht for the surprise
attack on the USSR. A top-secret appendix to the directive was prepared from
data provided by  German  Intelligence,  containing an  appreciation of  the
fighting strength  of the Red  Army. The German  generals  believed that the
Soviet  land forces  possessed 182 divisions,  of  which only  141  could be
brought into a  War  against Germany. Because of  the tense situation on the
Asian frontiers of the USSR,  a minimum of 41 divisions must at all costs be
left  guarding these frontiers. The whole plan for  the war against the USSR
was therefore based  on  an  estimate of the  speed  with  which  141 Soviet
divisions could be destroyed.
     On 22 June  Germany  attacked, taking  everyone  in  the  USSR,  Stalin
included, by surprise. The way  the war developed could not have been better
for Germany. In the first few hours, thousands  of aircraft were blazing  on
Soviet airfields while thousands  of Soviet tanks  and  guns  did  not  even
succeed in  leaving their depots.  In the first days of the  war,  dozens of
Soviet divisions, finding themselves encircled and  without ammunition, fuel
or  provisions, surrendered ingloriously. German armoured spearheads carried
out brilliant  encirclement operations surrounding not just Soviet divisions
or corps but entire Armies. On the third day of the war the 3rd and the 10th
Soviet Armies  were surrounded  near Bialystok.  Immediately after  this  an
equally large encirclement operation was carried out near Minsk, Vitebsk and
Orsha,  near   Smolensk.  Two  Soviet  armies  were  destroyed  after  being
surrounded near Uman' and five Armies in a huge pocket near Kiev.
     However,  already,  even  while  the  bells   were  ringing  for  their
victories, the sober-minded German generals  were biting  their fingernails,
as  they   bent  over  maps;  the  number  of  Soviet   divisions   was  not
diminishing--on  the  contrary, it was  rising fast.  Already in  mid-August
General Halder  was  writing in his diary: `We underestimated  them. We have
now discovered and  identified  360 of their divisions!' But Halder was only
talking  about the Soviet  divisions  which  were  directly involved at that
moment in fighting in the forward  areas--that is, first echelon  divisions.
But how many were there in the  second echelon? And in the third? And in the
reserves  of  the  Armies  and the  Fronts?  And in  the  internal  military
districts? And in the Stavka's reserve? And how many divisions had the NKVD?
How many were there in all?
     The  miscalculation proved  fatal. 153 German  and 37 allied  divisions
proved insufficient to destroy the  Red Army, even given the most favourable
conditions.
     The German generals' miscalculation was twofold. Firstly,  the Red Army
consisted, not of  182 but of 303 divisions, without counting  the divisions
of the  NKVD, the airborne forces, the marine infantry, the frontier troops,
the Fortified Area troops and others.
     Secondly,  and this  was  most  important,  the  German  generals  knew
absolutely  nothing about the `second  formation'  system--the  system which
splits Soviet divisions into  two in  the course of  one  night. This  is  a
system which enables the Soviet General Staff to increase the number  of its
divisions by precisely one hundred per cent, within a remarkably short time.

     The system of `invisible' divisions was adopted  by the Red Army at the
beginning  of the 1930s. It saved the Soviet Union from defeat in the Second
World War. It is still in use today.
     The process, which enables the Soviet leadership to expand the fighting
strength  of  its Armed Forces with great  speed, is simple and reliable and
uses almost no material resources.
     In  peacetime every divisional commander  has not one but two deputies.
One of these  carries out his duties  continuously, the  other does so  only
from time to time, since he has an additional series of responsibilities. He
also has a secret designation--`Divisional Commander--Second Formation'.
     The  chief of staff  of a  division, a Colonel, also has two  deputies,
Lieutenant-Colonels,  one of whom also has a secret designation--`Divisional
Chief of Staff--Second Formation'.
     The same system applies in every regiment.
     Every battalion  has a commander  (a  Lieutenant-Colonel) and a deputy,
who is secretly designated `Battalion Commander--Second Formation'.
     Let us imagine that  a  conflict  has broken out on the  Soviet-Chinese
frontier. A division receives its stand-to signal  and moves off immediately
to its  operational zone. The divisional commander has only  one deputy--the
officer   who  has   been  carrying   out   this  function,  with  all   its
responsibilities,  in  peacetime.  His  chief of  staff  and his  regimental
commanders, too, have only one deputy apiece. The battalion commanders  have
no deputies, but in a situation of this  sort one of the company  commanders
in each battalion  immediately becomes deputy to the battalion commander and
one of the platoon commanders automatically takes his place.
     Such  unimportant  moves   of  officers  do  not  reduce  the  fighting
efficiency of the division in any way.
     So,  the  division leaves  its camp  at  full  strength,  with all  its
soldiers  and equipment.  If it has less than its complement of soldiers and
junior officers,  it  will  be  brought  up to strength as  it  moves to the
operational  zone. The  absorption of  reservists is an operation  which has
been very carefully worked out.
     However, after the departure of the division the  military camp  is not
left empty. The Colonel who functioned  as deputy to the division's chief in
peacetime  has remained there. There, too,  are six Lieutenant-Colonels, who
were the  deputies  of the  regimental commanders,  together with the deputy
battalion commanders and  with one  third of the platoon commanders, who now
become company commanders.
     Thus, an  entire  command  staff remains in  the camp. Their previously
secret titles  become  overt. Within  twenty-four  hours this  new  division
receives  10,000  reserve soldiers  and the  military  camp  from which  one
division  has  only  just  set  out  is  already  occupied  by  a  new  one.
Unquestionably, of course, the new division is inferior in fighting power to
the  one which  has  just departed for  the front. Of course, the reservists
have long ago forgotten what they were taught during their army service many
years  earlier.  It  is  understandable  that the  platoons,  companies  and
battalions have  not  shaken  down and are  not yet  capable  of obeying the
orders of their commanders promptly and accurately. Nevertheless,  this is a
division.  At its head is a trained and experienced officer  who for several
years  has  been,  essentially, an  understudy  to  the commander  of a real
operational division  and who  has  often performed the latter's  functions.
Those in command of the new regiments, battalions and, companies,  too,  are
all  operational  officers,  rather than reservists. Each of them has worked
constantly with real soldiers and with  up-to-date equipment, has taken part
in battle exercises  and has borne constant,  heavy responsibility  for  his
actions and for those of  his subordinates. In addition, all the officers of
the new division  from the commander  downwards  know  one another  and have
worked together for many years.
     But  where  does enough  equipment for so many new divisions come from?
This  question is simple. These `invisible' divisions use old equipment. For
instance, immediately  after the  end  of  the war, Soviet infantrymen  were
armed with PPSh  automatic weapons. These  were changed  for  AK-47  assault
rifles. Each division received the number of new weapons which it needed and
the  old  ones were  mothballed and stored in  the division's stores for the
`invisible divisions'. Then  the AKM rifle replaced  the AK-47s,  which were
taken to the divisional store, from  which  the old  PPSh weapons were  sent
(still fit for use) to government storehouses or were passed on to `national
liberation movements'. The same path has been followed by the  RPG-1, RPG-2,
RPG-7 and then  the  RPG-16 anti-tank rocket launchers.  As new weapons were
received, those of the previous  generation remain in  the division's store,
until the division  receives  something completely new. Then the contents of
the store are renewed.
     The same happens with tanks, artillery, communications equipment and so
forth. I have myself  seen, in many divisional stores, mothballed JS-3 tanks
(which  were first issued to  units at the end of the Second World War) at a
time when the  whole division was equipped  with  the T-64, which  was  then
brand  new.  When  the  Soviet  artillery  began  to  be  re-equipped   with
self-propelled guns,  the old, towed guns were certainly not sent away to be
melted down. They were mothballed for the `second formation division'.
     So,  you  say, these `invisible divisions'  are not  only  staffed with
reservists  who  have  grown fat  and idle,  but  are equipped with obsolete
weapons? Quite correct.  But why, Soviet generals ask, reasonably, should we
issue fat reservists with the latest equipment? Would  they be able to learn
to use it? Would  there be enough time  to  teach  them in  a war? Is it not
better to keep the old (in other words simple and reliable) equipment, which
is  familiar to the reservists? Weapons which they learned to use  eight  or
ten years ago, when  they  were  in the  army? Mothballing an old  tank is a
thousand times cheaper than  building a new one. Is it not better to put ten
thousand old tanks into storage than to build ten new ones?
     Yes, the `invisible divisions' are old-fashioned and they don't bristle
with top-secret equipment,  but it costs  absolutely nothing to maintain 150
of them in peacetime.  And  the arrival of 150 divisions, even  if  they are
old-fashioned, at a  critical  moment, to reinforce 150 others who are armed
with the  very latest equipment,  could nonplus  the enemy and spoil all his
calculations. That is just what happened in 1941.
     The system of  `second formation' is not restricted to the land forces.
It is also used by  the airborne  forces,  the  frontier troops, the  marine
infantry, in the Air Forces and by the National Air Defence Forces.
     Here is an example of the use of this system.
     At  the  end of  the  1950s the  anti-aircraft  artillery regiments and
divisions of the National Air Defence Forces began to be rapidly re-equipped
with   rocket  weapons,  in  place   of  conventional   artillery.  All  the
anti-aircraft guns were  left with the anti-aircraft regiments and divisions
as secondary weapon systems, in addition to the new rockets. It was intended
that, in the event of war, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment could  be set
up as a counterpart to each anti-aircraft rocket regiment and  that the same
could  be  done  with  each  anti-aircraft   rocket  brigade  and  division.
Khrushchev  himself came out  strongly against  the system. Those commanding
the National Air  Defence  Forces suggested that Khrushchev should  withdraw
amicably  but Khrushchev refused, rejecting what he saw as  a whimsical idea
by a  handful  of conservative generals  who were unable  to understand  the
superiority of anti-aircraft rockets over  obsolete  anti-aircraft guns. But
then  the war in Vietnam began. Suddenly, it was realised  that rockets  are
useless against aircraft which  are  flying  at  extremely low altitudes. It
also became clear, that there are conditions in which it is quite impossible
to  transport rockets into certain  areas, that during  mass  attacks it  is
almost impossible  for rocket  launchers  to reload so  that after the first
launch they are completely  useless, that the electronic equipment of rocket
forces  is  exposed to intense countermeasures by the enemy, and  that those
may seriously reduce the effectiveness of  missile systems. It was then that
the  old-fashioned,  simple,  reliable,  economical anti-aircraft guns  were
remembered. Thousands of them  were  taken  out  of  mothballs  and  sent to
Vietnam to  strengthen the anti-aircraft rocket sub-units. The results  they
achieved are well known.
     This makes it quite clear why old anti-aircraft guns (tens of thousands
of them) are still stored, today, by  the anti-aircraft rocket  sub-units of
the Soviet Army. All of  them  have  already been collected together for the
`invisible'  regiments,  brigades  and   divisions.  If  it  should   become
necessary, all  that needs  to be done is to call upon those  reservists who
have  once served  in units  equipped  with these systems and  the numerical
strength of the National Air Defence Forces will  be doubled. Of course, its
fighting strength  will  not  be increased in  proportion to this  numerical
growth, but  in  battle any  increase  in strength  may change the  relative
positions of the combatants.
--------


     No single aspect of the  organisation of the Soviet  Army gives rise to
so  many  disagreements  and  misunderstandings  among  specialists  as  the
question of  Military  Districts. One expert will assert that a district  is
under  the  command of the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Land Forces. Others will
immediately reject this.  The commander  of a military district  has  an Air
Army at his disposal and he is  in command of it, but the C-in-C Land Forces
is not entitled  to exercise command over an Air  Army.  The commander of  a
military  district may have naval, rocket or flying  training schools in his
area  and he must command them,  but the C-in-C Land Forces has no authority
over  such institutions. In  order to understand the  role of  the  military
district in  the  Soviet Army, we  must  once  again return  to wartime  and
remember what its function was then.
     Before the war, the territory of  the  Soviet Union was divided into 16
military districts.  The same organisational  structure still  exists today,
with  minor changes.  Before  the war  military  districts were commanded by
Colonel-Generals  and Generals  of  the  Army.  Today  the situation remains
exactly the same. During the war the forces from these districts went to the
front, under the command  of these same  Colonel-Generals  and Generals. But
the  military  districts remained in  existence. During  the war  they  were
commanded by Major-Generals or, in a few instances, by Lieutenant-Generals.
     During the  war  the military  districts  were nothing but  territorial
military administrative units. Each military district was responsible for:
     Maintaining order and discipline among the population, and ensuring the
stability of the Communist regime.
     Guarding  military and industrial installations. Providing and guarding
communications.
     Mobilising  human, material, economic and natural resources for  use by
the fighting armies.
     Training reservists.
     Mobilisation.
     Of course these  activities did not fall within the scope of the C-in-C
Land Forces.  For this reason,  the military districts were subordinated  to
the Deputy  Minister  of  Defence  and through him  to the  most influential
section  of the Politburo.  The military districts  contain training schools
for all Services and arms of service  and it is in these that new formations
for all  the Armed Services are assembled. For example, ten  armies,  one of
them an Air Army, were formed in the Volga Military District during the war,
together with several brigades of marine infantry, one Polish division and a
Czech battalion. In any future war, the military districts would perform the
same function.  While military units and formations were being assembled and
trained  they  would  all come  under  the  orders  of the  commander of the
military district. He would himself be responsible to the C-in-C Land Forces
for all questions concerning the latter's armies, to the C-in-C of the  Navy
on all matters concerning marine  infantry, for air questions to  the C-in-C
of the Air Forces and for  questions relating to foreign units to the C-in-C
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Because the overwhelming majority  of the
units in a district comes from the  Land Forces, it has come to be  believed
that the C-in-C Land Forces  is the direct superior of the commanders of the
military districts. But this is a misapprehension. Each C-in-C controls only
his own forces in any given military district. He has no authority to become
involved  in  the  wide  range  of  questions for which the  commander of  a
military district is responsible, in addition to the training of reservists.
As soon as new  formations have completed their training, they pass from the
responsibility of  the commander of the military district to  the Stavka and
are sent to the front. Thus, the commander of a military district is  simply
the  military governor of a huge  territory. As  such, he  is in  command of
every military formation located  on his  territory, whichever Armed Service
it comes from.

     At the  end of  the  war staffs and fighting units  would be  dispersed
throughout the country in accordance with the plans of the General Staff. It
would be normal for a  Front, consisting of a Tank, an  Air and two All-Arms
Armies to be located in a military district. By virtue of his position,  the
Front Commander, who has the rank of Colonel-General or General of the Army,
is of  considerably  greater  importance  than  the wartime commander  of  a
military  district.  In  peacetime,  in  order  to  avoid  bureaucracy   and
duplication, the  staffs  of  the  Front and  of  the military  district are
merged.  The  Front  Commander  then  becomes  both  the  military  and  the
territorial commander, with the peacetime title  of Commander  of the Forces
of the  District. The  general, who acted as a purely territorial  commander
during the war, becomes the Deputy Commander  of  the district in peacetime,
with special responsibility for training. The Front's chief of staff becomes
the peacetime  chief of staff of the district and the officer  who  held the
function in the district in wartime becomes his deputy.
     Thus, in peacetime a military district is at one and  the same time  an
operational  Front  and an  enormous expanse  of territory. However,  it can
split into two  parts at any  moment. The Front  goes off to  fight and  the
district's  organisational framework  stays behind to  maintain order and to
train reservists.
     In  some cases something which is either larger or er than a Front
may  be  located  in a particular military  district.  For instance, only  a
single Army is stationed in the  Siberian Military District, while the Volga
and Ural Military Districts, too, have only one Army, which in both cases is
of reduced strength. In peacetime the staffs of these Armies are merged with
the  staffs of  the districts in  which they  are located. The Commanders of
these Armies act as district commanders while the generals who would command
the  district in wartime function  as their deputies. Since these particular
districts  do  not contain Fronts, they have no Air  Armies. The C-in-C Land
Forces therefore has the sole responsibility for inspecting these troops and
this is what  has led  to  the belief that  these  Districts are  under  his
command.
     No two districts are in the same  situation. The Kiev Military District
contains the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western  Strategic
District  and a  Group  of Tank Armies. The  staffs  of  the  Kiev  Military
District, of the Group of Tank Armies and of the C-in-C have been merged. In
peacetime, too, the  C-in-C goes under  the modest title of Commander of the
Kiev Military District. We have already seen  how different the  position is
in other districts.
     In the Byelorussian Military District the staffs of the District and of
a  Group of Tank Armies are merged. Although  he  has  more forces  than his
colleague  in Kiev, the Commander of the District is nevertheless two  steps
behind him, since he is not the C-in-C of a Strategic Direction but only the
Commander of a Group of Tank Armies.
     In the Trans-Baykal  Military District the District staff, that of  the
C-in-C of the Far Eastern Strategic Direction and the staff of the Front are
merged.
     Depending on the forces stationed on its territory, a military district
is assigned to one of three  categories, category 1 being  the highest. This
classification is kept secret, as  are the  real titles of the generals who,
in  peacetime,  each  carry  the  modest  title of Commander  of  a Military
District.
--------


     The Kremlin is one of the mightiest fortresses in Europe. The thickness
of  the  walls in  some  places  is as  much as 6-5 metres and  their height
reaches 19 metres. Above the walls rise eighteen  towers, each of  which can
defend itself independently and can cover the approaches to the walls.
     In the fourteenth  century the Kremlin  twice  withstood  sieges by the
Lithuanians and during the fifteenth century the Mongolian Tartars  made two
unsuccessful attempts within the space of fifty years to capture it.
     After the Tartar yoke had been shaken off, the  Kremlin  was  used as a
national treasury,  as a  mint,  as a prison and  as  a  setting for  solemn
ceremonies.  But  the Russian  Tsars  lived  in  Kolomenskoye and  in  other
residencies outside the town.  Peter the  Great  left Moscow altogether  and
built  himself  a new  capital, opening a window  on  Europe.  An unheard-of
idea--to build  a new capital on  the distant borders of his  huge  country,
right under the  nose of the formidable  enemy  with  whom Peter  fought for
almost  his whole  reign. And all  in  order  to  have  contact  with  other
countries.
     After Peter  the Great, not a  single Tsar built behind  the  Kremlin's
stone walls. Go to the  capital he built, to Tsarkoye Syelo, to Peterhof, to
the  Winter  Palace, and you will note  that all of them have one feature in
common--enormous  windows. And the wider the windows of the imperial palaces
became,  the more widely  the doors  of  the empire  were  thrown open.  The
Russian nobility spent at least half of their  lives in Paris, some  of them
returning home only long enough  to fight Napoleon before rushing back there
as quickly as possible. After  the 1860 reforms, a Russian  peasant  did not
even have to  seek permission before emigrating. If he  wanted  to  live  in
America--well, if he didn't like being at home, to hell with him! Even today
in the United  States and  in Canada millions of people still cling to their
Slavonic background. Foreigners were allowed into  the country without visas
of any  sort--and  not just as  tourists.  They  were taken  into Government
service and  were entrusted  with  almost everything, given posts in the War
Ministry, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the Ministry  of the Interior...
The  ministries,  the crown and  the throne were entrusted to  Catherine the
Great, who  was  honoured as  the  mother  of the  country, everybody having
forgotten  that  she  was a German.  There is  no need  even to  mention the
freedom given to foreign business  undertakings  which set  themselves up on
Russian territory. It was, in short, an idyllic state of affairs, or perhaps
not quite idyllic but certainly something entirely different to the state of
affairs which exists today.
     Under Lenin, everything changed. He began by closing all the frontiers.
Before the First World War more than  300,000 people went to  Germany alone,
each year, for seasonal work. Vladimir  Ilyich soon put a stop to that.  And
having closed the  country's frontiers he soon became aware that it would be
no bad thing to shut himself  away from the  people behind  a stone wall. He
suddenly thought of the Kremlin. Lenin  realised quite clearly that he would
be shot at more often than the  Emperors of Russia had ever been and without
a moment's hesitation he abandoned the wide windows of  the imperial palaces
for the blank walls of the Kremlin.
     Having shut his people in behind a wall of iron  and having put a stone
one between  them and himself, Lenin then  took  a precaution  which had not
been resorted  to  in  Russia for  a  thousand  years. He brought in foreign
mercenaries  to  guard the Kremlin--the 4th  Latvian rifles  to be  precise.
Lenin did not trust Russians with this job--he must have had his reasons.
     These mercenaries claimed,  as  one man, that  they were guarding Lenin
out of  purely  ideological  motives, since they  were convinced socialists.
Despite this,  however, not one of them  would  acknowledge  the validity of
Soviet bank notes; they demanded that  Lenin should pay  them  in the Tsar's
gold. Thanks to Lenin, there was enough of this available. At the same time,
a brave preacher  in Riga prophesied that the whole of free Latvia would one
day pay with its blood for these handfuls of gold.
     The  Kremlin also had a great  appeal for Stalin, who inherited it from
Lenin. He strengthened and  modernised all its  buildings thoroughly.  Among
the first of the changes he was responsible for was  a series of large-scale
underground  constructions--a  secret corridor  leading  to  the  Metro,  an
underground exit  on to  Red  Square  and  an  underground command post  and
communications centre.  Stalin threw Lenin's foreign mercenaries  out of the
Kremlin. Many  of  them  were  executed  straight away,  others  many  years
later--before the seizure of Latvia itself.
     Stalin chose to spend a large proportion  of  his thirty years in power
immured in the Kremlin.  He  also  arranged  for  a  number  of  underground
fortresses to be built in the  grounds of  his various dachas in the country
round Moscow. The most substantial  of these  was  at Kuntsevo.  His complex
pattern of movement between  the Kremlin and these dacha  fortresses enabled
Stalin to  confuse  even those  closest  to him about  where  he was  at any
particular moment.
     Stalin's system of governing the country and  of controlling its  armed
services is still  in  operation today. In peacetime all the  threads  still
lead back to the Kremlin and to the underground fortresses around Moscow. In
wartime,  control is exercised from  the control post of the  High  Command,
which, incidentally, was also built by Stalin.

     It  is quite impossible to  acquire  a plot of land  in  the  centre of
Moscow--even  in a cemetery. This  is not surprising if you visualise a city
which contains seventy Ministries. For Moscow is not only the capital of the
Soviet  Union but  also  of  the  RSFSR  (Russian  Soviet  Federal Socialist
Republic),  which  means  that  it must house not only Soviet ministries but
dozens of republican ones as well. Besides these  Moscow houses the KGB, the
General  Staff,  the  Headquarters  of  the  Moscow Military  District,  the
Headquarters of the Moscow District Air Defence Forces,  the Headquarters of
the  Warsaw  Treaty Organisation,  CMEA, more than  one  hundred  embassies,
twelve  military academies, the Academy of Sciences, hundreds  of committees
(including the Central Committee), and of directorates  (including the Chief
Intelligence Directorate--GRU), editorial offices, libraries, communications
centres, etc.
     Each of these  wishes to put  up  its buildings as close as possible to
the centre  of  the city and to  build  accommodation for  its  thousands of
bureaucrats as close to its main buildings as it can.
     A fierce battle  goes on for every square metre of ground in the centre
of Moscow  and only the Politburo can  decide who should be given permission
to build and who should be refused.
     And yet, almost  in the centre, a huge,  apparently endless field  lies
fallow. This is Khodinka, or, as it is known today, the Central Airfield. If
this field were built on there would be  room for all the bureaucrats. Their
glass skyscrapers would rise  right along the  Leningradskiy Prospekt, which
runs into Gorky Street and leads straight  to  the Kremlin. Many people look
enviously  at Khodinka musing about ways  of cutting    slices  out  of
it--after all this  `Central Airfield'  is not used  by  aircraft: it simply
lies there, empty and idle.
     For several years the KGB made efforts to acquire a  piece of land
at Khodinka. The Lubyanka could not be enlarged any further, but the KGB was
still growing. A vast new building was needed. But  all attempts  by the KGB
to  persuade the  Politburo  to  allocate  it  some  land at  Khodinka  were
unsuccessful. That was how the  huge new KGB building came to be built right
out  beyond  the  ring-road--a highly inconvenient location.  Meanwhile  the
endless field  still stretches through the centre  of Moscow, lying empty as
it always has  done.  Once  a  year rehearsals for the  Red Square  military
parade are held there and then the field sinks back into lethargy. Naturally
this  valuable piece of ground is  not being kept just for these rehearsals.
The troops could be  trained on  any other  field--there  are enough of them
around Moscow.
     Why does  the Politburo  refuse even the  KGB, its favourite offspring,
permission to  cut the est corner  off  this vast unused field? Because
the  field  is  connected  to  the  Kremlin by  a direct  underground  Metro
line--Sverdlov          Square          (under          the          Kremlin
itself)--Mayakovskaya--Byelorusskaya--Dinamo--Aeroport. Muscovites  know how
often and how  quickly  this  line  is closed during  any kind of holiday or
celebration, or  any other event which  breaks the normal rhythm  of life in
the Soviet capital.
     

     Why do the  Soviet  leaders  particularly like this Metro line? Already
before the war many  spacious underground  halls had been built  for  Moscow
Metro stations and the ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the revolution,
on 6 November,  1941, were  actually held in the Mayakovskiy  Metro station.
Everyone invited to attend had to reach  the station from above, because the
line had  been closed. Once they  were there a special Metro  train appeared
carrying Stalin,  Molotov and  Beriya. They came  from  the  Sverdlov Square
Metro station. To reach this, they do  not, of  course,  leave the  Kremlin.
They have  their own secret corridor leading to the Metro from right  inside
its buildings.
     Stalin's route out  of  the Kremlin  has existed  unchanged for several
decades. If  necessary, any  or all  of the members of the Politburo can  be
taken underground,  in complete  secrecy  and  security,  to Khodinka, where
government  aircraft   await  them  in  well-guarded  hangars.  With  normal
organisation, the Politburo can leave  the  huge, traffic-laden  city within
fifteen minutes, during which no  outsider  will spot official cars speeding
along streets in the centre or helicopters flying out of the Kremlin.
     North-west   of  Moscow  is   another  government   airfield--Podlipki.
(Incidentally, just beside  this airfield is the centre at  which cosmonauts
are trained.) The  sub-unit stationed at Podlipki is  known  as the 1st Task
Force of the Civil Air  Fleet. In  fact it has virtually nothing to  do with
the Civil Air Fleet--it is a group of government aircraft. Ordinary official
flights  begin  and end  at  Podlipki. Special  official flights,  involving
ceremonial meetings and escorts, make the brief flight to Sheremetyevo or to
one of Moscow's other large airports. In an emergency the Politburo could be
evacuated in various ways:
     - from the Kremlin in official  cars to Podlipki and from there by  air
to the Supreme  Command  Post;  this  is a long  and  inconvenient route. In
addition all Moscow can see what is happening.
     - from the Kremlin by Metro to Khodinka and from there by helicopter to
Podlipki;  this too, is a fairly  long route, involving as it  does changing
from the helicopter to a fixed-wing aircraft.
     -  the shortest variation--an  aircraft of the  1st Task  Force  of the
Civil Air  Fleet is either  permanently stationed at Khodinka or  makes  the
short flight there  from  Podlipki,  takes  the members of the  Politburo on
board, and vanishes.

     The special aircraft soars up into the early morning mist over sleeping
Moscow.  As it  gains height it  makes a  wide turn and sets  course for the
SCP--the  Supreme  Command  Post,  built by Stalin  and  modernised  by  his
successors. Where is the SCP? How  can it be found? Where  would Stalin have
chosen to site it?
     Most probably  it is  not  in Siberia.  Today  the  eastern regions are
threatened by China, as they were before the war by Japan. Of course the SCP
would  not  be  located  in   any  area  which  might  be  threatened,  even
theoretically, by  an  aggressor, so  it  cannot  be  in the Ukraine, in the
Baltic region, in  the Caucasus or in the Crimea. Common sense suggests that
it  must  be somewhere as far away as possible from any  frontier--in  other
words in the central part of the RSFSR, which  could hardly  be over-run  by
enemy  tanks and which  could scarcely be reached by  enemy  bombers, or  by
aircraft carrying airborne troops. And if hostile aircraft were to reach the
spot  they  could  only  do  so  without fighter  cover,  so  they would  be
defenceless.
     Secondly, the SCP  cannot, of course, be sited in an  open field. There
must be a minimum of 200 metres of solid  granite above its many  kilometres
of tunnels  and roads. This being so, it can only be in  either the Urals or
Zhiguli.
     Thirdly it  stands  to  reason that  it must be surrounded  by  natural
barriers  which are so impenetrable that no hunter who happens to enter  the
area,  no geologist who  loses his  way,  no  gaol-breaker, no pilot who has
survived a crash and wandered for  weeks  through the  taiga can come across
the  SCP's huge ventilator shafts, descending into terrifying chasms  or its
gigantic  tunnels,  their  entrances  sealed  by  armoured  shields weighing
thousands of tons. If Stalin set out to keep the location  of the SCP secret
he  would  not  have  chosen  the  Urals, whose  gentle  slopes  were  being
completely worn away  by the  feet of tens  of millions  of prisoners. Where
could one  build  a whole town,  so that no trace  of it would be found by a
single living soul? The only possible place is Zhiguli.
     Would it be possible  to  find a  better  place, anywhere  on earth, to
build  an underground town?  Zhiguli is a  real natural  miracle--a  granite
monolith 80 kilometres long and 40 wide.
     Some geologists  maintain that  Zhiguli is  one single  rock, crumbling
slightly at the edges  but retaining the original,  massive unity of all its
millions of tons.
     It rises out of the boundless steppes, almost entirely encircled by the
huge river Volga, which turns it  into a peninsula, with rocky  shores which
stretch for 150 kilometres and fall  sheer to the water's edge. Zhiguli is a
gigantic fortress built  by nature,  with  granite walls hundreds of  metres
high,  bounded by  the waters of  the  great river.  From  the  air, Zhiguli
presents  an  almost  flat  surface,  overgrown  with age-old,  impenetrable
forest.
     The climate is excellent--a cold winter, with hard frosts, but no wind.
The  summer  is dry  and hot. This  would be the place to build sanatoriums!
Here and there  in  clearings in  the  virgin  forests there  are  beautiful
private houses,  fences, barbed wire, Alsatian  dogs. One of Stalin's dachas
was built here, but nothing was  ever written about  it, any more than about
those at Kuntsevo or Yalta. In  the vicinity  were the villas of Molotov and
Beriya and later of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and others.
     Anyone who has  travelled on the Moscow Metro will say that there is no
better  underground  system  in  the  world.  But  I  would   disagree  with
this--there is a  much better  one.  In Zhiguli. It was built by the best of
the engineers who worked on the Moscow Metro--and by thousands of prisoners.
     In Zhiguli tens  of kilometres  of tunnels have  been  cut, hundreds of
metres deep  into  the  granite monolith  and command posts,  communications
centres, stores and shelters have been built for those who  will control the
gigantic armies during a war.
     In peacetime, no aircraft  may fly over this region. Not even  the most
friendly of foreigners may enter  the Zhiguli area, which is protected by  a
corps of  the National  Air  Defence Forces and  by  a division of the  KGB.
Nearby is a huge airfield, at  Kurumoch, which is completely empty. This  is
where the  special aircraft will  land but it  is  also  intended for use by
additional fighter aircraft, to strengthen the defences in the event of war.
     Close  to  Zhiguli  is the city of  Kuybishev.  It, too, is  closed  to
foreigners, and it  is  useful to remember  that  this was where  the  whole
Soviet government was based during the last war.
--------


--------


     For decades, Western military theorists have  unanimously asserted that
any  nuclear  war   would  begin  with  a  first  stage  during  which  only
conventional weapons  would be used. Then, after a certain period, each side
would begin, uncertainly  and irresolutely at first,  to use nuclear weapons
of the lowest calibre. Gradually, larger and larger nuclear weapons would be
brought into action. These theorists  hold varying views on the period which
this escalation would take, ranging from a few weeks to several months.
     Being  unopposed, this theory was  to be  found  in  the pages  of both
serious studies and  light novels--the  latter  being fantasies  with  happy
endings,  in which a nuclear war was brought to a halt in such a way that it
could never recur.
     The  theory  that a  nuclear  war  would take a long  time to build  up
originated  in  the  West  at  the  beginning of  the  nuclear  age.  It  is
incomprehensible and absurd, and  it completely  mystifies Soviet  marshals.
For  a  long  time there was  a secret debate at  the  highest levels of the
Soviet government--have the Western politicians  and generals gone off their
heads or are they bluffing?  It was concluded that, of course, no one really
believed in the theory but that it had been thought up in order to hide what
Western  policy-makers really  believed about  the  subject.  But  then  the
question arose: for whose benefit could such an  unconvincing and, to put it
mildly, such a  silly idea have been dreamed up? Presumably not for  that of
the Soviet leadership. The  theory is too naive  for specialists to believe.
That must mean  that  it was devised  for  the ignorant and  for the popular
masses in the West, to reassure the man in the street.

     The first American film I  ever saw was 

The  Magnificent Seven

 with Yul
Brynner in the main role. At that  time all I knew  about the  Americans was
what Communist propaganda said about them and I had not believed  that since
my earliest childhood. Thus it was from a cowboy film that I began to try to
form  my own independent opinions about  the  American  people and about the
principles by which they live.
     American films  are not often  shown in the Soviet Union, but after The
Magnificent Seven I  did not miss  a single one. The country as I saw it  on
the screen pleased  me  and the people  even more so--good-looking,  strong,
masculine and decisive. It seemed that the Americans spent all their time in
the saddle, riding on marvellous horses in blazing sunlight through deserts,
shooting down villains without mercy. My  heart belonged  only to America. I
worshipped the Americans--in particular for the decisiveness with which they
kept down the  number  of crooks in their society. The  heroes  of  American
films would submit for long periods  and with  great patience to humiliation
and insults and were cheated at every turn, but matters were  always settled
with  a dramatically decisive gunfight. The two  enemies gaze  unflinchingly
into each other's  eyes. Each has his hands  tensely  over  his holsters. No
exchange  of  curses,  no  insults,  not  a superfluous  movement.  Dramatic
silence. Both are  calm  and collected. Clearly  death has spread its  black
wings above them. The  gunfight itself almost represents death, for each  of
them.  They  look  long and  hard  into  each  other's  eyes.  Suddenly  and
simultaneously both of  them  realise, not  from what they see  or hear, not
with  their minds or their hearts but  from  pure animal  instinct, that the
moment has come. Two shots ring out as one. It is impossible  to detect  the
moment at which they draw their guns  and pull  the triggers. The denouement
is   instantaneous,  without  preamble.   A  corpse  rolls  on  the  ground.
Occasionally there are two  corpses.  Usually the villain is killed but  the
hero is only wounded. In the hand.
     Many years  passed and  I became an officer  serving with  the  General
Staff.  Suddenly, as I  studied  American  theories of  war,  I  came  to an
appalling realisation. It became  clear to  me that a modern American cowboy
who is  working  up to  a  decisive  fight will  always  expect to  begin by
spitting at and insulting his opponent and to continue by throwing whisky in
his face and chucking custard pies at him before  resorting  to more serious
weapons. He expects to hurl  chairs  and bottles at  his enemy and to try to
stick a fork  or  a tableknife  into his behind and then  to fight  with his
fists and only after all this to fight it out with his gun.
     This is a very dangerous philosophy. You are going to end up  by  using
pistols. Why not start with  them?  Why should the bandit you  are  fighting
wait for you to remember your gun? He may shoot you before  you do,  just as
you  are  going  to slap his face.  By using his  most deadly weapon  at the
beginning  of the fight, your  enemy saves his strength. Why should he waste
it throwing chairs at  you? Moreover,  this will enable him  to save his own
despicable  life. After  all, he  does not know, either, when you, the noble
hero, will decide to use  your gun. Why should he wait  for this moment? You
might make a sudden decision to shoot him immediately after throwing custard
pies at him, without waiting for the  exchange of chairs. Of course he won't
wait for you when  it comes to staying alive. He  will shoot first.  At  the
very start of the fight.
     I consoled  myself for a  long time with the  hope  that the theory  of
escalation in a nuclear war had been  dreamed up by the American specialists
to reassure  nervous  old-age pensioners. Clearly, the theory is too fatally
dangerous to serve as a basis for  secret military  planning. Yet, suddenly,
the American specialists demonstrated to the  whole world  that they  really
believed that this  theory  would apply  to  a world-wide  nuclear war. They
really did believe that the bandit  they  would be fighting would  give them
time to throw custard pies and chairs at him before he made  use of his most
deadly weapon.
     The demonstration was as public  as it possibly could be. At the end of
the 1960s the Americans began to  deploy their anti-missile defence  system.
They could not, of course, use it to defend more  than one vitally important
objective. The objective they chose to protect was their  strategic rockets.
They did  not decide to safeguard the heart  and mind  of their country--the
President, their government or their  capital. Instead  they  would  protect
their pistol--in other words they were showing the  whole world that, in the
event of a fight, they did not intend to use it. This revelation was greeted
with the greatest delight in the Kremlin and by the General Staff.

     The philosophy of the Soviet General Staff is no different from that of
the horsemen whom I  had watched  riding  the desert.  `If  you want to stay
alive, kill your enemy.  The quicker you finish him  off, the less chance he
will have to use his  own gun.' In essence, this  is  the whole  theoretical
basis on  which their plans for a  third world war have  been  drawn up. The
theory is known unofficially in the General Staff as the `axe theory'. It is
stupid, say the Soviet generals, to start a fist-fight if your  opponent may
use a knife. It is just  as stupid to attack him with  a knife if he may use
an axe. The more terrible  the weapon which your opponent may  use, the more
decisively you must attack him, and  the more quickly  you must  finish  him
off. Any  delay or  hesitation  in  doing  this  will  just give him a fresh
opportunity to use  his axe on you. To put it briefly,  you can only prevent
your enemy from using his axe if you use your own first.
     The `axe theory' was put forward in all Soviet manuals and handbooks to
be read at regimental level and higher. In  each  of these one of  the  main
sections was  headed  `Evading  the blow'.  These handbooks  advocated, most
insistently, the delivery of a  massive pre-emptive  attack on the enemy, as
the best method of self-protection. This recommendation was not  confined to
secret manuals--non-confidential military publications carried it as well.
     But  this  was  trivial by  comparison to  the demonstration  which the
Soviet  Union gave the whole  world at the  beginning of the 1970s, with the
official publication of data about the  Soviet anti-missile defence  system.
This  whole  system was, in reality, totally inadequate, but the idea behind
it provides  an  excellent illustration of  the Soviet philosophy on nuclear
war. By contrast to  the United States,  the Soviet Union had no thought  of
protecting its  strategic  rockets with  an  anti-missile  system.  The best
protection for  rockets in  a war is to  use them immediately. Could any one
devise a more effective way of defending them?

     In addition to such elementary military logic,  there are political and
economic  reasons which would quite simply compel the Soviet command to make
use of the overwhelming proportion of its nuclear  armoury within  the first
few minutes of a war.
     From the political  point of  view,  the turning point  must be reached
within the first few minutes. What alternative could there be?  In peacetime
Soviet soldiers  desert to the West  by the hundred, their sailors  jump off
ships in  Western  ports,  their  pilots  try  to break through  the  West's
anti-aircraft  defences in their aircraft. Even  in peacetime,  the problems
involved  in keeping the population  in  chains  are  almost insoluble.  The
problems are already as acute  as this when no more  than a few  thousand of
the most trusted Soviet citizens have even a theoretical chance of escaping.
In  wartime tens  of  millions of soldiers  would  have  an  opportunity  to
desert--and they would take it! In order to prevent this, every soldier must
realise quite clearly  that, from the very first  moments of a war, there is
no sanctuary for him at  the other side of the nuclear desert. Otherwise the
whole Communist house of cards will collapse.
     From an  economic  point  of  view,  too,  the war must be  as short as
possible. Socialism  is unable  to feed itself from its  own resources.  The
Soviet variety is no exception to this general  rule. Before the revolution,
Russia,  Poland,  Estonia, Lithuania,  and Latvia  all  exported foodstuffs.
Nowadays they have not enough  reserves to hold out  from one harvest to the
next.  Yet  shortage  of  food  leads  very  quickly  to  manifestations  of
discontent, to  food-riots  and  to  revolution.  Remember what happened  in
Novocherkassk in 1962, throughout the Soviet Union in  1964 and in Poland in
1970 and 1980. If socialism is unable to feed itself  in peacetime, when the
whole army is used to bring in the harvest, what will happen  when the whole
army is thrown into battle and when all the men and vehicles at present used
for agriculture are mobilised for war?
     For these reasons, the  Communists  are  forced to plan any  adventures
they have in mind for the second part  of the year, for  the period when the
harvest has already been brought in, and to try to finish them as quickly as
possible. Before the next season for work in the fields comes round.
--------


     Soviet generals  believe,  quite  correctly,  that  the  best  kind  of
defensive  operation  is   an   offensive.  Accordingly,   no  practical  or
theoretical work on purely defensive operations is carried out at Army level
or higher. In order that they should take the offensive, Soviet generals are
taught  how  to  attack.  In  order  that  they  should   defend  themselves
successfully, they are also taught how to attack. Therefore, when we talk of
a   large-scale   operation--one  conducted   by  a  Front  or  a  Strategic
Direction--we can talk only of an offensive.
     The  philosophy behind the offensive is simple. It is easy to tear up a
pack of cards if you take them one by one. If you put a dozen cards together
it is very difficult to tear them up. If  you try  to tear up the whole pack
at  once you will be unsuccessful: you will not be able to tear them all up,
and, furthermore, not  a  single  card in the pack will be torn.  Similarly,
Soviet generals attack  only with enormous  masses  of  troops, using  their
cards only as a whole pack. In this  way, the  pack protects the cards which
make it up.
     Observing  this principle of concentration of  resources, in any future
war the  Soviet Army  will only  carry out operations  by  single  Fronts in
certain  isolated  sectors.  In  most  cases it  will  carry  out  strategic
operations--that is to say operations  by  groups of Fronts working together
in the same sector.

     The scenario for  a strategic offensive operation is a standard one, in
all cases. Let us  take the Western  Strategic Direction as an  example.  We
already know that this has a  minimum of three Fronts in  its first echelon,
one more in its second echelon, and a Group of Tank Armies in its third. The
Baltic  Fleet  operates  on its flank. Each of its Fronts has one Tank Army,
one  Air Army  and two All-Arms Armies. In addition,  the Commander-in-Chief
has at his disposal a Corps  from the  Strategic Rocket Forces, a Corps from
the Long-Range Air Force,  three airborne divisions and the entire forces of
Military Transport Aviation. The  rear areas of  the Strategic Direction are
protected  by three Armies from the National Air Defence Forces. A strategic
offensive is divided into five stages:
     

The first stage,

  or  initial nuclear strike, lasts for half  an  hour.
Taking part in this  strike are all the rocket formations which  can be used
at  that stage, including the  Corps  from the Strategic Rocket Forces,  the
rocket brigades of the Fronts and Armies, the rocket battalions of the first
division echelon and all the nuclear artillery which has reached the forward
edge of the battle area. The initial nuclear strike has as its targets:
     Command  posts  and  command  centres,   administrative  and  political
centres, lines of communication  and communications centres--in other words,
the brain and nerve-centres of a state and of its armies.
     Rocket bases, stores  for nuclear weapons, bases for nuclear submarines
and for  bomber aircraft.  These  targets  must be knocked out in  order  to
reduce Soviet losses at the hands of the enemy to the absolute minimum.
     Airfields,  anti-aircraft  positions,  radar  stations, to  ensure  the
success of  the offensive breaks in the  enemy's defenses, must be made  for
Soviet aircraft. The main groupings of the enemy's forces. Why fight them if
they can be destroyed before a battle can begin?
     In addition to the forces directly under the command of  the  C-in-C of
the Strategic Direction, units of the Strategic Rocket Forces will also play
a  supporting  role  in  the initial  nuclear  strike.  These  will  concern
themselves in particular  with attacks on  the  enemy's principal ports,  in
order to prevent the enemy from bringing up reinforcements and in  order  to
isolate the European continent.
     Soviet  generals consider,  with  good reason, that  an initial nuclear
strike  must be unexpected, of short  duration and of the  greatest possible
intensity. If it is delayed  by  as much as  an  hour, the situation of  the
Soviet Union will deteriorate sharply.  Many of the  enemy's  fighting units
may move from their permanent locations, his aircraft may be dispersed on to
motorways; divisions of his land forces may leave their barracks, his senior
leaders  may move, with  their  cabinets,  to  underground  shelters  or  to
air-borne  command  posts  and  the task  of annihilating them  will  become
extremely  difficult, if not impossible.  This  is why the  maximum possible
number of nuclear weapons will be used to deliver an initial nuclear strike.
     

The second stage

 follows immediately  upon the  first. It lasts between
90 and 120 minutes. It consists  of a mass  air attack by the  Air Armies of
all the Fronts and by all the Long-Range  Air Force units at the disposal of
the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction.
     This  attack is carried out  as  a  series  of waves.  The  first  wave
consists of all the available reconnaissance aircraft--not only those of the
reconnaissance  regiments  but also the squadrons  of fighters  and  fighter
bombers  which have  been  trained in reconnaissance. In  all,  more  than a
thousand reconnaissance aircraft from the Strategic Direction will join this
wave;  they  will be  assisted by several  hundred pilotless  reconnaissance
aircraft.  The primary tasks of the aircraft in this  wave are to assess the
effectiveness of the initial nuclear strike and  to identify  any objectives
which have not been destroyed.
     Immediately behind these aircraft comes  the main wave,  made up of all
the Air  Armies and Corps.  Nuclear weapons are  carried  by those  aircraft
whose crews  have been trained  to deliver a nuclear strike.  The targets of
this wave are in the same categories as those of the rockets which delivered
the initial nuclear attack. But, unlike the rockets,  these aircraft  attack
mobile rather  than  stationary targets. They  follow up  after the rockets,
finishing off whatever the latter were unable to destroy. Among the first of
their mobile targets are: tank columns  which  have managed  to leave  their
barracks, groups of aircraft which  have succeeded  in taking off from their
permanent airfields  and  in  reaching  dispersal  points  on motorways, and
mobile anti-aircraft weapons.
     The Soviet commanders believe  that this  massive air  activity  can be
carried  out without heavy losses, since the enemy's radars  will  have been
destroyed, many of his computer systems and lines of communication will have
been disrupted  and  his aircrews and anti-aircraft forces  will  have  been
demoralised.
     While these massive air operations are taking place all staff personnel
will be working at  top  speed  on  evaluation of  the information  which is
coming  in about the results  of the initial  nuclear strike. Meanwhile, all
the rocket launchers which took part  in the initial  nuclear strike will be
reloading. At the same time, too, the rocket battalions of the divisions and
the rocket brigades of the Armies and Fronts, which did not take part in the
initial strike because they were too far behind the front line, will move up
to the forward edge of the battle area at the maximum possible speed.
     All  aircraft will then return to their bases  and the third stage will
begin immediately.
     

The third stage,

  like  the first, will  last only half an hour. Taking
part in it will  be  even more rocket  launchers than those  involved in the
first stage, since many will have moved up from the rear areas. The thinking
behind this  plan is simple: in battle the enemy's prime concern  will be to
hunt out  and  destroy all  Soviet  rocket  launchers; each of these  should
therefore inflict  the  maximum possible  damage  on the  enemy  before this
happens. The  aim is to destroy  all those targets which  survived the first
and  second stages, and  to put  the maximum possible number of the  enemy's
troops and equipment, especially his nuclear weapons, out of action.
     

The fourth stage

  lasts  between 10 and 20 days. It  can be broken down
into  offensive operations by individual Fronts. Each Front concentrates all
its efforts  on ensuring success for its  Tank  Army. To  achieve  this  the
All-Arms Army attacks the enemy's defences and the  Front Commander  directs
the Tank Army to the point at which a breakthrough has been achieved. At the
same time, the entire resources  of the Front's artillery division are  used
to clear a  path for  the Tank Army. The rocket brigades lay down  a nuclear
carpet ahead of  the Tank  Army, and  the  Air  Army covers its breakthrough
operation. The Front's  anti-tank brigades cover the Tank Army's flanks, the
air-borne assault  brigade  seizes  bridges and crossing points for its use,
and the diversionary  brigade, operating ahead of and on the flanks  of  the
Tank Army,  does everything possible to provide it with favourable operating
conditions.
     The Tank Army is brought up to a breach in the enemy defences only when
a real breakthrough  has been achieved and once the Front's forces have room
for manoeuvre. The Tank Army pushes forward at maximum possible speed to the
greatest depth it can reach. It avoids prolonged engagements, it keeps clear
of pockets  of resistance  and  it often  becomes separated  by considerable
distances from the other components of the Front. Its task, its  aim,  is to
deliver a blow like that  from a  sword or an axe: the  deeper it  cuts, the
better.
     An All-Arms Army advances more slowly than a Tank  Army, destroying all
the pockets of  resistance in its path and any groups of enemy  troops which
have been surrounded, clearing up the area as it moves forward.
     A Tank Army is like a rushing flood, tearing its way through a gap in a
dyke,  smashing  and  destroying everything in  its  path.  By  contrast  an
All-Arms Army is  a quiet, stagnant sheet of  water, flooding a whole  area,
drowning enemy islands and slowly undermining buildings and other structures
until they collapse.
     During the first few hours or days of a war, one  or all of the  Fronts
may suffer  enormous losses. But it should not be assumed that the C-in-C of
a Strategic  Direction  will  use his  second echelon Front to strengthen or
take the place  of  the Front which has  suffered most.  The second  echelon
Front  is  brought into action at  the point where  the greatest success has
been achieved, where the  dyke has really  been breached or where at least a
very dangerous crack can be seen developing.
     

The fifth stage

 lasts 7-8 days.  It  may begin at  any  time during the
fourth stage.  As soon  as  the  C-in-C is sure  that  one of his Fronts has
really broken through, he  moves up his second  echelon  Front and, if  this
manages to push through the opening, he brings his striking force, his Group
of Tank Armies, into action. This operation by the Group against the enemy's
rear defences represents the fifth stage of a strategic offensive.
     This Group of Tank Armies consists of two Tank Armies. However, by this
time the  Tank  Armies of  the Fronts may  already  be in action against the
enemy's rear  defences. These Tank Armies may be taken away from  the  Front
Commanders, at the decision of the C-in-C, and incorporated in  the Group of
Tank Armies.  Towards  the end  of  the action there may be five or even six
Tank Armies in the Group, bringing its establishment up to as much as 10,000
tanks. If during a breakthrough half or  even two thirds  of these are lost,
the Group still will be of impressive strength.
     However,  the Soviet  General Staff  hopes that losses  will not  be as
large as  this. Our pack of cards effect  should  manifest itself. Moreover,
the operations  of the Group  of Tank  Armies will be  supported by  all the
resources available to the C-in-C of the Strategic Direction. All his rocket
and  air  forces will  be  attacking  the  enemy  with nuclear weapons,  his
airborne divisions will be dropped to help the Group to advance. Lastly, the
whole  Baltic Fleet will be  supporting the Group. If  the Group manages  to
advance, the whole of the forces available to the State, up to and including
the Supreme Commander himself, can be massed to support it.

     The  strategic  offensive has  one  alternative form. This is sometimes
known as  a `Friday evening' offensive. It differs  from the normal  version
only  in  dispensing  with  the  first  three  stages  described  above. The
operation therefore begins at the fourth stage--with a surprise attack  by a
group of Fronts against one or more countries.
     In practice, what happened  in  Czechoslovakia  was an operation  by  a
group of Fronts, carried out swiftly and without warning. Significantly this
operation caught  the  Czechs off  guard--profiting by  the  Friday  evening
relaxation of the State apparatus after a working week. Because of the 
size  of  Czechoslovakia and the evident disinclination of the Czech army to
defend its  country,  the  C-in-C  did  not bring his  Group of  Tank Armies
forward from  Byelorussia and  the Front  commanders did not push their Tank
Armies into Czechoslovakia. Only a very   number of tanks  took part in
the  operation--some 9,000 in all,  drawn  from the  tank battalions of  the
regiments  involved,  the tank regiments  of  the  divisions  and  the  tank
divisions of the Armies.
     The success of the Czech operation  produced a new optimism in  various
other  countries  in  Europe, which  realised  that  they  could  hope to be
similarly liberated in the course of a few hours.
     The terrible epidemic of pacification  which subsequently swept through
Western Europe aroused  new hopes of success through a bloodless  revolution
in the hearts of the Soviet General Staff.
--------


     In  the winter  of  1940,  the Red  Army broke  through the `Mannerheim
Line'.  No one knows what price  it  paid  for this  victory, but,  time and
again, demographers have come up with the same figure--a total of  1,500,000
human lives. Whether this is accurate or not, the losses were so staggering,
even  by Soviet  standards,  that the advance was  halted  the  very  moment
Finnish resistance was broken.
     The following  summer Soviet tanks were rumbling through the streets of
three sovereign states--Estonia, Lithuania  and  Latvia.  Since then, Soviet
tanks have  visited  Warsaw,  Berlin, Prague,  Vienna,  Bucharest, Budapest,
Sofia, Belgrade,  Pyongyang  and even Peking. But they never dared to  enter
Helsinki.
     Finland  is  the only country which  has  fought  a war  against Soviet
aggression without ever having allowed Soviet tanks to enter its capital.
     It is  therefore  surprising that  it is  Finland which has become  the
symbol of submission to Communist expansion. Halted by the valour with which
this brave country defended itself, the communists changed their tactics. If
they could not bring the Finns to their knees by fighting, they decided they
would  do  it by peaceful methods.  Their  new weapon turned out to be  more
powerful than tanks.  Soviet  tanks  entered Yugoslavia and Romania but both
countries are  independent  today. They  never reached Helsinki, but Finland
has submitted.
     This result surprised even the Soviet Communists themselves and it took
them a long time  to appreciate the power of the weapon which had fallen  so
unexpectedly into their hands. When they finally realised its effectiveness,
they  put it  to  immediate use against the remaining  countries  of Western
Europe. Its effects are to be seen everywhere around us. The Communists knew
that  they could never seize Western  Europe so  long as  it was capable  of
defending itself, and this is why they concentrated their attacks on Western
European determination to stand up to them.
     Pacifism  is sweeping through  the  West. It  is doing the same  in the
Soviet Union. In  the West,  though, it is uncontrolled while in the USSR it
is encouraged from above. However, both movements have a common aim. Western
pacifists are  fighting  to stop the installation of new  rockets in 

Western

Europe.  Soviet   pacifists  speak  out  for  the  same  cause--against  the
installation of rockets in 

Western

 Europe.
--------


     When I lecture to Western  officers  on tactics in  the Soviet Army,  I
often close my talk  by  putting a question to them--always the same one--in
order to  be sure  that  they have understood me  correctly. The question is
trivial and elementary. Three  Soviet motor-rifle  companies are on the move
in the same sector. The first  has come under murderous fire and its  attack
has crumbled, the second is advancing slowly,  with  heavy losses, the third
has  suffered  an  enemy  counter-attack  and,  having lost all  its command
personnel,  is  retreating.  The  commander of the  regiment to  which these
companies  belong has three  tank companies and three artillery batteries in
reserve.  Try  and  guess, I say,  how this  regimental  commander uses  his
reserves to  support his three companies.  `You are  to guess,' I say, `what
steps a  Soviet  regimental commander would take,  not a Western one  but  a
Soviet, a Soviet, a Soviet one.'
     I have never yet received the correct reply.
     Yet in  this  situation there  is  only  one possible  answer. From the
platoon level to that of the Supreme Commander all would agree that there is
only one possible decision: all three tank companies and all three artillery
batteries must  be used to  strengthen the  company  which  is moving ahead,
however  slowly.  The  others, which are suffering losses, certainly do  not
qualify for  help. If the regimental commander, in a state of drunkenness or
from sheer stupidity,  were to make any  other decision he would, of course,
be immediately relieved of his command, reduced to the ranks and sent to pay
for his mistake with his own blood, in a penal battalion.
     My audiences ask,  with surprise,  how  it  can  be  that  two  company
commanders, whose men are suffering  heavy  casualties,  can  ask  for  help
without  receiving any?  `That's the way it  is,'  I reply, calmly. `How can
there be any doubt about it?'
     `What  happens,' ask  the  Western officers, `if a  Soviet  platoon  or
company commander asks for artillery support. Does he get it?'
     `He has no right to ask for it,' I say.
     `And if a company commander asks for air support--does he get it?'
     `He  has  no  right  to  ask for  support  of any  sort, let alone  air
support.' My audience smiles--they believe they have found the Achilles heel
of Soviet tactics. But I am always irritated--for this  is not weakness, but
strength.
     How is  it possible  not to  be irritated? A  situation in  which every
platoon commander  can  ask for  artillery  support  is  one  in  which  the
divisional commander  is  unable to  concentrate  the full  strength  of his
artillery in the decisive sector--a platoon commander cannot know which this
is. A situation in which every company commander can call for air support is
one in which the Commander of a Group of Armies  is unable to bring together
all  his  aircraft as  a  single striking force.  To  a  military  man  this
represents something quite unthinkable--the dispersal of resources.

     The tactics used  by  Jenghiz  Khan were primitive, in the extreme. His
Mongolian horsemen  would never  engage  in  a single combat in any  of  the
countries  which his  hordes overran.  The  training for  battle which  they
received consisted solely of instruction in maintaining formation and in the
observance of a disciplinary code  which was  enforced in the most barbarous
way.
     During a battle Jenghiz Khan would keep a close watch on  the situation
from a nearby hill. As soon as the  slightest sign of success was visible at
any point,  he  would  concentrate  all  his  forces  there,  sometimes even
throwing in his own  personal guard. Having broken  through the enemy's line
at a single point he would push irresistibly ahead and the enemy army, split
in two,  would  disintegrate. It  is  worth recording  that he never  lost a
battle  in his life. Centuries passed  and new weapons  appeared. It  seemed
that  this ancient principle of war was dead and  buried. That at  least was
how  it seemed to the French  armies at Toulon. But then the young Bonaparte
appeared, mustered  all the artillery at the decisive spot and won his first
brilliant victory  with lightning speed. Subsequently he always concentrated
his artillery and his cavalry in large  numbers.  In consequence, his junior
commanders were deprived  of  both artillery and  cavalry. Despite this, for
decades his armies won every battle. At Waterloo he  paid  the  penalty  for
abandoning the  principle of  concentrating his forces in the most important
sector. His defeat there was the price he paid for dispersing his resources.
     More   time  passed,  tanks,   aircraft  and  machine-guns  made  their
appearance. The principles  of  Jenghiz Khan  and Bonaparte were  completely
forgotten in France. In  1940  the  Allies had more tanks  than the Germans.
They were evenly distributed among infantry sub-units, whose commanders were
proud to have  tanks  directly  under their command.  Their German  opposite
numbers had no such grounds for pride, and this was the reason why Germany's
victory was so rapid  and so decisive.  The German tanks were not  dispersed
but  were concentrated in  what, by the standards of 1940, were huge groups.
The Allied tanks were scattered, like widely-spread fingers, which could not
be clenched to make a fist. The German tanks struck, as a fist, unexpectedly
and at the weakest point. The Germans' success has gone down in history as a
victory which was won by their tanks.

     Soviet tactics are of the utmost simplicity; they can be condensed into
a single phrase--the maximum concentration of forces in the decisive sector.
Anyone  who  was found  responsible  for  dispersing  forces  of  divisional
strength or  above  during  the war  was shot without further  ado. At lower
levels the usual penalty  for wasting resources in this way was reduction to
the ranks  and a  posting to  a penal  battalion,  which  would also lead to
death, though not always immediately, it is true.
     Every Soviet operation, from Stalingrad  onwards, developed in the  way
water  breaks  through  a  concrete  dam: a  single  drop  seeps  through  a
microscopic crack, and is followed immediately by a dozen  more drops, after
which first  hundreds  and  then thousands  of litres  pour  through at ever
increasing speed, becoming a cataract of hundreds  of thousands of tonnes of
raging water.
     Here  is one  entirely typical example of  such a breakthrough, carried
out by the 16th Guards Rifle  Corps of the 2nd Guards Army at Kursk in 1943.
During an offensive by  nine forward battalions only one managed to make any
ground. Immediately, the commander  of the regiment to which  this battalion
belonged  concentrated all his resources  at  that  point,  on a  front  one
kilometre wide. His divisional commander thereupon threw all his forces into
this sector. The breach slowly  became deeper  and  wider and within half an
hour the corps commander's reserves  began to arrive. Within three hours, 27
of the 36 battalions belonging to the corps  had been brought in to fight in
the  narrow sector, which was by  now 7  kilometres wide. 1,087 of the 1,176
guns belonging to the  corps, and all  its  tanks,  were  assembled  in  the
breakthrough sector. Naturally, the battalion commanders who had been unable
to penetrate the enemy's defences not  only received no  reinforcements, but
had everything  under  their  command taken  away from  them.  And  this was
entirely as it should have been!
     As  the breach  was  widened,  more  and more forces  were concentrated
there. As soon as  he was informed of  the breakthrough the Commander of the
Central Front, General Rokossovskiy, rushed an entire Army to the spot, with
an Air Army to cover the operations. A few  days later the Supreme Commander
added his  own  reserve army,  the  4th Tank  Army, to  the forces  breaking
through. Such a  massive  concentration of forces  could not, of  course, be
withstood by  the  German commanders. Several  hundred  kilometres of  their
front disintegrated simultaneously  and a hasty  withdrawal  began. The last
big offensive mounted by  the German  army in World  War  II had  collapsed.
After this, the Germans never  again launched  a single large-scale  attack,
confining themselves to er operations, such as those  at Balaton  or in
the Ardennes. The moral of this story  is  clear. If every platoon commander
had had the right to call for fire support for his unit, the corps commander
would  have been unable to concentrate  his reserves  in the breach and  the
Front would never have broken  through. Without  this, there could have been
no success.

     Modern Soviet tactics, then,  follow in the footprints of Jenghiz Khan,
Bonaparte, the German generals who  won the battle for France and the Soviet
generals in the war against Germany.
     Nuclear weapons have  changed  the face of war, as did artillery in the
middle  ages, the machine gun in the  First World  War  and  the tank in the
Second. The principles of military science have not been affected  by  these
changes, for  they are immutable--disperse  your forces  and you will  lose,
concentrate them and you will win.
     The only amendment  which needs to be made to these ancient  principles
in the nuclear age is that a commander  must concentrate his nuclear forces,
too, in the main sector, together  with  the artillery,  aircraft, and tanks
which he  assembles  there.  The threat of a  nuclear response, too, plays a
role in tactics. The concentration of forces can  be  completed very rapidly
today, and  they  are then a target for the enemy's nuclear weapons, whereas
earlier he  was unable to use  them during the comparatively long time  they
took to  assemble.  Otherwise  everything  remains  as it was.  If a  single
company  breaks  through the battalion  commander supports it with his whole
mortar battery, leaving the other companies to fend for themselves. Informed
of the success of the company, the commander of the regiment orders his tank
battalions  to  the  sector  and  arranges  for  his  artillery  to  provide
concentrated fire support, then  the  divisional commander moves in his tank
regiment and he too brings in his entire artillery reserves; in addition, he
may arrange to  have nuclear strikes  carried out ahead of his troops. Then,
flooding through like the torrent, rushing through the broken dam, come  all
the tanks and artillery of  the Army, all the tanks, aircraft, artillery and
rockets of the Front, of the Strategic Direction, of the Soviet Union and of
its satellites!

     One further misunderstanding needs clarification. Although a platoon or
company commander  is  not entitled to summon up aircraft or the  divisional
artillery, this  certainly does  not mean that Soviet forces operate without
fire support. The commander of a Soviet motor-rifle  battalion (400 men) has
6 120mm mortars at his disposal. The commander of an American battalion (900
men)  has only  4 106mm mortars. The  commander  of a Soviet regiment (2,100
men)  has  a  battalion of  18  122mm howitzers and  a battery of  6  Grad P
multi-barrelled  rocket  launchers.  The  commander  of  an American brigade
(4,000-5,000 men)  has no fire  weapons  at  all.  Commanders of Soviet  and
American divisions have approximately the same quantity of fire weapons.
     Commanders of Soviet battalions and regiments,  not being  entitled  to
call on their divisional commanders for help have enough fire  weapons under
their  command  to follow up successes achieved  by any  of  their platoons,
companies or battalions.  Since  they are equipped  with these  weapons, the
divisional  commander  is  free  to make  use  of  the full  weight  of  his
divisional artillery wherever he decides it is needed.
--------


     Many  Western  specialists  believe  that  in  order  to  carry out  an
operation of the sort described it  would be necessary to assemble a massive
concentration  of  material  resources  and  that the  Soviet  command would
encounter extreme difficulty  in  providing its  enormous  forces  with  the
supplies they would need. This delusion is based on typical Western concepts
of the organisation of the supply and replenishment of military forces.
     The Soviet Army has a  completely different approach to the problems of
supply  from that adopted  in the West--one which avoids many headaches. Let
us  start from the fact that a Soviet soldier  is not issued with a sleeping
bag, and  does not need one. He can be left unfed for several days. All that
he needs is  ammunition  and  this solves  many  problems.  The  problem  of
supplying Soviet  troops  in battle is thus  confined  to the  provision  of
ammunition. We already know  that each commander has transport sub-units  at
his disposal; every regiment  has a company which can transport loads of 200
tons, every division a battalion with a capacity of 1,000 tons, every Army a
transport regiment, and so forth. All  this capacity is  used solely to move
up  ammunition  for  advancing  forces.  Each  commander allocates  a  large
proportion  of this ammunition to the sector which is achieving success--the
remainder suffer accordingly.
     No less  important  during  a rapid advance is  fuel--the life-blood of
war. A  basic approach has been  taken to the  problem of fuel-supply.  As a
condition  for its acceptance by the armed  Services,  every  type of Soviet
combat vehicle--tanks, armoured personnel  carriers, artillery prime movers,
etc.--must have sufficient fuel capacity to take it at least 600 kilometres.
Thus,  Soviet Fronts would be  able  to make a  dash across Western  Germany
without refuelling. Thereafter, the pipe-laying battalion of each Army would
lay  a  line to the Front's main pipeline which would have been laid  by the
Front's  pipe-laying regiment. The Front's pipelines  would  be  linked with
secret underground main lines which had been laid  down in Eastern Europe in
peacetime. In addition, the C-in-C  of a  Strategic Direction  has under his
command a pipe-laying  brigade, which can be used to  assist  the Fronts. At
the terminals of the pipelines the pipe-layers set up a number of refuelling
centres, each of  which  can simultaneously refuel  a  battalion or  even  a
regiment. In addition, the Soviet Army is at present evolving techniques for
using  helicopters  for  fuel  resupply.  Let  us take  a division which  is
advancing.  One of  its  tank  battalions has  stopped, on  orders from  the
divisional commander, and is left behind by the other battalions. In a field
by the road,  on which  the  battalion has halted, a V-12 helicopter  lands,
carrying  40  or  more tons of fuel. Within ten minutes it has refuelled all
the  tanks and  taken off again. The battalion sets off for the front again,
replacing another which halts to refuel. A single V-12 helicopter flying  at
low altitude at  a  speed of  250 kilometres an  hour, can  refuel  a  whole
division in  one day. It  is not particularly vulnerable, since it is flying
over its  own rear areas,  which are  protected by the Air Defence Troops of
the Land Forces. If trucks were  used  to supply a division hundreds of them
would be needed, travelling on damaged, overloaded roads  and presenting  an
excellent target. The destruction of a single bridge could bring them all to
a halt.  While a single truck carrying ten tons would take twenty-four hours
to  make  a particular journey, a helicopter could  do the  same  job in one
hour.  Even if  helicopters  were  more  vulnerable  than endless convoys of
trucks, Soviet generals  would still use them, for time is far more precious
than money during a war.
     Provisions, spare parts, etc. are, quite simply, not supplied.

     Now let us see how this  works in practice. A  division  which is up to
full strength, fully equipped, fed and fuelled, with more than 2,000 tons of
ammunition, is moving  up into action from the second echelon. This division
can spend  from three to  five days in action, without  rest for  either its
soldiers or  its  officers. The  wounded  are evacuated to the rear  by  the
medical battalion, after first aid has been given.
     Its companies, battalions and regiments waste no time waiting for spare
parts for equipment which has been damaged. They  simply throw it aside. The
repair and refitting battalion mends whatever it can, cannibalising one tank
to repair  two  or three  others, removing its  engine,  tracks, turret  and
anything  else which  is needed.  Any piece of equipment  which is seriously
damaged is left for removal to the rear  by the Army's or the Front's mobile
tank repair workshop.
     In action,  the  division  fights  with  great determination,  but  its
numbers dwindle.  Some of its fighting equipment  is  returned after repair,
but not  a great  deal.  After three  to  five  days of hard  fighting,  the
survivors are sent back to the second echelon, their place being taken by  a
fresh division  which has been  well fed and fully rested. From the remnants
of the  old division, a new one is quickly put together. Combat equipment is
provided by the tank  repair workshops. The  fact that it belonged  to  some
other division only the  day  before is immaterial. Reinforcements reach the
new  division  from  the  hospitals--whether  these  soldiers  and  officers
formerly  belonged to  other divisions, Armies or Fronts is also immaterial.
With  them arrive equipment from  the factories and reservists--some of whom
are older, others still very young boys. The division shakes down, exercises
and  allows its  soldiers to get all the  sleep they need. Then,  after five
days, it  moves  up into action,  fully fed and fuelled,  with 2,000 tons of
ammunition.
     Often,  while  it  is  reforming,  a  division  receives  entirely  new
equipment, straight  from the factory, but it may also  be issued with older
material taken from store, while  its own, or what remains  of it, is  taken
from it for some other division which is also re-forming, not far away.
     Frequently,  after  a  particularly  punishing  series  of  battles,  a
division cannot be re-formed. In this event all its  commanders from company
level upwards are withdrawn and what is left of the division is administered
by the deputies to the battalion and regimental commanders and by the deputy
divisional commander.  This remnant will continue to fight, to the last man,
while  the  divisional  commander and  his  subordinates  are in  the  rear,
receiving new equipment and new soldiers. Within a short period of time they
return to  the  battle  in  which what  was left  of their  former  division
perished so recently.
     One most important element needed for the rebuilding  of a new division
is its old colours. A fresh division can  be set up very quickly around  the
old colours. But  if the colours are  lost--that is the end of the division.
If  such a thing should happen, all its former commanders  are sent to penal
battalions,  where they expiate their guilt with blood, while their division
is disbanded and used to bring others up to strength.
     Here is an  example from the  history of the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk Iron
Division, with which I entered Czechoslovakia in 1968.
     The division was established in 1918 and was one of the best in the Red
Army. Lenin corresponded personally with some of its soldiers. It was active
in  the war  against  Germany  from the  very  beginning  of hostilities and
distinguished  itself in  the fighting near Minsk until, as part of the 13th
Army, it found  itself encircled.  Part of the division managed to break out
but its colours were lost. Despite its past achievements,  the division  was
disbanded and  its  various  officers were tried  by  military tribunals. In
1944,  when the  Red  Army  once again reached and then crossed  the  Soviet
frontiers,  a special commission began questioning local  inhabitants in  an
attempt to discover where  Soviet officers and soldiers who had been  killed
in action  during the first days  of the war were buried. A peasant,  D.  N.
Tyapin, told  the  commission how he had found the body of a Soviet officer,
wrapped in a  flag, and how he had buried the body, with the flag. The grave
was immediately opened and the colours of the 24th Iron Division were found.
The flag  was immediately sent away for  restoration and, just as quickly, a
new division  was formed and given the old colours, the  battle  honours and
the title of the old division.  Today the 24th  Iron Division is one  of the
most  famous  in  the  Soviet  Army.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  it
distinguished itself in the battle which ended the war, it was never made  a
Guards division. It was not forgiven for the loss of its colours.
--------


--------


     I adore weapons. Of every sort.  I love military equipment and military
uniforms. One day I shall open a  museum, and the first exhibit which I
shall buy for my museum  will be an American jeep. This  is a  real  miracle
weapon. It  was designed before the Second World War and  it served from the
first day to the last, like a faithful soldier. It was dropped by parachute,
it was soaked in salt water,  it smashed its wheels  on the stony deserts of
Libya and sank into swamps on tropical islands. It served honourably in  the
mountains of Norway and of the Caucasus, in the Alps and the Ardennes.  And,
since  the  war,  can   any  other   military  vehicle  have  seen  so  many
battles--Korea,  Vietnam,  Sinai,   Africa,   the  Arctic,  South   America,
Indonesia, India, Pakistan?  And  is there any sort  of weapon which has not
been installed on a jeep? Recoilless guns,  anti-tank rockets, machine guns.
And  it  has  worked on reconnaissance  duties,  as an  ambulance,  a patrol
vehicle, a commander and an ordinary military workhorse.
     And how many types of tanks, guns, aircraft, rockets have come and gone
in the time  of the jeep? They were important and  impressive,  the jeep was
grey  and undistinguished. But they have gone and  the jeep is  still there.
And  how  many  times  have  they  tried  to replace the  jeep?  But  it  is
indispensable. In the desert, more reliable than a camel, in  the grasslands
faster than a leopard, in the Arctic hardier than a Polar bear.
     Another exhibit in my  museum  will be a Kalashnikov  automatic assault
rifle. Not one of those the terrorists used to kill  the Olympic athletes or
the  one  I had with me in  Czechoslovakia  or one  of those the  Communists
killed  doctors  with  in Cambodia.  No,  it  will  be one of the  thousands
captured  by the  American marines  in Vietnam and  used  in their desperate
attempt to halt  Communism  and  to  avert the calamity which threatened the
Vietnamese people.
     American  soldiers in  Vietnam  often mistrusted their  own weapons and
preferred  to  use their Kalashnikov  trophies. This was not so  simple, for
they  could  hardly  expect to be supplied with the proper rounds  for these
weapons  but they used them nevertheless, capturing more  ammunition as they
fought.  What is the  secret  of  the Kalashnikov? It  is uncomplicated  and
reliable,  like  a  comrade-in-arms,  and these  are  the  two qualities  of
greatest importance in a battle.

     My museum will have weapons from everywhere--from Germany  and Britain,
France and Japan. But the greatest number will come from the Soviet Union. I
hate the Communists,  but  I love Soviet weapons.  The  fact is that  Soviet
designers realised, decades  ago, the simple  truth that only  uncomplicated
and reliable equipment can be successful in war. This is as true as the fact
that the only plans which will succeed are those which are simple and easily
understood and that  the  best  battledress  is the  simplest and most  hard
wearing.
     Soviet requirements from  a weapon are  that it must be easy to produce
and simple in  construction, which makes it easier to teach soldiers  to use
it and simpler to maintain and repair.
     Although the Soviet Union produced the same amount of steel as Germany,
it built a much greater number of tanks. Moreover, because of the simplicity
of their  construction, it  proved possible to repair tens of  thousands  of
these tanks and to return them to battle two or even three times.
     General   Guderian  admired  Soviet  tanks   and   wrote   about  them,
enthusiastically and  at  length. He  was  insistent in urging that  Germany
should copy the T-34. The design  of this  Soviet tank was taken as a  basis
for  the  `Panzer' and  shortly afterwards  for the  `Tiger-König'.  But the
German    designers   were   unable   to    meet    the    most    important
requirement--simplicity of construction. As a result only 4,815 Panzer tanks
were built in all, while no  more  than  484 `Tiger-König' tanks  were  ever
produced. In the same period the Soviet Union built 102,000 tanks, 70,000 of
which were T-34s.
     In considering these figures it  should  be remembered that, while most
German tank factories were subjected  to bombing, many Soviet factories were
lost altogether--the Kharkov plant was captured by the Germans in the  first
months of  the  war,  and  this  was  the  largest  Soviet  factory and  the
birthplace of the T-34; the Stalingrad tank  factory was the setting for the
fiercest fighting it  is possible  to imagine. Leningrad  was besieged, but,
despite being  without  steel or coal,  the  tank factory  there, which  was
subjected to constant artillery  bombardment, continued  to repair tanks for
three years. On some occasions tanks which still were under repair had to be
used  to  fire through gaps in  the  walls  at  advancing groups  of  German
soldiers. The only factory that was left was in the Urals and it was to this
that  the  machinery was  taken and set up, virtually  in the open  air,  to
produce the world's simplest and most reliable tank.
     It should not  be thought that  Soviet  equipment  suffers any  harmful
effects because of its simplicity of design. Quite the reverse. In its time,
the T-34 was not only the simplest but also the most  powerful  tank in  the
world.

     When  a  MIG-25 landed in  Japan, the Western experts who  examined  it
marvelled  at  the simplicity  of  its  design.  Naturally,  for  propaganda
purposes, the fighting qualities of this excellent aircraft were disparaged.
One not particularly  perceptive specialist  even commented, `We had thought
it was made of titanium but it turns out to be nothing but steel.' It is, in
fact, impossible to reach the  speeds of  which the MIG-25  is capable using
titanium:  yet the  Soviet designers had managed to build this,  the fastest
combat aircraft in the world, from ordinary steel.
     This is a most significant fact. It means that this remarkable aircraft
can be built without especially  complicated  machine tools  or the  help of
highly skilled specialists, and that its mass-production in wartime would be
unaffected by shortages of  important materials. Furthermore, this  aircraft
is exceedingly cheap to  produce and could therefore  be built in very great
numbers  if this were necessary.  This is its most important characteristic;
the fact that for two  decades it has been the fastest  interceptor aircraft
in the world, with the highest rate of climb, is of secondary significance.

     Technology is developing and each  year equipment becomes more and more
complex. But this does  not  conflict  with the overall philosophy of Soviet
designers.  Of  course, decades  ago,  their  predecessors used  the  latest
equipment available in their combat vehicles and aircraft and this equipment
must then  have been  considered very complex.  But  the  iron,  unbreakable
principle observed  by  Soviet  designers retains  its force. Whenever a new
piece of equipment is  being developed,  making the  use of  highly  complex
tools and techniques unavoidable, there is always a choice of hundreds, even
thousands of possible technical procedures. The designers will always select
the very simplest possible of  all  the choices open to  them.  It would, of
course, be feasible to produce an automatic transmission  system for a jeep,
but it is  possible to get by with an ordinary one. This being so, there can
be only one Soviet choice--the ordinary transmission.
     I once saw a film comparing a Soviet and an American tank. A driver was
given both models to drive and he was then asked--`Which is the better?' The
American one, of course,' said the driver. `It  has automatic  transmission,
whereas in  the Soviet tank you have to change gear, which is not  easy in a
heavy machine.' He was quite right--if you see war as a pleasant outing. But
Soviet designers realise that any future war will be anything but this. They
consider, quite correctly, that, if there are mass bombing attacks, if whole
industrial areas are destroyed, if long-distance  communications break down,
mass production  of  tanks with automatic  transmission would be  out of the
question. Equally it would  be impossible to repair or service tanks of this
sort which had  been produced before the war. Accordingly, there can be only
one  choice--the  ordinary, non-automatic transmission. This may be hard  on
the tank  driver--he will get  tired. But it will be easier for industry and
for the  whole country, which  will continue  to  produce tanks  by the  ten
thousand on machines which have been set up virtually in the open air.

     The simplicity of  Soviet weapons surprises everyone. But each  type of
equipment which is produced is turned  out in two variants--the  normal  one
and the `monkey-model'.
     The `monkey-model' is  a  weapon  which  has  been simplified in  every
conceivable way and which is intended for production in wartime only.
     For instance, the T-62 tank is one of the simplest fighting vehicles in
the world.  But as  it was being designed, a still simpler version was  also
being developed, for wartime  use. The `monkey-model' of the  T-62  does not
have  a stabilised  gun, carries simplified radio and optical equipment, the
night-vision equipment uses an infra-red light source to illuminate  targets
(a method which is twenty years old), the gun is raised and turned manually,
steel rather than wolfram or uranium is used for the armour-plating piercing
caps of its shells.
     Soviet  generals consider, justifiably, that it is better to have tanks
like these in a war than none at all. It is intended that the `monkey-model'
approach will be used not only for building tanks, but  for all other  sorts
of  equipment--rockets, guns, aircraft, radio  sets, etc. In peacetime these
variants are  turned out in large quantities,  but  they are only issued  to
countries friendly to  the Soviet Union. I  have  seen two  variants  of the
BMP-1  infantry combat vehicle--one which is  issued to the Soviet army  and
another  which is intended for the  Soviet  Union's  Arab friends. I counted
sixty-three simplifications which made  the second `monkey-model'  different
from the original version.  Among the most important of these were: The 73mm
gun  has no  loading or  round selection  equipment. Whereas in  the  Soviet
version the gunnerjust presses the appropriate buttons  and  the round which
he requires slides into the barrel, in the simplified model all  of this has
to be  done by hand, and furthermore, the  gun is not stabilised. The turret
is rotated and the gun is raised mechanically. In the Soviet version this is
done  electrically--the mechanical system is there only  as  a  back-up. The
`export' version is armed with the Malyutka  rocket, the Soviet one with the
`Malyutka-M',  which  differs  from the other model in  having  an automatic
target  guidance  system.  The  `monkey-model'  is without the lead internal
lining on the walls, which protects the crew  against  penetrating radiation
and  against flying fragments  of armour in the  event of a direct hit.  The
optical system is  greatly simplified,  as is  the communications equipment,
there  is  no  automatic radiation  or  gas detector,  there is  neither  an
automatic hermetic sealing system nor an  air filtration  system, for use in
conditions of very heavy contamination, no  automatic topographical fixation
system is fitted and many other systems are missing.
     When  one  of these `monkey-models'  fell  into  the  hands of  Western
specialists, they naturally gained a completely false impression of the true
combat capabilities of the BMP-1  and  of Soviet  tanks. For what  they were
looking at was  no more  than  a casing, or a container, like an empty money
box which is of no value without its contents.
     The Soviet Union is currently making deliveries  abroad  of T-72 tanks,
MIG-23 fighters and  TU-22 bombers. But  these are different from the models
with  which the Soviet Army has armed  itself. When one of a  man's  pockets
contains banknotes and  the other simply holds pieces of paper, it is  quite
impossible to tell which is which from the outside.
     The current Soviet policy concerning equipment is a wise  one--to amass
first-class but very simple equipment in quantities sufficient for the first
few weeks of a war. If the  war continues, equipment will  be produced on an
enormous  scale,  but in variants which have been simplified to the greatest
possible extent. Experience of producing both standard  and  `monkey' models
is being gained in  peacetime; the  simpler variants are being  sold  to the
`brothers' and `friends' of the USSR as the very latest equipment available.
--------


     The winter of 1969 was an  exceptionally bitter one in the  Soviet  Far
East.  When  the first  clashes with  the  Chinese took place on  the  river
Ussuri, and before combat divisions  reached the area, the  pressure exerted
by the enemy was borne by the KGB frontier troops. After the clash was over,
the  General Staff held  a careful  investigation into all the  mistakes and
oversights which had occurred. It  was quickly discovered that  several  KGB
soldiers had  frozen  to death  in the snow,  simply because they had  never
received elementary instruction in sleeping out in temperatures below zero.
     This was alarming news. A commission from the General Staff immediately
carried out experiments  with three divisions, chosen at random, and came to
a depressing  conclusion. Wartime  experience  had been irrevocably lost and
the modern Soviet  soldier had  not  been  taught how  he could sleep in the
snow. Naturally  he was not allowed a sleeping  bag and  of  course  he  was
forbidden to  light a fire. Normally  a soldier would spend  nights when the
temperature was  below freezing-point in his  vehicle. But what was he to do
if the vehicle was put out of action?
     The  chiefs of  staff of  all divisions  were immediately  summoned  to
Moscow. They were given a day's instruction in the technique of sleeping out
in snow at freezing temperatures, using only a greatcoat. Then  each of them
was required to convince himself that this  was possible, by sleeping in the
snow  for   three  nights.   (It  should   be  remembered   that   March  in
Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, is a  hard month, with  snow on the ground  and
temperatures below  zero.)  Then the  chiefs  of  staff  returned  to  their
divisions and  immediately  the entire Soviet Army was put  to  a  very hard
test--that  of spending a night in  the open in numbing cold and without any
extra clothing. It  seemed as  if those who were stationed in deserts in the
south were in luck. But no--they were sent by turns to either Siberia or the
north to be  put through  the same tough training.  Thereafter,  spending  a
night in the snow became a part of all military training programmes.
     Two years before this, following the shameful defeats in Sinai, when it
had become clear how much Arab soldiers fear tanks and napalm, urgent orders
had been issued, making it compulsory for all  Soviet soldiers and officers,
up to the rank of general, to jump through roaring flames, and to shelter in
shallow pits as tanks clattered by just above their heads, or, if they could
not  find even this protection, to lie on the  ground  between the tracks of
the roaring vehicles.
     The Soviet Army re-learned its lessons within a single day. I have felt
napalm on  my  own skin, I  have crouched  in  a pit  as  a  tank crashed by
overhead, and I have spent terrible nights in the snow.
     At the beginning of  the  war, the Red Army had no idea how to organise
the defence  of  the country  or, particularly, of the large towns.  It  had
never been taught how to do this. It  had only learned how to attack and how
to `carry the war on to the  enemy's territory'.  However, the  war began in
accordance with the plans  of the German  General Staff rather than of their
Soviet opponents. One catastrophe followed another. Attempts to defend Minsk
lasted  for three  days, to hold Kiev  for two  days.  Everyone was at their
wits'  end to know  how to organise  things better. Kiev fell at  the end of
September  and  by  October   Guderian  was  approaching  Moscow.  Suddenly,
something quite astonishing  happened. Soviet defences  became impenetrable,
specifically those around Moscow, Tula and Tver'. For the first time in  the
course of the Second World War, the German military machine was brought to a
standstill. It is said  that freezing weather played its part in turning the
tide.  This was  true enough in November and  December,  but in  October the
weather was sunny. Something had happened;  a  radical change had  occurred.
The next  year, the  battle for Stalingrad took place--the city was defended
throughout  the  summer,  and frosts played  no  part  in  the outcome. This
campaign will go down in history as a model for the defence of a large city.
A second such model is the defence of Leningrad  which held  out for  almost
three years, during  which one and a half million of its citizens lost their
lives. It  was under  attack  for  two winters and  three summers.  Freezing
temperatures played no role  here  either--the  city could  have been  taken
during any season in these three years.
     In  the  Soviet  Army the  dividing line between inability to perform a
particular role and  the capacity  to carry  it  out with great professional
skill  is  almost indiscernible.  Transitions from one  to  the  other occur
almost instantaneously, not  only  in tactics,  strategy and the training of
personnel but also in equipment programmes.

     At the  beginning of  the 1960s a discussion developed  in the  Western
military journals about the need for  a  new  infantry combat  vehicle: this
must  be amphibious, well armoured, and  highly  manoeuvrable, and must have
considerable fire-power. The  Soviet  military press responded only  with  a
deathly silence. The discussion gathered strength,  there was much  argument
for and  against the proposition, intensive  tests  were  carried out... the
Soviet Union remained silent.
     One  night towards  the end of  1966 heavy transporters arrived  at our
military  academy carrying unusual vehicles of some sort, which were covered
in  tarpaulins.  These  were  BMP-1s--amphibious,  fiendishly  manoeuvrable,
well-armoured and heavily armed. By 1967 this vehicle  was being produced in
great numbers: meanwhile the discussion in  the  West  continued. Only  West
Germany took  any positive steps, by building  the  `Marder'--which  was  an
excellent  vehicle, but  was  not  amphibious and carried  almost  the  same
armament as previous German  armoured personnel carriers. Sadly, it was also
exceptionally complicated in design.
     In the early 1980s,  the discussion  is  still in progress in the West;
the first tentative steps have  been taken,  but at present, as before,  the
United States  has armoured  personnel carriers which  are  armed only  with
machine-guns. Of  course, Western specialists have found many faults  in the
construction of the BMP-1. But  this is yesterday's product--and the `monkey
model' of it  at  that.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been  producing  a  second
generation of BMPs in massive quantities for a long  time now while,  in the
West, discussion continues.
     The  same  has  happened   with  military  helicopters,  self-propelled
artillery, automatic mortars and many other types of equipment.
--------


     One day,  in Paris, I bought a book, published in 1927, on the problems
of a future war. The author  was sober-minded and reasonable. His logic  was
sound,  his analysis  was  shrewd  and  his  arguments  unassailable.  After
analysing  the  way  military equipment had developed  in his  lifetime, the
author concluded by declaring that the proper place for  the tank was in the
museum, next to the dinosaur skeletons. His argument was simple and logical:
anti-tank guns had been  developed  to  the point at  which they would bring
massive formations of  tanks to a complete halt  in any future  war, just as
machine guns had completely stopped the cavalry in the First World War.
     I  do not  know whether the author lived until 1940, to see the  German
tanks sweeping along  the Paris boulevards, past  the spot  at  which,  many
decades later, I was to buy my dusty copy of his book, its  leaves yellowing
with age. The belief that the tank is reaching the end of its life is itself
surprisingly long-lived. At the beginning  of  the 1960s, France decided  to
stop production of  tanks, because their era was over. It is fortunate  that
this delusion was shattered by  the  Israelis'  old `Sherman' tanks  in  the
Sinai  peninsula. Israel's brilliant victory  showed  the whole world,  once
again, that no anti-tank weapon is able to stop tanks in a war, provided, of
course, that they are used skilfully.
     The argument used by the tank's detractors is simple--`Just look at the
anti-tank  rockets--at  their  accuracy   and   at   their   armour-piercing
capability!' But  this argument does not hold water. The anti-tank rocket is
a defensive weapon--part of a passive system. The tank,  on the other  hand,
is an offensive  weapon. Any  defensive  system  involves  the dispersal  of
forces over a wide territory, leaving them strong in some places and weak in
others. And  it is  where  they  are  weak  that the  tanks will appear,  in
enormous  concentrations. Even if it  were possible  to distribute resources
equally, this would mean that no one sector would have enough. Try deploying
just ten  anti-tank  rockets along  every  kilometre of the front. The tanks
will then choose one particular  spot  and will attack it in their hundreds,
or perhaps  thousands, simultaneously.  If  you  concentrate  your anti-tank
resources, the tanks will simply by-pass them. They are an  offensive weapon
and they have the initiative in battle, being  able to choose when and where
to attack and how strong a force to use.
     The hope that  the perfection of anti-tank weapons  would lead  to  the
death  of the tank has been shown  to  be completely unfounded.  It  is like
hoping that the electronic defences  of banks will become so  perfect in the
future that bank robbers will die out as  a  breed. I assure you  that  bank
robbers  will not  become extinct.  They will  improve  their  tools,  their
tactics,  their  information  about  their  targets  and  their  methods  of
misleading  their enemies  and  they  will  continue  to  carry  out  raids.
Sometimes  these  will  fail,  sometimes they will  succeed, but  they  will
continue  so  long as  banks  continue to  exist.  The robbers have the same
advantage as tanks--they are on the  offensive. They decide where,  when and
how to attack and will do so only when they  are  confident of success, when
they have  secretly  discovered a weak  spot in the enemy's defences,  whose
existence is unknown even to the enemy himself.

     Soviet generals have never been faced with problems of this  sort. They
have always known  that victory in a war can only  be achieved by advancing.
To them defensive  operations spell defeat and death. In the best case, such
operations can only produce  a deadlock,  and not for long, at that. Victory
can only be achieved by means of an offensive--by seizing the initiative and
raining blows on the enemy's most vulnerable areas.
     Thus,  to win,  you must attack, you must move forward unexpectedly and
with determination, you must advance. For this  you need a vehicle which can
travel anywhere to destroy the enemy, preferably remaining unscathed itself.
The one vehicle which combines movement, fire-power and  armour is the tank.
Perhaps,  in the future, its armour will  be perfected, perhaps it  will not
have  tracks but  will travel  in some other way  (there  have been  wheeled
tanks), perhaps it  will not  have a  gun  but be armed  with something else
(there have  been  tanks armed solely  with  rockets), perhaps all sorts  of
things will be changed, but  its most important characteristics--its ability
to move, to shoot and to defend  itself--will remain. As  long  as there are
wars, as long as the desire for victory lasts, the  tank will exist. Nuclear
war  has not only not written  it off,  but  has  given it  a  new lease  of
life--nothing is  so suited to nuclear war  as a tank.  To survive a nuclear
war you must put your money on these steel boxes.
--------


     Drive a  tank on to an airfield and park it near a  military  aircraft.
Next put a helicopter between the tank and the  aircraft. Now, look  at each
of them  and then  answer the  question--which does  the helicopter resemble
more--the tank or the aircraft?
     I know what your opinion  will  be. You don't need to tell me. But  the
Soviet generals believe that to all intents and purposes the helicopter is a
tank. In  fact they  find it  difficult  to  distinguish  between  the  two.
Certainly  there is very little  in common  between  the helicopter  and the
aircraft.  details, like the ability to fly, but nothing more.
     Of course, they  are right.  The helicopter is related to the tank, not
to  the  aircraft. The reasoning behind this is simple enough--in  battle  a
tank  can  seize  enemy territory and  a helicopter can do the  same. But an
aircraft cannot. An aircraft  can destroy everything on the surface and deep
below it, but it can not seize and hold territory.
     For this  reason, the Soviet Army  sees  the  helicopter as a tank--one
which is capable of high  speeds and unrestricted cross-country performance,
but is only lightly armoured. It also  has approximately the same fire-power
as a tank.
     The tactics employed in the use of helicopters and tanks are strikingly
similar. An aircraft is vulnerable because in most cases it can only operate
from an airfield. Both the helicopter and the  tank  operate in open ground.
An aircraft is vulnerable because it flies above the enemy. A helicopter and
a tank both see the enemy in front of them. To attack, a helicopter does not
need to fly over the enemy or to get close to him.
     The  introduction of the helicopter was not greeted with any particular
enthusiasm by the Air  Forces, but the Land Forces were jubilant--here was a
tank  with a rotor instead of  tracks,  which  need not  fear minefields  or
rivers or mountains.
     It is  therefore  not surprising  that  the airborne  assault  brigades
(which are carried by helicopter) form part of the complement of Tank Armies
or of Fronts, which use them for joint operations with Tank Armies.
     At the present moment the Soviet MI-24 is the best combat helicopter in
the world. This is  not just my personal opinion, but one which is shared by
Western  military experts. Knowing the affection which  Soviet Marshals have
for  their helicopters, I prophesy that even better variants of these flying
tanks will  appear in  the next  few  years. Or  are they,  perhaps, already
flying above Saratov  or somewhere,  even though we have not been shown them
yet?
--------


     Before the Second World War each army had its own approach to questions
of  defence. Drawing on their experience of the First World War, the  French
considered that  their  main  problem was to survive artillery bombardments,
which might  continue for  several days or  even  several months. The German
generals  decided that  they  must make their forces  capable  of  repelling
attacks by  all enemy arms  of  service.  The Soviet generals concluded that
they must avoid diluting their resources and  that they must  concentrate on
the most important of the arms of service. Since for them this was the tank,
they saw defence purely as defence against tanks. Their defence system could
therefore only  be  considered complete  when  their  forces  were  asked to
repulse tank attacks.  If we can only  stop the enemy's tanks, the  generals
reasoned, everything else will be halted, too.
     They were  right,  as  many German generals,  the  first  of  whom  was
Guderian, have acknowledged. Many of the battles  which took place on Soviet
territory followed a standard scenario.  The  German  forces would  launch a
very  powerful tank attack, which, from the second half of 1942 onwards  the
Soviet troops always succeeded in halting. This was the  course of events at
Stalingrad, at  Kursk  and in Hungary, in the Balaton  operations. From 1943
onwards, having exhausted their  capacity for launching  such  attacks,  the
German  forces were ordered  by  Hitler to adopt  a strategy  of  defence in
depth. But  this was  not the  way to oppose tanks.  This strategy  did  not
enable the German army to halt a single breakthrough by Soviet tanks.

     Remembering  the  war, Soviet generals insist that  defence must  mean,
first and foremost, defence against tanks. The enemy can gain victories only
by advancing and, in the  nuclear age, as before,  offensive operations will
be  carried  out by  tanks  and infantry. Other forces can not carry out  an
offensive: their  only  role is to support the tanks and the infantry. Thus,
defence is essentially a battle against tanks.
     The  most  important  weapon in achieving victory is the tank. The most
important weapon in depriving  the enemy of victory is the anti-tank weapon.
The Soviet Union therefore  devotes  great attention to  the  development of
anti-tank weapons. As a result, it is frequently the first in the world with
really revolutionary  technical and  tactical innovations.  For example,  as
early  as  1955, the  USSR  began  production  of  the  `Rapira'  smoothbore
anti-tank  gun,  which has  an astonishingly  high muzzle velocity.  In  its
introduction of this weapon it led  the  West by more  than a  quarter of  a
century. In the  same  year  a  start was  also made with  production of the
APNB-70 infra-red  night sight, for the `Rapira'.  Sights of this  type were
not issued to Western armies for another ten years.
     The, Soviet Army takes  exceptionally strict measures to  safeguard the
secrets  of its anti-tank weapons. Many of these  are completely  unknown in
the West. The  Chief  Directorate  of  Strategic Camouflage insists that the
only  anti-tank  weapons  which  may be displayed  are  those  which can  be
exported--in other words the least effective ones. The systems which may not
be exported  are never  demonstrated but  remain unknown from  their  birth,
throughout their secret life and often, even, after their death. We will say
something about these later.

     Because  they  consider  anti-tank warfare to  be so  important, Soviet
generals insist that every soldier and every weapon system should be capable
of attacking tanks.
     Every soldier is  therefore armed with a  single-shot `Mukha' anti-tank
rocket  launcher.  These rocket  launchers are issued to all motor transport
drivers  and  to  those  belonging  to  staff,  rear-support and  all  other
auxiliary sub-units.
     When  the  BMP-1  infantry  combat vehicle  was  being  developed,  the
designers  suggested a 23mm  gun  as its  armament--this  would be effective
against infantry, and is simple and  easy to load. But the generals  opposed
this; as a first priority, the vehicle must be capable of opposing tanks; it
must have anti-tank rockets and  a gun which, even  though  , could  be
used  against  tanks.  The BMP-1 was therefore fitted with a 73mm  automatic
gun, capable of destroying any  enemy tank at ranges of  up to 1,300 metres,
with anti-tank  rockets which can be used over greater ranges. The fact that
20mm  automatic guns are  fitted to Western infantry combat  vehicles is met
with friendly  incomprehension by  Soviet  military specialists: `If  such a
vehicle is not capable of taking on our tanks, why was it built?'
     It is true that a light anti-aircraft gun has recently been  mounted on
the BMP.  But this does  not indicate  any alteration  in its main function.
This gun is installed  as  an auxiliary weapon, to  supplement the anti-tank
rockets  and  also as  an  anti-helicopter  weapon. In  other  words,  it is
intended for use against the flying tank. Incidentally, the decision to  fit
it was taken only after  the designers had been  able to demonstrate that it
could also be used against conventional, earthbound tanks.
     All  other  Soviet weapon  systems,  even if  they  are  not  primarily
intended  as anti-tank  weapons,  must  also  be  able to  function as such.
Accordingly,  all  Soviet  howitzers are supplied with anti-tank  shells and
anti-aircraft guns are much used against tanks--their teams  are trained for
this role and are issued with suitable ammunition.
     But  this  is not all. The new  AGS19  Plamya rocket-launcher  and  the
Vasilek  automatic mortar can  also be used  against  tanks,  as a secondary
function. They each have a rate of fire of  120 rounds a minute and both are
capable of flat trajectory fire against advancing tanks.
     Finally,  the  BM-21,  BM-27,  Grad-P  and  other  salvo-firing  rocket
launchers can fire over open sights and flood oncoming tanks with fire.
--------


     Why does  the  Soviet Union not use self-propelled anti-tank guns? This
is a question which  many are unable  to answer. After all, a self-propelled
gun is far more mobile on the battle-field than one which is towed, and  its
crew is better protected. This question has already been  partially answered
in the  last  chapter. The  Soviet Union has  some excellent  self-propelled
anti-tank weapon systems--but it does not put them on display. Nevertheless,
it  is true that towed guns are in the majority.  Why is this so? There  are
several reasons:
     

Firstly:

  A towed anti-tank gun is many times easier to manufacture and
to use than  one which is self-propelled. In wartime it might be feasible to
reduce the production of tanks; the effect of this would simply be to reduce
the  intensity of  offensive operations. But  a  drop in  the  production of
anti-tank weapons  would be  catastrophic.  Whatever  happens, they  must be
produced in  sufficient quantities.  Otherwise any tank breakthrough  by the
enemy could prove fatal for the whole military production programme, for the
national economy, and  for the Soviet Union itself.  In order to ensure that
these guns  are turned out, whatever the situation, even  in the midst  of a
nuclear war, it is essential  that  they should be as simple in construction
as possible. It was  no chance that  the first Soviet smoothbore guns to  be
produced were anti-tank guns. Smoothbore guns for Soviet  tanks were brought
out  considerably  later. Although a smooth barrel reduces  the  accuracy of
fire,  it enables muzzle  velocity  to be  raised  considerably,  and,  most
important of all, it simplifies the construction of the gun.
     

Secondly:

 A towed  gun has a very low silhouette, at least half that of
a  tank. In single combat with a  tank, especially  at  maximum range,  this
offers better protection than armour plate or manoeuvrability.
     

Thirdly:

 Anti-tank guns are used  in  two  situations. In defence, when
the enemy has broken through,  is advancing fast and must be stopped at  any
price. And in an offensive when one's own troops have broken through and are
advancing rapidly, and the enemy tries to  cut  through the spearhead at its
base, with a flank attack,  cutting off the advancing forces from their rear
areas. In both these situations,  anti-tank guns must stop the enemy's tanks
at some pre-determined line, which  he  must not  be allowed to cross. Towed
guns are  compelled, by  the weight  of  their construction, to fight to the
death. They are  unable  to  manoeuvre  or to move  to  a  better  position.
Certainly,  their  losses  are always  very  high.  That  is  why  they  are
traditionally nicknamed `Farewell, Motherland!' But by stopping the enemy on
the predetermined line, the anti-tank sub-units can save the whole division,
Army and sometimes the whole Front. This is what happened at  Kursk. If  the
anti-tank guns had been self-propelled, their commander would have been able
to  withdraw  to a  more advantageous  position when  he  came  under  enemy
pressure. This would have saved  his  anti-tank  sub-unit, but it might
have brought catastrophe to the division, the Army, the Front and perhaps to
several Fronts.
     Lest  seditious  thoughts  should  enter  the  head  of  the  anti-tank
commander, and  so  that he should not  think of pulling back  in a critical
situation, his anti-tank  guns have  no means of propulsion. In battle their
armoured  tractors are housed in  shelters; they would scarcely be  able  to
pull the guns away from the battle, under the deadly fire of the enemy. Only
one  option is available to the crews--to die  on the spot,  as they prevent
the enemy from crossing the line which they are holding.
     During the war, one of the main reasons for the unyielding stability of
the  Soviet formations  was  the presence among them  of huge but  virtually
immobile units of anti-tank guns.
--------


     The  Soviet  commander's favourite weapon is  the mortar.  A  mortar is
simply  a tube, one end of which rests  on a base plate, while the other end
points skywards, supported on  two legs. It would be  difficult  to devise a
simpler weapon, which is why it is such a favourite.
     In 1942, a terrible year for the USSR, during which military production
fell  to a catastrophically low level, the mortar was  the one weapon  which
remained available to every commander.
     In three  and a  half years of war,  the  Soviet Union produced 348,000
mortars.  In the  same period, Germany  produced 68,000. All  the  remaining
countries put together produced considerably less than Germany. Furthermore,
the  Soviet  mortars were the most powerful in  the world and  the number of
bombs produced for each was the highest recorded anywhere.
     Soviet commanders value the mortar so highly because of its reliability
and its almost primitive  simplicity, because it only takes a few minutes to
teach  a  soldier  how  to   use  it,  and   because  it  needs  almost   no
maintenance--its barrel is not even rifled! And they also like its immediate
readiness, in any situation,  to fire quite heavy  bombs at  the enemy, even
though it lacks complete accuracy.
     The  pressure  generated  inside  a  mortar  barrel  when  it fires  is
relatively low  and therefore a mortar, unlike a gun or a howitzer, can fire
cast-iron   rather    than   steel   bombs.    This    adds   two    further
advantages--firstly, simplicity and cheapness  of  production,  secondly the
fact  that when  a  cast iron  bomb  bursts  it  shatters  into  very  
splinters, which  form  a dense  fragment pattern.  Steel  gun and  howitzer
shells are not  only more  expensive  but  are more solidly constructed  and
therefore  produce a er  quantity of splinters, which do not cover  the
area so densely.
     In France and the  US, after the war,  mortars were improved. They  had
rifled barrels which gave them greater accuracy. As  early as 1944, a Soviet
designer,  B. L. Shavyrin,  had  suggested  that Soviet  mortars  should  be
rifled, but he was firmly  rebuffed--it was  simpler to make ten  smoothbore
mortars  than  one with  rifling.  Even if  a rifled  mortar  was  twice  as
effective as  a smoothbore one, the latter would therefore still  be  a  far
better proposition, if it was only twice as effective, but cost ten times as
much to produce, it must rate as a very poor weapon.  I entirely  agree with
this point of view.
     But what about accuracy? you will ask. It is of no significance. Soviet
commanders have chosen a  different way of approaching the problem.  If  you
have  to pay  for accuracy with  complexity of design, you are following the
wrong path.  Quantity is the better way to exert pressure. Since two simple,
smoothbore mortars can do the  work of one rifled one we  will use  the  two
simple ones, which  will  have the additional  advantage of  producing a lot
more noise,  dust and fire than one.  And this is by no means unimportant in
war. The  more noise you produce, the  higher the morale of your  troops and
the lower that of the enemy. What is more, two mortars are harder to destroy
than one.
     Yet another  approach to the problem was  devised. The lack of accuracy
of Soviet mortars is more than made up  for  by the explosive power of their
bombs. To  Soviet commanders, the best mortar is a  large one--the bigger it
is the  better.  At present  the  largest American mortar is  their 106.7mm,
while the est Soviet one is 120mm. The biggest American mortar tar bomb
weighs 12.3 kilogrammes, the est Soviet one 16 kilogrammes. But besides
this    mortar, the Soviet Army has a  160mm version,  which fires a 40
kilogramme bomb and a 240mm version which fires a 100 kilogramme bomb.
     Anyone who  has  seen 120mm  mortars firing, especially if  he was near
them, will  never forget the  experience.  I  have  actually seen  12  240mm
mortars in action  together. These fire not 16 kilogramme but 100 kilogramme
bombs. Within twenty  minutes, each mortar fired 15 bombs. This represented,
as I later calculated,  a  total  of  18  tons  of explosives  and cast-iron
splinters. I found the noise  absolutely staggering. It was amazing that men
could retain  their  sanity in  the midst of  it. While  the  firing was  in
progress,  one had the impression that  thousands  of tons of explosive were
going off  each second  and the  whole process  seemed to  last  an age. The
astonishing destructive  power of these mortars makes up for any  inaccuracy
in aiming or  in dispersion. I believe that  this  is the  correct approach.
Only one  country,  Israel,  has had  a  chance to  test  the value of  this
exceptionally  cheap and effective policy.  Her  army  has 160mm mortars.  I
sincerely hope that she will progress further--she is on the right path.

     The outstanding simplicity, reliability and ease  of maintenance of the
240mm mortar are vital qualities, and  they played  a decisive role when the
moment  came to decide  which should be  the first artillery weapon  to fire
nuclear  projectiles. It was  the  obvious choice  and  it is now many years
since  it  was selected for  this role.  It was  also  a good  choice, being
comparatively  , manoeuvrable and easier to conceal  than a gun. At the
same time, it has a  huge calibre, which solves several  technical problems.
Its muzzle velocity is considerably lower than that of a gun or  a howitzer.
There is therefore no danger that  the bomb  will  explode as it is fired or
that it will detonate accidentally. What could be better?
     In 1970, a  self-propelled version of the 240mm  mortar was introduced.
It was  installed on  a tracked  GMZ  chassis.  This  greatly increased  its
mobility,  its  ability  to move  across  rough country  and the  protection
provided  for  the crew. This development  further  increased the  affection
which the Soviet generals reserve for the mortar. At this period only Fronts
and General Headquarters reserves were equipped with these weapons. However,
Army  and  divisional commanders,  as  one man, implored  every meeting they
attended  at  the Ministry  of Defence to give  each divisional commander  a
battalion of these mortars and they  also  asked  that  each  Army commander
should have  at least a regiment of  them. Their pleas  were  heard and soon
they  received the mortars. And why not? It is after  all, the  simplest and
the most economical weapon imaginable.
     It's  all  right  for the  generals, you will say, but  what  about the
battalion commanders? Must they be  content with what their predecessors had
in  the Second World War? The number of mortars  in a battalion could hardly
be increased, for that would mean  that  half  the infantry would have to be
reclassified as artillery. Nor  is it  possible  to  increase the calibre of
battalion mortars. This  would  make them too  heavy  to follow the infantry
wherever it goes.
     A way out of this situation, too, has been found. In 1971 the `Vasilek'
automatic mortar was  issued  to battalions.  Its introduction did not  mean
that the insistence on simplicity had been dropped. This automatic weapon is
as uncomplicated as a Kalashnikov. When necessary, it can fire single shots.
As  an automatic weapon it  fires 120 bombs  a  minute. It differs  from all
earlier mortars in being capable  of both  high and flat trajectory fire. It
can fire  both  normal  and  anti-tank  bombs.  If  necessary,  a  battalion
commander can move his whole  mortar battery to a sector threatened by enemy
tanks and can shower them with 720 anti-tank bombs every minute.
     The Vasilek is being produced on a self-propelled, armoured chassis and
also in  a  towed variant.  Six of  them give a battalion  commander greatly
increased capability  to  bring  concentrated  fire to  bear  on a  decisive
sector.
--------


     When the Soviet Union first displayed the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle
in a parade, its designation and the calibre of its guns were unknown.  From
careful  examination of  photographs,  Western analysts concluded  that  the
calibre of the gun must be between 70 and 80mm. In this range there was only
one gun--the  76mm,  which is still,  as  it has been  for  many  years<,> a
standard weapon  in both the Soviet Army and  the Soviet  Navy. This gun was
the most widely distributed  of all  Soviet artillery weapons before, during
and after the  war and its calibre occurs again and again in designations of
Soviet equipment  (e.g. T-34-76, the SU-76, the PT-76). Since this seemed  a
safe deduction,  Western handbooks  listed the  new  Soviet  vehicle as  the
BMP-76.
     Then several  BMP-1s were  captured in  the Middle East  and  carefully
examined. To the amazement of  the specialists, it was established  that the
calibre of the gun was 73mm. This was virtually the same as the 76mm, so why
were the Soviet designers not using this trusted calibre? Why the variation?
     Meanwhile,  photographs of  new Soviet  tanks--the T-64  and  T-72--had
begun to appear in  Western  journals. Painstaking analysis  showed that the
calibre of  the gun carried by both  these tanks was 125mm. But this calibre
did not exist, either in the USSR or elsewhere. Many of  the experts refused
to accept the analysts' conclusion,  asserting that the new tanks  must have
122mm guns.  122mm--like 76mm--is  a standard  calibre,  which has  been  in
continuous use since  before the Revolution. The 122 howitzer is the largest
in use in the Soviet Army. Most  heavy armoured vehicles had and still  have
guns of this calibre--the IS-2, IS-3, T-10, T10-M,  SU-122, ISU-122,  IT-122
and  most  recently the new, self-propelled `Gvozdika' howitzer, even though
this appeared  considerably  later  than the  T-64.  But then the new Soviet
tanks began to appear abroad and all doubt ended--they did have 125mm  guns.
What was  all this about? Why  were all previous standards being  abandoned?
What lay behind it all?

     The switch from existing calibres was not the result of a whim; rather,
it was a carefully thought-out policy--one which has  a long history. It was
initiated by Stalin himself, a few hours before Germany's surprise attack on
the USSR.
     It  was  on the  eve  of the  war  that  the Soviet  naval and  coastal
artillery  were  first  issued  with  the  excellent  130mm  gun.  This  was
subsequently  used as  an anti-tank gun and as a field gun and finally, in a
self-propelled variant. Also just before the war, in  the spring of 1941,  a
highly  successful  rocket launcher was developed in  the USSR. This was the
BM-13,  which  could fire 16  130mm  rockets simultaneously. It later became
known to the Soviet Army as the `Katyusha' and to the Germans as the `Stalin
Organ'.  Naturally,  the existence of  both the gun  and the rocket launcher
were kept entirely secret.
     In the first days  of June 1941 the  new rocket  launcher was  shown to
members of the Politburo, in Stalin's presence.  However, it was  not fired,
because artillery shells instead of rockets  had been delivered to the  test
range. The mistake was understandable, in view of the great  zeal with which
secrecy was being preserved--how could the  ordinance officers possibly have
known of the existence  of  the 130mm rockets, which  bore no resemblance to
artillery shells?
     Knowing Stalin, those  present  assumed  that everyone  responsible for
this mistake would  be shot  immediately. However, Stalin told the  Chekists
not to get involved and went back to Moscow.
     The second demonstration took  place on 21 June at Solnechnogorsk. This
time  everything went off very well. Stalin  was  delighted with the  rocket
launcher. Then and there, on the range,  he  signed an order authorising its
issue to the  Soviet Army. However, he directed that henceforth, in order to
avoid confusion, the rockets should be referred to as 132mm, not as 130mm.
     Accordingly, while the rocket launcher  continued  to  be known as  the
BM-13 (13cm being 130mm), the rockets  were henceforth  referred to, despite
their true calibre, as 132mm. That very night the war began.
     During  the  war,  projectiles  of all  types were  fired  in  enormous
quantities,  reaching  astronomical  totals.  They   were   transported  for
thousands of kilometres, under  constant enemy attack. While they were being
moved  they had to be  trans-shipped again and again  and  this was done  by
schoolboys, by old peasants,  by convicts from prisons  and camps, by German
prisoners and by Soviet soldiers who had only been in  the army for  two  or
three days. Orders  and requisitions for the rockets  were passed hastily by
telephone  from  exchange  to  exchange  and  made  all  but   inaudible  by
interference. But there were no mistakes. Everyone could understand that `We
need 130s' was a reference to artillery shells and it was equally clear that
`1-3-2' meant rockets.
     In 1942  the design  of the rockets  was modernised and  their grouping
capability and destructive effect was improved. In  the process, they became
slightly  thicker, and their calibre was increased to 132mm--thus coming  to
match their designation.
     Stalin's decision had  proved  correct and, as  a  result, a  series of
artillery  weapons with unusual calibres were developed during the war. They
appeared, of course, only when an unusual shell or rocket was  designed. For
instance, in 1941  a start was  made with the development of  a  huge mortar
which was needed to fire a 40 kilogram bomb. The calibre of the mortar could
have  been, for instance, 152mm, like the great majority of Soviet  guns and
howitzers. Obviously,  however, a howitzer shell  would  be unsuitable for a
mortar and vice versa. A mortar fires a particular type of projectile, which
must itself be of a certain calibre. This was the requirement which resulted
in  the development of  the  160mm mortar.  Immediately after the war,  40mm
grenade launchers  appeared.  There had never before been a  weapon  of this
particular calibre in the Soviet Army. There were 37mm and 45mm  shells. But
a grenade launcher uses its own type of projectile and a special calibre was
therefore selected for it.
     Soviet  designers took steps to  correct past mistakes, which had  been
tolerated  until Stalin's  sensible  decision.  The  calibre of the standard
Soviet  infantry weapon is 7.62mm. In 1930, a 7.62mm `TT' pistol was brought
into service,  in addition to  the existing rifles  and machine-guns of this
calibre.  Although  their calibre  is the  same, the rounds  for this pistol
cannot, of course, be used in either rifles or machine-guns.
     In wartime, when everything is collapsing, when whole Armies and Groups
of Armies  find themselves encircled, when Guderian  and  his tank Army  are
charging  around behind your own lines, when one division is fighting to the
death for a  patch of ground,  and others are  taking to their heels at
the first shot, when deafened switchboard operators, who have not slept  for
several nights, have to shout  someone  else's incomprehensible  orders into
telephones--in  this  sort  of  situation absolutely  anything  can  happen.
Imagine that, at a  moment such as this, a  division receives ten truckloads
of 7.62mm  cartridges. Suddenly,  to his horror, the commander realises that
the consignment consists entirely of pistol ammunition. There is nothing for
his division's thousands of rifles and machine-guns and a quite unbelievable
amount of ammunition for the few hundred pistols with which his officers are
armed.
     I do not know whether such a situation  actually arose during the  war,
but once it  was over  the `TT' pistol--though not  at all a bad weapon--was
quickly withdrawn from service. The designers  were told to produce a pistol
with a different calibre. Since  then  Soviet pistols  have all  been of 9mm
calibre. Why  standardise calibres if this could result in fatally dangerous
misunderstanding?
     Ever since then, each time an entirely new type  of projectile has been
introduced, it has been given a new calibre. Naturally, shells for the BMP-1
gun  are not suitable for the PT-76 tank--that was already obvious when work
on the design of the new vehicle and of its armament was begun. Therefore it
should not  have a  76mm gun but  something different--for instance, a  73mm
one.  The shells for the new T-62  tank were of a completely  new design and
would obviously not be suitable for use in the old 100mm tank guns. In  that
case,  the  calibre  here  too,  should  be  something  quite different--for
instance, 115mm. The same went for the T-64 and T-72. Their shells had to be
quite different from those of the  old heavy tanks. So that the old and  the
new types of ammunition should not be mixed up,  it was decided that the new
shells should be  125mm whereas the old ones were 122mm. There are dozens of
similar examples.
     There are exceptions. In some cases it is essential to use a particular
calibre and  no  other.  For example, the 122mm,  40-barrel multiple  rocket
launcher must be of precisely that calibre--no more and no less. Its rockets
are therefore given a special designation;  they are called  `Grad' rockets.
This  is  the only way in  which they are ever referred to--they  are  never
called `122mm'  rockets. One makes this a habit  from one's very  first day.
Then, if  someone orders  `1-2-2' he is referring to howitzer shells, but if
he orders `Grad', he means rockets.

     Western  analysts find it hard to understand why  the Soviet Union  has
turned away from its old, well-tried standard calibres. Soviet analysts, for
their  part,  wonder  why  Western  designers  stick  so  stubbornly to  old
specifications. The British have an  exceptionally powerful  120mm tank gun.
An  excellent  weapon. They also have a  useful 120mm recoilless gun. One of
them was developed some time ago,  the other more  recently. Obviously, they
use quite different  shells.  Why  not use different calibres--one  could be
120mm, the other 121mm? Or leave the calibres as they  are;  just change the
designation of one to 121mm. Why not?
     The  same applies to West  Germany and to France. Both  countries  have
excellent 120mm mortars and both are working on the development of new 120mm
tank  guns. Of course this  works well  enough in peacetime.  Everything  is
under  control  when  the soldiers  are  professionals,  who  are  quick  to
understand a command. But what happens if, tomorrow, middle-aged  reservists
and students from drama  academies have to be mobilised  to defend  freedom?
What then? Every time 120mm shells are needed, one will have to explain that
you don't need the type which are used by recoilless guns or those which are
fired by  mortars, but shells for tank guns. But be careful--there are 120mm
shells for rifled tank  guns and different  120mm shells for smoothbore tank
guns. The guns are different and their shells are different. What happens if
a drama student makes a mistake?
     The  Soviet  analysts  sit and  scratch  their  heads  as  they try  to
understand why it is that Western calibres never alter.
--------


     The  41st Guards  Tank  Division  was  issued  with T-64  tanks  at the
beginning of  1967. Of  course,  its soldiers knew nothing about this.  They
joined the division, served it honourably for two  years and  then went back
to their homes; other soldiers came, learned something  about tanks but went
home having heard nothing about the T-64 and never having  seen one. In 1972
the  division was  reequipped with the new T-72s and  the T-64s were sent to
Germany. The soldiers, of course, knew  nothing about this--neither that the
division had received new tanks nor that the old ones had gone. The soldiers
serve in a division, they  are trained by  it for war but they know  nothing
about its tanks.
     To  the Western reader this  may seem rather strange.  However, when  I
came to  the West and took my first  look at Western armies, I was astounded
to discover that  Western soldiers knew  the  names of their tanks, and that
they drive and fire from them. This seemed absurd to me, but I was unable to
obtain any explanation of this strange policy.
     In the Soviet Army  everything is secret. When the war began it was not
only the German generals  who  knew  nothing  about the T-34  tank--even the
Soviet  generals knew no more than they did. It was being mass-produced, but
this was kept secret. Not even the  tank forces knew of  its existence.  The
new tanks were moved from the factories to some divisions, but only to those
which  were a long  way  back  from  the frontiers.  They were ferried  by a
factory team  (totalling 30 drivers  for  the whole of the Soviet Union)  in
convoys,  the  like of which had  never  been seen before, escorted by  NKVD
officers, who were  forbidden even  to talk to the drivers.  They  travelled
only  at night and the tanks were always completely covered with tarpaulins.
The routes they took were  closed to all other traffic  and heavily guarded.
When the  tanks  reached  their  destination,  they were off-loaded  by  the
factory team, who then  drove them into vehicle  parks, surrounded  by  high
walls, inside which they were put into storage.
     The tank  crews were quickly instructed on  various features of the new
tanks, but they were not told what the new tanks were called or shown  them.
The gunners were, however, introduced to the new gunsights and taught how to
use them,  firing from old tanks. The drivers were given intensive  training
in the old tanks after  being told that  there was a new tank in the offing,
which had to be driven rather  differently. The drivers  did not, of course,
know  whether  the  division  already had this  new  tank  or not. The  tank
commanders,  too, were told a certain amount and  shown  how to  service the
engine, but they were not  told the name of the tank from  which the unusual
engine came  or given  its horse-power. In short,  the division  was  simply
retrained, but only used the old tanks.
     Then  came  the  war,  unexpected  and terrifying.  The  first  echelon
divisions, which had  good,  although not secret  equipment,  were  torn  to
pieces in the first battles. While  this was happening, the divisions in the
rear areas received orders to go into  the tank parks, to take the tanks out
of storage  and to familiarise themselves with them. It took them  two weeks
to do this and  after a  further two  weeks they reached the  front. Then in
these  completely unknown tanks, the divisions  took on Guderian's  armoured
columns. It  was soon clear that they  could operate them  very well.  After
all, a driver  who can handle a  Volkswagen like a champion would  not  take
long to master a Mercedes. That is how it was  done in the Soviet  Army then
and how it will be done in  future--they learn on a Volkswagen, but keep the
Mercedes secretly hidden away until it is really needed.
     But, of  course, the  T-34 was  not  the  only  surprise  awaiting  the
Germans. They discovered the existence of the `KV' heavy tank only when they
met it in action;  before that  they had not even heard of it. Nor, for that
matter, had its  Soviet tank-crews had any idea of its existence--the KV had
been secretly stored away. The German troops soon met the `Stalin Organ' for
the first  time, too, and panicked when they  did so. In peacetime sub-units
armed  with  these  excellent  weapons  had  masqueraded  as  pontoon-bridge
battalions, whose uniforms they had worn, with the result that most of their
own soldiers had not realised that they were in reality rocket troops. Their
retraining  started only when the  war began, but even then only the battery
commanders  knew  the  correct  designation of  their rocket launchers.  The
remaining  officers, NCOs  and  other  ranks  did not  even  know  what  the
equipment which they  were using in battle was  called.  The launchers  were
marked  with  the letter K (standing for the Komintern factory in Voronezh).
Naturally, no one, even the battery commanders, knew what this stood for and
the  result  was  that  the  soldiers  on every front  almost simultaneously
christened these splendid weapons `Katerina', `Katya' or `Katyusha'.  It was
under  this  last  name  that  they  went  down  in  history.  Their correct
designation--BM-13--was only allowed to be used in secret documents from the
middle  of 1942 onwards and  it was  not used in unclassified  papers  until
after the end of the war.

     The policy of observing the strictest  rules of secrecy  has completely
justified itself. For this reason it is universally accepted and  is applied
with ever  greater  rigour.  As  a result,  officers  serving in  a  nuclear
submarine may know, for instance, the output of  the boat's reactor, if they
are involved in its maintenance, but they will not know the maximum depth to
which  the boat  can dive, since this does not concern them. Others may know
this maximum depth, but will  not  know the range of the  missiles which the
submarine carries.
     This  policy of secrecy is applied to  the  production of heavy assault
guns, mounted on tank chassis.  A  tank with  a fixed turret is an excellent
weapon. True, its  arc of fire is reduced, but against this, a more powerful
gun  can be  installed,  the  quantity  of  ammunition  it  carries  can  be
increased, its armour  can be  strengthened  without  increasing its overall
weight and, most important, it is much easier  to manufacture. Guns of  this
sort are indispensable, when  used  in close  conjunction  with  tanks  with
normal  turrets. Both  the  Soviet  and the German generals  came to realise
their value during the war, but since then only the former have continued to
produce  them.  In order  that other  countries  should  not  be  tempted to
introduce  this simple but  excellent weapon, all  Soviet heavy assault guns
are  protected by strict security measures. Their production has  continued,
without a break, ever since the war. Every motor-rifle regiment (inside  the
USSR, but  not  abroad)  has one battery of heavy assault guns. In the 1950s
the powerful D-74 (122mm) was mounted on  a T-54 tank chassis, then the M-46
gun  (1 30mm) was installed on the T-62 tank chassis. All regiments, without
exception, have heavy assault guns of this type. They  are kept in mothballs
for decades, never seeing  the light of  day. Their crews train on  T-54 and
T-62 tanks. Sometimes they are shown the gunsights of the assault guns. They
know the  tactics  which  will  be used  and  they know how  to service  the
engines. If war should break out their commander would disclose to them that
instead  of tanks  they were about to  be equipped with something which  was
similar but far more powerful and  better  armoured.  In the  middle of  the
1970s all these guns were replaced by  more powerful  models but, naturally,
they  were  not  melted down. Instead they  were either sent  to the Chinese
frontier to be installed in concrete emplacements or sent to holding depots,
in case they should come in useful one day.
     The same  secrecy  is  maintained around the  IT-1 and  IT-2  anti-tank
rocket launchers and the Rapira-2 and Rapira-3 anti-tank guns.
     The IT-1 is built on a T-62 tank chassis but is armed with the `Drakon'
anti-tank rocket instead  of a  gun. Each  Army has one battalion  of IT-1s,
which  are kept in  mothballs, well  concealed and never  seen even  by  the
battalion's own soldiers. If the Army to which it belongs is  posted abroad,
the battalion remains  on Soviet  territory, to all appearances  an ordinary
tank battalion. Its soldiers are  given  instruction in  tactics and driving
and  maintenance of the  vehicles but ordinary tanks or  training simulators
are used for this.
     In  this way it is possible to serve  out your time in the Soviet Army,
learning nothing--or very little--about its equipment.
--------


     Nothing at all. I will repeat that. All this costs nothing at all.
     Let  us imagine that you work at  a full-time  job, but that your  wife
does not. You give her an allowance and she has  no other source  of income.
You start to give her driving lessons and decide to make yourself some money
by doing so. After all,  you are using  up energy, time, labour,  nerves and
petrol. But now answer a question--is it more in your interest to make  your
wife pay through the nose for  her lessons, or to keep the price  low? Which
will be more profitable for you?
     If you were  giving lessons to a neighbour, of course, you would ask as
high a  price as you felt you could. But  what should you  do  when you  are
teaching  your own wife?  The  more money  you make her pay,  in the hope of
becoming rich, the more she will need from you, for where else could she get
it?
     If  you  lower your fee, you  will need to give your wife less, and she
will let you have  less back. You soon realise that whatever you  charge she
will just be taking money from your pocket and then returning it to you.
     Now, turn your thoughts to the 6th Guards Tank Army, with its thousands
of tanks and tens of thousands  of men. Imagine yourself to be the Communist
Pharaoh,  the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet  Union.
Something  strange--goodness knows  what--is  going on in Czechoslovakia. To
safeguard  yourself  you decide  to  move  the  6th Guards  Army up  to your
frontier with this fraternal  state. It is only possible  to move a thousand
tanks over a distance of a  thousand kilometres by rail, for tanks wear  out
roads very  fast--and vice versa. How much  is  this going to cost you?  You
summon the Minister of Railways  (being nationalised, the railways are fully
controlled by the people--in other words by the government--that is,  by you
personally)  and  put this question  to  him.  He  tells  you--`100  million
rubles'. This means that you will have to take 100 million rubles out of the
State's  pocket  and  give it to the Army;  the  Army pays the money to  the
railways, which,  in turn, puts  this, the profit they  have made, back into
the State's pocket. What on earth is the point of taking it out in the first
place, if it was going to be  put  back  almost immediately? So, in fact, it
does  not get taken  out  in the first  place. The  General  Secretary  just
summons the  Minister  and tells him to move the  6th Guards  Tank Army. The
Minister  says  `Yes,  Sir', clicks his heels and does  as he has been told.
That is all. No money is needed for the  operation.  The same system applies
to  any  movement by  individual soldiers. An  officer  comes  to  a railway
station and shows papers which say  that in the  national interest he is  to
proceed to  the Far East.  What would  be  the point in giving  the  officer
money, for him to pay a State organisation, which must  then refund the same
money to the State?
     In the Soviet Union everything has been nationalised. Private deals are
forbidden. Since everything is in  the hands of  the State, prices for goods
produced  for the State have  no meaning. Tanks, guns, rockets--none has any
price inside  the State. It is like  growing  a strawberry in  your  garden,
selling  it  to yourself and eating it, moving the money you pay for it from
your right pocket to your left one. Your strawberry only acquires a price if
you sell it to someone else and put the money he pays you into your  pocket.
In the same  way, Soviet tanks acquire a price only when someone abroad buys
them.
     For the State, which owns all the safes in the land,  to move  billions
of rubles from  one  safe to another is meaningless. So nothing is moved.  A
Ministry simply receives an order to produce a  thousand tanks or rockets or
bombers and to  deliver them to the armed forces. That is all. If a minister
does  not carry  out his  orders  he  loses  his  place  at  the ministerial
feeding-trough.  Money  of a  sort is paid to the workers but  it is  really
nothing but the equivalent of ration cards. Workers are given just enough to
buy bread or potatoes, a poor quality suit every three years and vodka every
day. This money is printed by the State but  it is not recognised  by anyone
abroad, since it can not be exchanged for gold.
     In  the Soviet Union there are virtually no taxes, because they are not
needed.  Everything is in  the  hands  of  the  State, everything  has  been
nationalised. A Soviet banknote is essentially a ration card, issued  by the
State for work done in its interests. Why hand out ten ration cards and then
take  five of them  back  again?  The  State does  not  grow any  richer  by
re-acquiring these cards, which do  not  help to make more meat available in
the shops. Accordingly,  the State, which prints these  cards, produces only
enough to buy the amount of  bread, potatoes, rotten meat  and old fashioned
clothes which it  is prepared to  distribute to its citizens. The latter eat
the meat and give  the ration cards back to the State,  which hands them out
again.
     Sometimes  the  State becomes more concerned about producing tanks than
food, but  it must continue to hand  out ration  cards to  the  people. This
creates  inflation,  since now the ration cards can  not even purchase bread
and this soon has a calamitous effect on the whole huge military machine.
     It is a  good thing that there are capitalists in  the world,  ready to
come forward with help at times like these.
--------


     The Soviet Union has designed  a  large number  of first-class weapons,
among them the  T-34 tank, the Kalashnikov automatic assault  rifle and  the
IL-2 Shturmovik ground attack  aircraft. Even today, in the  early 1980s, no
one has succeeded  in improving on the  performance of the Soviet 130mm gun,
although it  was developed  as  long  ago as 1935. The  Soviet Union was the
first to  use  rockets fired from an  aircraft--this  was in  August 1939 in
Mongolia,  in combat  with Japanese  aircraft.  A  Soviet motor torpedo boat
(under Egyptian colours) was the first in history to use rockets to sink  an
enemy ship.  The Soviet Union  was  the first  to use the BM-13 salvo-firing
rocket launcher. The Soviet  Union was the first, many years ago, to realise
the value of smoothbore guns, with their astonishingly high muzzle velocity,
and it  was  the  first  to mass-produce automatic  mortars and  many  other
excellent types of weapon.
     At the same  time, the Soviet intelligence services, the largest in the
world,  search  unceasingly  for  anything  new  in the  field  of  military
equipment. The enormous  extent  of Soviet  activity in this sphere  beggars
description. Soviet intelligence succeeded  in obtaining all  the  technical
documentation needed to produce nuclear weapons, in winning over a number of
distinguished scientists and in ideologically recruiting others as agents.
     Since the war, the Soviet Union has succeeded in copying and in putting
into mass production the American B-29  bomber, British Rolls-Royce aircraft
engines, American lorries and German  V-2 rockets. It has also completed the
development of a number of German rocket designs which were still unfinished
at  the end of the war. It has stolen  plans for the construction of  French
anti-tank  rockets, American  air-launched  missiles,  laser  range-finders,
stabilisers for  tank guns,  rocket fuel, special dye-stuffs  and many, many
other highly important products.
--------


--------


     For 35 years (between the ages of  17 and  50) all  Soviet men--and all
the Soviet  women  whose professions  might make them  useful  to the  Armed
Forces--remain on the register of those liable for military service, forming
the Armed  Forces reserve. This  register, listing all these individuals, is
maintained  by Rayon City,  Oblast, and  Republic Commissars, who come under
the orders of the  Organisational Directorate of the Military Districts and,
thus,  ultimately,  of the Chief Organisational Directorate of  the  General
Staff.
     The tens of millions of people on the register may be called up without
notice, if either partial or full mobilisation is announced.
     As soon as a  young man is 17, he appears before a medical board and is
listed on the register. The next year, as soon  as he is 18, he is called up
for service in the Armed Forces. Depending on the date of his birthday, this
may happen in the  spring (in May or June), or in the winter (in November or
December).
     Conscripts spend two years in all Services and  arms of service, except
for the Navy, in which they serve for three years.
     Every year, two intakes, each of approximately a million young men join
the Armed Forces and those who have completed their service are demobilized.
Thus, every six months something like a quarter of the total number of other
ranks  changes over. New men join, the older  ones leave, remaining  on  the
reserve until they are 50.

     Private Ivanov received instructions to report to  the  local  assembly
point on 29 May. In preparation he did three things:
     -- he got together with a gang of fellow spirits to beat up some of his
enemies, in accordance with the principle--`Today  you help me to knock  the
hell out of the people I  don't like  and then tomorrow  I'll help you to do
the same.'
     --  he told  his girl-friend that she was to wait two years for him, to
go  out with no one else and to write to  him  frequently--`Otherwise you'll
see, I'll come back and kill you. You know me.'
     -- on the night of 28 May he drank himself into complete insensibility.
Parents realise that unless they hand over their drunken son to the assembly
point by midday he will be punished under military law.
     A convoy takes the crowd of drunk and half-drunk youths to the station,
where they are put on a train and taken to their place of duty.
     A soldier is not  entitled  to  choose an  arm of service,  the area in
which  he  will serve or the trade  which  he will  follow in the army. Long
before  Ivanov  received his call-up papers, the General  Staff had sent all
Military Commissariats details  of the  men  they  would  be  receiving  and
instructions on where they were to send them. Naturally,  the General  Staff
does not go into details, saying no more than `150 men, of  category "0" are
to be  sent to  Military unit 54678'. This  may  be  a unit  of diversionary
troops,  it may  be a nuclear submarine, or it may be  something very secret
indeed.  The  Military  Commissar can only guess.  (If  the  number has four
figures the unit  belongs to  either the  KGB  or  the  Ministry of Internal
Affairs. If it has  five, it is  a Ministry of Defence unit.) This is all he
is told except that there is sometimes a minor  additional requirement, such
as `Category "0", but all are to be tall and physically well-developed.'
     The Military Commissar prepares  groups of soldiers by  categories--for
instance, 5 men from Category 1, 100 from Category 2 and 5,000 from Category
3  to  military  unit   64192.  The  Military   Units   receive   their  own
instructions--`You will receive 100  men from Khabarovsk, 950 from Baku, 631
from Tbilisi.'
     Each  Military  District  makes up  several troop transports,  provides
escorts and officers, and sends them off  to  different corners of  the huge
country, while mixed columns move off to distant rocket batteries, fortified
areas and motor-rifle divisions.
     One requirement is sacrosanct  when  these selections are  being  made:
whenever possible, Russians must not be stationed  in the  RSFSR, Ukrainians
in  the Ukraine  or Latvians in Latvia. If  there are disturbances among the
Russian population of,  for instance, Murom or Tolyatti or Omsk,  these will
be crushed, sometimes with considerable bloodshed,  by non-Russian soldiers.
If  a strike breaks out  in Donetsk (as  one did in 1970)  there will  be no
Ukrainian soldiers  in the  area. The soldiers  stationed there  are Tatars,
Kirghiz,  Georgians. It  is all the same to them who  they shoot at. What is
important is that  there  is  no one in the crowd confronting them whom they
know and no one in it who speaks a language they can understand.
     It  is  also  essential  to  mix  all  the  nationalities  together  in
divisions, regiments  and  battalions. If  one  regiment contains  too  many
Lithuanians and another too many  Tatars, this must result from a slip-up by
some military bureaucrat. The punishment for such mistakes is harsh.
     The movement of such colossal numbers of men takes up two whole months.
Surprisingly,  the machine works extremely smoothly,  rather like a  sausage
machine--all  sorts of pieces  of meat, some onions, some  rusks,  and  some
garlic are put in  at one end  and  out of the other come solidly compressed
rolls of well-mixed human material.

     A column of new recruits  is  not a sight for anyone with weak  nerves.
Traditionally, anyone joining the army dresses in such rags that  you wonder
where on  earth  he found them.  For  recruits know  that any  more or  less
useable  article--socks  which  are  not  in   tatters,  for  instance--will
immediately be seized from  them  by the soldiers escorting the  column.  So
they  dress  in  the  sort of rags which should  be  thrown on  a bonfire--a
mechanic's boiler suit,  solid  with  grease,  a  painter's  working clothes
daubed with  paint of all colours, even a sewage-collector's overalls.  Many
of them will have  black eyes, acquired  in farewell fights with their local
enemies. All  are  unshaven,  uncombed, shaggy, dirty--and  drunk, into  the
bargain.
     All  the officers and soldiers  escorting  the  column are  armed.  The
roughest, toughest sergeants and other ranks are chosen for  this job.  They
stop the fights which keep breaking out, giving the recruits new  bruises as
they do so. The young newcomers quickly feel the weight of a sergeant's fist
and soon realise that it is best to do what he tells them--and that the same
goes for a soldier, who may himself have spent a  fortnight in the same sort
of  column,  swapping punches with those around  him, as recently  as a year
ago.
     Anyone who  has  once  seen  for  himself  what  a column  of these new
recruits  looks  like will  understand  why there are  no volunteers in  the
Soviet Army, why there never could be and why there is no need for them. The
whole system is too inflexible, too regulated, and too tightly controlled to
concern itself with any individual's opinions  or wishes. Everyone is simply
grabbed, indiscriminately, as soon as he reaches 18, and that's that.
--------


     At some  juncture  long ago,  before Stalin, in  Lenin's  day, the wise
decision  was  taken  that  the state apparatus  should  be  manned, not  by
riff-raff,  but  by   comrades   of  proven  worth,  who  were  responsible,
experienced and dedicated to  the popular  cause. In  order that  the  state
should not  be infiltrated by alien elements at some stage in the future, it
was decided that successors to this ruling group should be prepared and that
it  was  essential  to  ensure  that  these young people were  appropriately
educated.  Educational establishments  were therefore set up to prepare  the
future  ruling  class, and these were filled, for the  most  part,  with the
children of the  comrades of  proven worth, who were themselves dedicated to
the  revolutionary cause.  The comrades were very pleased with this plan and
have never  since contemplated any  deviation from the  course  approved  by
Lenin.
     As  an  illustration--the  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs of  the  USSR,
Comrade A.  A. Gromyko is, of course, a  person of proven  worth. It follows
that his son,  too, must be dedicated to the people's cause; this means that
Comrade Gromyko's  son  can become  a diplomat  and,  provided  that  it  is
possible  to  check  that Comrade  Gromyko's son  has made a success of this
career, the  grandson  of  Comrade  Gromyko,  too,  can enter the diplomatic
service.  Comrade  Gromyko's deputy is Comrade  Malik. He, too, is a trusted
person, dedicated to the national cause  and this means that  the road to  a
diplomatic career is also open to both his son and his grandson.
     The  comrades  of proven worth got together and agreed among themselves
that, since their children  were  already  dedicated to their Motherland and
prepared to defend its interests throughout their entire lives, there was no
need for them to enter the army. Accordingly, when the sons of the  comrades
of  proven worth reach  17  they are not required to  register for  military
service; instead, wasting no time, they enter the Institute of International
Relations. After qualifying there,  they go  off to spend not just two years
but the  whole of their lives defending the interests of their Motherland at
the  most   exposed  portion  of  the  front  line  in  the  battle  against
capitalism--in Paris, Vienna, Geneva, Stockholm or Washington.  This  is why
the  children of  the comrades  of proven  worth do not have  to be  ferried
around  in dirty railway trucks, are not punched in the mouth by  sergeants,
and  do  not  have  their  gold  teeth  pulled  out,  and  why,  too,  their
girl-friends do not need to wait for them for two or three years.
     Lest the absurd idea  should  enter anyone's head  that the sons of the
comrades of proven worth are not defending socialism, with weapons  in their
hands, they are given military awards for  their service  from time to time.
The son of that most responsible  and trusted of all comrades, Brezhnev, for
instance, spent years defending the interests of socialism in the barricades
of Stockholm;  on his return from this most crucial  operation  he was given
the military rank of Major-General even though he  has never spent a day  in
the army, or indeed as much  as an hour locked in a railway wagon with a lot
of grubby recruits.
     In the KGB, as in the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, they read the works
of  Lenin and therefore, following his  precepts,  they, too, admit to their
training establishments the sons  of  comrades of proven worth,  rather than
just anyone.  And  because these  boys, too, will have to spend their  lives
defending socialism, they are also given exemption from military service.
     The  Workers' and Peasants'  State contains a mass  of other  important
state  organisations  and  undertakings  for which  future leaders  must  be
prepared.  To  train  them   an  enormous  network  of   higher  educational
institutions has been set up. The comrades of proven worth have decreed that
anyone  entering one  of  these higher  educational institutions  is  to  be
granted exemption from military service.  The universities organise military
training courses, of limited scope, and these are considered sufficient.

     In  every town  there is  at  least one institute  which  is ultimately
controlled,  through a series  of intermediate  authorities,  by  the  First
Secretary  of  the Oblast  Committee  of  the Party.  Naturally,  the  First
Secretary's own children do not  attend this institute. They study somewhere
in Moscow. But he has  a Second  Secretary and a  Third; they have deputies,
who themselves have  assistants,  who have consultants. All  of  these  have
children. Formerly all those concerned with the administration of the Oblast
sent their  children straight to the local  institute where, since they were
the  children  of  trusted  comrades,  they  were  received  with open arms.
Nowadays, things have changed somewhat.  The Third  Secretary of the  Oblast
Committee will telephone  his opposite number  in a nearby town--`My son  is
due for call-up in the autumn and your boy next spring. If you'll look after
my son,  I'll do  the  same for  yours.' A  mutually beneficial exchange  is
arranged. A  couple of lotus-eaters are  admitted to two higher  educational
institutions, without being required to pass any examinations. However, they
find  themselves in  neighbouring  towns, rather than at home,  and they are
also regarded as  `workers and peasants' rather than as the sons of comrades
of proven worth. But then, first in one town and then in the  other, the two
Third Secretaries are suddenly seized with the desire to  improve the living
conditions of students. Not everyone can be given a rent-free  apartment, of
course, so  the  Oblast Committee allocates just one.  Thus only one student
gets one--our  own,  dear  `worker-peasant'.  With  considerable  effort  he
obtains his certificate of higher education. Everyone else is  sent  off  to
work in Siberia  but he is  found a place with the  Oblast Committee, as  an
assistant. Time passes quickly, he  climbs  steadily upwards and before long
his own son  is  growing up  and will soon  be  eligible for  army  service.
Meanwhile, however, the system has become more complicated. Mutually helpful
exchanges  between  two neighbouring  towns  are  too  conspicuous.  So  our
worker-peasant doesn't enrol his son in the  nearest town. Instead,  the son
of someone who appears to be  a true member of the  working  class enters an
institute in a third town, without  having to  pass  exams, while  from this
third town to ours comes an apparently straightforward young man, the son of
some official or other, whose name no one knows. A flat is quickly found for
this young man,  who then gets a post  with the Oblast Committee. He finds a
job there for  someone else,  who reciprocates  by letting him  have a  car,
without payment, and  who in his turn does the same for yet another  person.
The wheel turns on and hundreds of  thousands of parasites  avoid having  to
endure the railway wagons or the brutish armed sergeants.

     But what happens if  your father is not among  those at the helm of the
Workers' and Peasants' State? In that case if he will just slip the Military
Commissar a few thousand rubles, you can be found unfit for military service
and  your  name removed from the register. The  Military Commissar in Odessa
was shot for doing  this, the  same  happened in  Kharkov, in Tbilisi, every
year  for five years  in succession, they sent a Military Commissar  to gaol
but that  did not solve the problem so they had to shoot the sixth one. They
would  hardly  have  shot  a  Military  Commissar--a  Colonel--for  misdeeds
involving  a few thousand  rubles. The  sums  concerned must have  been very
large indeed.
     And if your father has not got a few thousand rubles to spare? Then you
could cut off your  trigger finger with an  axe. Or you could stick a  
piece of foil on your  back when  you go for your X-ray, so that they decide
you have  tuberculosis and turn you  down  for  the  army. You  could go  to
prison. But if you haven't  the  courage for  any of these, brother,  you'll
find yourself in that dirty railway wagon.
--------


     The column of recuits finally reaches the division to which it has been
allocated. The thousands of hushed, rather frightened youths leave the train
at a station surrounded by barbed wire, their heads are quickly shaven, they
are  driven through a cold bath, their filthy rags are burned on huge fires,
they  are issued with  crumpled greatcoats, tunics and trousers that are too
large or too , squeaky boots  and  belts. With that  the first  grading
process is completed. It does not occur to any of them that each of them has
already been assessed, taking  into account his political  reliability,  his
family's  criminal record (or  absence of one), participation (or failure to
participate)  in  Communist mass  meetings, his height and his  physical and
mental  development.  All these  factors  have  been taken into  account  in
grading him  as Category 0,  1, 2, and so forth and then allocating him to a
sub-category of one of these groups. There will be no more than ten Category
0 soldiers  in  a  whole  motor-rifle  division--they  will  go to  the  8th
department of the  divisional  staff. In  each intake there will  be two  or
three  of them, who will replace others who are being  demobilised, and  who
will themselves join the reserve.  They  have  no idea that they are in this
particular  category  or  that files exist on  them which have long ago been
checked and passed by the KGB.
     Category  1  soldiers are  snapped  up  by  the  divisional  rocket  or
reconnaissance  battalions or by the  regimental  reconnaissance  companies.
Category 2  soldiers  are those who are able to understand  and to work with
complicated  mathematical  formulae. They  are  grabbed by  the fire-control
batteries  of  the artillery regiment, of the  anti-aircraft rocket regiment
and  of the  self-propelled artillery battalions of the motor-rifle and tank
regiments. And then there are the soldiers of  my  own  arm of service,  the
tank crews--Category  6, thanks  to  the  swine who do  the planning in  the
General Staff. But nothing can be  done about that--the army is enormous and
bright  soldiers  are in demand everywhere. Everyone  is  after the  strong,
brave, healthy ones. Not everyone can be lucky.
     A detachment is set up in each battalion, to handle the new intake. The
battalion  commander's deputy heads  this and he  is assisted by some of the
platoon commanders and  sergeants. Their task  is to  turn the recruits into
proper  soldiers  in  the  course  of one month. This  is  called  a  `Young
Soldier's Course'. It is a very hard month in a soldier's life; during it he
comes  to realise that the  sergeant above  him  is a  king,  a god  and his
military commander.
     The  recruits  are  subjected  to   a  most   elaborate   and  rigorous
disciplinary programme; they clean  out lavatories with their tooth-brushes,
they are  chased  out  of  bed twenty  or  thirty times every  night,  under
pressure to cut seconds off  the time it takes them to dress, their days are
taken up  with training  exercises which  may last for sixteen  hours  at  a
stretch.  They study  their weapons,  they are taught  military regulations,
they learn the  significance  of the different  stars and insignia on  their
officers'  shoulder  boards.  At the end  of the month  they fire  their own
weapons  for the first time  and  then they are paraded to swear the oath of
allegiance, knowing that any infringement of this will be  heavily punished,
even, perhaps, with the death-sentence. After this the recruit is considered
to have become a real soldier.  The training detachment is disbanded and the
recruits are distributed among the companies and batteries.

     Socialists  make the  lying claim  that  it  is  possible  to  create a
classless society. In fact, if a number of people are thrown together, it is
certain that a leading  group,  or perhaps  several groups,  will emerge--in
other words different classes. This has nothing to do with race, religion or
political beliefs. It will  always happen, in every situation of  this sort.
If  a  group of survivors  were  to  reach  an  uninhabited  island  after a
shipwreck and you were able to take a look at them after they had been there
only a  week, you would undoubtedly find that a  leader or leading group had
already emerged. In the German concentration camps, no  matter  what sort of
people  were  imprisoned together, they would always establish themselves in
stratified societies, with higher and lower classes.
     The division into  leaders  and  followers occurs automatically. Take a
group of children and ask them to put  up a tent; do not put one  of them in
charge but stand aside and  watch  them. Within five  minutes a  leader will
have emerged.
     A group of  short-haired recruits nervously enters an  enormous barrack
room, in which two,  three or even five  hundred soldiers live. They quickly
come to  realise that they have entered a class-dominated society. Communist
theory has  no place  here. The sergeants split  the  young soldiers  up  by
platoons, detachments and teams. At first everything goes normally--here  is
your  bed,  this  is  your  bedside  locker  in  which  you  can  keep  your
washing-kit,  your four manuals,  brushes and  your  handbook of  scientific
communism and nothing else. Understand? Yes, sergeant.
     But  at  night  the barrack-room  comes  alive.  The  recruits  need to
understand that  it contains four classes--the  soldiers who will be leaving
the army in six months, those who will go  after a year, a  third  class who
have eighteen months still to serve and, lastly, they themselves, who have a
full two years to go. The  higher  castes guard  their privileges jealously.
The lower castes must acknowledge their seniors as their elders and betters,
the  seniors  refer to inferiors  as `scum'. Those who  still  have eighteen
months to serve are  the superiors of the new recruits, but scum, naturally,
to those who have only a year to go.
     The night  after the new intake has arrived is  a terrible one in every
barracks: the  naked recruits are flogged with  belts, and ridden, bareback,
by their seniors, who use them as horses to fight  cavalry battles  and then
they are driven  out to sleep in the lavatories while  their beds are fouled
by their elders and betters.
     Their  commanders  know  what is going  on, of course, but  they do not
interfere; it is in  their  interests that the other ranks should be divided
among themselves by barriers of real hatred.
     The lowest  class have no rights whatsoever. They,  the scum, clean the
shoes and make the beds of their seniors, clean their weapons for them, hand
over  their meat and sugar rations,  sometimes even their bread to them. The
soldiers who are soon to be released appropriate the recruits' new uniforms,
leaving  them  with their  own worn-out ones.  If  you are  in command of  a
platoon  or a company  you  are quite content  with the situation. You order
your sergeants  to get something done--digging tank pits, for instance.  The
sergeants give the  senior soldiers this job to do and they in  turn hand it
on to the scum.  You can  be confident that  everything will be finished  in
good time. The senior soldiers will do nothing themselves but they will make
each of the scum do enough for two or three men. You can take your sergeants
off into the bushes and hand out your  cigarettes; whatever  you  do,  don't
fuss. Wait until someone comes to report that the job has been done. This is
your moment:  appear like the  sun  from behind  the clouds, and  thank  the
senior soldiers  for their hard work. I assure you--both the senior soldiers
and the scum will love you for it....
     Six months pass and a new  consignment of scum joins your sub-unit. Now
those who  suffered yesterday  have  a chance to vent their rage on someone.
All the humiliations and insults which they have suffered for six months can
now be heaped on the  newcomers. Meanwhile  those  who still insult and beat
them up continue to be regarded as scum by their own superiors.
     These  are the circumstances in which  a  soldier begins to master  the
rudiments of the science of war.
--------


     `Roll  on  my demob!' `I wish  you all  a speedy  demob--make  sure you
deserve it!'  They've taken everything  else away,  but they can't  take  my
demob!' `Demobilization is as inevitable  as  the  collapse of  capitalism.'
These are sentences you will see  scribbled  on the  wall  of  any soldiers'
lavatory. They are cleaned off  every day  but  they are soon back again, in
paint which is still wet.
     Demobilization comes  after two years' service. It is the  day-dream of
every soldier and NCO. From the moment a  recruit joins  the army, he begins
to cross off the days  to his demob. He lists the days left on the inside of
his belt or ticks them off on a board, a wall, or on the side of  his tank's
engine compartment. In any military camp,  on the backs of the  portraits of
Marx,  Lenin,  Brezhnev,  Andropov  and  Ustinov  you  will  find scores  of
inscriptions such as  `103  Sundays left  to my demob',  accompanied by  the
appropriate number of marks,  carefully ticked off  one  by  one  in  ink or
pencil. Or `730  dinners to my demob' and more marks. Or, frequently `17,520
hours to my demob' or, even more often, `1,051,200 minutes to my demob'.
     A soldier's day is split up into a number of periods of so many minutes
each and this makes it most convenient for him to calculate in minutes.  The
Soviet  soldier reckons that his  day lasts just a little bit longer than it
does  for any  other inhabitant  of the planet, so  in  his calculations  he
reckons  that a day contains 1,441 minutes--a minute longer than it does for
the rest of us.
     A minute is the  most  convenient division of time for him, although he
has to count in seconds, too.

     The  soldier's second day-dream,  after  his  demobilization, is  to be
allowed to sleep for 600 minutes.  Theoretically, he  is allowed 480 minutes
for sleep. Of course, one  of the scum gets only half this: as he moves into
a higher  caste and becomes more senior he sleeps longer and longer. A month
before his demobilization  a  senior  soldier hangs a note above his bed `Do
Not Tilt! To be Carried Out First In Case Of Fire.'
     Reveille is at 0600 hours. Wake up, jump out of bed, trousers and boots
on, run outside for a rapid visit to the lavatory, sprint to the door, which
is jammed with  people, another sprint and you are on the road outside, past
the  sergeants who are  lying in wait  for the `last on parade'. By 0605 the
company  is already moving briskly along the roads  of the military camp. In
rain  and wind, in  hail  and snow--just  boots and  trousers, chests  bare.
Running and PT until 0640--35 minutes of really hard physical exercise.
     Then the company goes back to the barrack-room with 20 minutes to  wash
and make beds. During this  time  the  scum have to make both their own beds
and those of the  senior soldiers. At 0700  there is morning inspection; the
sergeant-major spends  half an  hour on  a rigorous  check of  the company's
general tidiness,  haircuts,  contents  of  pockets, etc.  After  this,  the
company falls  in and moves off, bawling a song and  marching in time to it,
to the  dining hall. An  attentive observer would notice that the  number of
soldiers in the company is  now greater  by a quarter than it was during the
PT  parade. Actually,  when the  orderly first  shouted, `Company.  On  your
feet!' at reveille, by no means everyone jumped hastily out of bed. The most
senior of the soldiers, those with only six months to go before their demob,
get up unwillingly and slowly, stretching,  swearing quietly to  themselves,
not joining in  the rush to the lavatory or tearing off to the parade. While
the  rest of the company  marches round  the corner, they go  quietly  about
their own affairs.  One may stretch out under his bed  to  sleep for another
half hour, others  doze behind the long  row of greatcoats, which  hang from
pegs by the wall, and  the  rest may tuck  themselves  away somewhere at the
back of the barrack-room by a warm pipe from the furnace-room. Whatever they
choose  to do, they don't turn out for PT with the rest of the company. They
keep  an eye out for the patrolling  duty  officers, quietly changing  their
hiding places if  he approaches. Eventually  they go and wash, leaving their
beds to be made by the scum.
     The  Soviet  Army  serves  a meagre  breakfast. A soldier is allowed 20
grammes  of butter a day, but since, theoretically, 10 of these are used for
cooking,  there are  only 10 grammes on his plate. With this, for breakfast,
he receives two slices of black bread, one of white,  a bowl of kasha  and a
mug of tea, with one lump of sugar.
     Butter and sugar are used as a sort of  currency, with which to placate
one's seniors for  yesterday's  mistakes or for some piece of  disrespectful
behaviour. They  are  also  used  as stakes  for  bets so that many  of  the
soldiers have  to hand  over  their  breakfast butter or  sugar--or both--to
those who have been luckier than them at guessing the results of football or
hockey matches.
     There is not much bread, either, but  if a  soldier  somehow manages to
get hold of an  extra slice, he will  always try to make his tiny portion of
butter cover it too, so that it  is bread and butter  rather than just bread
that he is eating. Several soldiers from my company once spent a day working
in the bakery and, of course, they helped themselves to a few loaves,  which
they shared with the other members of their platoon. Each of them had ten or
fifteen slices of bread to spread  his butter on and was able to eat as much
as he  wanted,  for the first  time for months. But  there  was  very little
butter indeed for each slice. I was not far away,  and, seeing how they were
enjoying themselves, I went over and asked how they could tell which  of the
slices had butter on them. They laughed and one held a  piece of bread above
his head and gently  tilted  it towards the sun. The  answer became clear--a
slice on which there was even the  est scraping of butter reflected the
sunlight.

     At  0800 hours there  is  a regimental  parade. The  deputy  regimental
commander presents the regiment for  inspection  by the commander.  Then the
day's training, which  lasts  for seven hours, begins. The  first hour is  a
review  period,  during which  officers  from  the regimental  or divisional
staffs test  the extent  to which  officers,  NCOs and soldiers are ready to
proceed with the  forthcoming  day's  work. Soldiers are  questioned on what
they learned during the  previous day, what training they received  and what
they  have  memorized.  For  me,  as  for any commander,  this  was  a  most
uncomfortable  hour.  During  this  review period,  too,  orders  by  senior
commanders from regimental  level up  to  that  of the  Minister  of Defence
himself are read  out, together with the sentences imposed on  the  previous
day  by Soviet  Army military tribunals--outlines of cases involving five to
ten years' imprisonment, and sometimes death sentences.
     If  the  review period ends  early,  the  rest of the hour is  used for
drill. After this come three periods, each of two hours. During  these  each
platoon works  in  accordance  with  a  training schedule  which  covers the
following subjects:
     Political training
     Tactics
     Weapon training
     Drill
     Technical training
     Weapons of mass destruction and
     Defence against these
     Physical training
     The  number  of  hours  spent  on  each  subject  varies  considerably,
depending on the arm of service and the Armed  Service in which the soldiers
are  serving. However, the general  plan of  work  is the same everywhere--a
review period, drill and then six hours of work on the subjects listed above
in accordance with individually arranged training schedules.
     Ninety-five  per  cent of all work, except for  political training,  is
done out of doors, rather than in classrooms--in the open country on ranges,
in tank  training  areas,  in  tank  depots,  etc. All  periods,  except for
political training, involve physical work, which is often very strenuous.
     For instance, tactical training may involve six  hours digging trenches
in blazing sun or in a hard frost, high-speed crossings  of rivers, ravines,
ditches and barricades, rapid erection of camouflage--and everything is done
at  the  double. Instruction in  tactics is always  given without equipment.
Thus,  a tank crew is told to imagine that they are in a tank, attacking the
enemy `on the edge of the wood over there'. Having run to the wood, the crew
returns  and the tank commander explains the mistakes they made--they should
have attacked not on  the  crest of the  hill  but in  the gully. Now,  once
again... Using this system of instruction, you can quickly teach a crew, who
may be unable to understand complicated explanations, how an enemy should be
attacked, and how to use every hollow  in the ground  to  protect  their own
tank in battle. If  they don't, well they just run off again, and again, and
again for the whole six hours if necessary.
     Weapon training involves study of  weapons and of combat equipment. But
you  should  not imagine  that  a  platoon sits in a  classroom,  while  the
instructor describes the construction of tanks,  guns and armoured personnel
carriers.
     The sergeant  shows  a  young  soldier an assault rifle. This  is  your
personal  weapon. You  strip it like this. You are allowed 15 seconds to  do
this. I  will  show  you  and  then we  will  practise  it--do it again--and
again--now do it with this  blindfold. And  again... This  is  our  tank. It
carries 40  shells, each  of which  weighs between 21  and  32  kilogrammes,
according  to  type. All  the shells are to be loaded  from these containers
through this hatch into the tank's ammunition store.  You've got  23 minutes
to do this. Go! Now do it again--and again--and again.
     Any process, from changing a tank's tracks or its  engine to running in
rubber  protective  clothing  during  CW  training,  is  always  learned  by
practical experience and practised again and again until it becomes entirely
automatic, every day, every night for two years. So many seconds are allowed
for each part of the operation. Make sure you do it this time: if you  don't
you'll  have to practise it again and again and again, at night, on Sundays,
on Sunday nights.
     Exceptional physical strain is  put upon Soviet  soldiers.  During  his
first days  in  the army a young recruit  loses weight,  then,  despite  the
revolting food, he begins to put it on, not as fat, but as muscle. He starts
to walk differently, with  his shoulders back, a mischievous twinkle appears
in his  eye and he begins to acquire self-confidence.  After six months,  he
begins to develop considerable aggression,  and to dominate the scum. In his
battles  with the  latter,  he wins not  only  because of tradition,  or the
support of his  seniors,  his  NCOs  and  officers--he  is  also  physically
stronger than they are. He knows that recruits coming  into the army are far
weaker than he is--he has six months of service behind him. Within a year he
has become a real fighting-man.
     A Soviet soldier is forced  to  adapt to circumstances. His body  needs
rest and he will  find a thousand ways to get it. He learns  to sleep in any
position  and in  the most unlikely places.  Don't  ever think of  giving an
audience of Soviet soldiers a lecture with any theory in it--they would fall
asleep at your very first words.
     At 1500  hours the platoon, exhausted  and dripping with sweat, returns
from training, and tidies itself up. Hastily, everyone cleans boots, washes,
puts things right--at the double,  all  the  time. Dinner parade--they march
off, singing, to the dining hall and spend 30 minutes there over disgusting,
thin soup, semi-rotten  potatoes  with  over-salted fish and three slices of
bread. Hurry, hurry. `Company, on your feet! Fall in!' Dinner is  over. They
march off,  singing,  to  the  barrack-room.  From 1600 to  1800  they clean
weapons,  service  equipment, clean  the barracks and  tidy  the surrounding
area. From 1800 to 2000 `self-tuition'. This means training which is devised
not by the divisional staff  but by  the sergeants. `50 press-ups. Now do it
again...  You didn't  make much  of  a  job of  loading those shells. Try it
again... Now once more... The time you took to run three  kilometres in your
respirator was poor. Go and do it again.'
     From 2000 to 2030--supper. Kasha or potatoes, two slices of bread, tea,
a  lump  of  sugar.  `Butter?--you had that this  morning.'  After  supper a
soldier has 30 minutes of free time. Write a letter home,  read a paper, sew
up a  senior  soldier's collar-lining  for tomorrow's inspection, clean  his
boots until they gleam, iron his trousers.
     At  2100 hours  there is  a formal  battalion, regimental or divisional
parade. Evening roll-call, a run-through of the time-table  for tomorrow and
of  the  results  of today's  training, more sentences imposed  by  military
tribunals and then an evening stroll. This takes the form of 30  minutes  of
drill,  with  time kept  by  drum-beat,  and  training songs, yelled  out by
several thousand voices. At 2145  the  soldier  reaches the barracks  again,
washes, cleans  his teeth, polishes and cleans everything for  next morning.
At 2200--lights out. For those, that is, who are not on night exercises. The
timetable  makes  provision  for 9  hours  of night  training each  week. No
allowance is made  for loss of sleep. These  night exercises can, of course,
go  on for any length of time. And those who are not on night  exercises may
be got out of bed at any moment by a practice alert.

     Saturday is a working-day  in the Soviet Army.  What makes it different
from  other days  of the  week is that the  soldiers have a film-show in the
evening. No--not about James Bond, but about Lenin or Brezhnev.
     Sunday is a rest-day. So  reveille is at 0700  hours, instead  of 0600.
Then, as always, morning toilet, PT, breakfast. And  then free time. This is
what the  political officer has  been  waiting  for. There  is one of  these
`Zampolits', as they are called, in each company, battalion, regiment and so
on. The  Zampolit can only work  with the soldiers on Sundays, so  his whole
energy  is  devoted  to  that day.  He arranges tug-of-war competitions  and
football matches--more running! He also gives lectures about how bad  things
were before the  Revolution, how good  life is nowadays, how the  peoples of
the world groan under the yoke of capitalism and how important it is to work
hard to free them. In some regiments the soldiers are allowed to sleep after
dinner.  And  how  they  sleep--all  of  them!  On  a  bright  sunny Sunday,
sometimes, a division looks like  a land of the dead. Only very occasionally
is  a single figure--the duty officer-to be seen walking around. The silence
is  astonishing  and  unimaginable  at any other  time. Even the  birds stop
singing.
     The soldiers sleep on. They are tired. But the Zampolits are not tired.
They  have been resting all week  and now they are bustling about, wondering
what to organise next for the soldiers. How about a cross-country run?
     Sunday  does  not belong  to  the  Soviet soldier,  and so  he reckons,
reasonably enough, that this day, too, lasts 1,441 minutes instead of 1,440.
--------


     Practice makes perfect.  This is a wise saying, which  the Soviet  Army
accepts.
     Accordingly, during his service every  soldier  goes  through the  same
cycle of instruction four times.
     Each of these lasts for  five months, with one month  as a break before
the next one begins.  During this interval,  the soldiers who have completed
their service are demobilized and the new intake arrives. In  this month the
recruits go through their Young Soldier's Course: the remainder overhaul and
repair equipment and weapons, and do maintenance work at barracks, camps and
firing-ranges. They are also used for various sorts of heavy  work. This  is
not  always  for the Armed Forces;  sometimes they become labourers on State
projects. Then the five-month cycle of instruction begins. All the  subjects
in the training schedule are covered but during the first month the emphasis
is on the individual training of each soldier. The  youngest ones learn what
they need to know and  do,  while  the older ones  repeat everything for the
second, third or fourth time. As a  soldier's service lengthens, the demands
he must meet increase. A soldier who has only just joined may be required to
do, for instance, 30 press-ups, one who has served  for 6 months 40, after a
year he will  have to do 45  and after 18 months  50. The standards required
increase  similarly in every type of  activity--shooting,  running,  driving
military   vehicles,  resistance  to  CW  materials,  endurance  without  an
air-supply in a tank under water, etc.
     In  the second  month,  while  work  continues on  the  improvement  of
individual skills, sections, crews and military teams are set up. In reality
they exist already, since 75% of their members are soldiers who have already
served in them for at least six months.  The young  recruits adapt  quickly,
for they are made to do the work for  the  whole team: the older members  do
not  exert themselves but they squeeze enough sweat for  ten out of the  new
arrivals so as o avoid being accused of idleness themselves and in order not
to incur the wrath of their platoon or regimental commander.
     From the  second month, weapon training is no longer  individual but to
whole  sections. Similarly, the sections, teams and other basic combat units
receive all their tactical, technical and  other  instruction as groups.  At
the same  time, members  of these sections, teams and  groups  learn how  to
replace one another and  how to  stand in for their  commanders. Sub-machine
gunners practise firing machine-guns and grenade  launchers, machine gunners
learn to drive and  service  armoured personnel carriers, members  of rocket
launcher  teams are  taught  how  to carry out the  duties of  their section
commander. Members of tank, gun,  mortar  and  rocket-launcher crews receive
similar instruction.
     The third month is devoted to perfecting unit and in particular platoon
cohesion. Exercises lasting for  several days, field firing, river crossing,
negotiation of obstacles, anti-gas and anti-radiation treatment of personnel
and equipment--the  soldiers carry all  these out as  platoons. During these
exercises, section  commanders receive practice in commanding a  platoon  in
battle. Then come field firing and other practical exercises lasting for two
weeks  each, first at company, then  at regimental and finally at divisional
level. Two final  weeks are taken up with large-scale  manoeuvres, involving
Armies, Fronts or even complete Strategic Directions.
     After this an inspection of all the formations which make up the Soviet
Army  is  carried  out.  Checks  are  carried out  on  individual  soldiers,
sergeants,  officers, generals,  sections,  platoons, companies,  batteries,
battalions,  regiments, brigades, divisions and  Armies. With this the cycle
of   instruction  is  completed.  A  month  is  set  aside  for  repair  and
refurbishing  of  equipment,  firing-ranges,  training grounds and  training
centres.  In this month, again, the demobilization of time-expired  soldiers
and the reception of a new intake of recruits takes place. This is  followed
by  a repetition of the  entire  training cycle--individual  instruction and
then the  welding together  of  sections, platoons,  companies,  battalions,
regiments,  divisions,  then  the  large-scale  exercises  and  finally  the
inspection. So it goes on, over and over again.
--------


     Most Soviet  soldiers  do  not  know how to  read  a map.  This is  the
absolute truth. They are just not taught to do so. What is more, there is no
intention that they should learn, since it is not considered necessary.
     In the West you can  buy a map at any petrol station. In  the USSR  any
map with more than  a  certain amount of detail on it  is  classified  as  a
secret document.  If you  lose  a  single sheet of  a map you can  be put in
prison for a long time--not a luxurious  Western prison, but something quite
different.
     The fact that  maps are regarded as  secret  gives the Soviet command a
number of important advantages. In the event of a war on Soviet territory an
enemy would have considerable difficulty in directing his artillery fire, or
his  aircraft, or in  planning operations  in  general.  Thus, in 1941,  the
German command had to use  pre-revolutionary maps, printed in 1897,  to plan
its air raids on Moscow. From time to  time single Soviet maps fell into the
hands of German troops, but this only occurred accidentally so the maps were
unlikely   to  be  consecutive  sheets.  When  the  Germans  entered  Soviet
territory, it was noticeable that the accuracy of  their artillery fire from
covered fire positions fell off sharply. They  were unable to use their  V-1
and V-2 rockets.
     By making  the map a secret document the Communists  achieved something
else--attempting to flee from the  Soviet paradise without a map is a fairly
risky  undertaking. On one occasion a Soviet  soldier  swam across  the Elbe
near Winterberg and asked  for political asylum. When he was asked if he had
any  secrets  to  disclose he revealed  that he had  spent the last eighteen
months painstakingly gathering every crumb of information he could  lay  his
hands on. He was  carefully questioned and was  then  sentenced to death and
shot. He had swum the Elbe at the wrong point and had fallen  into the hands
of the East  German  frontier  guards,  who  had questioned  him,  in broken
Russian, at the request of their Soviet comrades. If  he had swum across the
Elbe a few kilometres  further north  he would have  landed safely  in  West
Germany--if, that is, he  had  avoided  treading on mines or  being torn  to
pieces by guard dogs.

     In the  Soviet Army  there  are, it is true, hundreds  of  thousands of
soldiers who  have been instructed in map-reading. But they  are  only those
who would need  to  use  a map in battle--reconnaissance and assault troops,
SPETSNAZ  diversionary  troops,  topographers,  missile  control  operators,
aircrew, artillerymen, etc.
     An ordinary tank crew member or infantry  soldier does not need  a map.
He  does  not  take operational  decisions, he obeys  them.  Remember Soviet
tactical theory--no  battalion,  no  regiment,  division  or  Army  advances
independently.  Even a  Front can only operate  independently in exceptional
circumstances. A Soviet offensive is a massive avalanche of tanks, supported
by a storm  of  artillery fire.  All  this  is directed at a single,  narrow
sector  of  the enemy's front. Individual initiative could ruin  the overall
plan. In many cases, regimental and divisional commanders  have no authority
to  deviate from the  route  they have  been  ordered  to  follow.  In  this
situation an ordinary soldier does  not need a map. His function  is to keep
his weapons and equipment in  good  order  and  to  use  them skilfully,  to
advance bravely and with  determination in  the direction  indicated by  his
commander, and to push  forward at  all  costs and whatever the losses.  The
Soviet soldier is not expected  to pore over a map--there are any  number of
others  who  are  doing  that--but to  refuel  a  tank  quickly,  to  unload
ammunition as fast as he can, to aim  accurately and to fire cold-bloodedly.
His  task  is  to work  as fast as he can, repairing damage to his  personal
weapons or changing rollers or tracks on tanks, putting  out  fires, driving
his tank under water towards the enemy's shore. He must go without sleep for
three  days and  without  food for  five, he must sleep in  the  snow in his
shabby greatcoat and carry out the orders  of his commander unquestioningly.
The Soviet Army teaches him to do all this. But it only teaches map  reading
to those who will command and direct this soldier.
     Those  who built the Great Pyramids were probably not particularly well
educated and often they probably  did not even understand  each other, since
slaves  had been  driven together  from  distant  areas to  build  the  huge
structures. But the  pyramids turned out none the worse for that. The slaves
were  not  expected to carry  out intricate calculations or  to make precise
measurements: all that was  required  from them was obedience and diligence,
submission to the lash and willingness to sacrifice themselves in order that
some  unknown but most  desirable aim  should  be achieved.  Soviet generals
adopt a similar position--surely it is  not necessary to involve every slave
in plans of such enormous complexity. Soviet generals are not arrogant; they
are completely satisfied  with a  soldier who, even if he cannot read a map,
does not strike, does not set up trades unions,  does not pass  judgement on
the actions of his commanders and only  gets his  hair cut  when a  sergeant
tells him to.
--------


     Soldiers are glad when their column reaches their new division and they
are  told  that  they  are  joining,  for instance,  the  207th  Motor-Rifle
Division, the 34th Guards Artillery or the 23rd Guards  Tank Division.  They
know and are ready for what  awaits them. But they  are seriously alarmed if
they discover that they are joining the  92nd Motor-Rifle Training Division,
the  213th  Motor-Rifle  Training  Division or  the 66th  Guards Motor-Rifle
Training Division. The word  `Training' has  an ominous  sound to a recruit.
True,  it means that he will  never be one of the  scum,  that he will never
have senior soldiers above him, but, instead,  he will become a sergeant  in
six months' time,  standing above both scum  and senior  soldiers,  as their
lord and master. But he knows that for this he will have to pay a very heavy
price--six months in a training division.
     Formerly each regiment trained  its  own sergeants. In addition to  its
four or  five  battalions and its  various  companies, each  regiment  had a
`regimental school'. The regimental commander put his best company commander
in charge of this school. If the last of an officer's postings contained the
words `commanded the regimental school' this showed that at one stage he was
regarded as the best young officer in his regiment. The regimental commander
devoted equal attention to his choice of platoon commanders from this school
and he  also sent the  most  ferocious of  his  sergeants  there.  Then each
company  commander would  pick out the most  promising of  his  recruits and
would  send them to the school. Their  training would  turn  them  into real
wolf-hounds;  they  would  return to  their  company with  their  sergeant's
shoulder-boards and lead its soldiers to glory.
     But the  system  of regimental schools  had one  shortcoming. Different
nationalities  have differing  temperaments and  their  own traditions.  Any
Soviet officer  will confirm that a  Tatar makes  the best sergeant of  all.
Ukrainians are very good  sergeants. The  Lithuanians are  not bad. But  the
Russian, while he makes a good soldier  or a good  officer, is  not  a  good
sergeant. The great Russian people must forgive me,  but this is not just my
opinion: it is that of the majority of Soviet officers.
     It  may, of  course,  be that  all Soviet  officers  are mistaken  but,
anyway,  the regimental schools certainly accepted all the Tatars  they were
offered, immediately. They took the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians, too, but
Georgians, Russians,  Uzbeks and  Azerbaidzhanis were given  no places. Now,
consider what happens when  mobilization is ordered. All divisions, wherever
they are permanently garrisoned, will call up their reservists and fill  all
their  vacancies. Next second formation divisions--`invisible divisions' are
formed. In the process, it comes to light that in the Tatar Republic all the
reservists are sergeants and that there are no other ranks. The situation in
the Ukraine and in Lithuania  is  almost  the  same.  In the other republics
though,  all the  reservists are private soldiers and there are no sergeants
at  all.  While  it is  true  that  for  instance, Georgians make  excellent
officers, they are not accepted  for training as sergeants, because they are
too warm-hearted and this makes  them ready to  overlook  trifling mistakes.
Trifling mistakes  are precisely what a sergeant is  concerned with--he must
never overlook them and  he must punish those responsible without mercy. So,
how could you ever build up a division in Georgia?
     The General Staff racked its brains for a long time  over this problem,
but finally  adopted the  radical solution  of disbanding all the regimental
schools and of training sergeants centrally, in training divisions.

     Naturally,  the  standard of  sergeants  and  their  authority  dropped
sharply as  this decision  was implemented. Whereas previously each  company
commander had picked out one of his recruits and told him, `You are going to
be a sergeant', now there was no  such personal  selection.  One  column  of
recruits was sent to a normal division, another went to a training division:
it  was done quite  haphazardly.  Against that, the General Staff now  knows
that, under the mobilization plans,  Georgia, for instance, needs to produce
105,000 sergeants from its reserve but that in fact it has only 73,000.  The
remedy is  obvious--in  the near future the requisite number of  new  intake
columns from  Georgia must  be sent to training divisions.  All  the General
Staff  needs to do is  to work out  what sort of  sergeants it needs--rocket
troops,  artillery  or  infantry--and to issue the necessary instructions to
local Military Commissars  about  the numbers  they  are  to  send  to  each
training division.
     Of course, in formulating these  instructions, the  General  Staff does
not forget to ensure that a suitable mixture of nationalities is retained in
each division.

     A  training  division  has  the  same  establishment, organisation  and
equipment  as a normal  motor-rifle  division. Three of  the  most important
battalions--the  reconnaissance,  communications  and rocket battalions--are
combat subunits which are identical with those in a normal division. All the
other  regiments  and  battalions  of  the  division  keep   their   weapons
mothballed, holding additional weapons  for  training purposes. The training
divisions have  no  fixed establishment of personnel: every six months  each
division receives  ten  thousand recruits  to  train.  After  five months of
brutally  tough  training  these trainees become sergeants and are  sent  to
combat  divisions,  to replace  those who have  been  demobilized.  Then the
training division receives another ten thousand and the cycle  begins again.
Thus each training division turns out twenty thousand sergeants a year.
     Each trainee spends half of his first year at the training division, is
promoted and then spends the remaining eighteen months of his service with a
combat division.
     Training divisions are located only on Soviet territory. If  war should
break out  their current  intake would be promoted  ahead  of  time and they
would call up their reserves, take their weapons out of storage and function
as a combat divisions.
     Each  of the regiments of a training  division trains sergeants in  one
particular field, following a specialised curriculum. The artillery regiment
trains 1,500 artillery  sergeants,  the engineering battalion turns  out 300
engineer  sergeants with varying specialist  qualifications, and so forth. A
very  large  proportion  of tank  crew  members  pass  through the  training
divisions, since the commander, gunner  and driver  of  a tank are all NCOs:
only the loader is a private soldier. Since the newest Soviet tanks carry no
loaders, every member of a tank crew will henceforth pass through a training
division. In the artillery the proportion of sergeants is much lower. In the
infantry, units with armoured personnel  carriers have  one sergeant to each
section,  those with infantry combat  vehicles  have three sergeants to each
section. The training of sergeants in  the various different fields proceeds
in accordance with the requirements of the combat divisions.
     In the tank training regiments, the first battalion usually trains tank
commanders, the second, the gunners and the third, the drivers.
     At  the conclusion of their training all trainees sit examinations.  If
they pass them the specialists (gunners, tank drivers, radio operators etc.)
become  lance-corporals; those  who  pass  with  distinction  become  junior
sergeants. Gun-, tank- and section-commanders become junior sergeants: those
who pass with distinction receive immediate promotion to sergeant.

     A training division has no scum or senior soldiers. All 10,000 recruits
arrive  and leave the division at the same time. The division does, however,
have sergeants, and their influence  is a hundred times greater than that of
the sergeants in  combat  divisions. In a  combat division, while a sergeant
must not be over-familiar with his senior soldiers, he must at least respect
them and  take their opinions into account. In a training division,  on  the
other hand, a sergeant simply  dominates his trainees,  totally ignoring any
views  they  may  have. In  addition,  each platoon commander in a  training
division, supervising thirty  or forty  young trainees, is allowed to retain
the services of one or two of the toughest of them. A sergeant in a training
division  also knows that he would have nothing like the same authority in a
combat  division.  While he is  still a trainee,  therefore,  he picks noisy
quarrels  with  his fellows,  in  the  hope that his  platoon commander will
notice and decide that he is someone who should be kept on to join the staff
after the end of the course. He cannot afford to  reduce  his aggressiveness
if he succeeds in landing a  job with the training division, or he  may find
himself sent off to  join  a combat division, having  been  replaced by some
young  terror who is  only too ready to spend  all his nights as well as his
days  enforcing order and discipline.  (If, however, this  should happen, he
would soon realise that  he is unlikely  to be  sent on anywhere else from a
combat division and that he can  therefore afford to  let  up a  bit  and to
slacken the reins.)
     Discipline in a training division is almost unbelievably strict. If you
have not experienced life in one you could never imagine  what  it is  like.
For instance, you might  have  a section of non-smokers headed by a sergeant
who does  smoke.  Every  member  of the section  will  carry cigarettes  and
matches in his pocket. If the sergeant, apparently without realising that he
is doing so, lifts two fingers to his mouth, the section will assume that he
is in  need  of a cigarette. As one, ten trainees will rush forward, pulling
cigarette  packets from  their pockets. The sergeant  hesitates, considering
which  of the ten  stands highest in his favour at that moment, and  finally
selects  one of  the cigarettes  he is offered.  By doing  so, he  rewards a
trainee for his recent performance. Ten packets of cigarettes disappear in a
flash;  in  their  place  appear  ten  lighted  matches, held  out  for  the
sergeant's  use.  Once  again he pauses, looking  thoughtfully  from face to
face--whom to reward this time? One match goes out, burning the fingers of a
young  trainee, who stoically endures the pain, even though it brings  tears
to his eyes. The sergeant accepts the light offered by the  soldier next  to
him and puffs contentedly away.
     Each day the sergeant picks one of the trainees and puts him in command
of  the others. The trainee must spend the  day devising  fresh torments for
his fellows. If he really  distinguishes himself  by his  inventiveness,  he
will receive  the  greatest honour of  all--he will be allowed to polish the
sergeant's  boots that  evening. The trainees  fight a silent  battle  among
themselves, every hour of every day, for this privilege.
     Power depraves those who wield it and a sergeant in a training division
is  as depraved as it is possible to be. He uses his power to manipulate his
subordinates, gradually turning them into real man-eaters.
     Service  in  a  training  division  is  the  pipe-dream of many  Soviet
officers.  It is generally believed that in a training division one does  no
work at all. But this is not true: I know because I have served in  one. The
work is sheer drudgery. It is true that you never need to teach the trainees
anything--their sergeants do  that. It is true that  every  square  metre of
asphalt  is scrubbed with  toothbrushes.  It is true that the floors in  the
lavatories shine almost as brightly as the sergeant's boots. It is true that
no sergeant will ever step out of line, for fear of being posted to a combat
division.
     Against  all this,  however,  the number  of suicides  in  the training
divisions must  exceed the figures  for any similarly-sized  group of people
anywhere  else in the world. If a trainee  in  your  platoon or your company
kills himself, your own record of  service will carry a black mark. And this
black mark will never be erased. Each officer must therefore keep a constant
watch on each of his trainees. As soon as he spots  the slightest indication
that something is wrong he must take action. He must pick out and give power
to the trainee who appears to have reached  the  end of his tether and to be
about to turn on his platoon, to blaze away at them, at his officers and  at
anyone else nearby and then, calmly changing the  magazine, to send  another
long burst ripping through his own young body.
     But how can you watch them all? Can you get to the right one in time to
make  him so  drunk  with power that he  will resist the temptation  to kill
himself?
--------


     Some say that before the Revolution the Russians were slaves in chains.
Many believed this and many others still do  so. Napoleon was  one  of these
and he  decided  that he  would  conquer  the country by  winning  over  its
down-trodden  serfs.  As  he  entered  Russia,  therefore,  he  published  a
manifesto, freeing the peasantry from serfdom. However, for whatever reason,
the Russian  peasants did not  view him as a  liberator and they ignored his
edict.  More than that, they  rose against him,  everywhere he or his armies
appeared.  Eventually  they  drove  him  from  Russian  soil,  ignominiously
abandoning his armies as he did so.
     The Communists claim that  they liberated the Russian people. Yet, when
the  war began, these  same  Russians greeted  their  foreign  invaders with
tears, with flowers and with enthusiastic hospitality. What can have brought
them to the point at which they would greet even Hitler as their saviour and
liberator?
     The Soviet forces surrendered to Hitler in regiments, divisions, corps,
and  Armies. In  September  1941  the  5th,  21st,  26th,  and  37th  Armies
surrendered simultaneously and without resistance. In May  1942 the whole of
the South-Western Front, the 6th,  9th and 57th Armies, the 2nd, 5th and 6th
Cavalry Corps, the 21st and 23rd Tank Corps surrendered in the Kharkov area.
They fought for four days and laid down their arms on the fifth: At the same
moment,  the 2nd Shock  Army capitulated on the North-Western Front. What is
more, they  then  turned  their weapons  against  the Communists.  Soldiers,
officers, and generals of every nationality of the Soviet Union surrendered,
although  the  Russians were  the  most numerous,  both in numbers and  as a
percentage  of the total Russian  population  of  the  country.  The Russian
Liberation Army was the largest of all the anti-Communist forces, drawn from
the inhabitants  of the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire,  which were set up
during the  Second World  War.  By the  end  of  the  war  it  consisted  of
approximately one million  Russian soldiers and officers, who had chosen  to
fight against  the Soviet Army. It could have  been still larger than  this,
but Hitler would not  give his wholehearted support to Lieutenant-General A.
Vlasov, the leader of the Russian anti-Communist movement. With unbelievable
short-sightedness, he  embarked  upon  a  bloodthirsty  campaign  of  terror
against the  inhabitants of the territories occupied by his armies. Compared
to  the  liberation  and  collectivisation  campaigns  carried  out  by  the
Communists, this  terror  was relatively mild, but it deprived Hitler of any
hope of winning the laurels of a champion of freedom.
     But  the  Communists were not idle. They  did everything they  could to
retain power and to  prevent the total  collapse  of the Soviet  Army. On 13
May,    1942    the    murderous    `Smersh'     organisation--a    military
counter-intelligence  service,  operating  independently  of  the  NKVD--was
established.  Its most  important task was defined  by Beriya on  15  May as
`fighting attempts to revive a Russian Army'.  That  same day a new  law  on
hostages was enacted, decreeing  that the relatives  of Soviet citizens  who
joined the Russian Liberation Army could be imprisoned for twenty-five years
or shot. A day later new guidance on penal battalions was issued.
     Penal battalions existed already but not in the form now envisaged. Nor
had there ever been as  many of them as was  now proposed. Their final shape
was decided upon in May 1942. The original proposals were confirmed and they
have not changed from that day to this. Let us look at them more closely.

     The old Russian Army had a good tradition: if its soldiers considered a
war to be a just one they would fight like  lions. If they believed it to be
unjust and unnecessary for the Russian people, they would simply stick their
bayonets in the ground and go  home. That is  what they did in 1917 and they
did it again in 1941.  Millions of Russian soldiers could  see no  reason to
defend the Communist  regime. Proof that this was a widespread  attitude was
provided by the Armies who gave themselves up. The  same  opinion was shared
by  hundreds  of thousands  of  Ukrainians,  who  established  the Ukrainian
Insurgent  Army,  by  Cossacks, Georgians,  Lithuanians,  Latvians,  Crimean
Tatars and  by  many other peoples who,  before the  Revolution,  had fought
fearlessly  for  the interests  of the Russian  Empire against every foreign
invasion.
     The Communists  are clever people. They saved  their dictatorship in  a
most  original  way--by  developing a new  use  for penal  battalions, which
proved to  be a  decisive force  in  the battles  with  the German army. The
Germans choked on the blood of  the Soviet penal battalions. Also,  with the
help  of  the penal battalions, the  Communists  destroyed millions of their
potential and actual domestic enemies and put an end  for several decades to
the growth of disobedience and resistance to their regime.
     Until  May  1942, each  Army  fighting  at  the  front  had  one  penal
battalion.  These  battalions  were  used  in  defence  as  well  as  during
offensives. After this the situation altered--the battalions were only to be
used, according to the new policy, in offensives. In defence they were to be
employed only to counter-attack --and, after all, a counter-attack is itself
an offensive action on a  scale. In addition  to the battalions already
serving  with  Armies,   other  battalions,  subordinated  to  Fronts,  were
introduced. Each  Front commander henceforth had  between 10  and  15  penal
battalions at his disposal.
     Each battalion had an administrative  group, a guard company  and three
penal companies. The permanent component of the battalion--the command staff
and  the  guards--consisted of  ordinary  soldiers  and  officers  who  were
selected for  their  obtuseness,  their ferocity and their fanaticism.  They
were rewarded with unheard-of privileges. The  officers received seven times
the normal pay--for each year of service they were given seven years towards
their pension.
     The penal battalions contained individuals who had shown  reluctance to
fight and others who were  suspected of cowardice.  With them  were officers
and soldiers who  had  been sentenced  for various crimes and  offences. The
officer's who were sent to the battalions lost any decorations they had been
awarded, together with their ranks, and joined the battalion as privates.
     During periods  of calm the penal  battalions were kept in the rear. At
the last moment before an  offensive, they were brought up, under guard, and
positioned at  the  forward edge  of  the  battle  area.  As  the  artillery
preparation began, the  guard company, armed with  machine guns,  would take
their place behind the  penal companies, who were then issued  with weapons.
Then, on the command `Advance  to attack!' the guard  company's machine guns
would force  the reluctant  penal  companies  to  get to their  feet  and to
advance.  Being  unable to move  in  any  other  direction,  they  attacked,
frenziedly. The most  brilliant  victories achieved by the Soviet  Army were
bought with the blood of the penal battalions. They  were given  the hardest
and  most thankless tasks. They would break through the enemy's defences and
then, sweeping through their midst,  trampling  on their corpses, would come
the elite Guards divisions. Thereafter no one wanted the  penal companies in
the area. It was far better to let the Guards do the fighting.
     During  the  assault  on the German  defences at  Stalingrad, 16  penal
battalions were concentrated  in the 21st  Army's breakthrough sector and 23
more  in the 65th Army's  sector on the  Don Front.  Soviet Fronts  employed
almost  as  many as  this during  the Kursk  battles,  to breach the  German
defences. At one point in the course of the fighting in Byelorussia, on  the
orders of  Marshal Zhukov,  34  penal battalions were  brought together  and
thrown into the attack, to  cut a  way through for the 5th Guards Tank Army.
34 battalions are the equivalent of almost 4 divisions. One  should add that
very few of them survived the engagement and that, of course, those who were
fortunate enough to live through this battle were almost certainly killed in
the next one.
     Each penal battalion had an establishment of 360. This may seem a 
number.  Yet  the  capacity  of  these battalions  was  astonishing.  Soviet
generals loved  to  attack  or counter-attack: anyone under  the command who
seemed  to  lack fighting spirit would  quickly  find  himself serving as  a
private in a penal battalion.  An unsuccessful attack brought certain  death
for the members of the penal companies--they were unable to  escape and they
were  shot down  by the  guard company.  If they succeeded in advancing, the
process would be repeated, again and again. They would die, eventually, when
they came  up against an impregnable defence.  The  guard company would then
return  to  the rear,  and  assemble a new battalion, which would resume the
attack on the following day--or even the same day.
     The official figures  given  for  Soviet casualties  during the  Second
World War is 20,000,000 officers  and men. In reality,  of course, the total
was considerably  higher. A large proportion of these millions reached their
destiny through  the sausage machine of the penal battalions. Much stupidity
and  idiocy  was  displayed  in  the war,  there were many  unnecessary  and
unjustifiable sacrifices. But this was  an exception: a subtle and carefully
thought-out policy  of  using the  blood  of  potential internal  enemies to
destroy  an  external enemy--the German military machine. It  was at once  a
shrewd and appalling scheme.
     The German  command  understood  the situation  very  well.  But  their
outlook was too limited and too  pedantic to allow them to adopt the correct
riposte--retreating rapidly before the penal battalions, giving the latter a
chance to find cover from the heavy machine guns, which threatened them from
the rear, and to turn their weapons on the  guard  company. If Field Marshal
von Paulus had done this at Stalingrad,  the  Soviet penal battalions  would
have  cleared his path to the  Volga. If von Manstein had done this at Kursk
he would have won the greatest battle in tank history.
     If...  if...  if  only someone had  realised  how  the Russians  loathe
Communism. If only someone had tried to tap this reserve of hatred.

     In addition  to the  infantry  penal  battalions, which represented the
majority, there  were mine-clearing and air force penal units. The  function
of the mine-clearing  units is self-explanatory but  something  more must be
said about the air  force  penal companies. In addition to  their bomb-loads
and rockets the bombers and ground-attack aircraft carried cannon or machine
guns in  turrets for  defence  against  enemy fighters.  Why,  reasoned  our
glorious Communist leaders, should  honourable young  Communists, devoted to
the cause  of liberating the working-class, die in  our aircraft? Of course,
our pilots must be trustworthy  and dedicated (and there are hostages we can
use to ensure that they remain  so) but an air-gunner's duties could just as
well be carried  out  by someone  who is  an  enemy  of  socialism. And  why
shouldn't they be? He can't escape  and he  can't  avoid fighting, since his
own life depends on the outcome, By repelling enemy  fighters he is first of
all  preserving his  own  worthless  life,  but  he  is also  defending  the
aircraft, and with it the Communist cause.
     From May 1942 onwards, penal companies of air-gunners were attached  to
all the bomber and ground-attack units of the Red Army. They  were kept near
the airfields,  in stockades surrounded by  barbed  wire. Their training was
rapidly completed. They were simply taught  how to estimate the  distance of
an approaching enemy aircraft  and how to fire their cannon or machine-guns.
They were not given parachutes--they would not, in  any case, have known how
to use them. In  order that no rash ideas  should enter his  head  during  a
flight, the  newly-fledged gunner was firmly strapped to his seat--as if for
his own safety. The pilot in the IL-2 and IL-10 ground-attack  aircraft  was
protected  by armour-plating;  behind  him  with  his  back  to him, sat the
gunner, who was  protected only by  his 12.7mm machine gun. Members of penal
companies were also used as gunners on PE-2 and TU-2  dive-bombers and  also
on the PE-8 and other bombers.
     In order to arouse the  fighting spirit of these `flying convicts',  an
incentive  was devised--their  sentences were  reduced  by a  year  for each
operational flight. At that time  their standard sentence was ten years. Ten
flights and you'll be free!  This device worked, even though the gunners had
not volunteered for the job. Nevertheless,  the fighting spirit  among these
prisoners, who were really  under sentence of death, was considerably higher
than it was among their fellow-sufferers on the ground.
     Whoever thought of this idea was certainly no fool. In the  first place
not many  of  the gunners survived nine flights. Anyone who did manage to do
so was  never sent on a  tenth flight.  His companions were told that he had
been sent to another regiment, nearby, or released, whereas in fact the poor
devil had  been sent to serve for a year with a mine-clearing battalion. The
pretext  used  was a  standard  one--`your  nerves are in  a bad state.  The
medical officer won't allow you to fly any more.'
     The average  expectation of  life in a mine-clearing battalion  was, if
anything,  lower  than  that  in the  penal battalions which served with the
infantry.
     The death rate among the `flying convicts' remained exceptionally high.
This  did not  greatly  concern  anyone--this  was  their  inevitable  fate.
Unfortunately though, when an  air-gunner  was killed, his machine-gun would
slip from his hands and its barrel would drop lifelessly downwards. This was
a useful signal to the German fighters--the gunner in that aircraft has been
killed, so the aircraft is defenceless. Let's get it!
     The Soviet  command finally realised,  after questioning  a  number  of
German airmen who had been shot down, that,  as he died, the air gunner  was
involuntarily signalling to the enemy that his aircraft was undefended. What
could  be  done? You  could not  get two flying convicts into one cabin--and
what would be  the point, in any case, since the same  burst  of  fire might
kill both of them. Much thought  was given  to the problem. Then a brilliant
idea occurred to Marshal of the  Air Forces A. E. Golovanov, Stalin's former
personal pilot and bodyguard,  whose  job it had been to arrest marshals and
generals for his master  and  to conduct them to  Moscow.  He thought of the
idea  of fixing a spring to the breech of an aircraft's machine gun. Whether
the gunner was alive or  not, the barrel of the gun would now  keep pointing
upwards. For this  invention  Stalin rewarded this favourite of his with the
Order of Lenin.

     In peacetime the penal battalions are known as Independent Disciplinary
Battalions. Each commander  of a Military District is responsible for two or
three of them.  Commanders of Groups of  Forces  stationed outside  the USSR
also  have  battalions  of this  sort  under  their  command,  but they  are
stationed on Soviet territory.
     The  disciplinary battalions have been organised in precisely the  same
way as  the  wartime  penal battalions--administration, a  guard company and
three  penal  companies.  In  peacetime  the  officers  serving  with  these
battalions are paid  at  double rates--for each year of service they receive
two years' pay and two years towards their pension.
     The soldiers and sergeants on the permanent  staff of these  battalions
have  been  sent to them by military tribunals which have sentenced them  to
work there for  periods of between three months and two years. Time spent in
a disciplinary battalion does  not  count  as part  of a  soldier's military
service. In my division, on one  occasion,  two sergeants got  drunk the day
before they  were  to be demobilized  after two  years'  service.  In  their
drunken state they were  insufficiently respectful towards one  of the staff
officers. A tribunal sentenced each of them to lose his  rank  and to  serve
for two years with  a  disciplinary battalion. After two years they returned
to  the  division,  completed   their  remaining  day's  service  and   were
demobilized.
     Life in a Soviet disciplinary battalion today is a large subject, which
should  be discussed at length and separately. I will limit myself to saying
that  such a battalion  will break the strongest  of characters within three
months. I have never, during my entire service, met a soldier  who had spent
time in one who showed the slightest traces of disobedience or indiscipline.
It  is  a great day for  any commanding officer in the Soviet Army when  his
unit is re-joined  by someone whom everyone has forgotten  and whom very few
will recognise--a man  sent to  a disciplinary battalion  some time  ago for
insubordination, or indiscipline  or for some form of protest.  The officers
in the regiment and the division have mostly changed since  his day, as have
the  overwhelming  majority  of  sergeants and  other  ranks.  Suddenly,  he
appears--quiet, downtrodden, submissive. He  talks to no one and carries out
all  orders  or instructions uncomplainingly. It is impossible to get him to
say a single word about where he has been or what he has seen. His an<s>wers
are monosyllabic  and  expressionless--`Yes'  and  `No' seem  to be the only
words  left  in  his  vocabulary.  Then suddenly  one  of the longer-serving
soldiers   remembers--this   was  Kol'ka,  the  trouble-maker,  the  wit,  a
live-wire, forever  suggesting risky  escapades, who  sang  and  played  the
guitar and was adored by all the  local  girls.  Eighteen  months ago he was
sent to  a disciplinary  battalion for  some  trifling offence.  The younger
soldiers, gazing  at this silent, gloomy new  arrival, can only half-believe
what  they  hear. The regiment  quietens  down,  discipline  improves,  more
respect is shown to its officers.
     For minor offences a soldier does 3 to 15 days in the unit's guardroom.
Any soldier who spends  more than 45 days there in a  year  is automatically
sent to a disciplinary battalion. There he is reformed: after  he returns to
his unit he will never again commit  a  disciplinary  offence. He will never
want to sit behind bars again.
     Nevertheless, if  war with the  West should break  out, Soviet soldiers
would surrender  by the million. Disciplinary or penal battalions  would not
prevent this from happening. And the Politburo has no illusions about this.
--------


--------


     I arrived at divisional  headquarters  early in  the morning.  The duty
officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel, was welcoming. He had not slept all night and
he might  well  have  told me, peevishly,  to  go  to  hell.  As it was,  my
brand-new  lieutenant's shoulder-boards  seemed to strike  a  chord  in  his
memory, and he just smiled to himself and said, `Go out and take a walk  for
half an hour or so. It's still a bit early.'
     Half an hour later I returned to divisional  HQ  and was taken straight
to  the  office  of the  head  of  the  personnel department.  He,  too, was
pleasantly welcoming. He had been sent  my personal  file a  month  earlier.
After I had finished my training, I had taken my first leave  as an officer,
like all my companions from the military  training college, but  my file was
already  lying in front  of  this  personnel  officer, on that table, and at
night it had been put in that safe  over there.  Probably he knew me  better
than I knew myself. He took a long look at me and  then  asked one question,
which I had, of course, been expecting:
     `How about changing to First Specialisation?'
     Each  military trade is  referred to  by a number. Before the war there
were  about 150  of them. Nowadays  there are more than  1,000. But all-arms
commanders  are  all First  Specialisation men--and  they  are the  ones who
ensure that  all  the different  arms of  service  and  Armed  Services work
together  properly.  Those  who  command  motor-rifle  platoons,  companies,
battalions, regiments, divisions  and all-arms Armies,  Fronts and Strategic
Directions  are  all First Specialisation  officers.  The Supreme Commander,
too, has the  same background. I am a tank officer and I love tanks, but now
they are offering me an infantry job--one which is more difficult, but which
has better  prospects.  The  cushy jobs are  always  full,  but  there is  a
constant  and  acute shortage  of  officers  in the  infantry. Platoons  are
commanded  by sergeants, because there are  not  enough lieutenants.  In the
infantry, one's chances of promotion are very  good, but they are never able
to  find  enough people who  are  prepared to put up with the  hardships  of
infantry    life.    So    they    often    ask    officers    with    other
specialisations--officers  with  tank, anti-tank  and  mortar training--this
question.
     `I  am  in  no hurry.  You've got  time  to  think it  over--and  it is
something  you need  to think  about.'  Nevertheless, the  personnel officer
looks  at me expectantly. I do not usually  take long to make up my mind.  I
stand up and say, decisively, `I wish to transfer to First Specialisation.'
     He likes my reaction, perhaps not because he has succeeded so easily in
getting  me to  volunteer  for such  a  hellish job,  but simply because  he
respects a positive attitude.
     `Have you been able to have any breakfast yet?'--his tone alters.
     `Not yet.'
     `There's quite a good cafe opposite Divisional HQ. Why  don't  you look
in there?  Meet me there at  10  o'clock and I'll take you to the divisional
commander. I'll recommend you for a company straight away. I knew  you would
accept. In the divisional  tank regiment you  would only get  a  platoon and
you'd  have  to  do  three  years there  before  there was  any prospect  of
promotion.'

     The order appointing me commander of the 4th motor-rifle company of the
Guards motor-rifle  regiment was signed  at  10.03 hours. Already by 10.30 I
was   at   regimental   headquarters.  The   regimental   commander   looked
disapprovingly  at my  tank badges.  I could see him thinking--a  lot of you
crooks wangle yourselves jobs in the infantry to see what you can get out of
it.  He asked me some standard questions and then  told me I could take over
the company.
     The 4th Company had already been without  a commander for three months.
Instead of five officers it had only one, a lieutenant who was in command of
the  first platoon. He had  graduated from his military training college the
previous  year, had commanded a platoon for six  months and  had  been given
command of  the company. But then he had taken to  drinking  heavily and had
been returned to  his platoon. Equipment? The company had none. In the event
of mobilization a regiment would receive agricultural lorries to do the  job
of  armoured  personnel carriers, but in peacetime the  regimental commander
has  a  number of APCs at  his  disposal, and these are used for the  combat
training of individual companies and battalions.
     There were 58 NCOs and other ranks in the company,  instead of the full
complement  of 101--the division  was being kept below strength. Most of the
company   spoke   Russian.   Discipline   was   poor.   Demobilization   was
approaching--an  order would be coming  from the  Minister immediately after
the  inspection.  In anticipation  of this,  the oldest soldiers  had become
slack, putting pressure on the scum, not to  make them work  hard but to get
them to fetch vodka. There were  19 of these senior soldiers in the company.
Their  sergeants  found  them almost uncontrollable. The inspection  was  to
begin in four days' time.

     At a meeting that  evening the regimental commander presented me to his
hundred or so officers,  who  looked at  me without  particular  interest. I
clicked my heels and made a  bow.
     The  only  subject  discussed  at   the  meeting  was  the  forthcoming
inspection. `And just in case  the idea should occur  to anyone--there is to
be no cheating--better  the truth,  however unpleasant, than  some elaborate
cover-up. If I hear of any attempt to deceive the commission, to try to make
things look  better than they  are, the  officer concerned will lose his job
and  will  be  put under  immediate  arrest!' I  liked  this straightforward
approach. That was the proper way to do things. It was quite wrong  to sweep
things  under  the  carpet. The  other  officers nodded  in  agreement.  The
regimental commander finished his  address  and looked towards his  chief of
staff,  who smiled jocularly.  `Company  commanders 20  rubles  each, deputy
battalion commanders 25, battalion commanders 30 and the rest know what they
should give. Give your donation to the finance officer.  I want to emphasise
once  again,  that  this  is  entirely voluntary.  It's  just  a  matter  of
hospitality.'  The  pile  of  money  in  front  of the finance officer  grew
steadily. I did not ask why we were handing over this money. The Soviet Army
has not only  got more divisions and tanks, more soldiers and generals, than
any other army  in the  world. It also has  more pigs. Under  the  Socialist
system of  equitable distribution,  more  is collected  from the industrious
than from the idle and the peasants are given no incentive to work hard: any
surplus they produce is  just taken away from  them.  This  means  that  the
agricultural sector is  unable to supply enough food for either the  army or
the  defence industries. Because of this, each regiment has to keep pigs. No
money is allocated for this purpose. The pigs are fed on left-overs from the
kitchens. There are thousands of regiments  in the Soviet Army: each of them
has a hundred pigs. How could any army on earth have so many pigs?
     In theory, the pigs are  kept so that the diet of  the soldiers can  be
improved.  In practice they are  all destined to feed the  commissions which
come  to  inspect the  regiment.  Some  of their meat is made into excellent
chops,  gammon steaks and so forth. The remainder  is sold, and the proceeds
are used to buy  caviare, fish, ham and other delicacies, all of which, with
the meat, is for consumption  by  the commissions. And their vodka is bought
with  money  from  regimental funds, together with the `voluntary' donations
provided by the officers.

     Commissions  are  made  up  of  staff   officers  from  other  military
districts.  For  instance,  this year,  officers  from the  Baltic  Military
District may inspect the divisions in the Far Eastern and Turkestan Military
Districts,  while  others  from  the Sub-Carpathian  Military  District will
inspect those in the Moscow, Volga and Baltic Military Districts.
     Staff officers are idealists, theoreticians who are  remote  from  real
life. They have  forgotten, or perhaps  have  never known, the cost of human
sweat.  They  expect  soldiers  to be  able  to  answer  questions about the
principles of modern  warfare, forgetting that some of them have  never even
heard the Russian language until they entered the army. They expect soldiers
to  be able to do fifty press-ups, unconcerned  that some of them  come from
families that have  suffered for generations  from  undernourishment. It may
have taken  me two years to teach someone from this sort of background to do
ten press-ups and  both he and I may be proud of  what we have achieved. But
this would not satisfy a staff  officer. Staff officers are  used  to moving
armies across maps, like pawns  on  a chessboard, forgetting that  a soldier
may  disobey an order,  he  may  suddenly  go  mad,  he  may  rebel  against
authority, oppose  his superiors, or perhaps, driven to  desperation, he may
kill his  unit commander. Do staff officers realise this? Like hell they do.
And this is why they have to be entertained over and over again.  A glass of
vodka and another  and another? A  little pork? Some  caviare? A helping  of
mushrooms and a little more vodka?
     However, as I handed over my  money for the vodka, it  did not occur to
me  that a  regimental commander needs to  create  a  general  atmosphere of
friendliness and hospitality for the commission, I  forgot about  the bitter
competition   between   company  and  battalion   commanders,  I  completely
overlooked the fact that the commission is not allowed to give everyone good
marks and that, if one  company  succeeds by its welcome  and hospitality in
achieving  an  `Excellent' rating, another will have  to suffer, because the
commission is compelled to mark someone `Unsatisfactory'.
     I assumed that the  regimental commander's  warning against fraudulence
was sincere. It did not occur to me that, if what was really going on became
known, the  commander himself would be dismissed immediately.  At  the  same
time, he  could hardly  advocate the use of deceit--he could be thrown  into
gaol for that. So what else could he have said?
     Anyway the inspection began. I presented the company exactly as it was.
But, all around us, miracles  were being performed. The results  achieved by
the  other  companies  were  quite  astonishing.  In the  5th  Company,  for
instance, they  tested  the drivers  of  armoured  personnel  carriers.  The
latter's knowledge  of their vehicles was entirely  theoretical. Yet all ten
drivers were given `excellent' gradings for their performance in driving  an
APC over rough ground.  It was only  several  months later that I discovered
that the company  commander had used  up all  the petrol allocated to him in
training just  two, not  ten, of  his drivers. During the test,  the drivers
took their  places one after another in the APC and each  one, as he got in,
would  close the hatch. Then  one of the two experts who was  already in the
vehicle, would take the wheel and race the vehicle round the course.
     All the soldiers in the 1st Company  were graded  `excellent' for their
shooting. Their performance seemed too good  to be  true, but the members of
the  commission, who were quite sober  at  the time, had examined the target
after  each soldier had  fired his rounds and  had  marked every bullet-hole
with paint. Quite by chance, I  discovered that the best shot in the company
had been lying in some nearby bushes with  a  sniper's rifle, fitted  with a
silencer. He had helped his comrades out. Everyone  was doing much  the same
sort  of  thing. Then  there was  the  boozing.  First  the  commission  was
entertained  at  regimental  level  and  then came  the turns of  individual
battalions and companies. No preparation at all had been made in my company.
As  a result, the marks which we were awarded turned out to be catastrophic.
Each time I paraded the men after the inspection I would hear someone behind
me mutter angrily, through his  clenched teeth, `Scum!' He was,  of  course,
addressing me.
     Each  officer  is  responsible for the unit under his  command from the
very moment he takes it over.  He is answerable  for  everything, even if he
has only arrived four days--or three hours--earlier.
     My company got the worst marks in the whole regiment. It did not matter
that the next worst did not get  many more--a wide rift  appeared between us
and all the other companies. The  officers laughed at me, openly, and on the
doors of the  company's barrack-room  there appeared the inscription  `SUC =
Suvorov's Uncontrolled Company'.
     I reacted  to all  this mockery with  a  cheerful smile. Meanwhile, the
companies which had taken between third and eighth  places in the inspection
were being put through `training' sessions by their officers. Ostensibly  in
order to correct the mistakes for which they had been marked down, they were
taken off  into open country and punished  in the most brutal fashion, being
made  to  run  in  gas  masks  and rubber  protective  clothing  until  they
collapsed,  unconscious. My company waited, mutely, for me to do the same. I
did not delay.  I  drew up  a training programme and had it approved  by the
regimental staff.  I asked  for  the use of five armoured personnel carriers
and  for the help of a tank platoon, since my company had told  me that they
had had  no instruction in working with tanks in action. Besides the tanks I
applied for three blank rounds for the tanks' guns.
     I  took  my  company  out  to a training area and carried out  ordinary
training exercises with  them. I  explained anything they did not understand
and then put  them through their paces, but did not punish them  in any way.
Next I paraded  them  and called the oldest  group of soldiers forward. `You
have done your duty honourably,' I  said to them,  `and you  have followed a
hard  road. Today you have come to its end. Your last day of training in the
Soviet Army is over. I  thank you for all you have done. I cannot reward you
in any way. Instead, allow me to shake you by the hand.'
     I went up  to each man and shook  him firmly by  the hand. Next I  went
back to the centre of the parade and bowed stiffly to them--something which,
according to the  regulations, should only be done  in front  of a  group of
officers. Then, at my signal, the three  tanks suddenly shattered the  quiet
of the autumn  woods by firing the blank rounds, one  after the other.  This
was so unexpected that it made the young soldiers flinch.
     `The  Army salutes you. Thank you.' I turned to  the sergeant-major and
told him to march the company back to the barracks.
     Some days after  this, late  one evening, dozens  of  rockets  suddenly
soared skywards over the camp, thunderflashes and practice grenades exploded
and bonfires were lit.  The demobilization order, signed by  the Minister of
Defence, had arrived. It had  been  expected for  some days  but  it  always
arrives without warning. As soon as they hear about it, those who are  to be
demobilized treat themselves to a firework  display. For several days before
the order every regiment has a  team searching  for illegally  held rockets,
training grenades and anything which could be used for  a bonfire. They find
and  confiscate  a lot but they cannot discover everything, for each soldier
has been carefully gathering and hiding  materials which he can  use for the
`ceremonial salute'.
     At the moment when the sky was suddenly lit up by blazing bonfires  we,
the officers, were in the middle of a Party meeting.
     `Go  and stop  that!'  the regimental  commander  snapped.  The company
commanders leapt to  their  feet  and  ran  off to stop the  row which their
unruly charges were making.
     The  only  people  left  in the room  were  the regimental  doctor, the
finance officer, some technical and staff officers who had no soldiers under
their direct command,  and  me. I stood quietly watching what  was  going on
outside the window. The regimental commander looked at me in astonishment.
     `The 4th Company are  not involved,' I said, in  answer to his unspoken
question.
     `Is that  so?' he  said, with some  surprise and sent  one of the other
officers to check my claim.
     It was  indeed true that  nothing was happening  in the 4th Company. My
tank salute had  been  a great deal more impressive than a  few  rockets and
thunderflashes. The  appreciation which I had shown had flattered the senior
soldiers  and  had  given   them  prestige   and   self-respect.  While  the
barrack-rooms  of all  the other companies were being  searched for anything
which could be detonated or  burned, they came to me to  hand over a kit-bag
full of odds and  ends which they had collected and promised that they would
not take part in the celebrations.
     When  the  meeting was  resumed,  the  regimental commander rebuked the
other company commanders  for their failure to prevent the outburst. Then he
asked me to stand up and he commended me for the way I controlled my men and
made them behave as  I wanted. It was never his way to ask officers how they
achieved results. However, his chief of staff could not restrain himself and
he  asked  me  to  tell them how I had handled  the senior  soldiers  in  my
company, so that everyone could learn from my example.
     `Comrade  Lieutenant-Colonel--I gave my orders  and they  were obeyed.'
From the outburst of good-natured laughter with  which  this  was greeted, I
knew that I had been accepted as an equal by the regiment's officers.

     A Soviet officer is someone who has no rights whatsoever.
     In  theory, he  knows,  he must  encourage  those who are diligent  and
careful; he must punish the idle and the undisciplined. But the dictatorship
of  the  proletariat  has  produced  a  state  in  which  authority  is  too
centralised to permit him to use either a stick  or a carrot.  He is allowed
neither. He is not entitled either to punish or to reward.
     On Sundays, the commander of a  sub-unit is allowed to send 10%  of his
NCOs and soldiers into town during daylight  hours. This  might seem to be a
way of encouraging those  who deserve it.  In fact, however, although he may
make a soldier  a present of eight hours in this way, he cannot be sure that
his battalion or regimental  commander will not overrule him by stopping all
leave.   Besides,   platoon   and  company  commanders  themselves  are  not
enthusiastic about letting soldiers out of camp. If a  soldier is checked by
a patrol in the town and  they find the  slightest thing  wrong, the officer
who  allowed  the soldier  to  leave  his  barracks is  held  responsible. A
commander, therefore, prefers  to send soldiers off for the day in  a group,
under the eye of the political officer. This is the only way in which Soviet
soldiers  are  allowed to go into  a  town in Eastern Europe  and it is very
frequently used in the Soviet Union, too. Since a  Soviet soldier  does  not
like being part of a convoy, he just does not bother to leave camp.
     A company commander may hold a soldier under arrest for three days, but
a  platoon commander is not allowed to do so. However, by giving the company
commander this right, the Soviet authorities  have  him by the throat;  when
the  state  of  discipline  in  a  unit is  being  assessed,  the  number of
punishments is taken into account. For instance, arrests might average 15 in
one company each month, but 45 in another.  Clearly, say the powers that be,
the first company  must be the better one. Three  soldiers might be punished
in the  first  company  and  ten  in  the  second. Again, this  is  a  clear
indication that  the first company is in better shape. This  attitude on the
part  of  the  authorities forces  unit commanders  to  hush  up  or  ignore
disciplinary offences and even  crimes,  in order  not to  drop behind their
competitors. As a soldier comes to understand the system, he begins to break
the rules more and more frequently and ingeniously,  confident  that he will
not  be  punished.  Many attempts  have  been made  to  establish  different
criteria  for assessing the state of discipline,  but  nothing  has come  of
them. So long as the present system lasts, a  commander  will  avoid handing
out punishments, even when they are really called for.
     Deprived  of  the right to  punish or  reward,  an officer devises  and
imposes his own system. Thus,  in one  company, the soldiers will know that,
if anything goes wrong, their night exercises will always be held when it is
raining and will  drag on for  a long  time. In another, they will know that
they will have to spend a lot of time digging trenches in rocky ground.
     Every  commander gradually  refines his  system  and he may  eventually
manage to avoid arrests and officially recognised punishments completely: he
comes to be obeyed, without having to resort to them.

     As well  as denying  the officer any  legal method  of controlling  his
charges,  the  system  also  forces  him  to  develop  his  own  methods  of
instructing them. Nor is he given any proper guidance  in  ways  of ensuring
the  obedience of the men for whom  he is responsible.  Those who understand
how to  exercise power in  the USSR  guard  their knowledge  jealously: they
certainly  do not write textbooks on  the  subject. This is done for them by
professors, who have  never  set eyes on  a soldier  in  their  lives. These
professors have  no power themselves--they may understand how it is acquired
and retained, but their knowledge is entirely theoretical.
     Nor will a young officer's colleagues  pass on  their experience on  to
him, for it has cost  them too much to be handed out free. Anything which he
learns  at  his military  training  college  about  relationships  with  his
subordinates  is  the  product  of a  professor's  imagination and is of  no
practical value.
     Once he graduates from his training college, the young officer suddenly
finds  himself in the  position of a lion-tamer  in  a cage of lions, except
that he knows no more about lions  than that they belong to the cat  family.
Thereafter, the  system of natural selection  comes  into  operation--if you
understand how to control your troops you will be accepted by the system; if
not you will be relegated to the humblest of roles.
     You learn the techniques of control from your own mistakes--and, unless
you  are a fool, from the mistakes of others. For there will be mistakes  in
plenty to be seen everywhere around you.
     As an example, for several years the commander of the  guard company of
the  5th  Army Staff punished  any form  of disobedience without mercy.  His
company  was considered one  of  the best in  the  whole, huge  Far  Eastern
Military District. His excellent record was noted and he was nominated for a
place at  an Academy, which would enable  him  to develop  and to get ahead.
With only a month left in command of the company, he found it  impossible to
retain  his tight  hold--his thoughts  were centring more  and  more  on the
Academy. He changed  his  way of exercising command. One evening  he invited
all his sergeants to his office and gave them a tremendous  party. The night
turned out to be  an unpleasant one for him--the sergeants, having had a lot
to drink, nailed him to his office  floor. The unfortunate man obviously had
a poor knowledge of  history;  he had  not  grasped the  simple fact that  a
revolution does not occur during a period  of terror, but at the moment when
that terror  is suddenly  relaxed. Historically, the examples  of the French
Revolution and of the  Hungarian uprising in 1956 illustrate this principle;
it will continue to operate.
     A tough  commander may  take  a disobedient  soldier into  the  company
office and  beat him unmercifully.  The  soldier writhes  on the floor for a
while but then he gets to his feet,  seizes  a lamp from the table and hurls
it in the  officer's face.  The  soldier  will  be court-martialled  but the
officer will never  again be able to  control his company; the soldiers will
laugh at him behind his back.
     A young officer in front of his soldiers says to them, `If you get good
marks at the inspection I promise you  I'll...'  As an outside observer, you
will see scepticism on the faces of the soldiers. You realise that the young
Lieutenant is revealing one of his  weaknesses,  his desire to succeed.  You
can't always be kind to everyone, Lieutenant, and henceforth anyone whom you
treat roughly  will use this weakness against you. Everyone has a failing of
some sort, but why let others realise it? They may prove to be  anything but
sympathetic. Just look at this scene and always  try  to remember the golden
rule of controlling others--NEVER PROMISE ANYONE ANYTHING!
     If you are able  to do  something  for another  person--do it,  without
having made any promises. From this first rule there follows a second--NEVER
THREATEN ANYONE!
     You can punish someone and, if you consider it necessary, you should do
so. But promises and threats simply weaken your authority as a commander.
     After some time you will come to understand the most important rules of
all, one which you have never been taught--RESPECT YOUR SOLDIERS.
     If a commander is invited by his soldiers to sit at their table, and if
he accepts with the gratitude with which  he would accept an invitation from
his colonel, he is  never likely to suffer  at  their  hands. He can be sure
that these soldiers will defend him in battle, even if it  should cost  them
their lives. If a commander has learned to respect his soldiers (which means
more than just showing them  respect),  he will suddenly realise,  with some
surprise, that he no longer needs informers  in  their  ranks.  His men will
come forward of their own accord, tell him what  is going on and ask for his
help or protection.
     A commander who respects a soldier  can ask  anything of him and can be
confident that the soldier will carry out all his  requests without pressure
of any sort.
--------


     The  regimental parade  takes place  every  day  at 0800 hours. All the
officers  of  the  regiment  must  attend. Some of them  will  already  have
supervised reveille and morning PT, so they will have had to have arrived at
the barracks before 0600. If it takes them an hour to get to  the unit, they
will  have had to get  up  very  early  indeed.  From 0800 to 1500 hours all
officers take  part  in  the  training  programmes.  If you  are  a  platoon
commander you work with your platoon.  If you  are a company commander,  you
may work  with  your company sergeants or with  one of the platoons--perhaps
one of the platoon commanders is on leave,  or  perhaps you  have no platoon
commanders  in  your  company.  Battalion  commanders,  their  deputies  and
battalion  chiefs  of  staff,  either  work  with  platoons  which  have  no
commanders or check the  training being  carried  out  by platoon or company
commanders. Checking  training  is a  good  deal easier  than  being checked
yourself.
     Officers have lunch  between 1500  and 1600 hours. From  1600 until the
late evening they are involved in  officers' meetings or Party meetings,  or
they  attend Komsomol meetings held  in  platoons,  companies or battalions.
During this  period,  after  their  lunch, officers also  receive  their own
training--they pore over secret orders, they are shown classified films, and
so forth. Meanwhile, the cleaning  of weapons and combat equipment  is being
carried out in sub-units and, although  this is supervised by sergeants, the
officers are  responsible  for  the  condition of  the  equipment,  and they
therefore need to  take  a few minutes to keep  an eye  on what is going on.
Finally, the officer will  have to give seven hours of  instruction next day
and  he must  prepare  for this.  The colonel  comes  over  from  divisional
headquarters to see what preparations  we are making.  He  states  that  the
preparation for a  two-hour training  period must include a trip out to  the
training area, the selection of a good spot for the work which is to be done
there  and briefing for the sergeants  on  the way  the training  is  to  be
carried out. Thereafter,  sub-unit  commanders are to return to the camp and
to   work   with   their   sergeants,  studying   manuals,  regulations  and
recommendations. Next, they are to draw up plans listing the exercises which
are  to be carried out, to  have these approved by their immediate superiors
and  targets,  simulators,  combat  to  prepare  everything  which  will  be
needed--equipment, etc.
     From what the  colonel  says,  it appears that  the preparations  for a
two-hour  exercise should take at least five hours. We express agreement, of
course, but to ourselves  we think, `You  can get stuffed,  Colonel.  I give
seven  hours' instruction a  day. If I prepare  for it  in the  way you  are
suggesting, I shan't even  have time  to  go to  the  lavatory. No, my  dear
Colonel,  I'm not going  to spend five  hours  preparing this exercise. I'll
spend five minutes.'  As quickly as I can,  I  write  out the  plan for  the
exercise and  explain  to my  deputy how he must  prepare for it. Everything
will sort itself out  tomorrow. If time is really pressing, during the Party
meeting I get  hold  of  the  plans I prepared for last  year's exercise and
carefully alter the date. That means we can use last year's plan over again.
     In the  late evening comes the second regimental  parade  and  by  2200
hours the officers who are not involved in night exercises have finished for
the day.
     What  shall I do now? I am  unmarried, of course. Anyone idiotic enough
to get married while he is a lieutenant soon regrets it bitterly. He and his
wife never  see  each other. The  regiment  has no married accommodation for
junior officers  and the relationship  is doomed to  failure.  Any  sort  of
private life is severely discouraged under Socialism, as a potential  source
of discontent and disunity. The  resources  available to the  Armed Services
are used to build  tanks, not to put up  married quarters for lieutenants. I
realised this a long time ago and this was why I have not got married.
     So, what shall I do with my spare time? The library is  already closed,
of course, and  so  is  the  cinema. I have  no  interest  in  going to  the
gymnasium--I  have been rushing about so  much  today  that  I  feel utterly
exhausted.  I'll just go back to the officers' quarters, where all the young
bachelors  live. There is a television set there but I already know that the
whole of today's  programme  is  about Lenin.  Yesterday  it  was  about the
dangers of abortion  and the  excellence of the harvest, tomorrow it will be
about Brezhnev and the harvest or Ustinov and abortion.
     As I enter the living room,  I  am greeted with delighted cries. Around
the table sit fifteen or so officers. They  have just begun a game of  cards
and thick clouds of cigarette smoke  hang over them already. I got no  sleep
last night so I decide to play just one round and then go to bed. A place is
made for me at the table  and a  large glass of vodka put down  beside me. I
drink it, smiling  at my  companions, and push  a large sum of money over to
the bank. Here we go.
     Some time after  one  o'clock, officers returning  from night exercises
burst noisily into the room, dirty, wet and worn out. They are  found places
at the  table and  someone brings them glasses of vodka. They  got no  sleep
last night and decide to go to bed after just one round.
     I  lose money fast. This  is a good  sign--unlucky  at cards, lucky  in
love. I assure the sceptics around me that losing is really  a  sign of good
fortune.
     Three hours  later,  the commander of  a neighbouring company  appears,
having just inspected  the night guard.  He is greeted with delighted cries.
Someone produces a full glass of vodka for him. We have  already got through
a good deal and we  have begun to drink only half a glass at a time. The new
arrival got no sleep last night, so he decides to leave after one round. The
money  flows  quickly from  his  pockets--this  is not  a bad sign. At least
anyone  who  loses  money is  not hiding it in his pockets. By tradition the
loser buys drinks for everyone else. He  does so. We decide to play one more
round. A  good sign... we've drunk all that... someone is  coming... they're
pouring out more drinks... another round... a good sign...
     At  six  o'clock  the  clear  notes of  a  bugle  float  out  over  the
regiment--reveille for the  soldiers. When we  hear it we all get up,  throw
our cards on the table and go off to bed.
     At 0700 hours  a soldier, designated by me as the  best in my  company,
has to wake me up. This is no easy task, but he manages it.  I sit on my bed
and gaze at the portrait of Lenin which hangs on the  wall.  What would  our
great Teacher and Leader say if he could see me in this state, my face puffy
with  drink and  lack  of sleep?  My  boots have been carefully  cleaned, my
trousers pressed.  This is not part  of the soldier's duties, but  evidently
the senior soldiers have given him  orders  of their own. They must like me,
after all!
     The doors and windows swim before my eyes. Here comes the door floating
past. It is essential not to miss this and to choose the right moment to run
through  it,  as it  passes.  Someone  helpfully  pushes  me  in  the  right
direction. Along the corridor there are ten doors and they are all  swimming
past me. I must find the right one. Somehow I manage it and I step under the
freezing,  searingly  cold shower. Then comes breakfast and  by  0800 hours,
glowing and rejuvenated, I am present at  the regimental parade, in front of
my Guards company. Hell, I've forgotten my map case, which has got the day's
programme in it! But  some one helpfully  hangs it over my  shoulder and the
working day begins.

     The  Communist  Party  hopes  that  an  unconquerable  soldier  can  be
produced--one who is more  dedicated to  Leninism than Lenin himself, who is
an athlete of Olympic standards, who knows his tank, his gun or his armoured
personnel carrier at least as well as its designer. But, for whatever reason
this is not how things  work out,  so the Party comrades call for a detailed
training programme for soldiers and NCOs to  be prepared.  This is presented
to the Central Committee, but it does not produce better soldiers.  Clearly,
the junior commanders are not fulfilling their norms. Check up on them!
     And check on us they do, each day and every day.  Everything is checked
and  tested--by the staffs of the battalions, regiments. Armies and Military
Districts, by the General Staff and  by  a whole mass of committees which it
has set up,  by the  Inspectorate of the Soviet Army, by the  Directorate of
Combat Training of the Soviet Army, by  similar directorates within Military
Districts, Armies and divisions and by the Strategic Camouflage Directorate.
In  addition, tank crews  are  checked  and tested by their own  commanders,
artillery personnel by theirs and so on. The first  question any  commanding
officer is asked is--have you had experience  of working with  the infantry?
If he has, he is sent off to test them, and then they come back  to test his
sub-unit.
     Hardly a day passes without two or three checks. Every commission which
arrives to carry out a check has its own pet  subject. Can your men get into
an APC in ten seconds and out again in the same time? Of course  they can't,
I reply.
     That's bad, Lieutenant. Haven't you studied the plan? We'll make a note
of that. Cursing, I take the one APC I have been allocated off to a clearing
in the woods  and make my  first platoon climb  in and out  of  it again and
again as the plan requires. But soon another commission appears and wants to
know whether  my  men  can reach  the  standards  laid down  for  high-speed
crosscountry  driving across  broken terrain.  No, I  say, they can't. Well,
Lieutenant,  that's  very  bad.  The assessors  record  this  unsatisfactory
finding  and order me to begin training my  drivers  immediately,  using the
APC.  I salute and recall the  platoon which has  been practising getting in
and out  of the APC, but I don't send the vehicle for driver-training.  I'll
keep the damned thing here with me, I decide. A new  commission appears  and
asks their pet  questions.  How  is your  platoon  getting  on  with  firing
automatic  weapons from an APC? Not too well, I reply, but we are practising
day  and night. Here is the  APC,  there is  the platoon  and  those are the
machine-gun crews. The members of the commission smile and move on.
     Two failures in  one day. But no one is  interested  in the fact that I
haven't got  enough  APCs. Even  if  I had,  fuel would  be  short  or there
wouldn't be enough grenades or grenade launchers.
     Two failures in one day--two failures  to reach the norms prescribed in
the  programme  for the training  of NCOs  and other ranks  which  has  been
approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party!
     I get back to  my quarters late  that evening,  wet, dirty,  tired  and
angry. I have  had to do  two night  exercises, with two different platoons,
straight  off--two more  teams  have checked  our performance and we've been
awarded two more bad marks.
     People make a  place  for  me. Someone gives me a tumbler of vodka  and
tries to cheer me up--don't take it too seriously! I drink the vodka, but it
is some time before it takes effect. So I have another. Now I'll  play  just
one round of cards. But  my  anger does not  evaporate. They pour me another
drink. Another  round of  cards. A sure sign...  Someone bursts  through the
door...  they pour him a drink... they pour me a drink... another round... a
good sign... At 0600 hours the bugle rouses us from  the table. On  it there
are piles of cigarette ends, underneath it is a heap of bottles.

     Gradually one gets  used to checks and tests. One finds ways of dealing
with the searching questions. I come gradually to the  conclusion that it is
quite impossible for  me to meet the  requirements of the training plan--for
me or for anyone  else. Its demands are too high and the training facilities
are  quite inadequate. Besides, the plan  robs an officer of any initiative.
I'm not allowed to give the company physical training if the plan shows that
this  is the  period for  technical training.  During  technical training  I
cannot show them how to replace the engine of a vehicle if, according to the
plan, I should be teaching them its working principles. But I can't  explain
an engine's working principles because the soldiers don't understand Russian
sufficiently  well, so I  am unable  to do either one  thing  or  the other.
Meanwhile, the commissions keep arriving. In the evenings my friends tell me
not  to get upset.  I do the same whenever I see  signs  that one of them is
approaching breaking point. I hurry over and pour him  a  drink. I  sit  him
next to me at table  and thrust cards into his hand. Here, have a cigarette.
Don't take it so hard...
     After a few more months,  I realise  that it is essential for me to  go
through the  motions of meeting the  plan's  requirements. However, I do not
give all the drivers a chance  at the wheel: instead I allow two or three of
the best of them to use all the driving time which we are allocated. All the
anti-tank rockets which we receive go to the three who perform best with the
launchers; the other six will have to get by with theoretical training.
     When  a commission arrives, I  tell them confidently that we are making
progress  in  the  right  direction.  Look  at  those drivers--they  are  my
record-breakers--the  champions  of  the company! The rest  are coming along
quite well, but they are  still young and  inexperienced. Still, we know how
to  bring them on. The commission  is happy  with  this.  And those  are the
rocket launchers. They could  hit an  apple with their anti-tank rockets (if
you'd care to stand your son over there with an apple on his head). They are
crack shots, the  stars of our team! We'll soon  have the others up to their
standard, too. And these are  our machine-gunners--three of them  are  quite
superb! And this man is a marksman! And that  section can get into an APC in
seven  seconds  flat--which  is  faster  than the  official  record for  the
Military  District!  How can the commission know that jumping into an APC is
all  that the section ever does, and that  they have never been taught to do
anything else?
     People begin to notice  me.  They  praise me. Then I am promoted to the
staff. Now I walk  about with a notebook, drawling comments--

NOT

  very good!
Have you not studied the  Plan which  the Party has approved? Occasionally I
say--Not  

TOO

  bad. I  know perfectly  well that  what I  am seeing has been
faked, that  this is  a handpicked  team--and  I also know the cost at which
such results are achieved. But still I say Not 

TOO

  bad. Then  I move off to
the officers mess so that they can ply me with food and drink.
     The  difference  between the work of  a  staff  officer and  that of  a
sub-unit commander is that on the staff you have no responsibility. You also
get a  chance to drink but don't have  to drink too much. All you do is walk
about giving some people good marks and others bad ones. And you eat  better
as a staff  officer. Those  pigs are meant  for visiting  commissions, after
all--in other words, for us staff officers.
--------


     The triangle  of  power represented  by the Party, Army and KGB  brings
pressure to bear on every officer and, what is more, it does so with each of
its  corners  simultaneously.  I am  conscious  of  three  separate  weights
pressing down on  me at the same  time; the forces they  exert are different
and  push in  different directions. To accept the pressure  of  all three at
once is impossible and if you are not careful you  can find yourself  caught
and crushed between two of them.
     To  me, as  a  platoon or  company commander, the power of  the Army is
personified by  my battalion  commander,  by the commander of my regiment or
division, by the Commander of the Army or Military District in  which I find
myself,  by the  Minister  of Defence and by  the  Supreme  Commander. As  I
advance in my career as an officer,  there will always be  enough gradations
of authority above me for me to feel the weight  of some superior's boots on
my shoulders.
     The Party, too, keeps an eye on each officer, NCO and other rank. Every
company  commander has a deputy who heads the political section. This deputy
has equivalents at battalion and regimental level and each successive higher
level. A political officer is not really an officer at all. He wears uniform
and has  stars on his shoulders, but the extent of his success or failure is
not dependent upon the judgements of military commanders. He is a man of the
Party. The Party appointed  him to his post and can promote and dismiss him:
he is accountable only to it. The  company `politrabochiy', as he is  known,
is  subordinated to the battalion `politrabochiy' who is himself  answerable
to his regimental  equivalent  and so forth, right up to the Chief Political
Directorate  itself. This Directorate is in some  senses a part of the Armed
Services; at the same time, however, it is  a full Department of the Central
Committee of the Party.
     The KGB,  too,  is active in  every regiment. That inconspicuous senior
lieutenant over there, the one whom our colonel has just acknowledged with a
bow, represents  a special department, and he controls a secret KGB network,
which is at work in our regiment and also in its immediate surroundings.

     The three  forces push me  in different directions, threatening to tear
me apart.  To manoeuvre  between  them is very  difficult. Each of the three
tries  incessantly to control my very thoughts and to  exclude the influence
of its rivals.
     The army is  glad  that  I am a  bachelor. It  would be  ideal  if  all
officers  were a  species  of crusading  monks, content to live in a citadel
which  we  would  never  leave, unless the State  required  us to do so. The
divisional  commander  calls  one  of  my  platoon  commanders  forward  and
addresses him clearly  and distinctly, so  that everyone can hear. `I made a
vow that I  would  defend our Motherland. Therefore I will defend you and  I
expect you  to do the  same for me. But I made no such vow to your wife, and
so I cannot allow you to spend the night at home. You are an officer and you
must be operationally available at  any moment. Telephone your wife and tell
her  that,  although she has not  seen  you  for  two months, she should not
expect to do so  for as long again.  You  can add that  the situation in the
Navy is even worse than in the Army!'
     However, my situation does not please  the Party at all. The  political
officer summons  me and we have a  long talk. `The  country's  birth-rate is
catastrophically low. Even under the Mongols our population remained stable,
but that  is  not  the  case today,  under  Communism.  Viktor,  you  are  a
Communist. You should fulfil your duty to the Party.' I nod in agreement and
ask, naively,  `But will you find me accommodation?  Will I be allowed leave
overnight,  even once a  month?' The political officer bangs his fist on the
table.  He  explains that a true  Communist must do  his duty  to the Party,
whether he has  accommodation and free time or  not. `All right,  I'll think
about it,' I say. `Yes,  think  about it--and soon,' he calls after me. This
puts me  in a  tricky situation. If some  local prostitute  now goes  to the
political officer and reports that I have  spent the night with her, they'll
make me marry her straight away. That is the policy of the Party. And I am a
member of the Party.  If  I  had not  joined the  Party, it  would not  have
allowed me  to become  a company commander. On the other hand, having joined
the Party, I must be guided by its wise policies.
     The KGB, too, keeps a close eye  on me. In every company there are sure
to be  half  a dozen  informers. And who is the  first  person on  whom they
report? The company  commander, of  course, although they also report on the
man who is trying to  penetrate my very soul, the political officer.  So the
Chekist runs into me, apparently by chance. `Drop in and we'll have a chat.'
When I do  so, he, too, encourages me to marry. The KGB, too, is keen to get
every officer married. They won't give me  accommodation or time  off either
but they will put pressure on me.
     The KGB likes to have  a spy in  each officer's home. If I do something
wrong and my wife falls out with  me, she will keep the Chekist informed  of
my interests and my contacts.

     The  Army  would prefer me  not  to  drink at all. The  Party  does not
express itself clearly on the  subject. From  one point  of view alcohol  is
obviously highly  undesirable,  but  against this, they  reason, what  am  I
likely to begin thinking about if my head is not spinning  with the accursed
stuff? The KGB simply avoids expressing any opinion, but whenever I meet the
Chekist he always offers me something to drink. If I don't drink anything at
all, I am unlikely  to unburden myself to  him. And, if I don't drink myself
into  a stupor  each evening, how  can he hope to  hear  about my  innermost
thoughts?
     The Army totally  disapproves of alcohol.  And yet the regimental  shop
sells  shoe-polish, toothpaste, vodka--a  great deal of  vodka--and  nothing
else at all. Evidently, the  Army's position is dictated by pressure exerted
by the  Party and the  KGB,  neither  of which ever  clearly states its  own
points of view.

     There has been more fighting--a new war in the Middle East. Once again,
our `brothers' have somehow suffered defeat. The Army requires me to explain
to  my  soldiers the  tactical errors which have  led  to this.  I  do so. I
describe  to   them   how  a  ,   determined  country   wages  war.  No
propaganda--heaven forbid! I simply describe the operations conducted by the
two sides  calmly  and dispassionately,  as if the war  had been a  game  of
chess.
     Soon I  find myself summoned  to the political  officer and then by the
special department, too. So, no, this year I shan't be going to the Academy.
If either  the Party or the KGB are displeased with me, it is not worth  the
Army's while to stick up for  me. My superiors are only human and they don't
want  to pick a fight with two such powerful forces just about me. There are
plenty  of other young officers  in the Army this year  who are eligible for
the Academy in every respect.
--------


     The great ideals  of Socialism are  simple  and  can be  understood  by
anyone.
     Society is built upon reasonable principles. Unemployment is a thing of
the past.  Medical services  are free. Food,  in  reasonable quantities,  is
free, too. Every person  has  a  separate room, with light  and ventilation.
Water, drainage and  heating are free. Everyone  has the right to some  free
time. There are no rich or poor. Everyone has comfortable, durable clothing,
appropriate to the time of  year--and  this is,  of  course,  provided free.
Everyone is equal before the law.
     You may say that this is nothing but a beautiful dream, that no one has
ever succeeded  in building pure socialism. Nonsense. In every country there
are already islands of pure, untainted Socialism, in which each one of these
requirements are met.
     Is there a prison in your town? If  so, go and  take a look  at it--you
will find yourself  in  a society in which everyone is fed, and everyone has
work, in which clothing, accommodation and heating are all provided free.
     Soviet Communists  are frequently  reproached for having  attempted  to
build  a socialist  society  but  having produced  something  which  closely
resembles  a  prison. Such a  charge is entirely unjustified. In  the Soviet
Union  some of  the  inmates have  larger cells than  others, some eat well,
others badly. There is complete confusion--a lot  remains to be done to tidy
up the situation. True socialism, in which everyone is truly equal, does not
just  resemble  a  prison--it  is a  prison. It can not  exist  unless it is
surrounded  by high walls,  by watchtowers  and  by guard-dogs,  for  people
always  want to escape from any  socialist regime,  just  as  they do from a
prison. If  you try  to  nationalise medicine  and,  from  the best possible
motives, to guarantee work for all the doctors, you will find that they pack
their bags and  leave the  country. Try to  bring  a  little  order into the
situation  and  your  engineers  (the  best  ones),  your  designers,   your
ballerinas  (again,  the  best  ones)  and many, many others will also  flee
abroad. If you continue your  attempts to establish a model society you will
need to build walls around it. You will be forced to do this sooner or later
by the flood of refugees.

     The Politburo is the governing body of the prison. You should not abuse
them for the privileges they possess.  Those in  charge  of a prison must be
better  off in some  ways than the convicts.  The KGB  are the warders,  the
Party  is the administrative and  educational  organisation, the Army guards
the walls.
     When I  am  asked why I chose  to  become a Soviet officer,  I say that
those who serve as  guards are better fed  and have  a pleasanter  and  more
varied  life than those in the  cells. It  was only some time after I joined
the Army  that I  realised that it is far easier to escape from a  prison if
you are one of  the guards.  Trying to escape from  a  cell  is  a  hopeless
business.
     In  most  states,  life  in the  armed services  is  far more  strictly
regulated than it is for most of the inhabitants.
     In  the USSR, however, the  reverse is true.  The  whole society  finds
itself in prison and, even though the  Armed  Services are  kept  under  the
tightest possible control (although even  guards must be relieved), the life
of  an  officer is far  better  than  the drudgery  which  is the lot of the
ordinary Soviet citizen.
     While I was still one of  those guarding our beloved prison,  I carried
out a sociological investigation among my brother officers, in an attempt to
discover what  had  led them to tie themselves, hand and foot, to the Soviet
Army, without expecting any guarantees or any form of contract. Naturally, I
approached my colleagues with the greatest care and discretion.
     `You remember,' I would ask, `how, when Khrushchev came to power he had
1,200,000 men thrown out of the Army with a stroke  of  his pen? Your father
was one  of them; after  another  three  months he  would  have completed 25
years' service.  He was kicked out like a dog, without any  sort of pension,
in  spite of his medals  and despite the blood  which he  had  shed for  the
country during his four years of war service. How  did you, Kolya / Valentin
/  Konstantin Ivanovich,  come  to  choose  an officer's career in spite  of
that?'
     I  collected several hundred  replies to my question. They all amounted
to  the same thing--everyone wanted to escape the  drabness  of life  in our
prison cells.
--------


     If you decide to become a  Soviet officer, you would be well advised to
lose no time and to submit your application as soon as you leave school.
     The  training of officers is carried out  by Higher  Military Colleges.
The authorities consider,  reasonably  enough,  that if you are to  become a
good officer you must first  be a good soldier. Training at  a college lasts
for between four and five years and during this time  a future officer leads
a tough existence,  which combines  the  hardships of  a  soldier's life  in
barracks with the penury of a Soviet student's existence. Instruction begins
at the  very  beginning, with  a  ferocious course  of  square-bashing.  The
sergeants who put you through this  have  completely  arbitrary powers  over
you, whether  or  not you have already put in two years of military service.
Once you have decided to become an officer, therefore, it  is  better not to
wait until you get swept up as a conscript but to try to  get into a College
immediately you  leave school.  Unless you succeed, you will simply lose two
years, and you  will find yourself  spending longer  in a private's uniform,
which, as you may have realised already, is not a pleasant experience.
     Until some  years ago, officers  were trained at military schools.  The
courses lasted between two and three  years, depending on the arm of service
concerned. These schools  gave  a  medium-level military education  and  the
students became  lieutenants  upon the completion of  their  studies. At the
beginning  of  the  1960s, Khrushchev,  who was going through a peace-loving
phase, threw 1,200,000 officers  and NCOs out of the Army. A  Soviet officer
has no contract or other guarantee of tenure  and so, if someone still had a
couple of  months  to go to complete  25  years of  service, he  was  simply
dismissed, with  the  tiniest of pensions if he  was lucky.  If he still had
some  days to serve before  completing  20  years of  service no  matter how
unblemished he was kicked out without  anything. Most of  these unfortunates
were officers  who had served  at the  front and  had  undergone  the  worst
horrors of the Second World War.
     The Party was  delighted, because they were able to reduce  expenditure
considerably.  However, these  short-term gains eventually led  to  colossal
expense.  For  many years,  no  one had  the slightest desire  to  become an
officer--you give the Army 24 years of your life and then they drive you out
like  a  dog:  what  happens  to  you then? Immediately  after the  fall  of
Khrushchev, steps  were taken to restore  the prestige  of  officers.  Their
uniforms were improved, their salaries were increased, and they were given a
number of additional privileges. But this did not cause young men to rush to
join the colours. They wanted permanent guarantees for the future. A current
joke ran: `If you can go to a tank training school--and they throw you  out,
you can become a tractor driver. If you  go to a flying school, you  can get
straight into Aeroflot if you are sacked, but what  will happen to political
officers, if they  make  more cuts in the Army?' The answer  was: `Political
officers can easily get  jobs  with the  post  office,  sticking  stamps  on
envelopes, because they have such long tongues.'
     The solution which was found eventually was a good  one for individuals
as well as for the State. All military training schools were to be up-graded
from medium to  higher educational establishments and every  student  was to
receive a university education and to be trained for a civilian  profession,
as well as for an army career.
     First, the course of instruction given at the infantry training schools
was reorganised, since it was the infantry which was feeling the shortage of
junior commanders most acutely. The length  of the course was increased from
two  years to  four. Graduates from  the school continued  to emerge with  a
medium-level military education and the rank of lieutenant, but from  now on
they also  received a higher general education, a normal  university diploma
and civilian professional training. The civilian professions for which those
attending Higher  Military Training  Colleges are  prepared normally include
automobile engineering and  the  teaching of mathematics,  physics, history,
geography and foreign languages. Once the infantry training schools had been
reorganised in this way.  Colleges for tank, airborne and artillery officers
were  set  up, and  then,  finally,  others to  serve the remaining  arms of
service.

     At  present  there  are  154  Higher Military Training  Colleges in the
Soviet  Union. Their courses  last  for between  four and  five years.  Each
College has about 1,000 students  and each  therefore turns out between  200
and 250 lieutenants a year. Each  has a  Major-General, a Lieutenant-General
or even a Colonel-General as Commandant.
     In selecting a  College one is, of course,  completely ignorant  of the
choices which are available. Once a year the Army  newspaper 

Krasnaya Zvezda

publishes  a long list of Colleges,  together with their  addresses and very
brief explanatory notes on each.
     You study  this,  scratch  your head and plump  for one of the Colleges
which seems to cater for your interests. However, there are  usually several
which specialise in each field of study--thus, for instance, there are seven
tank colleges. Some people choose the one closest to their  homes but others
may  select  one which is far away,  in  Central  Asia  or  the Far  Eastern
Military District, because it is easier to get into.
     However,  there  is  so little information  in  the newspaper that  you
cannot even form the vaguest idea of what lies ahead of you.  For  instance,
in the Tashkent Tank Officers  Training College,  in  addition to the normal
faculties, there is  another  faculty which  trains tank  officer cadets for
service  with  the Airborne  Forces.  When you  pass your examinations,  you
receive your officer's shoulder-boards and swear your oath of allegiance and
then you suddenly  find,  to your great  surprise,  that  you  are  to begin
parachute training very shortly  and that  you are going  to spend  all your
life jumping out of aircraft, until you break your neck.
     The Moscow Officers Training College has  no faculties at all,  the one
in Kiev, although it is  in  exactly the same category, has both general and
reconnaissance faculties, and in Baku there is a marine infantry faculty. In
Blagoveshchensk there is a specialist faculty which trains officers for work
in Fortified  Areas, and in Ryazan,  besides a normal faculty, the  Airborne
Officers  Training  College contains  a  faculty  which trains officers  for
diversionary units.
     The young entrant,  of course, knows none of  this, so he may therefore
end up,  quite  unintentionally,  in  a  diversionary  unit,  in  the marine
infantry--or, indeed, anywhere else at all.
     The  situation  is  the  same  in   the  Air  Force  Officers  Training
Colleges--one trains fighter  pilots, another pilots  for transport aircraft
and  a third  those who  will fly  long-range bombers  for the Navy. But, of
course,  no one will  explain  this to you before you  enter that particular
college.
     This is, perhaps, not so bad, but there  are many Colleges about  which
nothing at  all  is  said.  For instance,  the  Serpukhov Engineer  Officers
Training  College.  If  you  look   at  the  papers  set  for  its  entrance
examinations,  you  will  realise that  they are  unusually difficult.  Some
people are put off by this but it attracts others. If you succeed in gaining
a  place  there, you will discover,  during  your second year, that  you are
being trained for service with the Strategic Rocket Forces.

     Having chosen a College which appears to cater for your interests, even
though you have no real idea what it offers, you should immediately apply to
its  commandant, saying that you want to  become an  officer and  explaining
what you want to do, attach your school-leaving certificate, references from
your school  and from  the  Komsomol and send everything  off  as quickly as
possible to the College.  In  due course you  will  be  summoned to sit  the
entrance examination.
     My  own choice  was straightforward--the  Kharkov Guards  Tank Officers
Training College. I scribbled  my way through four exams, without particular
difficulty. They tested me  to find out what level I had  reached at school,
but  it was clear  that the standard of my knowledge  was  not  particularly
important and that they were  more interested in my speed of reaction, in my
general  level of  development  and  in  the  range of  my  interests.  More
important than the written tests were the medical examinations and the tests
of physical  development. Secretly, before  candidates  were summoned to the
examinations, of course, enquiries  about them had been made  with the local
KGB offices; nothing was done until these were completed.  The decisive part
of the selection process, however, was a discussion which lasted for several
hours, during which one's  suitability--or lack of it--for commissioned rank
in the Soviet Army was explored. The assembly line moves fast. Three or four
applications are usually received for each vacancy. Every evening there is a
parade, at which one of the officers reads out  the names of those  who have
been given a place and of those who have been rejected. Every morning, a new
batch  of hopefuls arrives and  every  evening,  after a  week  spent at the
College, groups of disappointed would-be  entrants  leave. If they  have not
done their military service they will be called up before long.
     I  was  successful   and  joined  a  battalion--300  strong  of  young,
shaven-headed  new cadets. We  were divided into  three companies,  each  of
three platoons. We were  commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who had a  major
as his deputy and political officer. The companies were commanded by majors,
the  platoons by  captains and  senior lieutenants.  At that point we had no
sergeants. In my  own platoon of 33, only one had done his military service.
All the rest had come straight from school. Evidently, not many of those who
had already had the opportunity to see how an officer  lived  wished to take
up the army as a career. The first night after the battalion had been formed
we found ourselves on a troop train, in goods  wagons. No  one knew where we
were going. We  travelled for three  whole  days and  then  we arrived  at a
training division. Most of us had only the vaguest idea what this meant, but
one cadet, who  had already served in the army for  two years, became  quite
agitated. He had certainly not expected this. During his army service with a
tank unit, he had been  a loader and he had therefore escaped service with a
training division, but he had heard a lot about such units. And now he found
himself in one, with a contingent of scum.
     The battalion now  acquired  sergeants--of  the  type who run  training
divisions--and life began to gather speed. Reveille, PT, training exercises,
disgusting  food, cold, night alerts. And  together with  this, came  orders
such as `Take a matchstick, measure the corridor with  it, and then come and
tell me how long  the corridor is'. Or, `Take your toothbrush and  clean out
the latrine. Report to me on the progress you've made by dawn'.
     No higher education for  you for the present, my friends; first we must
make good soldiers out of you!
     A training division knocks all the independence and insubordination out
of you. You  learn a lot while you are there. You are  taught to  understand
others and to represent them. You learn how to recognise  scoundrels and how
to find friends.
     The first  lesson which you  learn is that soldiers and future officers
must not  be afraid of tanks.  During  each of  the first few days you spend
several  hours getting  used  to them. At  first it  is easy--you lie at the
bottom of a  concrete-lined trench  while a tank roars round and round above
your head, crushing the concrete with its tracks  as it does so. Then things
get a bit more complicated--you are told that you are to take shelter  in an
unlined slit trench, which you are to dig. You are told that,  provided  you
make the trench narrow enough, you  will be safe. However, you are also told
to  cover your head with  your tunic, so that if the  trench should cave in,
you will have a few lungfuls of air, which should be enough to enable you to
dig yourself out. Next, you  are told that you will be given one  and a half
minutes to dig  your trench--and to jump into it, curled up like a hedgehog.
You can see the tank, waiting not far away. Both of you are given the signal
to start at  the same moment.  You start digging  like a mole, as  the  tank
bears down on you...
     And so  you carry on,  day after day, sweating your guts out, until you
have spots  in front of your eyes,  until you vomit from fatigue, until  you
collapse with exhaustion.
     There  is a  lot more fun to be had  during the  training, besides your
introduction  to tanks--napalm, gas, rubber protective clothing worn in  the
blazing sun, barbed-wire obstacles
     `Accursed barbed wire obstacle
     Creation of the 20th century
     By the time a man has climbed across you
     He is no more than half a man'
--and the eternal pressure to save seconds. And the constant uncertainty...
     After  six  months  we finish the  training  course  and  the  time for
assessment   irrives.   Hitherto,    we   have   worn   ordinary   soldiers'
shoulder-boards, but now, after  the course, we are given black velvet  ones
with the gold stitching and the red piping of the cadets of  a Tank Officers
Training College. But not all of us get these. Forty out of our 300 received
the shoulder-boards of junior  sergeants and  were  sent off to become  tank
commanders and  tank  gunners. Our  College  did not  ever want to  see them
darken its doors again.
     The battalion was re-formed. Now it had only two companies, each of 130
cadets. We  were sent  back to the College  for  the  next three and  a half
years.

     The life of a cadet at a College is very little different from  the one
he led in the training division.  The shoulder-boards are  different,  it is
true, and he receives 10 rubles a month instead of 3. (In his third  year he
receives 15 and in his fourth 20.) And the food is better. But every College
has a  training centre.  A  cadet spends one or two  weeks  at  the  College
studying  theory--both military and  civil. Then  he  goes to  the  training
centre for the next one  or  two weeks.  There  he  spends his time driving,
shooting, doing night exercises, platoon engagements, encounter battles with
tank companies, more driving, more familiarisation  exercises with tanks and
with napalm. More pressure to save seconds. More uncertainty.
     You are  constantly driven out of the College. The time you spend there
only counts towards your army service if you are  there for medical reasons.
But since everyone is robustly healthy, this really does not apply.
     One  night, my friend Pashka Kovalev,  who  was  already  in his fourth
year, with three months to go before he graduated, broke out of barracks. He
had a girl-friend in Kharkov. He was away for three hours. He managed to get
through the barbed-wire and other obstacles on his way back in without being
spotted  and he  slipped  quietly into bed. Before leaving, he  had  put his
rolled greatcoat into  the bed, and had laid out his dress uniform and boots
beside it, in accordance with regulations. As a rule,  anyone carrying out a
kit inspection during the night would be sure to check that all footwear was
properly displayed. But Pashka was clever--he made his unauthorised  trip in
running shoes.
     Reveille, PT,  and breakfast went  by without  incident. Then  came the
review  period.  There were about a  thousand  of  us  on  parade. We stood,
freezing,  and  listened  to  a   string  of  orders  issued  by   different
authorities. These were  read out  in  order of seniority: first  came those
from the Minister of Defence, then others from the Commander of the Military
District, more from his director of training  and,  finally, those issued by
the College Commandant. Suddenly, and without warning, Pashka was called out
of  the  ranks  and  an  order  for  his  expulsion  was  read.  His  velvet
shoulder-boards  were ripped  off and replaced with those worn by  a private
soldier. His absence had been detected by a surprise check during the night.
The cadets who had  been on guard duty that  night were immediately arrested
and thrown  in the cells for ten  days. Others were being  woken  up to take
their place, as the commission which had  made the check departed. They were
told nothing of what had occurred. Pashka returned towards morning, crept in
through a  window  in  the latrines and  got  back into his  bed. He did not
realise that the guard had been changed and assumed he had got away with it.
But, while he was breaking in, the order for his expulsion was being already
drafted  by the staff. It took no account of the four years he had  spent at
the College--four years which had made him  feel that he  was already almost
an officer.  He was sent  to the training  division  at  which we began  our
service.
     Long afterwards,  I  heard that he had  not been able to endure life in
the training  division, that he had finally refused  to obey orders  and had
hit a  sergeant.  For  this  he  was  sent  to  a  penal battalion  for  two
years--which  did  not, of  course, count as  part of his military  service.
After this he would have been returned to the unit which had sent him to the
penal battalion--the training division. Whether he ever did go back I do not
know--I never heard anything more about him.
--------


     I  knocked on the door, waited for permission to enter and went in. The
regimental  commander, Colonel Dontsov, was standing. Despite this, a major,
whom  I  did not recognise,  was  sitting  by his  side.  I saluted smartly,
clicking my heels as I did so.
     `Comrade Colonel, may I have permission to make my report?'
     `Ask the Major for permission.'
     I turned quickly to the Major.
     `Excuse me, Comrade Major, I am Senior Lieutenant Suvorov. May I report
to Colonel Dontsov?'
     The major nodded, expressionlessly. I  report to the colonel on a  duty
trip I had just finished. He  asked a few questions and then nodded, showing
that he had no more to say. I again turned to the major.
     `Comrade Major, may I have permission to leave?'
     He said that I might go. I turned and went out.
     The situation had  been  clear to me from the moment I entered. While I
had  been  away  from the unit, an officer of  greater  importance than  our
regimental commander had arrived, as his superior (and therefore also mine).
If this major was more important than the  commander of a  regiment, he must
be the equivalent of at least a deputy divisional commander.
     In the corridor  I  met one of the orderly room clerks and I asked him,
`Who's this new major, who is lording it over the boss?'
     `He's an important man,' said the clerk, with some awe. `He  is the new
divisional chief of staff, Major Oganskiy.'
     I whistled: from now on I knew whom to salute, whom to  click my  heels
to.

     The system of awarding military ranks  in  the Soviet Army is a  fairly
simple  one,  but  it is  different  from those used elsewhere and therefore
needs to be explained.
     The system came into use during the war--effectively at the time of the
battle  for Stalingrad. In  other words, it  dates from  the  time  when the
Soviet Union  first began to aspire to become a  super-power. It is designed
to take maximum advantage of the rivalry  between the officers on each  rung
of the promotion ladder and  to ensure that advancement comes  as quickly as
possible  to  the  staunchest  supporters of  the  regime--the hardest, most
callous, most masterful and most competent.
     To achieve this, the Soviet system applies the following simple rules:
     1. Seniority depends, not  on  rank  but on  appointment. Only when two
officers have no  professional  connection  with  one  another, is seniority
determined by rank.
     2. An officer's eligibility  for a higher appointment  depends, not  on
his rank or length of service, but on his ability to command.
     3. The time  spent in a  particular  appointment is not  limited in any
way. Thus, an officer may command  a platoon for the whole of his service or
he may be given greater responsibility within a few months.
     4.  The  appointment  held  by an  officer  makes him  eligible  for  a
particular rank. However, he is not given this rank unless  he  occupies  an
adequately responsible place on the ladder  of service and has  served for a
given number of years.
     The system for the advancement and  promotion  of officers in peacetime
works  in exactly the  same way as it did during the war. We will  therefore
illustrate it with wartime examples.
     Imagine that the deputy commander of a battalion is killed in action. A
replacement is needed  without delay.  The  battalion commander  has only  a
limited choice. There are three companies in his battalion and the commander
of  one of  these  companies must  take  his  deputy's place. In  making his
choice, the battalion commander  will ignore an  individual's  expectations,
his length of service and the number of stars on his shoulderboards. What he
needs, quickly, is the man who,  in his opinion, will measure up best to new
responsibilities. Of the three candidates one is, let us say, a captain, the
second a senior lieutenant and the third a lieutenant  who  arrived recently
from his military training school and who has been in command of his company
for  two  weeks. The battalion  commander knows that the captain is a  heavy
drinker,  the  senior lieutenant is  a  coward but  that  the  lieutenant is
neither  of these. He therefore appoints the  lieutenant as his  deputy. The
lieutenant  will  be  promoted to  a higher  rank later, but the  two  other
officers, with  whom  he was  on equal terms  until this moment, are now his
subordinates.  Shortly  afterwards,  the battalion commander is  killed,  at
which  point  our lieutenant automatically takes his place, leaving the post
of deputy battalion commander vacant once again. The new battalion commander
must now decide--very quickly--who should fill the vacancy. He  could select
the  alcoholic captain, although  almost anyone else would be  better, or he
might choose  a  lieutenant  who is even younger than  him, who finished his
training even more recently than  he did,  but who  received better marks at
the training school than he did himself.
     Here are some examples from real-life. The first is from 1944, when the
29th  Guards  Rifle Division found itself  in  urgent  need of a  commanding
officer for one of its regiments. Captain I. M.  Tretyak was chosen. He  was
only twenty-one, but he had three and a  half years of continuous service in
action behind him. During these years he had worked  his way steadily up the
promotion   ladder,  having   held  every   rank,  one   after   the  other.
Understandably, he tended to be chosen  whenever an officer was needed for a
more responsible post.  He  was promoted later on but  for the time being he
commanded the regiment  while still a captain. Under his command  were eight
lieutenant-colonels, and  dozens  of majors  and captains.  Subsequently  he
continued up the ladder with the same speed. Today he is a Marshal.
     In 1942 the 51st Army was left without a commanding officer. The senior
command decided  that the best candidate  for this post was  Colonel  A.  M.
Kuznetsov.  The  brigades  and  divisions  in  the  army  were commanded  by
generals,  a  general commanded  each of  the corps and, in four  cases, had
another general as deputy, the Army's  administrative and staff  departments
bulged  with still  more generals,  but Colonel Kuznetsov suddenly ascended,
through their midst, to  lead them  all. He became the commander--he was the
one you had to click your heels to.
     The 58th Army, too, was commanded by a Colonel--N. A. Moskvin--in spite
of the fact that there were generals galore  on the Army's strength. But  it
was Colonel Moskvin to whom they and all their men became answerable, for he
was the man whom the higher command selected as the best  officer available.
The situation  in  peacetime  remains exactly as it  was during the war. The
time an officer spends doing a particular job is not limited by any rules or
regulations.  Young  officers  arrive  from  their  colleges and  are  given
platoons. The regimental commander has the right to take one of them and put
him in  command of a company--and he can do this after the officer  has been
in charge of a platoon for only one day.  In his own interests, a regimental
commander will always select the harshest, the most demanding,  and the most
dependable of the officers at his disposal for the post.
     A divisional commander appoints his deputy battalion commanders and all
officers  holding equivalent  appointments  under him.  However, he may only
make his choice from officers  who have  reached the  immediately  preceding
grade--that is from among his company  commanders but not from the  latter's
platoon  commanders.  In  order to  rise  to the  post of  deputy  battalion
commander,  a  young  officer  must  first  please  his regimental commander
sufficiently to  be put in charge of a company and then  he must find favour
with  the  divisional  commander--without, however,  falling  out  with  his
regimental commander, who has enough power to ruin the career of any officer
who is under his command.
     An Army  Commander can choose his battalion commanders, but these  must
come  from those who have done the  job of deputy battalion  commander.  The
Commander of  a Military District can  select and appoint  deputies  for his
regimental  commanders  from any  of  his  battalion commanders.  Regimental
commanders are appointed by the Minister of Defence.
     The same procedure is followed at other levels. The chief of staff of a
Military  District  appoints  battalion chiefs of  staff, the Chief  of  the
General Staff chooses the chiefs of staff for regiments.
     All officers  higher  than  regimental  commander are  appointed by the
Administrative Department of the Central  Committee. Appointments senior  to
that  of divisional  commander  must  also  be  ratified by  the  Politburo.
However, the Politburo  follows  the principle used throughout--seniority is
determined not by rank but by the appointment held--for it was the Politburo
itself which devised this principle.
     Each  appointment in the Soviet  Army is open  only to officers of  not
more than a certain rank.  Thus, a  platoon commander may not be more than a
senior lieutenant. Similarly, as regards command appointments:
     A company commander may  not be more than a captain. A deputy battalion
commander may not be more than a major.
     A battalion commander/deputy regimental commander may not  be more than
a lieutenant-colonel.
     A regimental commander/deputy divisional commander may not be more than
a colonel.
     A divisional  commander/deputy  Army commander may  not be  more than a
major-general.
     An Army Commander may not be more than a lieutenant-general.
     A Front or Military District Commander may  not be  more than a general
of the Army.
     Minister of Defence, Chief of  the General Staff, Chief of  a Strategic
Direction, Chief of an Armed Service may not be more than  a Marshal  of the
Soviet Union.
     The Supreme  Commander  during  wartime ranks  as  Generalissimo of the
Soviet Union.
     The same applies to non-command appointments. Thus:
     The chief of staff of a battalion must not be more than a major.
     The  chief  of  staff  of  a   regiment  must  not   be  more   than  a
lieutenant-colonel.
     The chief of staff of a division must not be more than a colonel.
     The chief of staff of a Army must not be more than a major-general. The
chief  of staff  of a Front must not be more  than a lieutenant-general. The
chief  of   staff  of  a  Strategic  Direction  must  not  be  more  than  a
colonel-general. The chief of the  General Staff is a Marshal  of the Soviet
Union.
     In the  financial branch,  to  take a  further example,  the  financial
section of a regiment will be headed by a captain, of a division by a major,
of an Army by a lieutenant-colonel,  of  a  Front or Military  District by a
major-general. The senior officer of the entire branch is a colonel-general.
     An officer is  given  an appointment without  reference to his rank: he
will receive any  promotion  due to him subsequently. The following are  the
minimum times for which an officer must remain at each rank:
     Junior lieutenant


1


 ... 2 years
     Lieutenant ... 3 years
     Senior lieutenant ... 3 years
     Captain ... 4 years
     Major ... 4 years
     Lieutentant-colonel ... 5 years
     Above this rank there are no fixed terms.
     Normally, the graduate of a Higher Military Training College  (at which
he has spent 4 years) becomes a  lieutenant at 21. In theory, he will  reach
the  rank of lieutenant-colonel  in 19 years. However, in  order  to receive
each promotion, he must not only serve for the requisite number of years but
he must also be acceptable for an appointment which carries this rank.
     If  you  are  a   platoon   commander,  provided  that  your  platoon's
performance  is  satisfactory,  you  will  automatically   become  a  senior
lieutenant after three years. After three more years you become eligible for
the next rank, that of captain. However, if you are still with your platoon,
not having succeeded in being chosen  to command  a company, you will not be
promoted. If  you  are  already in  charge of  a company, or have progressed
still  further   up  the  ladder,  you  will  receive  your  captain's  star
immediately. Four years later, the  time comes when you can be  promoted  to
major;  provided that  you  are by now deputy  commander of a battalion your
progress will not be held up. If you are still a company commander, you will
have  to wait  for promotion. If  you are never  able to  show that you  are
better than the other company  commanders  and that  you should  be promoted
before them, you will never become a major.
     In principle, therefore, an officer's appointment opens the way for his
promotion, but promotion only  follows after  the  completion  of a  certain
number of years'  service spent in the preceding rank. If you have ever been
held back, and have lost some years  in one particular rank,  you will never
catch up. When you are eventually promoted, you will still have to serve for
the prescribed number of years in your  new rank before  you become eligible
for the next one.
     

1

 This rank is given only to those who have undergone a shorter  course
of training.

     Here is another example  from life. In August 1941, General Major A. M.
Vasilyevskiy  was appointed  to  head the  Operational  Directorate  of  the
General  Staff. At the same time he  also became deputy to the Chief of  the
General Staff. The Operational (or  First)  Directorate of the General Staff
is responsible for producing war plans.
     This post  is one  of enormous importance by  any  standards, not  only
those of the  Red Army. It is enough to say  that it is in this  Directorate
that  the  Soviet Union's 5-year economic plans  originate; thereafter,  the
Council of  Ministers  and  the State  Planning  Commission decide  how  the
requirements of the  General  Staffs are  to be met, before proceeding, with
the highly secret military plan as a  basis, to draw  up the All-Union Plan,
in both its secret and open variants.
     The German  intelligence  services concluded  that the appointment of a
mere colonel to such an august  position was an indication that  the role of
the General Staff was being reduced in importance. The reason that they made
this mistake was that the Germans did  not understand the  Red Army's simple
principle--seniority is  not  determined  by  rank, but by appointment. Rank
follows appointment, slowly but surely, just as infantry follows tanks which
have suddenly and forcefully broken through into the rear of the enemy.
     In  fact  there  was   nothing  particularly   astonishing   about  the
appointment of the General Major to such a high post:  the  explanation was,
quite  simply,  that  the Supreme  Commander  decided that  this  particular
officer would meet the demands  of  the  job  better than anyone else.  This
Vasilyevskiy did--within eights months  he had become Chief of  the  General
Staff.
     Since  he had risen to so  high an appointment, the way to considerable
further promotion was open to him.  Stars rained down on his shoulderboards.
He passed quickly through  the hierarchy of generals, wearing the four stars
of a General of  the Army for a mere twenty-nine days  before being promoted
to the rank of Marshal. After the end of the war with Germany he carried out
a  brilliant  operation in Manchuria, becoming Commander-in-Chief of the Far
Eastern Strategic Direction.
     But we must not be misled. The Red Army is an enormous organisation and
not everyone can succeed as Vasilyevskiy did. I have  met hundreds of senior
lieutenants who will stay at this rank for the rest of their lives.
--------


     In  order  to  achieve  high  rank  you need  an  appropriately  senior
appointment: in order to be considered for such an appointment you must have
completed a course of studies at a Military Academy.
     It  will be recalled that Higher  Military Training  Colleges provide a
higher  general  education  but  only a  medium-level  military one.  Higher
military education is the province of the Military Academies, of which there
are 13 at present. Among these are the Frunze All-Arms, Armoured, Artillery,
Engineering, Military-Political, Naval,  two  Air  Force,  two  Rocket,  Air
Defence, and Chemical Warfare Academies. Officers  spend three years  at  an
Academy, which may be headed  by a Colonel-General, a General of the Army, a
Marshal of  one of  the  arms  of service  or even  the  Chief Marshal  of a
particular service.
     The road to an Academy is a hard one. First, one must have commanded at
least  a company.  Secondly, the sub-units  under your  command must achieve
excellent ratings for  two years  (which means  that you must lay in  enough
vodka and proceed  to pour it into  the  commissions which come to check you
until they  are afloat with it--assuming, of  course,  that they  consent to
drink with you at all). Thirdly, approval  for your application for entry is
required from all your superior officers up to and including your divisional
commander. Any of these officers has the right to stop your application from
going on to his immediate superior. If one of them does  so you will have to
wait until the following year and your  battalion  or  company will have  to
maintain its excellent  record. Finally, you will have to pass examinations,
a  medical commission, and interviews and, thereafter,  succeed against  the
competition within the Academy itself.
     Unless  an  officer manages to secure  a place  at an Academy, he  will
never command more than a battalion. If he is successful, he has three years
of intensive work on  a  very wide-ranging  and detailed  curriculum.  After
graduation,  wide  horizons stretch  before  him.  Quite  young  majors  are
frequently made regimental commanders,  or,  failing that, deputy regimental
commanders, as soon as they have completed the course. Whatever  happens the
path upwards is now open.

     Towering above all the Academies is the General Staff Academy. Entry to
this  is tree  of all the competition, examinations, applications and  other
problems involved in admission to the others. Everything is done for  you by
the  Administrative  Department of the Central  Committee of  the CPSU.  The
Central Committee selects  those who will head the Red Army in the immediate
future  from among  all the  colonels who  show  promise and who  are  truly
dedicated to the regime.
     Of course,  all the entrants to the General Staff Academy have  already
studied at  a Higher Military  Training  College  and  then  at  the  Frunze
Armoured or Air Academies, or at one of the others.
     The lowest rank held by entrants is colonel and there are often several
colonel-generals  on  the  current list  of those  attending.  Commanders of
Armies, Military  Districts, Groups of Tank Armies, Flotillas and Fleets are
often invited to visit the Academy by the Central Committee.
     Having completed  his studies at  this  Academy,  a  general  will rise
higher and higher, leaving his former rivals far behind.
--------


     `How fine  to  be  a General'  runs  a line from a  popular  song. And,
indeed, seen from  below, the life led by a  general does seem to be a quite
sublime existence.
     A Soviet general enjoys a great many privileges. If he  wishes,  he can
acquire his own harem.  Soviet  ideology  will  not stand in his  way. Every
divisional commander, every Army, Front  and Military District commander has
signal  units, communications centres and  telephone switchboards  under his
command, staffed by  attractive  girls  who have been  security-vetted.  The
general is  their absolute  master.  He  guards them  jealously against  the
attentions of others.
     While  I was with  the  24th  Division, a senior  lieutenant who was  a
friend of mine, became friendly with an attractive girl from  the divisional
communications battalion. He was hauled  before an Officer's Court of Honour
which  sentenced  him  to revert  to  the rank of lieutenant. The  girl  was
dismissed from the  army,  immediately.  He had  to face a charge  of having
attempted to penetrate the divisional  communications centre, in which there
were secret  command  channels and she was accused of complicity.  Both were
enormously  relieved when these  accusations  were dropped  and delighted to
have escaped as lightly as they did. This episode served as a  lesson to the
whole division. During the same period, the  divisional  commander, in order
to ensure that he kept in touch with the girls under his  command, organised
a number of them into a shooting team. On their days off,  he would pack his
`markswomen' into his car, take them off to the divisional firing range  and
train  them, personally,  there. Imagine the scene--a vast, empty stretch of
country in  the  Carpathian  mountains, a  huge area, carefully guarded  and
completely  shut off from the world. Thickly  wooded mountains, rocky slopes
intersected by streams rushing downhill over  rapids--without a living  soul
for miles  around.  On Sundays, our general was joined  at the  range by the
local Party bosses, who used to bring their own girls  from Lvov. He trained
them, too. He was quite a man...
     On a rather higher  level, the entertainment of generals  in the Soviet
Army is  catered  for by professionals.  Every Military District,  Group  of
Forces and Fleet has  its own  troupe of singers and dancers. These are made
up of professional performers, who are under contract to the Armed Services.
They are subject to military discipline, for they are employees of the Armed
Services  just like the Army's doctors, nurses, typists  and  so  forth. The
Army  is  a more  generous  employer than  any others.  The  girls in  these
ensembles--singers  and dancers--are  kept  continuously and intensively  at
work entertaining the command staff. Generals' dachas have  long since  been
transformed into temples dedicated to  the worship not of Marx and Lenin but
of Bacchus and Venus.
     Athletically inclined  young girls, especially gymnasts, are in special
demand among our military leaders. The Army's Central  Sports Club is one of
the largest and richest in the USSR. Girls who have no connection whatsoever
with the Armed Services can join this organisation and have all their living
expenses paid.  Sport  in  the  USSR  is  an entirely  professional  affair.
Sportsmen  or  sportswomen are  paid, fed, clothed,  and given  decorations,
accommodation and cars for their services--and the  better they are the more
they are paid.  But their free and easy life  must still be paid  for by the
athletes  themselves.   The  girls  pay   in  kind,  becoming   involved  in
prostitution while they are still very young. Those  who are  most amenable,
as  well as those who are  most talented,  are led by  their  coaches to the
highest realms of professional sport.

     What more  can the generals want from  life?  Their dachas are huge and
luxurious. Marshal Chuykov's dacha, for example,  was  built for him by  two
brigades  of engineers,  each of four battalions. More  than 2,500 men  were
involved and they had the use of the best military engineering equipment.
     Our  military leaders fly  off  on  hunting trips in helicopters, which
they  then  use  to drive  game  through nature  reserves.  They  are  given
everything they need--quarters,  cars, and all the cognac  and  caviare they
want.  Surely  theirs must  be  a perfect  existence? And  yet the number of
senior military leaders who commit suicide is exceptionally high. Of course,
they do not shoot  themselves when they become too fat or sated to go on but
when rivals seize them by the throat and wrest their power from them.
     During  the Great Purge,  33,000  officers  with  the  rank of  brigade
commander or above were executed in a single year. `But that was in Stalin's
day' I shall be told--as if the very name of Stalin explains everything. But
even since Stalin's day, generals have not been able to  sleep peacefully at
night. They are constantly plagued by  uncertainty. Although Stalin  is dead
and  gone,  generals are still  being offered  up  as sacrifices.  The first
victim was  Lieutenant-General  Vasiliy Stalin. He was thrown  into a mental
asylum immediately  after  Stalin's death  and there  he  died, quietly  and
quickly. While his  father  was  still  alive,  no  one  had  diagnosed  any
abnormality. He was as strong as a bull; he was the only general of his rank
in the whole Soviet Army who flew jet-planes.
     After Stalin's death, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev shot Marshal of
the Soviet  Union  Beriya  during a  session of  the Politburo itself. Next,
Marshal  of the  Soviet  Union  Bulganin  lost  his rank and was  driven  in
disgrace from his position at the head of the Soviet  government. There  was
also the case of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulik, demoted to major-general
by Stalin, who had then sent him to prison and  announced  that he was dead.
After Stalin, Kulik  was  released from prison and  restored to his  rank of
lieutenant-general.  He  was  promised  promotion  to  Marshal if  he  could
organise  the  design and  production of the  first Soviet  intercontinental
ballistic missile. He succeeded and in 1957 he again became a Marshal of the
Soviet Union, although no explanation of his return from the  dead  was ever
made public. When he received a telegram from the government announcing this
and congratulating  him, Kulik collapsed and died,  from a  heart attack, at
the rocket range at  Kapustin Yar. According to one story,  when he received
the telegram he shot himself.
     Such  has been  the fate of various  Marshals. The generals fare worse.
They are  plagued,  endlessly, by uncertainty. In one day, in February 1960,
Khrushchev sacked 500 generals from the Soviet Army.
     No Soviet general, and for that matter no Soviet officer or soldier--no
single member  of this enormous organisation--has any guarantee that he will
be  allowed to retain  his privileges,  his rank or even  his life. They may
drive him out, like an old  dog, at any moment: they may stand him against a
wall and shoot him.
--------

     Why don't they  protest? Why don't  they rebel?  Can they  really enjoy
living like this? Why are they silent?
     An excursion guide once showed me an area in a large Western city which
he  said was entirely  controlled by  the Mafia. Prostitutes, drug-peddlers,
shoeblacks, shopkeepers, owners  of restaurants, cafes  and  hotels--all  of
them controlled, and protected by the Mafia.
     Once we  had  emerged,  unscathed, from  this  unhappy district, in our
large tourist  bus,  and felt  that we were back in safety, I put these same
questions  to our  apprehensive guide. Why  the  hell  didn't  they protest?
Everyone living there had grown up in freedom and democracy; behind them lay
centuries of freedom  of speech,  of the press and of assembly. Yet, despite
these centuries-old traditions, the inhabitants were silent. They had a free
press on their side, the population of the entire country, running into many
millions, the police,  political parties, parliament, the government itself.
And yet they said nothing. They made no protest.
     The society from which I fled is not simply a spacious well-lit prison,
providing  free  medical care  and  full employment.  It,  too, is under the
control of a Mafia.  The difference between  Soviet society and  the Western
city which I visited, is that those who live where I used to live are unable
to turn  to the police for help, because the police themselves represent the
mailed fist of  our Mafia. The army is another section--the  most aggressive
one--of the  Soviet Mafia. The government is  the ruling  body of the Mafia:
parliament is  the old people's home in which the aged leaders of  the Mafia
are cared for. Press, television, the judges, the prosecutors--these are not
influenced by the Mafia--they are the Mafia.
     Smart tourist  buses  pass through our unhappy capital. The drivers and
guides belong to  the  Mafia. `Intourist' works for  the KGB. `Aeroflot', is
controlled  by the  military intelligence service, the GRU. Foreign tourists
sit listening to the patter of the guides and  wondering with amazement--why
don't they protest? Can they really enjoy living like this? In  their place,
they think, I would write to  the papers, or organise a  demonstration.  But
clearly the KGB has stifled inhabitants so that  they are unable to protest.
The KGB has driven them to their knees and made them slaves.
     My friend, you are  right. We are slaves: we are  on  our knees: we are
silent: we do not protest.
     According to the estimates  of  demographers, based on official  Soviet
statistics, the population of my  country should have reached 315 million in
1959. Instead,  the census showed only 209 million. Only our  own government
knows  what happened to the missing hundred million. Hitler is said to  have
executed  20  million. But where are  the  others? You  must  agree  that no
criminal organisation in  your  own country  has shown such  activity as our
Soviet Mafia.
     Having brought my countrymen to their knees,  the  Mafia triumvirate of
the KGB, Party  and Army moved  on to  conquer neighbouring countries. Today
they are busy in your country, in  your home town.  They have  stated openly
that  it is their dearest wish to do to the  world what they have done to my
country. They make no secret of it.
     I  spent thirty years of my life on  my  knees. Then I got  up and ran.
This was the only way I could protest against the system. Are you surprised,
my dear Western friend, that I did not demonstrate  against the KGB  while I
was living there? Well, there is something which surprises  me, too. In your
own beautiful country, the KGB, that monstrous organisation, is hard at work
at  this very moment, the Soviet Communist Party is  subsidising a horde  of
paid hacks and crackpots. Soviet Military Intelligence is sending members of
its diversionary units  to visit your country,  so that  they  can  practise
parachuting  on to your native soil. The aim  of all this activity is, quite
simply, to bring you to your knees. Why don't you protest?
     Protest today. Tomorrow it will be too late.
Книго
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